^^ 


\ 


\ 


i 


' 


ENIGMA   OF  LIFE. 


ETHIC 


DEMONSTRATED    IN   GEOMETRICAL   ORDER 
AND  DIVIDED   INTO  FIVE   PARTS, 

WHICH  TREAT 

I.  OF  GOD. 
II.  OF  THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND. 

III.  OF  THE  ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

IV.  OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE,  OR  OF  THE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

V.  OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  INTELLECT,  OR  OF  HUMAN  LIBERTY. 


BENEDICT   DE    8PIN0ZA. 

STransIatcU  from  tijc  ILatin 

BY 

WILLIAM   HALE   WHITE. 


NEW   YOEK: 
M  A  C  M  I  L  L  A  N    &    CO. 

1S83. 


xy  yy'^ 


PREFACE. 


The  present  translation  of  Spinoza's  Ethic  was  completed 
more  than  twenty  years  ago,  but  at  that  time  the  interest 
in  Spinoza  w^as  too  slight  to  justify  its  publication.  Lat- 
terly, however,  a  number  of  books  and  articles  have  been 
written  about  him,  and  it  is  hoped  therefore  that  a  render- 
ing into  English  of  hiS  central  work  may  stand  a  chance 
of  being  read.  Before  going  any  further  I  wish  to  ac- 
knowledge the  very  great  obligation  under  which  I  lie  to 
Miss  Stirling,  daughter  of  Dr.  J.  Hutchison  Stirling  of 
Edinburgh.  She  has  revised  with  singular  patience  and 
care  every  word  which  I  had  written,  and  at  innumerable 
points  has  altered  and  adapted  what  before  was  a  misfit, 
so  that  I  trust  the  dress  will  now  be  found  not  to  disguise 
but  accurately  to  figure  forth  the  original.  I  am  quite 
sure  that  those  fortunate  friends  who  know  ]\Iis3  Stirling, 
and  what  is  the  quality  of  her  scliolarship,  will  congratu- 
late me  on  having  been  able  to  find  such  help.  My  object 
has  been  not  to  present  an  interpretation  of  the  Etiiic, 
but  a  translation  of  it,  and  I  would  beg  tlie  reader  who 
may  here  and  there  complain  of  obscurity  to  remember 
that  perhaps  the  Latin  may  also  be  obscure.  Some 
difficulties  are  not  quite  satisfactorily  solved.  For 
example,  Spinoza,  although  a  scientific  writer,  frequently 
uses  a  scientific  term  like  modus  in  two  difTerent  senses. 
At  one  time  he  means  "mode,"  as  he  defines  it  in  the  fiftli 
definition   of   the   First   Look,  and   at   another  time  Le 


vi  PREFACE. 

means  simply  "  way  "  or  "  manner."  The  best  has  been 
done  that  I  can  do  to  distinguish  between  these  mean- 
ings, but  it  is  possible  that  in  some  cases  I  have  failed. 
Again,  it  will  frequently  happen  that  the  reader  will 
think  that  the  right  name  has  not  been  found  for  what 
are  called  the  affects,  of  which  a  list  is  given  at  the  end 
of  the  third  book  and  elsewhere.  Taking  individual  pas- 
sages by  themselves,  better  names  might  undoubtedly 
liave  been  discovered,  but  individual  passages  cannot  be 
isolated,  and  the  word  to  be  selected  must  be  one  which 
best  meets  the  requirements  of  all  the  passages  taken 
together  in  which  a  particular  affect  is  named.  One 
blemish,  which  has  disfigured  previous  translations,  both 
French,  German,  and  English,  and  indeed  most  Latin  edi- 
tions of  Spinoza,  has  been  removed.  The  references  to 
the  different  propositions,  axioms,  -postulates,  and  defini- 
tions liave  been  carefully  verified,  and  many  corrections 
have  been  the  result.  The  new  edition  by  Van  Vloten 
and  Land  came  just  in  time,  and  their  text  has  been  the 
one  used  in  revising  the  proofs  for  the  press.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  now  and  for  the  first  time  there  is  presented 
to  the  English  reader  a  version  in  his  own  tongue  of  the 
Ethic,  which  certainly  may  not  be  elegant,  but  is  at  least 
tolerably  literal,  and  does  not  in  many  cases  miss  the 
sense.  Xo  doubt  competent  critics  will  discover  many 
possible  improvements,  and  I  can  only  say  that  I  shall  be 
glad  to  hear  of  them  in  order  that  they  may  be  incorpo- 
rated in  a  second  edition,  should  the  book  ever  obtain 
such  a  success. 

The  object  which  I  have  in  view  in  this  preface  is  not 
to  write  an  essay  upon  Spinoza.  In  the  first  place,  I  am 
not  equal  to  the  task,  and  in  the  second  place  there  have 
been  many  essays  upon  him  lately  of  more  or  less  merit. 
Those  persons  who  wish  to  affiliate  Spinoza  with  the 
philosophy  before  and  after  him,  cannot  perhaps  after  all 
do  better  than  read  Schwegler,  whose  excellent  Handbook 


PREFACE.  vii 

Dr.  Stirling  has  translated  into  English,  '^[y  purpose  is 
to  offer  one  or  two  general  observations  which  may  serve 
to  tempt  anybody  who  takes  up  ,this  volume  to  go  on 
seriously  with  the  study  of  Spinoza  for  himself.  The 
aim  of  every  writer  who  writes  upon  any  author  who 
is  worth  reading  ought  to  be,  not  to  prevent  people  from 
reading  him,  but  to  induce  them  to  do  it,  and  not  to 
remain  satisfied  with  reading  about  him  in  abstracts  or 
articles,  be  they  ever  so  able  and  popular. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  indicate  to  the  ordinary  reader 
one  central  difficulty  in  Spinoza,  for,  until  that  is  over- 
come, advance  will  be  impossible.  Thought  is  generally 
considered,  or  at  least  is  generally  considered  by  English- 
men, to  be  limited  by  the  imagination.  What  cannot  be 
depicted  before  the  eye  of  the  mind  is  simply  nothing. 
Spinoza,  however,  warns  us  in  the  15  th  proposition  of  the 
first  part  to  distinguish  between  the  imagination  and  the 
intellect,  and  in  the  scholium  to  the  48th  proposition  of 
the  second  part  the  warning  is  repeated.  "  For,  by  ideas," 
he  says,  "  I  do  not  understand  the  images  which  are  formed 
"  at  the  back  of  the  eye,  or,  if  you  please,  in  the  middle  of 
"  the  brain,  but  rather  the  conceptions  of  thought."  If 
we  deny  what  we  cannot  image,  and  if  we  consider  it  to 
be  a  sufficient  objection  to  a  religious  or  philosophical 
statement,  "  I  cannot  imagine  it  to  be  true,"  it  is  not  worth 
while  to  have  anything  to  do  with  Spinoza.  It  may  be 
added  too,  that  it  is  not  worth  while  to  have  anything  to 
do  with  religion  or  with  any  philosophy  properly  so  called. 
Spinoza,  insisting  on  the  power  of  thought  to  go  beyond 
the  imagination,  is  really  claiming  no  more  than  the 
orthodox  Christian  creeds  claim  from  the  humblest  of 
believers.^ 

^  A  minor  difficulty  is  the  use  of  them.     Upon  this  subject  Dr.  Stir- 

the  words  "subjective  "  and  "objec-  ling  has  been  good  enough  to  furniwh 

tive,"  which  with  Spinoza  and  with  me    with    the    accompanying  notes 

Descartes  bear  a    meaning   exactly  which  I  transcribe  :—"  I'rantl  (vol. 

the  reverse  of  that  now  assigned  to  "  iii.  p.  208}  says  of  these  words  'sub- 


viii  PREFACE. 

It  may  he  worth  while  also  to  remove  one  prevalent  mis- 
conception as  to  Spinoza.  He  is  usually  supposed  to  be 
destructive.  lu  reality  he  belongs  in  a  remarkable  degree 
to  the  constructive  class.  It  is  quite  true  that  he  is  the 
founder  of  modern  Biblical  criticism,  but  he  criticised 
merely  in  order  to  remove  obstacles.  Were  he  simply 
negative,  his  influence  would  have  disappeared  long  ago. 
It  is  the  builder  and  believer  whom  we  worship. 
"  Typhon,"  says  Plutarch,  "  tears  to  pieces  and  puts  out 
of  sight  the  sacred  word  which  Isis  again  gathers  up  and 
puts  together."  And  it  is  Isis  who  is  truly  divine,  while 
Typhon  is  a  demon.  In  the  body  putting  together  is 
another  name  for  life,  and  pulling  asunder  is  death.  So, 
wlien  the  mind  is  alive  it  is  affirmative,  and  when  it  is 


"jective'  and  'objective'  in  Duns 
"  Scottis — '  In  innumerable  places 
"'from  now  on  to  the  eighteenth 
"'century  (that  is,  until  Alexander 
"'I5auni{,'arten)  we  find  this  use  of 
"  '  the  words  '  objective '  and  '  sub- 
" 'jective'  which  relates  itself  to 
"  '  the  present  one  as  exactlj'  the  re- 
"  '  verse :  namely,  '  subjective  '  then 
'"meant  what  refers  itself  to  the 
"'subject  of  the  judgments;  con- 
"  'secjuently  to  the  concrets  objects 
"'of  thi nights  :  'objective'  again 
" '  what  lies  in  the  mere  objicere, 
"  '  that  is,  in  the  making  conceivable 
"'or  mentally  representable,  and 
"  '  falls  conse<juently  to  the  score  of 
'"the  conceiver— the  mental  repre- 
"  •  scnter.'  Trendelenburg  ( Kl.  Log. 
"Ari8t<itel,  p.  52,  note)  also  ob- 
"  serves  :— '  Thus  snhject  during  the 
" '  Middle  Ages  has  the  force  of 
"'underlying  substance,  as  it  has 
"  '  also  with  Descartes  and  Spinoza. 
"'The  latter  (Princip.  Philos.  Car- 
"'U'H.,  p.  II,  ed.  I'aul.)  says, — 
" ' '  Kverything  in  which,  as  in  a 
'"subject,  tiiere  is  immediately  any 
" '  jiropcrty,  whose  real  idea  is  in 
"'UB,  is  called  substance.'  So  fs«c 
"  *  tuhjectivum  (to  be  subjective — 
"'iubjective  Being),  quite  contrary 
"  '  to  the  present  usage  amongst  the 


"  '  Germans,  is  said  by  Occam  (Sec. 
'"XIV.)  to  be  'that  which,  as 
" '  though  a  thing  in  nature,  is 
" '  placed  outside  of  the  forms  of 
"  'the  mind,  and  is  not  imaged  by 
"  '  thought  alone  ;  '  whereas  esse 
" ' o'ljccthum  (objective  Being)  on 
" '  the  contrary,  is  explained  as 
"  ' '  Cognition  itself,  and  conse- 
"  '  quently  a  certain  imaged  Being 
"  '  (esse  quoddam  fictwn).''  (Occam, 
"  '  sentent.  lib.  I.  distinct.  II.  qusest. 
"'8.)  From  which  it  will  be  evi- 
" '  dent  what  is  the  meaning  of 
"  '  objective  reality  with  Descartes 
"  '  (e.g.,  in  med.  3).  Amongst  the 
"  '  Germans,  chiefly  Kant  and  then 
"  '  Fichte  being  the  originators  of 
" '  the  change,  the  use  of  these 
" '  words  is  completely  inverted. 
"  '  While  the  subject  is  said  to  be  he 
" '  who  knows  ;  the  object,  on  the 
" '  contrary,  is  something  which, 
"  '  u-hile subjected  in  thinldng  (i.e.,  the 
"'subject  of  thought),  still  main- 
"  '  tains,  nevertheless,  its  own  nature 
" '  in  independence  of  the  opinions 
"  '  of  him  who  thinks.  Hence  it  is 
" '  that  subjective  is  said  to  be  that 
"'which  lies  in  the  changing  con- 
" '  dition  of  the  thinker,  and  objective, 
"  '  again,  that  which  lies  in  the  fixed 
'"nature  of  the  thing  itself.'  " 


PREFACE.  ix 

dead  it  is  negative.  iSTothing  more,  however,  need  be 
said  in  this  direction,  because,  although  the  Spinoza  who 
is  current  amongst  those  who  have  never  read  him  is  a 
sceptic  or  atheist,  it  is  impossible  for  any  person  who  will 
even  look  at  him  not  to  be  aware  that  here  is  no  waste 
no-man's  land  with  nothing  on  it  but  a  deposit  of  broken 
potsherds  and  miscellaneous  rubbish,  but  at  least  archi- 
tecture. A  closer  acquaintance  will  prove  tliat  we  have 
before  us  a  temple. 

The  question  which  we  have  a  right  to  ask  of  any 
person  who  professes  to  have  anything  to  say  to  us  is, 
Wherein  can  you  help  me  ?  And  this  is  the  question  we 
put  to  Spinoza.  It  may  be  answered  boldly  that  Spinoza 
is  helpful  to  us  through  his  system,  or  rather  through  what 
there  is  in  him  which  is  systematic,  through  his  much- 
decried  method.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  geometri- 
cal demonstrations  derive  their  cogency,  not  from  their 
form,  but  from  the  fact  that  they  deal  with  intuitions,  and 
leave  no  room  for  doubt  through  liaziness  of  definition. 
This  is  quite  true:  nevertheless  Spinoza,  in  his  consecutive- 
ness,  his  advance  from  position  to  position  in  complete 
connection  and  in  perfect  order,  remains  exemplary  to  us. 
The  power  to  go  from  one  ascertained  point  to  another 
point,  and  so  on  and  on,  is  what  makes  the  strength  of 
the  human  mind.  It  is  this  which  creates  for  us  prin- 
ciples, or  at  least  the  only  principles  worth  the  name. 
Our  usual  habit  is  something  quite  different.  We  pick 
up  one  rule  to-day  and  act  upon  it,  and  we  pick  up 
another  to-morrow  and  act  upon  that.  To-day  we  discern 
that  our  only  safety  lies  in  self-government  as  strict  as 
that  of  the  Stoics,  and  to-morrow  we  incline  to  a  belief  in 
the  natural  man  and  in  the  divinity  of  all  our  passions. 
It  is  even  a  settled  and  formulated  article  of  belief  that 
nothing  must  be  pushed  to  extremes;  that  a  deduction 
from  an  axiom  is  right  so  far,  and  that  then  it  goes  all 
wrong,  and  another  so-called  axiom  must  be  a.ssumed. 


X  PREFACE. 

^ye  bold  that  black  is  black,  but  nevertheless,  "  under 
"  certain  circumstances,"  &c.  Contraries  lie  side  by  side  in 
us  in  peaceful  repose,  and  if  they  were  only  to  stir  one 
must  devour  the  other.  But  they  never  do  stir  ;  we  never 
take  the  trouble,  in  fact,  to  bring  them  together.  Spinoza, 
on  the  other  hand,  walks  with  a  thread  to  guide  him, 
never  stopping.  Once  a  thing  strikes  him  he  exhausts  it. 
He  fears  no  conclusions,  and  embraces  every  result  which 
his  intellect  offers  him,  no  matter  how  extreme  it  may 
seem  to  be.  He  knows  well  enough  that  the  whole  value 
of  any  intellectual  process  lies  in  these  extremities,  that 
they  are  its  precious  final  fruit. 

His  system,  therefore,  is  his  recommendation ;  not  per- 
haps in  an  age  like  the  present,  for  it  is  not  an  age  of 
systems,  but  of  disintegration,  and  all  systems  are  ex  vi 
termini  condemned.  Every  religion,  however,  has  been  a 
system,  and  unless  we  have  some  kind  of  a  religion,  that 
is  to  say,  some  linked  and  settled  conclusions  upon  the 
problems  which  incessantly  confront  us,  we  live  aimlessly. 
A  man's  mind  ought  to  be  open  to  the  reception  of  new 
light,  but  he  ought  not  to  allow  vital  questions  affecting 
his  daily  life  to  remain  open.  He  is  bound  to  close  them, 
and  when  he  comes  to  mature  years  he  should  be  able  to 
say  that  he  has  put  forth  all  his  strength  on  such  and 
such  subjects,  and  has  once  for  all  decided  in  this  way 
and  no  other.  The  reason  why  we  cannot  do  this  is  be- 
cause we  have  never,  after  the  manner  of  Spinoza,  gone 
resolutely  to  work  and  examined  and  thought  to  the  very 
end  of  our  capacity. 

Spinoza,  as  a  necessary  result  of  his  consecutiveness, 
was  a  perfectly  formed  character,  and  not  a  mere  mass  of 
shapeless  slush.  He  had  acquired  for  himself  certain 
definite  rules  of  procedure  available  under  given  circum- 
.stances,  and  one  of  his  rules  is  always  at  hand  to  meet 
foreseen  cases.  His  whole  private  life  went  on  certain 
lines  prescribed  for  him  by  his  Ethic.     He  was  always 


PREFACE.  xi 

armed,  and  had  not  to  look  for  a  weapon  when  he  wanted 
one.  It  is  most  instructive  that  he  even  uses  the  eccle- 
siastical word  dogmata  to  describe  the  maxims  which 
were  law  to  him,  signifying  thereby  that  they  are  unques- 
tionable, and  he  counsels  that  we  should  commit  them  to 
memory.     They  are  his  apostles'  creed. 

This  habit  of  Spinoza  is  the  same  thing  as  the  unity 
which  is  remarkable  throughout  the  whole  of  the  Ethic, 
and  is  its  peculiar  charm.  Spinoza  knows  that  the  chief 
delight  of  man  is  in  unity,  and  that  we  rejoice  not  so 
much  in  the  perception  of  this  thing  and  that  thing  as  in 
the  perception  that  this  thing  and  that  thing  are  the  same. 
His  unity  is  especially  remarkable  in  his  treatment  of  the 
passions.  "  It  will  doubtless,"  he  says  in  his  Preface  to 
the  Third  Part,  "  seem  a  marvellous  thing  for  me  to  en- 
"  deavour  to  treat  by  a  geometrical  method  the  vices  and 
"  follies  of  men,  and  to  desire  by  a  sure  method  to  demon- 
"  strate  those  things  which  these  people  cry  out  against 
"  as  being  opposed  to  reason,  or  as  being  vanities,  ab- 
"  surdities,  and  monstrosities.  The  following  is  my  reason 
"  for  so  doing.  Nothing  happens  in  nature  whicli  can  be 
"  attributed  to  any  vice  of  nature,  for  she  is  always  the 
"  same  and  everywhere  one.  Her  virtue  is  the  same,  and 
"  her  power  of  acting ;  that  is  to  say,  her  laws  and  rules, 
"  according  to  which  all  things  are  and  are  changed  from 
"  form  to  form,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same ;  so 
"  that  there  must  also  be  one  and  the  same  method  of 
"  understanding  the  nature  of  aU  things  whatsoever,  that 
"  is  to  say,  by  the  universal  laws  and  rules  of  nature.  The 
"  affects,  therefore,  of  hatred,  anger,  envy,  considered  in 
"  themselves,  follow  from  the  same  necessity  and  virtue  of 
"  nature  as  other  individual  things  ;  they  have  therefore 
"  certain  causes  through  which  they  are  to  be  understood, 
"  and  certain  properties  which  are  just  as  worthy  of 
"  being  known  as  the  properties  of  any  other  thing  in  the 
"  contemplation  alone  of  which  we  delight.    I  shall,  there- 


xii  PREFACE. 

"  fore,  pursue  the  same  method  in  considering  the  nature 
"  and  strength  of  the  affects  and  the  power  of  the  mind  over 
"  them  which  I  pursued  in  our  previous  discussion  of  God 
"  and  tlie  mind,  and  I  shall  consider  human  actions  and 
"appetites  just  as  if  I  were  considering  lines,  planes,  or 
"  bodies."  The  popular  religious  belief  tends  the  other 
way.  "We  hear  of  a  schism  in  us,  a  lower  deep  of  mutiny 
which  requires  suppression  or  even  annihilation.  We 
have  to  ask  ourselves,  not  whether  such  a  view  is  of 
service  to  man,  but  is  it  true  ?  If  it  is  not  true,  it  is  of 
no  use  whatever  to  preach  it.  It  is  better  to  preach  at 
once  the  truth  wliich  visits  us,  no  matter  how  dangerous 
it  may  seem  to  be  to  any  or  every  cause,  for  we  may  be 
sure  that  it  will  bring  its  own  compensation  and  its  own 
restrictions.  It  is  a  fact  that  man  does  not  stand  outside 
tlie  general  order  of  things,  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to 
imagine  a  system  for  him  alone.  Man  is  governed  as  the 
planet  is  governed.  Spinoza  knows  that  neither  in  planet 
nor  man  can  any  law  hold  its  way  unchecked  by  the 
operation  of  another  and  its  opposite  law.  Neither  tlie 
earth  itself  nor  the  smallest  atom  of  it  can  yield  to  its 
centrifugal  tendency  in  its  course  round  the  sun,  but  at 
every  instant  is  subject  to  the  centripetal  pull  which, 
together  with  centrifugal  urge,  gives  the  perfect  curve. 
In  fact  the  pull  is  inconceivable  without  the  urge,  and 
the  urge  without  the  pull.  Everywhere  it  is  the  same ; 
everywhere  is  the  contrary  not  only  an  accompaniment  to 
any  given  force,  but  positively  essential  to  its  existence. 
Spinoza  holds  that  all  desires  are  good.  The  desire  to 
appropriate  is  good,  and  is  nothing  but  the  impulse  to 
preserve  our  being,  but  man  has  other  desires,  and  the 
desire  to  appropriate  brought  under  their  influence  is 
altered  and  becomes  moral.  It  would  be  an  entire  mis- 
take, therefore,  to  suppose  that  Spinoza's  creed  lends  itself 
to  licentiousness  or  loosens  the  hold  which  conscience 
has  upon  us.     No  man  ever  supplied  such  reasons  for  a 


PREFACE.  xiii 

pure  and  upright  life.  Man  properly  instructed  will 
prefer  mercy  and  love  to  lust,  just  as  lie  prefers  bread  to 
swine's  meat.  Blyenbergh  is  told  "  that  if  any  one  sees  he 
"  can  live  more  comfortably  on  a  cross  than  sitting  at  his 
"  table,  he  would  act  foolishly  if  he  did  not  hang  liiniself 
"  on  the  cross,  and  he  who  clearly  sees  that  by  perpetrating 
"  crimes  he  can  really  enjoy  a  more  perfect  and  better  life 
"  or  essence  than  in  the  pursuit  of  virtue,  is  also  a  fool  if 
"  he  does  not  commit  crimes."  This  is  bold,  but  it  is 
surely  a  sharper  incentive  than  a  sermon  on  the  text  that 
our  passions  are  simply  of  the  devil  and  must  be  put 
down.  Spinoza  provides  us  with  the  strongest  of  all 
reasons  for  being  virtuous,  and  through  him  we  come  also 
to  see  that  what  we  have  thought  to  be  mere  evil  in  us 
is  necessary  to  virtue,  a  discovery  of  immense  practical 
importance.  The  desires  which  we  accuse  so  bitterly  are 
really  indispensable  to  our  purification. 

Spinoza's  unity  is  of  course  exemplified  in  all  he  has 
to  say  about  God ;  but  upon  this  subject  I  confess  a  dread 
of  insufficient  power  of  expression  and  of  inequality  to 
anything  like  coherent  and  intelligible  comment.  If  I 
were  to  attempt  it,  I  should  only  lose  myself  in  indefinite 
phrases.  Moreover,  my  desire  now  is,  as  before  observed, 
not  to  provide  a  commentary  but  a  stimulus.  An  exposi- 
tion, too,  of  the  De  Deo  would  have  the  disadvantage  of 
leading  the  mind  of  the  student  away  from  what  is  parti- 
cularly serviceable  to  him — which  he  would,  unaided,  pro- 
bably discover  for  himself— and  of  turning  his  attention 
to  what  somebody  else  has  seen  to  be  serviceable.  "NVe 
will  then  content  ourselves  with  the  passing  remark  that 
the  Divine  Unity  with  Spinoza  is  something  very  dillerent 
from  that  of  the  theologians.  It  means,  to  use  his  own 
language,  that  "  whatever  is  is  in  God,  and  nothing  can 
"  either  be  or  be  conceived  without  God."  It  is  not  Unity 
as  against  Trinity,  but  it  is  the  denial  of  any  entity  per- 
sonal or  metaphysical  which  can  be  set  over  against  God. 


xiv  PREFA  CE. 

God,  in  other  words,  becomes  sufficiently  extended  to 
cover  every  fact  in  the  universe,  and  in  every  fact  He  is 
present,  whether  to  us  it  be  evil  or  good. 

Let  us  again  ask  the  question.  Wherein  can  you  help  me  ? 
And,  returning  to  the  subject  just  dropped,  I  say  that 
Spinoza  will  be  found  specially  and  practically  serviceable 
in  all  tliat  he  says  about  action  and  passion,  and  the 
means  by  which  passion  is  to  be  kept  under  control.  The 
remedies  against  the  passions  are  thus  summed  up  in  the 
scholium  to  the  20th  proposition  of  the  fifth  part.  They 
lie— 

"I.  In  the  knowledge  itself  of  the  affects.  (See  Schol. 
"Prop.4,pt.  5.) 

"  2.  In  the  separation  by  the  mind  of  the  affects  from 
"  the  thought  of  an  external  cause,  which  we  imagine 
"  confusedly.  (See  Prop.  2,  pt.  5,  and  Schol.  Prop.  4, 
"  I't.  5-) 

"3.  In  duration,  in  which  the  affections  which  are  re- 
"  lated  to  objects  we  understand  surpass  those  related  to 
"  objects  conceived  in  a  mutilated  or  confused  manner. 
"  (I'l'op-  7>  pt.  5-) 

"  4.  In  the  multitude  of  causes  by  which  the  affections 
"  whicli  are  related  to  the  common  properties  of  things  or 
"  to  God  are  nourished.    (Props.  9  and  11,  pt.  5.) 

"  5.  In  the  order  in  which  the  mind  can  arrange  its 
"  affects  and  connect  them  one  with  the  other.  (Schol. 
"  Prop.  10,  pt.  5,  and  see  also  Props.  12,  13,  and  14,  pt.  5.) 

The  distinction  between  action  and  passion  is  one  which 
is  vital  throughout  the  whole  of  the  Ethic.  "  I  say  that 
"  we  act,"  Spinoza  observes  in  the  second  definition  of  the 
third  part,  "  when  anything  is  done,  either  within  us  or 
"  without  us,  of  which  we  are  the  adequate  cause,  that  is  to 
"  say  (by  tlie  preceding  definition)  when  from  our  nature 
"  anything  follows,  either  within  us  or  without  us,  which 
"  by  that  nature  alone  can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  under- 
"  stood.     On  the  other  hand,  I  say  that  we  suffer  when 


PREFACE.  XV 

"  anything  is  done  within  us,  or  when  anything  follows 
"  from  our  nature,  of  which  Ave  are  not  the  cause  cxccpt- 
"  ing  partially."  So  far  as  the  mind  has  adequate  ideas  it 
is  active  ;  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate  ideas  it  is  not  active, 
and  the  increase  of  adequate  ideas  is  to  be  our  great  aim. 
Virtue  is  action  and  power.  "  By  virtue  and  power,"  says 
the  eighth  definition  of  the  fourth  part,  "  I  understand  tlie 
"  same  thing ;  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  virtue,  in  so 
"  far  as  it  is  related  to  man,  is  the  essence  itself  or  nature 
"  of  man  in  so  far  as  it  has  the  power  of  efTecting  certain 
"  things  which  can  be  understood  through  the  laws  of  its 
"  nature  alone."  The  formal  proof  of  the  first  remedy  is 
to  be  found  in  the  third,  fourth,  and  fourteenth  propo- 
sitions of  the  fifth  book,  which,  for  the  reader's  conve- 
nience, I  will  venture  to  quote  together  and  entire : — 

"  Peop.  III. — An  affect  which  is  a  passion  ceases  to  be  a 
"  passion  as  soon  as  we  form  a  clear  and  distinct  idea 
"  of  it." 

"  Dcmonst. — An  affect  which  is  a  passion  is  a  confused 
"  idea  (by  the  general  definition  of  the  Affects).  If,  there- 
"  fore,  we  form  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  this  affect,  the 
"  idea  will  not  be  distinguished — except  by  reason — from 
"  this  affect,  in  so  far  as  the  affect  is  related  to  the  mind 
"alone  (Prop.  21,  pt.  2,  with  its  Schol.),  and  therefore 
"  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3)  the  affect  will  cease  to  be  a  passion. — 

"  Q.E.D." 

"  Corol.  —  In  proportion,  then,  as  we  know  an  aHl-ft 
"  better  is  it  more  within  our  control,  and  the  less  does 
"  the  mind  suffer  from  it." 

"  Prop.  IV. — There  is  no  affection  of  the  body  of  which 
"  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  coucep- 
"  tion." 


xvi  PREFACE. 

"  Dcmonst. — Those  things  which  are  common  to  all 
"  cannot  be  otherwise  than  adequately  conceived  (Prop. 
"  38,  pt.  2),  and  therefore  (Prop.  12,  andLem.  2,  following 
"  Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  2)  there  is  no  affection  of  the  body  of 
"  which  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
"  tion. — Q.E.D." 

"  Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  no  affect  of 
"  which  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
"  tion.  For  an  affect  is  an  idea  of  an  affection  of  the  body 
"  (by  the  general  definition  of  the  Affects),  and  this  idea 
"  therefore  (Prop.  4,  pt.  5)  must  involve  some  clear  and 
"  distinct  conception." 

"  Schol. — Since  nothing  exists  from  which  some  effect 
"does  not  follow  (Prop.  36,  pt.  i),  and  since  we  under- 
"  stand  clearly  and  distinctly  everything  which  follows 
"  from  an  idea  which  is  adequate  in  us  (Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  it 
"  is  a  necessary  consequence  that  every  one  has  the  power, 
"  partly  at  least,  if  not  absolutely,  of  understanding  clearly 
"  and  distinctly  himself  and  his  affects,  and  consequently 
"  of  bi  iuging  it  to  pass  that  he  suffers  less  from  them.  We 
"  liave  therefore  mainly  to  strive  to  acquire  a  clear  and 
"  distinct  knowledge  as  far  as  possible  of  each  affect,  so 
"  that  the  mind  may  be  led  to  pass  from  the  affect  to  think 
"  those  things  which  it  perceives  clearly  and  distinctly, 
"  and  with  which  it  is  entirely  satisfied,  and  to  strive  also 
"  that  the  affect  may  be  separated  from  the  thought  of  an 
"  external  cause  and  connected  with  true  thought.  Thus 
"  not  only  love,  hatred,  &c.,  will  be  destroyed  (Prop.  2, 
"  pt.  5),  but  also  the  appetites  or  desires  to  which  the 
"affect  gives  rise  cannot  be  excessive  (Prop.  61,  pt.  4). 
"  For  it  is  above  everything  to  be  observed  that  the  appe- 
"  tite  by  which  a  man  is  said  to  act  is  one  and  the  same 
"appetite  as  that  by  which  he  is  said  to  suffer.  For 
"  example,  we  have  shown  that  human  nature  is  so  con- 
"  stituted  that  every  one  desires  that  other  people  should 


PREFACE.  xvii 

"  live  according  to  his  way  of  thinking  (Schol.  Prop.  31, 
"  pt-  3),  a  desire  which  in  a  man  who  is  not  guided  by 
"  reason  is  a  passion  which  is  called  ambition,  and  is  not 
"  very  different  from  pride  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
"  a  man  who  lives  according  to  the  dictates  of  reason  it 
"is  an  action  or  virtue  which  is  called  piety  (Schol.  i, 
"  Prop.  37,  pt.  4,  and  Demonst.  2  of  the  same  Prop.)  In 
"  the  same  manner,  all  the  appetites  or  desires  are  passions 
"  only  in  so  far  as  they  arise  from  inadequate  ideas,  and  are 
"  classed  among  the  virtues  whenever  they  are  excited  or 
"  begotten  by  adequate  ideas  ;  for  all  the  desires  by  which 
"  we  are  determined  to  any  action  may  arise  either  from 
"  adequate  or  inadequate  ideas  (Prop.  59,  pt.  4).  To  return, 
"  therefore,  to  the  point  from  which  we  set  out :  there  is 
"  no  remedy  within  our  power  which  can  be  conceived 
"  more  excellent  for  the  affects  than  that  which  consists  in 
"  a  true  knowledge  of  them,  since  the  mind  possesses  no 
"  other  power  than  tliat  of  thinking  and  forming  adequate 
"  ideas,  as  we  have  shown  above  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3)." 

"  PPlOP.  XIV, — The  mind  can  cause  all  the  affections  of 
"  the  body  or  the  images  of  things  to  be  related  to 
"  the  idea  of  God  (ideam  Dei)."  ^ 

"  Z^cmons^.— There  is  no  affection  of  the  body  of  which 
"  the  mind  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception 
"(Prop.  4,  pt.  5),  and  therefore  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i)  it  can 
"  cause  all  the  affections  of  the  body  to  be  related  to  the 
"  idea  of  God. — q.e.d." 

The  particular  mode  in  which  these  propositions  are 
demonstrated,  more  particularly  the  fourth,  would  lead  to 
a  longer  discussion  than  is  possible  in  a  preface  ;  but  the 
abstract  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  it  is  possible  to  think 
of  any  passion  as  we  think  of  a  crystal  or  a  triangle,  and 
when  we  do  so  it  is  no  longer  injurious.     A  man,  for 

^  See  note,  page  24. 


xviii  PREFACE. 

example,  suffers  an  insult,  and  is  hurried  by  passion  to 
avenge  it.  He  is  a  victim  for  the  time  being  (jpatitur). 
A  stream  of  images  passes  before  him,  over  which  he 
exercises  no  authority.  But  it  is  possible  to  break  that 
series  of  images, — to  reflect,  to  put  the  insult  from  him, 
to  consider  it  as  if  it  were  an  efifect  of  gravitation  or 
electricity,  to  place  himself  outside  it,  to  look  at  it  as 
God  looks  at  it.  This  is  to  refer  it  to  God's  idea,  or  to 
have  an  adequate  idea  of  it. 

For  the  meaning  of  the  second  remedy,  which  consists 
"  in  the  separation  by  the  mind  of  the  affects  from  the 
"  thought  of  an  external  cause,  which  we  imagine  con- 
"  fusedly,"  we  turn  to  the  second  proposition  of  the  fifth 
part : — 

"  If  we  detach  an  emotion  of  the  mind  or  affect  from  the 
"  thought  of  an  external  cause,  and  connect  it  with 
"  other  thoughts,  then  the  love  or  hatred  towards  the 
"  external  cause,  and  the  fluctuations  of  the  mind 
"  which  arise  from  these  affects,  will  be  destroyed." 

"  Bcmonst. — That  which  constitutes  the  form  of  love  or 
"  hatred  is  joy  or  sorrow,  accompanied  M'ith  the  idea  of  an 
"  external  cause  (Defs.  6  and  7  of  the  Affects).  If  this  idea, 
"  therefore,  be  taken  away,  the  form  of  love  or  hatred  is  alsoj 
"  removed,  and  therefore  these  affects,  and  any  others  whicl 
"  arise  from  them,  are  destroyed. — q.e.d." 

Spinoza  does  not  mean  that  each  remedy  is  sovereign , 
against  all  the  affects.     Those  which  are  now  in  his  mindj 
are  love  and  hatred.     We  hate,  not  because  of  any  injury} 
done  to  us,  but  because  it  has  been  done  to  us  by  a  person  | 
like  ourselves.     The  misery  consequent  on  it  is  out  of 
proportion  to  the  actual  loss  or  pain.     Spinoza  impresses 
on  us  that  really  the  only  thing  which  need  concern  us 
is  the  actual  loss  or  pain,  and  that  these  are  due  to  the 
operation  of  natural  laws.     So,  too,  he  supposes  that  the 


PREFA  CE. 

disturbance  due  to  a  passion  of  any  kind  mf/['^e  quelled. 
It  is  the  imagination,  in  fact,  which  M-anderg^)Q,5TDUd  the 
immediate  here  that  is  tlie  cause  of  tlie  mischief.  '' ■■'  '{  ■  ^ 
For  tlie  explanation  of  the  third  remedy,  which  consists 
"  in  duration,  in  which  the  affections  which  are  rehited  to 
"  objects  we  understand  surpass  those  related  to  objects 
"  conceived  in  a  mutilated  or  confused  manner,"  we  are 
referred  to  the  seventh  proposition  of  the  fifth  part : — 

"  The  affects  which  spring  from  reason,  or  which  are 
"  excited  by  it,  are,  if  time  be  taken  into  account, 
"  more  powerful  than  those  which  are  related  to  indi- 
"  vidual  objects  which  we  contemplate  as  absent." 

"  Dcmonst. — We  do  not  contemplate  an  object  as  absent 
"  by  reason  of  the  affect  by  which  we  imagine  it,  but  by 
"reason  of  the  fact  that  the  body  is  affected  with  another 
"  affect,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  that  object  (Prop. 
"  17,  pt.  2).  The  affect,  therefore,  w^hich  is  related  to  an 
"  object  which  we  contemplate  as  absent,  is  not  of  such  a 
"  nature  as  to  overcome  the  other  actions  and  power  of 
"  man  (concerning  these  things  see  Prop.  6,  pt.  4),  but, 
"  on  the  contrary,  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can  in  some 
"  way  be  restrained  by  those  affections  which  exclude  the 
"  existence  of  its  external  cause  (Prop.  9,  pt.  4).  But  the 
"  affect  which  arises  from  reason  is  necessarily  related  to 
"  the  common  properties  of  things  (see  the  definition  of 
"  reason  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  which  we  always 
"  contemplate  as  present  (for  nothing  can  exist  which  ex- 
"  eludes  their  present  existence),  and  which  we  always 
"  imagine  in  the  same  way  (Prop.  38,  pt.  2).  Tliis  affect, 
"  therefore,  always  remains  the  same,  and  consequently 
"  (Ax.  I,  pt.  5),  the  affects  which  are  contrary  to  it,  and 
"  which  are  not  maintained  by  their  external  cause,  must 
"  more  and  more  accommodate  themselves  to  it  until  they 
"  are  no  longer  contrary  to  it.  So  far,  therefore,  the  affect 
"  which  springs  from  reason  is  the  stronger. — q.e.d." 


XX  PREFA  CE. 

The  affect  which  arises  from  reason  necessarily  related 
to  the  comuiou  properties  of  things  is  an  affect,  as  we  see 
from  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2,  from  generalisations  and 
adequate  ideas — from  laws,  in  fact.  The  meaning,  there- 
fore, is  that  the  ever  present  which  occupies  the  reason 
will  in  time  vanquish  the  affect  due  to  that  which  is  not 
present.  Hatred  of  a  person  not  actually  before  me  will 
yield  to  the  affects  of  the  reason,  because  the  objects  of 
the  reason  are  always  before  me.  It  will  yield  to  the 
direct  influence  of  the  affects  of  the  reason  co7itinually  at 
work  to  show  its  folly,  and  it  will  yield  also  still  more 
signally  to  the  indirect  influence  of  the  continual  occupa- 
tion of  the  reason  with  "  the  common  properties  of  things," 
One  inference  is  obvious,  that  if  we  wish  to  know  the 
efficacy  of  this  remedy,  our  reason  must  habitually  dwell 
upon  "  the  common  properties  of  things."  Dwelling  thus 
upon  them,  we  shall,  when  we  suffer  from  passion,  return 
under  their  control,  with  more  or  less  rapidity,  as  we  lie 
more  or  less  open  to  their  influence,  and  the  passion  will 
"  more  and  more  accommodate  itself "  to  the  affect  pro- 
ceeding from  them. 

To  find  the  meaning  of  the  fourth  remedy,  which  con- 
sists "  in  the  multitude  of  causes  by  which  the  affections 
"  which  are  related  to  the  common  properties  of  things 
"  or  to  God  are  nourished,"  we  have  to  turn  to  the  9th  and 
nth  propositions  of  the  5th  part: — 

"  PiiOP.  IX.— If  we  are  affected  by  an  affect  which  is  re- 
"  luted  to  many  and  different  causes  which  the  mind 
"  contemplates  at  the  same  time  with  the  affect  itself, 
"  we  are  less  injured,  suffer  less  from  it,  and  are  less 
"  affected,  therefore,  towards  each  cause  than  if  we 
"  were  aflected  by  another  affect  equally  great,  which 
"  is  related  to  one  cause  only,  or  to  fewer  causes." 
"  DemonsL— An  affect  is  bad  or  injurious  only  in  so  far 

"  as  it  hinders  the  mind  from  thinking  (Props.  26  and  27, 


PREFACE.  xxi 

"  pt.  4),  and  therefore  that  afTect  by  wiiich  the  iniiul  is 
"  determined  to  the  conteniphation  of  a  number  of  objects 
"  at  the  same  time  is  less  injurious  than  another  all'ect 
'■'  equally  great  which  holds  the  mind  in  the  contemphi- 
"  tion  of  one  object  alone,  or  of  a  few  objects,  so  that  it 
*'  cannot  think  of  others.  This  is  the  first  thing  we  had  to 
"  prove.  Again,  since  the  essence  of  the  mind,  tliat  is  to 
"  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  its  power,  consists  in  thought  alone 
"  (Prop.  II,  pt.  2),  the  mind  suffers  less  through  an  affect 
"  by  which  it  is  determined  to  the  contemplation  of  a 
"  number  of  objects  at  the  same  time  than  through  an  affect 
"  equally  great  which  holds  it  occupied  in  the  contempla- 
"  tion  of  one  object  alone  or  of  a  few  objects.  This  is  the 
"second  thing  we  had  to  prove.  Finally,  tliis  affect 
"  (Prop.  48,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  a  nuni- 
"  ber  of  external  causes,  is  therefore  less  towards  each. — 
"  Q.E.D." 

"  Prop.  XI. — The  greater  the  number  of  objects  to  which 
'•'  an  image  is  related,  the  more  constant  is  it,  or  tlie 
"  more  frequently  does  it  present  itself,  and  the  more 
"  does  it  occupy  the  mind." 

Dcmonst. — "  The  greater  the  number  of  objects  to  wliich 
"  an  image  or  affect  is  related,  the  greater  is  the  number 
"  of  causes  by  which  it  can  be  excited  and  cherished.  All 
"  these  causes  the  mind  contemplates  simultaneuusly  i»y 
"  means  of  the  affect  (by  hypothesis),  and  therefore  tlie 
"  more  constant  is  the  affect,  or  the  more  frequently  does 
"  it  present  itself,  and  the  more  does  it  occupy  the  mind 
"  (Prop.  8,  pt.  5.)— Q.E.D." 

To  exhibit  the  distinct  moments  of  tliis  remedy  wo 
note — 

Passion  holds  the  mind  to  a  single  thought. 

It  therefore  hinders  the  mind  from  thinking. 

Observe   by  the   way  the  characteristic  selectiun  by 


:,xii  PREFACE. 

Spinoza  of  this  one  as  chief  among  the   many  evils  of 
passion. 

An  affect,  therefore,  by  which  we  contemplate  a  number 
of  objects  at  the  same  time  with  the  affect,  is  less  inju- 
rious than  an  affect  which  holds  the  mind  to  the  contem- 
plation of  one  object. 

The  greater  the  number  of  causes  which  can  produce 
any  affect,  the  more  frequently  it  recurs  and  occupies  the 
mind. 

We  look  therefore  to  affects  which  are  due  to  the 
common  properties  of  things,  or  to  God,  as  the  remedy 
against  the  injurious  absorption  of  the  mind  by  passion. 

It  is,  as  we  say,  characteristic  of  Spinoza  that  his  objec- 
tion to  passion  is  that  it  chokes  thought.  Everybody 
who  tries  to  lead  a  life  from  the  intellect  knows  what 
a  calamity  is  that  incessant  apparition  of  the  object 
of  a  passion.  It  pursues  the  victim  like  a  Fury.  To  be 
capable  of  affection  by  the  common  properties  of  things, 
or  God,  is  the  cure,  and  everything  helps  that  w^ay.  Day 
unto  day  uttereth  speech,  and  night  unto  night  showeth 
knowledge.  There  is  no  speech  nor  language  where  their 
voice  is  not  heard. 

The  fifth  and  last  remedy  is  derived  from  "  the  order  in 
"  which  the  mind  can  arrange  its  affects  and  connect  them 
"  one  with  the  other.'"' 

The  entire  comprehension  of  this  remedy  is  not  possible 
without  lengthened  study  of  all  the  propositions  involved. 
'J'liere  is  no  possibility  of  jumping  Spinoza.  He  cannot 
be  understood  without  consecutive  study  and  strait  atten- 
tion to  every  line  from  beginning  to  end.  It  is  not,  it  is 
to  be  hoped,  necessary  to  reprint  all  these  propositions 
liere,  as  they  would  take  up  too  much  room,  and  the 
reader  who  is  serious  with  his  subject  will  not  mind  the 
trouble  of  turning  to  them.  The  proof  proceeds  as  fol- 
lows— 

Mind  and  body  are  the  same  thing,  considered  at  one 


PREFACE.  xxiii 

time  under  the  attribiite  of  thought  and  at  anotlier  under 
that  of  extension.  The  order  and  connection  of  things  is 
therefore  one,  whether  viewed  under  this  or  that  attribute, 
and  consequently  the  order  of  the  actions  or  passions  of 
the  body  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  actions  or  passions  of 
the  mind.  The  mind  has  the  power  to  form  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  and  of  deducing  others  from  them.  Con- 
sequently it  has  the  power  of  arranging  and  Qonnecting 
the  afiections  of  the  body  according  to  the  order  of  the 
intellect.  The  mind,  in  other  words,  has  the  power  of 
joining  one  idea  to  another.  If  I  conceive  a  triangle,  1 
conceive  that  its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
So  I  may  chain  (concatenare)  hatred  to  love,  that  is  to 
say,  I  may  establish  it  as  a  rule  that  hatred  is  to  be  over- 
come by  love,  and  the  affections  of  the  body  will  follow 
the  rule.  These  chained  demonstrations  in  morals  are 
called  by  Spinoza  dogmata,  and  these  he  counsels,  as  we 
have  before  noticed,  we  should  always  have  ready  for 
every  emergency. 

So  much  for  the  remedies  for  the  passions.  We  have 
now  heard  enough  to  convince  us  that  to  the  question. 
Wherein  can  you  help  mc  ?  Spinoza  can  give  a  solid 
answer.  The  truth  is,  that  this  book  is  really  an  clhic. 
It  is  not  primarily  a  metaphysic.  All  there  is  in  it  whicli 
is  metaphysical  is  intended  as  a  sure  basis  for  the  ethical. 
The  science  of  ethic  is  not  much  in  fashion  now.  There 
have  been  times  in  the  history  of  the  world  when  men 
have  thought  that  the  science  of  sciences  was  tlie  know- 
ledge of  self-control,  of  our  duty  to  ourselves  and  our 
neighbours.  Socrates,  Marcus  Antoninus,  and  Epictetus 
so  thought :  Spinoza  so  thought.  The  decay  of  religion, 
however,  amongst  other  innumerable  evils,  has  also  brought 
upon  us  this  evil,  that  the  purely  intellectual  with  no 
reference  whatever  to  the  ethical  is  the  sole  subject  of 
research,  and  a  man  devotes  all  his  life  to  the  anatomy  of 
lepidoptera  and  never  gives  an  hour  to  a  solution  of  the 


xxiv  PREFACE. 

problem  how  he  may  best  bring  insurgent  and  tyrannous 
desires  under  subjection  or  face  misfortune.  Xo  doubt 
the  anatomy  of  lepidoptera  does  contribute  ethical  results, 
but  ethical  science  strictly  so  called  is  non-existent.  No 
preacher  preaches  it ;  the  orthodox  churches  are  given 
over  to  a  philosophy  of  rags,  and  "  free  "  pulpits  do  nothing 
but  mince  and  mash  up  for  popular  ears  commonplaces 
upon  books  and  passing  events.  Neither  does  any  school 
teach  it.  It  is  frightful  to  think  that  at  the  present 
moment  the  only  ethic  known  to  the  great  mass  of  the 
cliildren  of  this  countiy  is  a  dim  and  decaying  dread  left 
over  by  a  departed  religion,  \vhile  to  the  children  of  the 
aristocracy  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  blind  obligation  to 
be  technically  honourable.  "  In  my  class,  and  it  is  a  large 
one,"  said  a  teacher  to  me  the  other  day,  "  there  is  not  one 
girl  who  would  not  on  the  slightest  pressure  tell  me  a  lie," 
and  this  Avas  in  a  school,  not  certainly  for  the  rich,  but 
certainly  not  for  the  very  poor.  The  world  is  alarmed 
now  at  the  various  portents  which  threaten  it.  On  every 
side  are  signs  of  danger  more  terrible  by  far  than  that 
which  impended  in  1793.  But  the  germinating  spot  in 
all  the  dangers  ahead  of  us  is  the  divorce  of  the  intellect 
from  its  chief  use,  so  that  it  spends  itself  upon  curiosities, 
trifles,  the  fine  arts,  or  in  science,  and  never  in  ethical 
service.  Tlie  peril  is,  of  course,  the  more  tremendous, 
because  the  religions,  M'hich  with  all  their  defects  did  at 
least  teach  duty  and  invested  it  with  divine  authority,  are 
effete. 

Spinoza,  in  this  total  absence  of  Ethic,  is  jierhaps  not  to 
be  recommended  as  a  class-book.  Nevertheless,  I  believe 
there  are  to  be  found  in  him,  more  than  in  any  other 
modern  author,  great  principles  which,  if  translated  into 
the  vulgar  tongue,  will  be  the  best  attainable  etliic  for 
the  people.  One  thing  the  student  will  observe,  that 
Spinoza  relies  altogetlier  upon  reason  as  effectual  to  cope 
with  passion.     He  does  not  content  himself  with  a  mere 


PREFACE.  XXV 

blind  "  Thou  slialt  or  thou  shalt  not,"  whether  as  the  voice 
of  a  God  or  a  conscience.  He  believes,  too,  in  reason  as 
able  to  do  what  he  expects  of  her.  Commonplaces  are 
frequent  enough  of  the  powerlessness  of  reason  over  the 
passions,  but  it  is  nearer  the  truth  to  say  that  men  yield 
to  passion  because  they  know  no  reason  why  they  should 
not.  At  any  rate,  if  they  are  to  be  reclaimed,  reason 
alone  can  reclaim  them. 

Although  Spinoza's  aims  are  ethical,  he  is  also  specu- 
lative. The  question,  Wherein  do  you  help  me?  may  be 
answered,  not  merely  by  wise  counsel  but  by  a  reve- 
lation; that  is  to  say,  by  ideas,  by  an  insight  wliich 
removes  the  limits  of  the  world  in  which  we  live  and 
shows  us  something  beyond.  There  is  no  assistance 
more  efficient  than  that  by  wliich  Ave  are  led  to  turn  our 
eyes  away  from  the  earth  and  raise  them  to  lieaven. 
Most  religions,  therefore,  are  speculative  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  and  their  power  over  men  is  due  to  the 
lift  which  they  give  even  to  the  feeblest  of  believers.  A 
religion  constructed  of  the  elements  of  this  world  and  of 
nothing  more  would  indeed  be  no  religion.  It  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  a  genuine  religion  that  it  should  take  the 
other  side ;  that  it  should  be  the  counterpoise,  the  per- 
petual affirmation  against  the  perpetual  negation  whicli 
lies  in  the  routine  and  vulgarity  of  existence.  The  demand 
to  which  the  Christian  doctrine  of  eternal  life  is  an 
answer  is,  in  some  shape  or  other,  absolutely  constant, 
and  there  must,  in  some  shape  or  other,  be  a  reply  to  it. 
The  promise,  however,  of  a  future  life  is  only  one  element 
in  religion.  It  tells  the  humblest  of  a  supreme  God  to 
whom  we  are  each  one  of  us  personally  rebated.  It  is  a 
window  to  men  through  which  they  look  into  tlie  Infinite, 
are  satisfied  and  consoled.  Now,  although  Spinoza  may 
be  hard  to  understand,  and  although  tlie  reader  may  rise 
from  the  perusal  of  some  of  his  demonstrations  and  not 
feel  content,  asking  himself  whether  the  thing  be  really 


y 


xxvi  PREFACE. 

so  or  not,  there  is  no  writer  probably  who  loosens  more 
effectually  the  hard  tyranny  of  time  and  circumstance 
and  provides  us  with  more  of  those  thoughts  which  it  is 
the  office  of  a  real  and  speculative  religion  to  supply. 
I  remember  the  self-given  warning  of  a  few  pages  back 
against  venturing  out  of  my  depth  in  the  first  book,  and 
yet   is  impossible  in  this  connection  to  pass  it  by  alto- 
gether.    Take,  for  example,  the  eleventh  and  following 
propositions.     "  God,  or  substance  consisting  of  infinite 
"  attributes,  each  one   of  which    expresses   eternal   and 
"  infinite  essence,  necessarily  exists."     Note  the  "  infinite 
"  attributes,"  each  attribute  infinite,  and  infinity  also  of 
number.     There  is  no  cataloguing  of  them.     A  few  only 
are  known  to  us.     The  sixteenth  proposition  affirms  that 
"  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  infinite  numbers 
"  of  things  in  infinite  ways  (that  is  to  say,  all  things 
"  which  can  be  conceived  by  the  infinite  intellect)  must 
"  follow."     What   a   region   is   this  into  which  we    are 
here  introduced !     The  effect  on  the  mind  is  something 
similar  to  that  produced  upon  men  when  the  sky  ceased 
to  be  a  solid  roof,  or  when  the  stars  took  their  proper 
places  and  the  earth  became  a  revolving  planet,  an  atom 
compared  with  the  immense  whole.     For  tlie  first  time, 
too,  as  before  pointed  out,  we  find  God  enlarged  so  as 
to  cover  every  fact,  even  the  most  obstinate.      "God," 
says  the  corollary  to  this  last-quoted  proposition,  "  is  the 
"  efficient  cause  of  all  things  which  can  fall  under  the 
"  infinite  intellect ; "  and  the  second  corollary  determines 
Him   as  "cause  through  Himself  and  not  through  that 
"  which  is  contingent." 

In  the  scholium  to  the  seventeenth  proposition  we  have 
a  further  development :— "  There  are  some  who  think  that 
"  God  is  a  free  cause,  because  He  can,  as  they  think,  bring 
"  about  that  those  things  which  we  have  said  follow  from 
"  His  nature— that  is  to  say,  those  things  which  are  in 
"  His  power— should  not   be,  or  should  not  be  produced 


PREFACE.  xxvii 

"by  Him.  But  this  is  simply  saying  that  God  could 
"  bring  about  that  it  should  not  follow  from  the  nature  of 
"  a  triangle  that  its  three  angles  should  be  equal  to  two 
"  right  angles,  or  that  from  a  given  cause  an  effect  should 
"  not  follow,  which  is  absurd.  But  I  shall  show  further 
'■'  on,  without  the  help  of  this  proposition,  that  neither 
"  intellect  nor  M'ill  pertain  to  the  nature  of  God.  I  know, 
'■  indeed,  that  there  are  many  who  think  themselves  able 
"  to  demonstrate  that  intellect  of  the  highest  order  and 
"  freedom  of  M'ill  both  pertain  to  the  nature  of  God,  for 
"  they  say  that  they  know  nothing  more  perfect  which 
"  they  can  attribute  to  Him  than  that  which  is  the  chief 
"  perfection  in  ourselves.  But  although  they  conceive 
"  God  as  actually  possessing  the  highest  intellect,  they 
"  nevertheless  do  not  believe  that  He  can  bring  about  that 
"  all  those  things  should  exist  which  are  actually  in  His 
"  intellect,  for  they  think  that  by  such  a  supposition 
"  they  would  destroy  His  power.  If  He  had  created, 
"  they  say,  all  things  which  are  in  His  intellect.  He  could 
"  have  created  nothing  more,  and  this,  they  believe,  does 
"  not  accord  with  God's  omnipotence  ;  so  then  they  prefer 
"  to  consider  God  as  indifferent  to  all  things,  and  creating 
"  nothing  excepting  that  which  He  has  decreed  to  create 
"  by  a  certain  absolute  will.  But  I  think  that  I  have 
"  shown  with  sufficient  clearness  (Prop.  i6)  that  from  the 
"  supreme  power  of  God,  or  from  His  infinite  nature,  in- 
"  finite  things  in  infinite  ways,  that  is  to  say,  all  things, 
"  have  necessarily  flowed,  or  continually  follow  by  the 
"  same  necessity,  in  the  same  way  as  it  follows  from  the 
"  nature  of  a  triangle,  from  eternity  and  to  eternity,  that 
"its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  The 
"omnipotence  of  God  has,  therefore,  been  actual  from 
"eternity,  and  in  the  same  actuality  will  remain  to 
"  eternity.  In  this  way  the  omnipotence  of  God,  in  my 
"  opinion,  is  far  more  firmly  established.  My  adversaries, 
"  indeed  (if  I  may  be  permitted  to  speak  plainly),  seem  to 


xxviii  PREFACE. 

"  deny  the  omnipotence  of  God,  inasmuch  as  they  are 
"forced  to  admit  that  He  has  in  His  mind  an  infinite 
"  numher  of  things  which  might  be  created,  but  which, 
"  nevertheless,  He  will  never  be  able  to  create,  for  if  He 
"  were  to  create  all  things  which  He  has  in  His  mind,  He 
"  would,  according  to  them,  exhaust  His  omnipotence  and 
"  make  Himself  imperfect.  Therefore,  in  order  to  make  a 
"  perfect  God,  tliey  are  compelled  to  make  Him  incapable 
"  of  doing  all  those  things  to  which  His  power  extends ; 
"  and  anything  more  absurd  than  this,  or  more  opposed  to 
"  God's  omnipotence,  I  do  not  think  can  be  imagined." 

The  meaning  of  this  is  not  that  everything  which  will 
exist  does  exist.  Spinoza,  of  course,  could  not  intend 
anything  so  obviously  untrue.  We  have  in  the  Scholium 
to  the  eighth  proposition  of  the  second  book,  a  clue  to  an 
interpretation.  The  eighth  proposition  itself  is,  "  The 
"  ideas  of  nonexistent  individual  things  or  modes  are  com- 
'•'  preliended  in  the  infinite  idea  of  God,  in  the  same  way 
"  that  the  formal  essences  of  individual  things  or  modes 
"  are  contained  in  the  attributes  of  God,"  and  the  scholium 
gives  us  an  illustration — "  The  circle,  for  example,  pos- 
"  sesses  this  property  that  the  rectangles  contained  by  the 
"  segments  of  all  straight  lines  cutting  one  another  in  the 
"  same  circle  are  equal ;  therefore  in  a  circle  there  are  con- 
"  tained  an  infinite  number  of  rectangles  equal  to  one 
'•'  another,  but  none  of  them  can  be  said  to  exist  unless  in 
'•'  so  far  as  the  circle  exists,  nor  can  the  idea  of  any  one  of 
"  these  rectangles  be  said  to  exist  unless  in  so  far  as 
"  it  is  comprehended  in  the  idea  of  the  circle.  Out  of  tliis 
"  infinite  number  of  rectangles,  let  two  only,  E  and  D,  be 
"  conceived  to  exist.  The  ideas  of  these  two  rectangles 
"  do  not  now  exist  merely  in  so  far  as  they  are  compre- 
"  hended  in  the  idea  of  the  circle,  but  because  they  involve 
"  the  existence  of  their  rectangles,  and  it  is  this  which 
"  distinguishes  them  from  the  other  ideas  of  the  other 
"  rectangles."     AVe  have  here,  then,  in  Spinoza,  as  we  so 


PREFACE.  xxix 

often  have,  a  realised  tlieological  doctrine,  a  doctrine 
nominally  taught  by  theology,  but  remaining  unrealised. 
This  is  the  true  unchangeableuess  of  God.  All  that  He 
is  lies  open  before  us,  and  has  always  been  open ;  what 
He  is  now  He  will  for  ever  be.  Thus  much,  however,  is 
sufficient  to  show  Spinoza's  suggestiveness,  and  to  indicate 
how  far  he  can  be  of  any  service  to  those  who  find  a 
solace  in  ideas. 

Spinoza  has  recognised  the  support  which  the  doctrine 
of  immortality  gives  to  Ethic.  It  is  quite  true  that  Ethic 
can  subsist  without  immortality.  Listen  to  the  forty-first 
proposition  of  the  fifth  part,  with  its  scholium — 

"  Peop.  XLI. — Even  if  we  did  not  know  that  our  mind  is 
"  eternal,  we  should  still  consider  as  of  primary  im- 
"  portance  Piety  and  Eeligion,  and  absolutely  every- 
"  thing  which  in  the  Fourth  Part  we  have  shown  to 
"  be  related  to  strength  of  mind  and  generosity. 

"  Dcmonst. — The  primary  and  sole  foundation  of  virtue 
"  or  of  the  proper  conduct  of  life  (by  Corel.  Prop.  22,  and 
"  Prop.  24,  pt.  4)  is  to  seek  our  own  profit.  But  in  order 
"to  determine  w^hat  reason  prescribes  as  profitable,  we 
"  had  no  regard  to  the  eternity  of  the  mind,  which  we  did 
"  not  recognise  till  we  came  to  the  Fifth  Part.  Therefore, 
"  although  we  were  at  that  time  ignorant  that  the  mind 
''is  eternal,  we  considered  as  of  primary  importance  those 
"  things  which  we  have  shown  are  related  to  strength  of 
"mind  and  generosity;  and  therefore,  even  if  we  were 
"  now  ignorant  of  the  eternity  of  the  mind,  we  should 
"  consider  those  commands  of  reason  as  of  primary  im- 
"  portance. — q.e.d. 

">^cAo/.— The  creed  of  the  multitude  seems  to^  be 
"  different  from  this ;  for  most  persons  seem  to  believe 
"  that  they  are  free  in  so  far  as  it  is  allowed  them  to  obey 
"  their  lusts,  and  that  they  give  up  a  portion  of  their 


XXX  PREFACE. 

"  rights,  in  so  far  as  they  are  bound  to  live  according  to 
"  the  commands  of  divine  law.  Pietv,  therefore,  and 
"  religion,  and  absolutely  all  those  things  that  are  related 
"  to  greatness  of  soul,  they  believe  to  be  burdens  which 
"  they  hope  to  be  able  to  lay  aside  after  death ;  hoping 
"  also  to  receive  some  reward  for  their  bondage,  that  is  to 
"  say,  for  their  piety  and  religion.  It  is  not  merely  this 
"  hope,  however,  but  also  and  chiefly  fear  of  dreadful 
"  punishments  after  death,  by  which  they  are  induced  to 
"  live  according  to  the  commands  of  divine  law,  that  is  to 
"  say,  as  far  as  their  feebleness  and  impotent  mind  will 
"  permit ;  and  if  this  hope  and  fear  were  not  present  to 
"  them,  but  if  they,  on  the  contrary,  believed  that  minds 
"  perish  with  the  body,  and  that  there  is  no  prolongation 
"  of  life  for  miserable  creatures  exhausted  with  the  burden 
"  of  their  piety,  they  would  return  to  ways  of  their  own 
"  liking;  they  would  prefer  to  let  everything  be  controlled 
"  by  their  own  passions,  and  to  obey  fortune  rather  than 
"  themselves. 

"  This  seems  to  me  as  absurd  as  if  a  man,  because  he 
"  does  not  believe  that  he  will  be  able  to  feed  his  body 
"  with  good  food  to  all  eternity,  should  desire  to  satiate 
"  himself  with  poisonous  and  deadly  drugs ;  or  as  if,  be- 
"  cause  he  sees  that  the  mind  is  not  eternal  or  immortal, 
"  he  should  therefore  prefer  to  be  mad  and  to  live  without 
"  reason, — absurdities  so  great  that  they  scarcely  deserve 
"  to  be  repeated." 

Nevertheless  Spinoza  can  neither  avoid  the  desire  to 
know  something  about  immortality,  nor  can  he  deny  the 
importance  of  this  knowledge.  It  must  be  confessed  too, 
that  there  are  few  men  who  can  be  satisfied  with  simple 
ignorance  upon  this  subject,  and  all  of  us  who  are  not 
capable  of  a  violent  M-rench  to  our  nature  seek  at  some 
time  or  other  to  come  to  a  conclusion  M'ith  regard  to  it. 
Tlie  majority  of   mankind,  tlie  vast   majority,  including 


J 


PREFACE.  xxxi 

even  the  best  and  wisest,  cannot  reconcile  themselves  to 
the  thought  of  a  blank  hereafter,  and  derive  from  their 
liope  the  strongest  stimulus  to  work  and  to  patience.  It 
is  not  so  much  happiness  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
word  which  is  coveted,  but  continued  life,  continued 
thought,  and  continued  progress  through  that  great  and 
Liradual  revelation  which  unfolds  itself  to  us  from  birth  to 
death,  and  is  gradually  unfolding  itself  to  the  world.  We 
cannot  help  feeling  that  it  makes  some  difference  if  in  a 
few  more  years  we  are  no  longer  to  be  witnesses  to  the 
evolution  of  all  that  is  now  stirring  amongst  mankind, 
and  our  own  development  and  ascent  are  to  be  sud- 
denly arrested.  It  makes  some  difference  if  we  believe 
that  the  experience,  the  self-mastery,  the  slowly-acquired 
knowledge,  the  slowly-reached  reduction  to  harmony  of 
what  was  chaotic  are  to  be  stopped,  and  not  only  stopped, 
but  brought  to  nothing.  Spinoza  evidently  could  not 
believe  it — that  is  certain ;  but  when  we  try  to  under- 
stand what  it  was  exactly  which  he  did  believe  we  find 
ourselves  in  difficulties.  I  trust  I  may  be  pardoned  if, 
departing  from  the  general  plan  of  this  preface,  which 
was,  not  to  give  any  complete  account  of  Spinoza's 
philosophy,  but  merely  to  present  so  much  of  it  as  may 
induce  a  study  of  it,  I  attempt  a  somewhat  more  detailed 
examination  of  the  propositions  in  which  his  teaching 
as  to  immortality  is  contained.  Two  things,  however, 
we  must  remember.  In  the  first  place,  complete  under- 
standing is,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  matter  in  hand, 
altogetlier  impossible.  Obscurity  must  remain,  and  all  I 
that  we  can  hope  to  do  is  to  diminish  it  here  and  there.  / 
Secondly,  Ave  must  recollect  that  our  first  duty  is  not  to 
criticise  our  author,  but  to  comprehend  him.  The  pro- 
positions which  deal  with  immortality  in  express  terms 
are  somewhat  abruptly  introduced  in  the  middle  of  the 
fifth  part.  We  are  told  in  the  twenty-first  proposition 
that  the  mind  can  neither  imagine  nor  remember  anything 


xxxii  PREFACE. 

excepting  so  long  as  the  body  lasts.     Then  comes  Prop. 
22 — 

"  In  God,  nevertheless,  there  necessarily  exists  an  idea 
"  which  expresses  the  essence  of  this  or  that  human 
"  body  under  the  form  of  eternity." 

The  demonstration  being — 

"  God  is  not  only  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  this  or 
"  that  human  body,  but  also  of  its  essence  (Prop.  25,  pt.  i), 
"  which,  therefore,  must  necessarily  be  conceived  through 
"  the  essence  of  God  itself  (Ax.  4,  pt.  i),  and  by  a  certain 
'•'eternal  necessity  (Prop.  16,  pt.  i).  This  conception, 
"  moreover,  must  necessarily  exist  in  God  (Prop.  3, 
"  pt.  2).— Q.E.D." 

We  have  to  remark  here,  firstly,  the  meaning  of  the 
word  essence.  Essence,  according  to  Def.  2,  pt.  2,  is  "that, 
"  which  being  given,  the  thing  itself  is  necessarily  posited, 
"  and  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is  necessarily  taken ; 
"  or,  in  other  words,  that,  without  which  the  thing  can 
"  neither  be  nor  be  conceived,  and  which  in  its  turn  can- 
"  not  be  nor  be  conceived  without  the  thing." 

Furthermore,  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  10,  pt.  2,  Spinoza  tells  us 
that  "  I  did  not  say  that  that  pertains  to  the  essence  of  a 
"  thing  without  which  the  thing  can  neither  be  nor  can  be 
"  conceived ;  and  my  reason  is,  that  individual  things  can- 
"  not  be  nor  be  conceived  without  God,  and  yet  God  does 
"not  pertain  to  their  essence.  I  have  rather,  therefore, 
"  said  that  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  necessarily  that  which 
"  being  given,  the  thing  is  posited,  and  being  taken  away, 
"  the  thing  is  taken  away,  or  that,  without  which  the 
"  thing  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived,  and  which  in  its 
"  turn  cannot  be  nor  be  conceived  without  the  thing." 

And  again  we  are  told  in  the  corollary  to  the  same  pro- 
position that  "  the  essence  of  man  consists  of  certain  modi- 
"  fications  of  the  attributes  of  God  :  for  the  Peing  of  sub- 


i 


PREFACE.  xxxiii 

"stance  does  not  pertain  to  the  essence  of  man  (Prop.  lo, 
"  pt.  2).  It  is  therefore  something  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i)  which 
"  is  in  God,  and  which  without  God  can  neither  be  nor  be 
«'  conceived,  or  (Corol.  Prop.  25,  pt.  i),  an  aflection  or  mode 
"  which  expresses  the  nature  of  God  in  a  certain  and 
"  determinate  manner." 

We  have  also  to  note  that  the  phrase  "  under  the  form 
"  of  eternity,"  in  the  22d  Prop.,  above  quoted,  has  no 
reference  whatever  to  time.  It  does  not  mean  indefinite 
prolongation  of  time.  Spinoza  is  express  on  tliis  point. 
"By  eternity,"  he  says  (Def.  8,  pt.  i),  "I  understand 
"existence  itself,  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  necessarily  to 
"  follow  from  the  definition  alone  of  an  eternal  thing. 
"  Explanation — For  such  an  existence  is  conceived  as  eter- 
"  nal  truth,  and  also  as  the  essence  of  the  thing.  It  there- 
"  fore  cannot  be  explained  by  duration  or  time,  even  if  the 
"  duration  be  conceived  without  beginning  or  end." 

Spinoza  believes,  therefore,  in  Being  which  has  no  rela- 
tion to  time,  and  he  illustrates  his  doctrine  by  the  example 
of  a  trtith  of  pure  thought  like  mathematics  or  geometry. 

The  idea  also  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  human 
body  is  the  mind.  "  The  object  of  the  idea  constituting 
the  human  mind,"  according  to  Prop.  13,  pt.  2,  "is  a  body, 
"  or  a  certain  mode  of  extension  actually  existing  and 
"  nothing  else." 

We  have  got  thus  far,  therefore,  that  the  idea  of  this  or 
that  human  body,  that  is  to  say,  the  mind  of  this  or  that 
human  body  exists  in  God  under  the  form  of  eternity,  in- 
asmuch as  each  mind  (Corol.  Prop.  10,  pt.  2)  is  a  modifica- 
tion of  some  attribute  of  God,  and  expresses  the  nature  of 
God  in  a  certain  and  determinate  manner. 

We  now  advance  to  the  23d  proposition — 

"The  human  mind  cannot  be  absolutely  destroyed  with 
"the  body,  but  something  of  it  remains  which  is 
"  eternal. 


xxxiv  PREFACE. 

"  Dcmonst. — In  God  there  necessarily  exists  a  conception 
"  or  idea  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  human  bod}^ 
'•'  (Prop.  22,  pt.  5).  This  conception  or  idea  is  therefore 
"necessarily  something  which  pertains  to  the  essence  of 
"the  human  mind  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2).  But  we  ascribe  to 
"  the  human  mind  no  duration  which  can  be  limited  by 
"  time,  unless  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  the  actual  existence 
"  of  the  body,  which  is  explained  through  duration,  and 
"  which  can  be  limited  by  time,  that  is  to  say  (Corol.  Prop. 
"  8,  pt.  2),  we  cannot  ascribe  duration  to  the  mind  except 
"  while  the  body  exists. 

"  But  nevertheless,  since  the  something  is  that  which  is 
"  conceived  by  a  certain  eternal  necessity  through  the 
"  essence  itself  of  God  (Prop.  22,  pt.  5),  this  something 
"  which  pertains  to  the  essence  of  the  mind  will  necessarily 
"  be  eternal. — q.e.d." 

Perhaps  this  somewhat  abstruse  demonstration  will  be 
better  understood  if  we  exhibit  it  in  successive  steps, 
slightly  altering  the  terminology. 

•  In  God  there  is  necessarily  an  idea  of  the  essence  of 
this  or  that  human  mind. 

This  idea  has  an  existence  in  time  only  in  so  far  as  the 
body  exists  in  time. 

Nevertheless  the  idea  exists  in  God  by  a  certain  eternal 
necessity,  and  is  explained  through  His  essence. 

Therefore  the  idea  of  this  or  that  human  mind  is 
eternah 

There  is  no  tliouglit  here  of  bodily  immortality  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  words.  It  strikes  us  as  strange  that 
Spinoza  should  use  the  words  essentia  corporis  instead  of 
onens,  but  this  is  explained  if  we  recollect  that  according 
to  the  ethic  the  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body.  "  The 
object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind,"  says 
Prop.  13,  pt.  2,  "  is  a  body." 

The  scholium  to  Prop.  23,  pt.  5,  is  as  follows — 

"  This  idea  M'hich  expresses  the  essence  of  the  body 


PREFACE. 

"  under  the  form  of  eternity  is,  as  we  liave  said,  a  certain 
"  mode  of  thought  which  pertains  to  the  essence  of  the 
"  mind,  and  is  necessarily  eternal.  It  is  impossible,  never- 
'•■  theless,  that  we  should  recollect  that  we  existed  before 
"  the  body,  because  there  are  no  traces  of  any  such  exist- 
"  ence  in  the  body,  and  also  because  eternity  cannot  be 
"  defined  by  time,  or  have  any  relationship  to  it.  Neverthe- 
"  less  we  feel  and  know  by  experience  that  we  are  eternal. 
"  For  the  mind  is  no  less  sensible  of  those  things  which  it 
"  conceives  through  intelligence  than  of  those  which  it 
"  remembers,  for  demonstrations  are  the  eyes  of  the  mind 
"  by  which  it  sees  and  observes  things. 

"  Although,  therefore,  we  do  not  recollect  that  we  existed 
"  before  the  body,  we  feel  that  our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it 
"  involves  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of 
"  eternity,  is  eternal,  and  that  this  existence  of  the  mind 
"  cannot  be  limited  by  time  nor  explained  by  duration. 
"  Only  in  so  far,  therefore,  as  it  involves  the  actual  exist- 
"  ence  of  the  body  can  the  mind  be  said  to  possess  dura- 
"  tion,  and  its  existence  be  limited  by  a  fixed  time,  and  so 
"  far  only  has  it  the  power  of  determining' the  existence 
"  of  things  in  time,  and  of  conceiving  them  under  the  form 
"  of  duration." 

We  must  not  suppose  that  the  phrase  "  we  feel  and 
"  know  by  experience  that  we  are  eternal "  is  mere  senti- 
ment, or  signifies  an  unaccountable  impression  that  we  are 
immortal.  The  eyes  of  the  mind  are  demonstrations.  They 
are  the  mind,  as  the  eyes  are  the  body,  and  through  them 
the  mind  becomes  aware  of  eternal  truth ;  through  them 
is  eternal  truth  admitted  to  the  mind  to  form  a  part  of  it, 
and  through  them  does  the  mind  know  its  relationship  to 
truth  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  time. 

The  38th,  39th,  and  40th  Propositions  again  take  up 
the  same  subject.     The  38th  Proposition  is  to  this  ullect— 

"  The  more  objects  the  mind  understands  by  the  second 


xxxvi  PREFACE. 

'•'and  third  kinds  of  knowledge,  the  less  it  suffers 
"  from  those  affects  which  are  evil,  and  the  less  it 
"  fears  death." 

And  the  scholium  is — 

"  We  are  thus  enabled  to  understand  that  which  I 
"  touched  upon  in  Schol.  Prop.  39,  pt.  4,  and  which  I 
"  promised  to  explain  in  this  part,  namely,  that  death  is 
"  by  so  much  the  less  injurious  to  us  as  the  clear  and 
'•'distinct  knowledge  of  the  mind  is  greater,  and  conse- 
"  quently  as  the  mind  loves  God  more.  Again,  since 
"  (Prop.  27,  pt.  5),  from  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  there 
"  arises  the  highest  possible  peace,  it  follows  that  it  is 
"  possible  for  the  human  mind  to  be  of  such  a  nature  that 
"  that  part  of  it  which  we  have  shown  perishes  with  its 
"  body  (Prop.  21,  pt.  5),  in  comparison  with  the  part  of  it 
"  which  remains,  is  of  no  consequence.  But  more  fully 
"  upon  this  subject  presently." 
The  39th  Proposition  is — 

"  He  who  possesses  a  body  lit  for  many  things  possesses 
"  a  mind  of  which  the  greater  part  is  eternal,"  the  proof 
being  that  the  possessor  of  such  a  body  is  least  agitated 
by  affects  which  are  evil ;  can  consequently  arrange  and 
concatenate  the  affections  of  the  body  according  to  the 
order  of  the  intellect ;  can  therefore  cause  all  the  affec- 
tions of  the  body  to  be  related  to  God's  idea,  and  so  attain 
a  love  to  God  which  must  occupy  or  form  the  greatest 
part  of  the  mind.  He  has  a  mind  therefore,  the  greatest 
part  of  which  is  eternal. 

The  40th  Proposition  with  its  corollary  is  as  follows — 

"  The  more  perfection  a  thing  possesses,  the  more  it  acts 
"  and  the  less  it  suffers,  and  conversely  the  more  it 
"  acts  the  more  perfect  it  is." 

"  Dcmonst.—ThQ  more  perfect  a  thing  is,  the  more  reality 


PREFACE.  xxx^ii 

"  it  possesses  (Def.  6,  pt.  2),  and  cousequently  (Trop.  3, 
"  pt.  3  with  the  Schol.)  the  more  it  acts  and  tlie  less  it 
"  suffers.  Inversely  also  it  may  be  demonstrated  in  tlie 
"  same  way  that  the  more  a  thing  acts  the  more  perfect 
"  it  is. — Q.E.D." 

"  Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  that  part  of  the  mind 
"  which  abides,  whether  great  or  small,  is  more  perfect 
"  than  the  other  part.  For  the  part  of  the  mind  which  is 
"  eternal  (Props.  23  and  29,  pt.  5)  is  the  intellect,  through 
"  which  alone  we  are  said  to  act  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  but  that 
"  part  which,  as  we  have  shown,  perishes,  is  the  imagina- 
'•'  tion  itself  (Prop.  21,  pt.  5),  through  which  alone  we  are 
"  said  to  suffer  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3,  and  the  general  definition 
"  of  the  affects).  Therefore  (Prop.  40,  pt.  5)  that  part 
"  which  abides,  whether  great  or  small,  is  more  perfect 
"  than  the  latter. — Q.E.D." 

To  sum  up.  The  essence  of  this  or  that  human  body 
being  a  modification  of  this  or  that  attribute  of  God 
expressing  His  nature  in  a  certain  determinate  manner 
exists  in  Him  under  the  form  of  eternity ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  idea,  of  which  this  or  that  human  body  is  the  object 
is  eternal.  What  then,  more  exactly,  is  that  idea,  that 
part  which  is  eternal  or  which  is  not  expressed  by  dura- 
tion? It  is  what  the  mind  knows  by  the  second  and 
third  kind  of  knowledge,  by  reason  and  by  intuition. 
It  is  the  intellect  as  distinguished  from  the  imagination 
which  perishes.  It  is  that  through  which  we  are  active 
as  distinguished  from  that  through  which  we  are  subject 
to  passion. 

Such  is  Spinoza's  teaching.  Although  it  becomes  more 
intelligible  like  many  other  difficulties  when  it  is  fairly 
exhibited,  it  is  still  abstruse  and  many  questions  ari.sc 
The  difficulties  lie  in  the  conception  of  an  eternity  in 
which  there  is  no  time,  no  succession,  and  in  the  con- 
ception also  of  the  body  as  the  object  of  the  mind. 

With  regard  to  eternity,  the  Christian  reliyiou  is  at 


xxxviii  PREFACE. 

one  with  Spinoza,  God,  says  the  Larger  Catechism,  is 
"  eternal,  unchangeable,  incomprehensible."  "  Nothing," 
adds  the  Confession  of  Faith,  "  is  to  Him  contingent  or 
"  uncertain  ...  in  His  sight  all  things  are  open  and 
"  manifest  .  .  .  He  hath  not  decreed  anything  because 
"  He  foresaw  it  as  future,  or  as  that  which  would  come  to 
"  pass  upon  such  conditions."  Here  we  have  obviously 
a  conception  of  a  Being  in  whom  there  is  no  before  or 
after,  and  to  whom  a  million  years  hence  is  as  truly 
])resent  as  to-day.  The  Christian  religion  is  in  truth  full 
of  these  mysteries  which  we  mouth  glibly  enough,  but 
when  they  are  originally  presented  to  us  and  in  different 
language  we  exclaim  against  them  as  absurdities. 

With  regard  to  the  second  difficulty,  it  is  one  which  is 
carried  over  from  Spinoza's  assumption  of  the  unity  of 
body  and  mind.  To  him  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing 
considered  now  under  the  attribute  of  thought  and  now 
under  the  attribute  of  extension.  We  cannot  see  why, 
if  this  be  so,  the  idea  of  the  body  should  only  include  the 
active  intellect.  When,  however,  we  hear  simply  that  the 
active  intellect  is  immortal  and  increases  in  immortality 
as  it  knows  more  things  by  the  second  and  third  kinds  of 
knowledge  we  are  on  firmer  ground.  Spinoza  affirms  an 
immortality  of  degrees ;  the  soul  which  is  most  of  a  soul 
being  least  under  the  dominion  of  death.  Every  adequate 
idea  gained,  every  victory  achieved  by  the  intellectual 
part  of  us,  is  the  addition  of  something  permanent  to  us. 
Surely  no  nobler  incentive  to  the  highest  aims  and  the 
most  strenuous  exertion  has  ever  been  offered  to  the 
world.  Every  deed  of  self-denial  done  in  secret,  every 
conviction  wrought  in  secret,  laboriously  strengthened  and 
sharpened  into  distinct  definition  by  diligent  practice,  is 
recorded  in  a  Book  for  ever  with  no  possibility  of  mistake 
or  erasure. 


Jirst  Part 

OF  GOD. 

Definitions. 

I.  By  cause  of  itself,  I  understand  that,  whose  essence 
involves  existence ;  or  that,  whose  nature  cannot  be  con- 
ceived unless  existing. 

II.  That  thing  is  called  finite  in  its  own  kind  (in 
suo  genere)  which  can  be  limited  by  another  thing  of  the 
same  nature.  For  example,  a  body  is  called  finite,  be- 
cause we  always  conceive  another  which  is  greater.  So 
a  thought  is  limited  by  another  thought ;  but  a  body  is 
not  limited  by  a  thought,  nor  a  thought  by  a  hotly. 

III.  By  substance,  I  understand  that  which  is  in 
itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself;  in  other  words, 
that,  the  conception  of  which  does  not  need  the  concep- 
tion of  another  thing  from  which  it  must  be  formed. 

lY.  By  attribute,  I  understand  that  which  the  intel- 
lect perceives  of  substance,  as  if  constituting  its  essence. 

V.  By  mode,  I  understand  the  affections  of  substance, 
or  that  which  is  in  another  thing  through  which  also 
it  is  conceived. 

VL  By  God,  I  understand  Being  absolutely  infinite, 
that  is  to  say,  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes, 
each  one  of  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence. 

Uxplanation. — I  say  absolutely  infinite  but  not  infinite 

A 


2  ETHIC. 

in  its  own  kind  {in  suo  gcnere)  ;  for  of  whatever  is  infinite 
only  in  its  own  kind  {in  silo  genere),  we  can  deny  infinite 
attributes ;  but  to  the  essence  of  that  which  is  absolutely 
infinite  pertains  whatever  expresses  essence  and  involves 
no  negation, 

VII.  That  thing  is  called  free  which  exists  from  the 
necessity  of  its  own  nature  alone,  and  is  determined  to 
action  by  itself  alone.  That  thing,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  called  necessary,  or  rather  compelled,  which  by  another 
is  determined  to  existence  and  action  in  a  fixed  and  pre- 
scribed manner. 

VIII.  By  eternity,  I  understand  existence  itself,  so 
far  as  it  is  conceived  necessarily  to  follow  from  the  defi- 
nition alone  of  an  eternal  thing. 

Explanation. — For  such  an  existence  is  conceived  as 
eternal  truth  ;  and  also  as  the  essence  of  the  thing.  It 
cannot  therefore  be  explained  by  duration  or  time,  even 
if  the  duration  be  conceived  without  beginning  or  end. 

Axioms. 

I.  Everything  which  is,  is  either  in  itself  or  in  another. 

II.  That  which  cannot  be  conceived  through  another 
must  be  conceived  through  itself. 

III.  From  a  given  determinate  cause  an  effect  neces- 
sarily follows ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  no  determinate 
cause  be  given,  it  is  impossible  that  an  effect  can  follow. 

IV.  The  knowledge  (cognitio)  of  an  effect  depends 
upon  and  involves  the  knowledge  of  the  cause. 

V.  Those  things  which  have  nothing  mutually  in 
common  with  one  another  cannot  through  one  another 
be  mutually  understood,  that  is  to  say,  the  conception 
of  the  one  does  not  involve  the  conception  of  the  other. 

VI.  A  true  idea  must  agree  with  that  of  which  it  is 
the  idea  {cum  suo  idcato). 

VII.  The  essence  of  that  thing  which  can  be  con- 
ceived as  not  existing  does  not  involve  existence. 


OF  GOD. 


PiiOP.  I. — Substance  is  hj  its  nature  prior  to  its 
affections. 

Devionst. — This  is  evident  from  Defs.  3  and  5. 


Prop.  II. —  Two  substances  having  different  attributes  have 
nothing  in  common  with  one  another. 

Demonst. — This  is  also  evident  from  i)ef  3.  For  each 
substance  must  be  in  itself  and  must  be  conceived  through 
itself,  that  is  to  say,  the  conception  of  one  does  not  involve 
the  conception  of  the  other. — q.kd. 

Prop.  III. — If  tioo  things  have  nothing  in  common  with 
one  another,  one  cannot  be  the  caiise  of  the  other. 

Demonst. — If  they  have  nothing  mutually  in  common 
with  one  another,  they  cannot  (Ax.  5)  through  one  an- 
other be  mutually  understood,  and  therefore  (Ax.  4)  one 
cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  other. — q.e.d. 


Prop.  IV. — Ttvo  or  more  distinct  things  are  distinguished 
from  one  another,  either  by  the  difference  of  the  attri- 
butes of  the  substances,  or  by  the  difference  of  their 
affections. 

'  Demonst. — Everything  -which  is,  is  either  in  itself  or 
in  another  (Ax.  i),  that  is  to  say  (I)efs.  3  and  5),  outside 
the  intellect  there  is  nothing  but  substances  and  their 
affections.  There  is  nothing  therefore  outside  the  intel- 
lect by  which  a  number  of  things  can  be  distinguisiied 
one  from  another,  but  substances  or  (which  is  the  same 
thing  by  Def  4)  their  attributes  and  their  affections. — 

Q.E.D. 


4  ETHIC. 

Pfior.  V. — In  nature  there  cannot  he  tioo  or  more  sub- 
stances of  the  same  nature  or  attribute. 

Demonst. — If  there  were  two  or  more  distinct  sub- 
stances, they  must  be  distinguished  one  from  the  other 
by  difference  of  attributes  or  difference  of  affections 
(Prop.  4).  If  they  are  distinguished  only  by  difference 
of  attributes,  it  will  be  granted  that  there  is  but  one 
substance  of  the  same  attribute.  But  if  they  are  distin- 
guished by  difference  of  affections,  since  substance  is 
prior  by  nature  to  its  affections  (Prop,  i),  the  affections 
therefore  being  placed  on  one  side,  and  the  substance 
being  considered  in  itself,  or,  in  other  words  (Def.  3  and 
Ax.  6),  truly  considered,  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  distin- 
guished from  another  substance,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  4), 
there  cannot  i3e  two  or  more  substances,  but  only  one 
possessing  the  same  nature  or  attribute. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  VI. — One  substance  cannot  be  produced  by  another 
substance. 

Demonst. — There  cannot  in  nature  be  two  substances 
of  the  same  attribute  (Prop.  5),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  2), 
two  which  have  anything  in  common  with  one  another. 
And  therefore  (Prop.  3)  one  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the 
other,  that  is  to  say,  one  cannot  be  produced  by  the 
other. — Q.E.D. 

Gorol. — Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  nothing  by 
which  substance  can  be  produced,  for  in  nature  there  is 
nothing  but  substances  and  their  affections  (as  is  evident 
from  Ax.  i  and  Defs.  3  and,  5).  But  substance  cannot 
be  produced  by  substance  (Prop.  6).  Therefore  abso- 
lutely there  is  nothing  by  which  substance  can  be  pro- 
duced.— Q.E.D. 

Another  Dem.onst. — This  corollary  is  demonstrated 
more  easily  by  the  reductio  ad  absurdum.  For  if  there 
were  anything  by  which  substance  could  be  produced, 
the  knowledge  of  substance  would  be  dependent  upon 


OF  GOD. 


V-. 


the  knowledge  of  its  cause  (Ax.  4),  and  therefore  (1  )cf.  3) 
it  would  not  be  substance. 

Prop.  YII. — It  pertains  to  the  nature  of  substance  to  ca-ial. 

Demonst. — There  is  notliing  by  wliich  substance  can 
be  produced  (Corol.  Prop.  6).  It  will  therefore  be  the 
cause  of  itself,  that  is  to  say  (Def,  i),  its  essence  neces- 
sarily involves  existence,  or  in  other  words  it  pertains  to 
its  nature  to  exist. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  VIII. — Every  sulstance  is  neccssarihi  infinite. 

Demonst. — Substance  which  has  only  one  attribute 
cannot  exist  except  as  one  substance  (Prop.  5),  and  to 
the  nature  of  this  one  substance  it  pertains  to  exist  (Prop. 
7),  It  must  therefore  from  its  nature  exist  as  fmite  or 
infinite.  But  it  cannot  exist  as  finite  substance,  for  (Def. 
2)  it  must  (if  finite)  be  limited  by  another  substance 
of  the  same  nature,  which  also  must  necessarily  exist 
(Prop.  7),  and  therefore  there  would  be  two  substances 
of  the  same  attribute,  which  is  absurd  (Prop.  5).  It  exists 
therefore  as  infinite  substance. — Q.e.d. 

Schol.  I. — Since  finiteness  is  in  truth  partly  negation, 
and  infinitude  absolute  affirmation  of  existence  of  some 
kind,  it  follows  from  Prop.  7  alone  that  all  substance 
must  be  infinite. 

Sclwl.  2. — I  fully  expect  that  those  who  judge  things 
confusedly,  and  who  have  not  been  accustomed  to  cognise 
things  through  their  first  causes,  will  find  it  difficult  to 
comprehend  the  demonstration  of  the  7th  Proposition, 
since  they  do  not  distinguish  between  the  modiiications 
of  substances  and  substances  themselves,  and  are  igno- 
rant of  the  manner  in  which  things  are  produced.  Hence 
it  comes  to  pass  that  they  erroneously  ascribe  to  substances 
a  beginning  like  that  which  they  see  belongs  to  natural 
things ;  for  those  who  are  ignorant  of  the  true  causes  of 
things  confound  everything,  and  witliout  any  mental 
repugnance  represent  trees  speaking  like  men,  or  imagine 


6  ETHIC. 

that  men  are  made  out  of  stones  as  well  as  Legotten 
from  seed,  and  that  all  forms  can  be  changed  the  one 
into  the  other.  So  also  those  who  confound  human  nature 
with  the  divine,  readily  attribute  to  God  human  affects,^ 
especially  so  long  as  they  are  ignorant  of  the  manner  in 
which  affects  are  produced  in  the  mind.  But  if  men 
would  attend  to  the  nature  of  substance,  they  could  not 
entertain  a  single  doubt  of  the  truth  of  Proposition  7  ; 
indeed  this  proposition  would  be  considered  by  all  to  be 
axiomatic,  and  reckoned  amongst  common  notions.  For 
by  "  substance  "  would  be  understood  that  which  is  in 
itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself,  or,  in  other  words, 
that,  the  knowledge  of  which  does  not  need  the  know- 
ledge of  another  thing.  But  by  "  modifications  "  would  be 
understood  those  things  which  are  in  another  thing — those 
things,  the  conception  of  which  is  formed  from  the  concep- 
tion of  the  thing  in  which  they  are.  Hence  we  can  have 
true  ideas  of  non-existent  modifications,  since  although 
they  may  not  actually  exist  outside  the  intellect,  their 
essence  nevertheless  is  so  comprehended  in  something  else, 
that  they  may  be  conceived  through  it.  But  the  truth 
of  substances  is  not  outside  the  intellect  unless  in  the 
substances  themselves,  because  they  are  conceived  through 
themselves.  If  any  one,  therefore,  were  to  say  that  he 
possessed  a  clear  and  distinct,  that  is  to  say,  a  true  idea 
of  substance,  and  that  he  nevertheless  doubted  whether 
such  a  substance  exists,  he  would  forsooth  be  in  the  same 
position  as  if  he  were  to  say  that  he  had  a  true  idea  and 
nevertheless  doubted  whether  or  not  it  was  false  (as  is 
evident  to  any  one  who  pays  a  little  attention).  Similarly 
if  any  one  were  to  affirm  that  substance  is  created,  he 
would  affirm  at  the  same  time  that  a  false  idea  had  become 
true,  and  this  is  a  greater  absurdity  than  can  be  conceived. 

1  Affectum  is  translated  by  "af-  Affectus  has  sometimes  been  trans- 
feet "  and  affectio  by  "affection."  lated  "passion,"  but  Spinoza  uses 
There  seems  to  be  no  other  way  in  jmssio  for  passion,  and  means  some- 
the  English  language  of  marking  thing  different  from  affectus.  See 
the  relationship  of  the  two  words  Def.  III.,  part  3. 
and  preserving  their  exact  meaning. 


I 


OF  GOD.  y 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  admit  that  the  existence  of  sub- 
stance, like  its  essence,  is  an  eternal  truth.  Hence  u 
demonstration  (which  I  have  thought  wortli  while  to 
append)  by  a  difierent  method  is  possible,  showing  tliat 
there  are  not  two  substances  possessing  the  same  nature. 
But  in  order  to  prove  this  methodically  it  is  to  be  noted  : 
I.  That  the  true  definition  of  any  one  thing  neither 
involves  nor  expresses  anything  except  the  nature  of  the 
thing  defined.  From  which  it  follows,  2.  That  a  defini- 
tion does  not  involve  or  express  any  certain  number  of 
individuals,  since  it  expresses  nothing  but  the  nature  of 
the  thing  defined.  For  example,  the  definition  of  a 
triangle  expresses  nothing  but  the  simple  nature  of 
a  triangle,  and  not  any  certain  inimber  of  triangles. 
3.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  of  every  existing  thing 
there  is  some  certain  cause  by  reason  of  which  it 
exists.  4.  Finally,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  this  cause, 
by  reason  of  which  a  thing  exists,  must  either  be  con- 
tained in  the  nature  itself  and  definition  of  the  existing 
thing  (simply  because  it  pertains  to  the  nature  of  the 
thing  to  exist),  or  it  must  exist  outside  the  thing. 
This  being  granted,  it  follows  that  if  a  certain  num- 
ber of  individuals  exist  in  nature,  there  must  neces- 
sarily be  a  cause  why  those  individuals,  and  neither 
more  nor  fewer,  exist.  If,  for  example,  there  are  twenty 
men  in  existence  (whom,  for  the  sake  of  greater  clearness, 
I  suppose  existing  at  the  same  time,  and  that  no  otliers 
existed  before  them),  it  will  not  be  sullicient,  in  order 
that  we  may  give  a  reason  why  twenty  men  exist,  to 
give  a  cause  for  human  nature  generally ;  but  it  will  be 
necessary,  in  addition,  to  give  a  reason  why  neither  more 
nor  fewer  than  twenty  exist,  since,  as  we  have  already 
observed  under  the  third  head,  there  must  necessarily  be 
a  cause  why  each  exists.  But  this  cause  (as  we  have 
shown  under  the  second  and  third  heads)  cannot  be  con- 
tained in  human  nature  itself,  since  the  true  definition  of 
a  man  does  not  involve  the  number  twenty,  and  therefore 


8  ETHIC. 

(by  the  fourth  head)  the  cause  why  these  twenty  men 
exist,  and  consequently  the  cause  why  each  exists,  must 
necessarily  lie  outside  each  one ;  and  therefore  we  must 
conclude  generally  that  everything  of  such  a  nature  that 
there  can  exist  several  individuals  of  it  must  necessarily 
have  an  external  cause  of  their  existence. 

Since  now  it  pertains  to  the  nature  of  substance  to 
exist  (as  we  have  shown  in  this  scholium),  its  definition 
must  involve  necessary  existence,  and  consequently  from 
its  definition  alone  its  existence  must  be  concluded.  But 
from  its  definition  (as  we  have  already  shown  under  the 
second  and  third  heads)  the  existence  of  more  substances 
than  one  cannot  be  deduced.  It  follows,  therefore,  from 
this  definition  necessarily  that  there  cannot  be  two  sub- 
stances possessing  the  same  nature. 

PltOP.  IX. — Tlic  more  reality  or  leing  a  thing  j^ossesscs,  the 
more  attributes  belong  to  it. 

Demonst. — This  is  evident  from  Def.  4. 

PKOr.  X. — Each  attribute  of  a  substance  must  he  conceived 
through  itself. 

Demonst. — For  an  attribute  is  that  which  the  intel- 
lect perceives  of  substance,  as  if  constituting  its  essence 
(Def.  4),  and  therefore  (Def.  3)  it  must  be  conceived 
through  itself. — q.e.d. 

Sehol. — From  this  it  is  apparent  that  although  two 
attributes  may  be  conceived  as  really  distinct — that  is  to 
say,  one  without  the  assistance  of  the  other — we  cannot 
nevertheless  thence  conclude  that  they  constitute  two 
beings  or  two  different  substances ;  for  this  is  the  nature  of 
substance,  that  each  of  its  attributes  is  conceived  through 
itself,  since  all  the  attributes  which  substance  possesses 
were  always  at  the  same  time  in  itself,  nor  could  one  be 
produced  by  another ;  but  each  expresses  the  reality  or 
being  of  substance.      It  is  very  far  from  being  absurd. 


OF  GOD.  g 

therefore,  to  ascribe  to  one  substance  a  number  of 
attributes,  since  nothing  in  nature  is  clearer  tlian  that 
each  being  must  be  conceived  under  some  one  attribute, 
and  the  more  reality  or  being  it  has,  the  more  attributes 
it  possesses  expressing  necessity  or  eternity  and  infinity. 
Nothing  consequently  is  clearer  than  that  IJeing  abso- 
lutely infinite  is  necessarily  defined,  as  we  have  shown 
(Def.  6),  as  Being  which  consists  of  infinite  attributes, 
each  one  of  which  expresses  a  certain  essence,  eternal 
and  infinite.  But  if  any  one  now  asks  by  what  sign, 
therefore,  we  may  distinguish  between  substances,  let 
him  read  the  following  propositions,  which  show  that  in 
nature  only  one  substance  exists,  and  that  it  is  absolutely 
infinite.  For  this  reason  that  sign  would  be  sought  for  in 
vain. 

Peop.  XI. — God,  or  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attri-     L 
lutes,  each  one  of  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite 

essence,  necessarily  exists. 

Demonst. — If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  it  be  possible, 
that  God  does  not  exist.  Then  it  follows  (Ax.  7)  that 
His  essence  does  not  involve  existence.  But  this  (Prop. 
7)  is  absurd.      Therefore  God  necessarily  exists. — Q.E.D. 

AnothsT^  proof. — For  the  existence  or  non-existence  of 
everything  there  must  be  a  reason  or  cause.  For  example, 
if  a  triangle  exists,  there  must  be  a  reason  or  cause  why 
it  exists  ;  and  if  it  does  not  exist,  there  must  be  a  reason 
or  cause  which  hinders  its  existence  or  which  negates 
it.  But  this  reason  or  cause  must  either  be  contained  in 
the  nature  of  the  thing  or  lie  outside  it.  For  example, 
the  nature  of  the  thing  itself  shows  the  reason  why  a 
square  circle  does  not  exist,  the  reason  being  that  a 
square  circle  involves  a  contradiction.  And  the  reason,  on 
the  other  hand,  why  substance  exists  follows  from  its 
nature  alone,  whibh  involves  existence  (see  Prop.  7). 
But  the  reason  why  a  circle  or  triangle  exists  or  doca 


lo  ETHIC. 

not  exist  is  not  drawn  from  their  nature,  but  from  the 
order  of  corporeal  nature  generally ;  for  from  that  it 
must  follow,  either  that  a  triangle  necessarily  exists, 
or  that  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  exist.  But  this  is  self- 
evident.  Therefore  it  follows  that  if  there  be  no  cause 
nor  reason  which  hinders  a  thing  from  existing,  it  exists 
necessarily.  If,  therefore,  there  be  no  reason  nor  cause 
which  hinders  God  from  existing,  or  which  negates  His 
existence,  we  must  conclude  absolutely  that  He  neces- 
sarily exists.  But  if  there  be  such  a  reason  or  cause,  it 
must  be  either  in  the  nature  itself  of  God  or  must  lie 
outside  it,  that  is  to  say,  in  another  substance  of  another 
nature.  For  if  the  reason  lay  in  a  substance  of  the 
same  nature,  the  existence  of  God  would  be  by  this  very 
fact  admitted.  But  substance  possessing  another  nature 
could  have  nothing  in  common  with  God  (Prop.  2),  and 
therefore  could  not  give  Him  existence  nor  negate  it. 
Since,  therefore,  the  reason  or  cause  which  could  negate 
the  divine  existence  cannot  be  outside  the  divine  nature, 
it  will  necessarily,  supposing  that  the  divine  nature  does 
not  exist,  be  in  His  nature  itself,  which  would  therefore 
involve  a  contradiction.  But  to  affirm  this  of  the  Being 
absolutely  infinite  and  consummately  perfect  is  absurd. 
Therefore  neither  in  God  nor  outside  God  is  there  any 
cause  or  reason  which  can  negate  His  existence,  and 
therefore  God  necessarily  exists. — Q.E.D. 

Another  proof. — Inability  to  exist  is  impotence,  and,' 
on  the  other  hand,  ability  to  exist  is  power,  as  is  self- 
evident.  If,  therefore,  there  is  notliing  which  necessarily 
exists  excepting  things  finite,  it  follows  that  things  finite 
are  more  powerful  than  the  absolutely  infinite  Being,  and 
this  (as  is  self-evident)  is  absurd  ;  therefore  either  nothing 
exists  or  Being  absolutely  infinite  also  necessarily  exists. 
But  we  ourselves  exist,  either  in  ourselves  or  in  some- 
thing else  which  necessarily  exists  (Ax.  i  and  Prop.  7). 
Therefore  the  Being  absolutely  infinite,  that  is  to  say, 
(Def.  6),  God,  necessarily  exists. — Q.E.D. 


OF  GOD.  I, 

SchoL — In  this  last  demonstration  I  wished  to  prove 
tlie  existence  of  God  ct  posteriori,  in  order  that  tlic  de- 
monstration might  be  the  more  easily  understood,  and  not 
because  the  existence  of  God  does  not  follow  a  jviori  from 
the  same  grounds.  For  since  ability  to  exist  is  power, 
it  follows  that  the  more  reality  belongs  to  the  nature  of 
anything,  the  greater  is  the  power  for  existence  it  derives 
from  itself ;  and  it  also  folloM's,  therefore,  that  the  I'einj,' 
absolutely  infinite,  or  God,  has  from  Himself  an  absolutely 
infinite  power  of  existence,  and  that  He  therefore  neces- 
sarily exists.  Many  persons,  nevertheless,  will  perhaps 
not  be  able  easily  to  see  the  force  of  this  demonstratinn. 
because  they  have  been  accustomed  to  contemplate  tliosc 
things  alone  which  flow  from  external  causes,  and  they 
see  also  that  those  things  which  are  quickly  produced  from 
these  causes,  that  is  to  say,  which  easily  exist,  easily 
perish,  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  they  adjudge  those 
things  to  be  of  a  more  difficult  origin,  that  is  to  say,  their 
existence  is  not  so  easy,  to  which  they  conceive  more 
properties  pertain.  In  order  that  these  prejudices 
may  be  removed,  I  do  not  need  here  to  show  in  what 
respect  this  saying,  "What  is  quickly  made  quickly 
perishes,"  is  true,  nor  to  inquire  whether,  looking  at  tla- 
whole  of  nature,  all  things  are  or  are  not  equally  easy. 
But  this  only  it  will  be  sufficient  for  me  to  observe,  that 
I  do  not  speak  of  things  which  are  produced  by  exter- 
nal causes,  but  that  I  speak  of  substances  alone  which 
(Prop.  6)  can  be  produced  by  no  external  cause.  For 
whatever  perfection  or  reality  those  things  may  have 
which  are  produced  by  external  causes,  whether  they 
consist  of  many  parts  or  of  few,  they  owe  it  all  to  the 
virtue  of  an  external  cause,  and  therefore  their  existencf 
springs  from  the  perfection  of  an  external  cause 
alone  and  not  from  their  own.  On  the  other  hand. 
whatever  perfection  substance  has  is  due  to  no  extcrnnl 
cause.  Therefore  its  existence  must  follow  fruin  its 
nature   alone,   and    is    therefore   nothing    el.se   than    it.s 


12  ETHIC. 

essence.  Perfection  consequently  does  not  prevent  the 
existence  of  a  thing,  but  establishes  it;  imperfection,  on  the 
other  hand,  prevents  existence,  and  so  of  no  existence  can 
we  be  more  sure  than  of  the  existence  of  the  Being 
absolutely  infinite  or  perfect,  that  is  to  say,  God,  For 
since  His  essence  shuts  out  all  imperfection  and  involves 
absolute  perfection,  for  this  very  reason  all  cause  of 
doubt  concerning  its  existence  is  taken  away,  and  the 
highest  certainty  concerning  it  is  given, — a  truth  which 
I  trust  will  be  evident  to  any  one  who  bestows  only 
moderate  attention. 

Pkop.  XII. — No  attribute  of  substance  can  be  truly  con- 
ceived from  ichich  it  follows  that  substance  can  be 
divided. 

Demonst. — For  the  parts  into  which  substance  thus 
conceived  would  be  divided  will  or  will  not  retain  the 
nature  of  substance.  If  they  retain  it,  then  (Prop.  8) 
each  part  will  be  infinite,  and  (Prop.  6)  the  cause  of  itself, 
and  will  consist  of  an  attribute  differing  from  that  of 
any  other  part  (Prop.  5),  so  that  from  one  substance  more 
substances  could  be  ibrmed,  which  (Prop.  6)  is  absurd. 
Moreover  the  parts  (Prop.  2)  would  have  nothing  in 
common  with  their  whole,  and  the  whole  (Def.  4  and 
Prop.  10)  could  be,  and  could  be  conceived  without  its 
parts,  which  no  one  will  doubt  to  be  an  absurdity.  But 
if  the  second  case  be  supposed,  namely,  that  the  parts 
will  not  retain  the  nature  of  substance,  then,  since  the 
whole  substance  might  be  divided  into  equal  parts,  it 
would  lose  the  nature  of  substance  and  cease  to  be, 
which  (Prop.  7)  is  absurd. 

Prop.  XIII. — Substance  absolutely  infinite  is  indivisible. 

Demonst. — For  if  it  were  divisible,  the  parts  into  which 
it  would  be  divided  will  or  will  not  retain  the  nature  of 
substance  absolutely  infinite.      If  they  retain  it,  there  will 


OF  GOD.  ,3 

be  a  plurality  of  substances  possessing  the  same  nature, 
which  (Prop.  5)  is  absurd.  If  the  second  case  be  sup- 
posed, then  (as  above),  substance  absolutely  infinite  can 
cease  to  be,  which  (Prop.  1 1)  is  also  absurd. 

Cowl. — Hence  it  follows  that  no  substance,  and  con- 
sequently no  bodily  substance  in  so  far  as  it  is  substance, 
is  divisible. 

Schol. — That  substance  is  indivisible  is  more  easily  to 
be  understood  from  this  consideration  alone,  that  the 
nature  of  substance  cannot  be  conceived  unless  as  infinite, 
and  that  by  a  part  of  substance  nothing  else  can  be 
understood  than  finite  substance,  which  (Prop.  8)  involves 
a  manifest  contradiction. 

Prop.  XIY. — Besides  God,  no  suhsiance  can  he  nor  can 
be  conceived. 

Demonst. — Since  God  is  Being  absolutely  infinite,  of 
whom  no  attribute  can  be  denied  which  expresses  the 
essence  of  substance  (Def.  6),  and  since  He  necessarily 
exists  (Prop.  11),  it  follows  that  if  there  were  any  sub- 
stance besides  God,  it  would  have  to  be  explained  by 
some  attribute  of  God,  and  thus  two  substances  woulil 
exist  possessing  the  same  attribute,  which  (Prop.  5)  is 
absurd ;  and  therefore  there  cannot  be  any  substance  ex- 
cepting God,  and  consequently  none  other  can  be  con- 
ceived. For  if  any  other  could  be  conceived,  it  would 
necessarily  be  conceived  as  existing,  and  this  (by  the  first 
part  of  this  demonstration)  is  absurd.  Therefore  besides 
God  no  substance  can  be,  nor  can  be  conceived. — Q.K.D. 

Carol.  I. — Hence  it  follows  with  the  greatest  clearness, 
firstly,  that  God  is  one,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  6),  in  nature 
there  is  but  one  substance,  and  it  is  absolutely  infinite, 
as  (Schol.  Prop.  10)  we  have  already  intimated. 

Carol.  2.— It  follows,  secondly,  that  tlie  thing  extende.l 
(rem  extensam)  and  the  thing  thinking  (rem  cogitantem) 
are  either  attributes  of  God  or  (Ax.  i)  affectiona  of  the 
attributes  of  God. 


14  ETHIC. 

PiiOP.  XV. —  Whatever  is,  is  in  God,  and  nothing  can 
either  he  or  he  conceived  ivithout  God. 

Demonst. — Besides  God  there  is  no  substance,  nor  can 
any  be  conceived  (Prop,  14),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  3),  no- 
thing which  is  in  itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself. 
But  modes  (Def.  5)  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived  with- 
out substance  ;  therefore  in  the  divine  nature  only  can  they 
be,  and  through  it  alone  can  they  be  conceived.  But  be- 
sides substances  and  modes  nothing  is  assumed  (Ax.  i). 
Therefore  nothing  can  be  or  be  conceived  without  God. 
— Q.E.D. 

Schol. — There  are  those  who  imagine  God  to  be  like 
a  man,  composed  of  body  and  soul  and  subject  to  pas- 
sions ;  but  it  is  clear  enough  from  what  has  already  been 
demonstrated  how  far  off  men  who  believe  this  are  from 
the  true  knowledge  of  God.  But  these  I  dismiss,  for 
all  men  who  have  in  any  way  looked  into  the  divine 
nature  deny  that  God  is  corporeal.  That  He  cannot  be 
so  they  conclusively  prove  by  showing  that  by  "  body  "  we 
understand  a  certain  quantity  possessing  length,  breadth, 
and  depth,  limited  by  some  fixed  form;  and  that  to 
attribute  these  to  God,  a  being  absolutely  infinite,  is  the 
greatest  absurdity.  But  yet  at  the  same  time,  from  other 
arguments  by  which  they  endeavour  to  confirm  their  proof, 
they  clearly  show  that  they  remove  altogether  from  the 
divine  nature  substance  itself  corporeal  or  extended,  affirm- 
ing that  it  was  created  by  God.  By  what  divine  power, 
however,  it  could  have  been  created  they  are  altogether 
ignorant,  so  that  it  is  clear  they  do  not  understand  what 
they  themselves  say.  But  I  have  demonstrated,  at  least 
in  my  own  opinion,  with  sufficient  clearness  (see  Corol. 
Prop.  6  and  Schol.  2,  Prop.  8),  that  no  substance  can  be 
produced  or  created  by  another.  Moreover  (Prop.  14), 
we  have  shown  that  besides  God  no  substance  can  be 
nor  can  be  conceived ;  and  hence  we  have  concluded 
that  extended  substance  is  one  of  the  infinite  attributes 


OF  GOD. 


>5 


of  God.  But  for  the  sake  of  a  fuller  explanation,  I  will 
refute  my  adversaries'  arguments,  which,  taken  aUojjothor, 
come  to  this.  First,  that  corporeal  substance,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  substance,  consists,  as  they  suppose,  of  parts,  and 
therefore  they  deny  that  it  can  be  infinite,  and  con- 
sequently that  it  can  pertain  to  God.  This  they  illustrate 
by  many  examples,  one  or  two  of  which  I  will  adduce. 
If  corporeal  substance,  they  say,  be  infinite,  let  us  con- 
ceive it  to  be  divided  into  two  parts  ;  each  part,  therefore, 
will  be  either  finite  or  infinite.  If  each  part  be  finite, 
then  the  infinite  is  composed  of  two  finite  parts,  which 
is  absurd.  If  each  part  be  infinite,  there  is  then  an 
infinite  twice  as  great  as  another  infinite,  which  is  also 
absurd.  Again,  if  infinite  quantity  be  measured  by  equal 
parts  of  a  foot  each,  it  must  contain  an  infinite  number  of 
such  parts,  and  similarly  if  it  be  measured  by  equal  parts  of 
an  inch  each ;  and  therefore  one  infinite  number  will  be 
twelve  times  greater  than  another  infinite  number.  Lastly, 
if  from  one  point  of  any  infinite  quantity  it  be  imagined 
that  two  lines,  AB,  AC,  which  at  first  are  at  a  certain 


and  determinate  distance  from  one  another,  be  infinitely 
extended,  it  is  plain  that  the  distance  between  B  and  C 
will  be  continually  increased,  and  at  length  from  being 
determinate  will  be  indeterminable.  Since  therefore  these 
absurdities  follow,  as  they  think,  from  supposing  quantity 
to  be  infinite,  they  conclude  that  corporeal  substance 
must  be  finite,  and  consequently  cannot  pertain  to  the 
essence  of  God.  A  second  argument  is  assumed  from 
the  absolute  perfection  of  God.  For  God,  they  say,  since 
He  is  a  being  absolutely  perfect,  cannot  suffer ;  but  cor- 
poreal   substance,   since    it   is   divisible,   can   suffer:    it 


1 6  ETHIC. 

follows,  therefore,  that  it  does  not  pertain  to  God's 
essence.  These  are  the  arguments  which  I  find  in 
authors,  by  which  they  endeavour  to  show  that  corporeal 
substance  is  unworthy  of  the  divine  nature,  and  cannot 
pertain  to  it.  But  any  one  who  will  properly  attend 
will  discover  that  I  have  already  answered  these  argu- 
ments, since  the  sole  foundation  of  them  is  the  supposi- 
tion that  bodily  substance  consists  of  parts,  a  supposition 
which  (Prop.  12  and  Corol.  Prop.  13)  I  have  shown  to 
be  absurd.  ]\Ioreover,  if  any  one  will  rightly  consider  the 
matter,  he  will  see  that  all  these  absurdities  (supposing 
that  they  are  all  absurdities,  a  point  which  I  will  now 
take  for  granted),  from  which  these  authors  attempt 
to  draw  the  conclusion  that  substance  extended  is  finite, 
do  not  by  any  means  follow  from  the  supposition  that 
quantity  is  infinite,  but  from  the  supposition  that  infinite 
quantity  is  measurable,  and  that  it  is  made  up  of  finite 
parts.  Therefore,  from  the  absurdities  to  which  this 
leads  nothing  can  be  concluded,  excepting  that  infinite 
quantity  is  not  measurable,  and  that  it  cannot  be  com- 
posed of  finite  parts.  But  this  is  what  we  have  already 
demonstrated  (Prop.  12,  &c.),  and  the  shaft  therefore 
wliich  is  aimed  at  us  turns  against  those  who  cast  it. 
If,  therefore,  from  these  absurdities  any  one  should  at- 
tempt to  conclude  that  substance  extended  must  be  finite, 
he  would,  forsooth,  be  in  the  position  of  the  man  who 
supposes  a  circle  to  have  the  properties  of  a  square, 
and  then  concludes  that  it  has  no  centre,  such  that  all 
the  lines  drawn  from  it  to  the  circumference  are  equal. 
Tor  corporeal  substance,  which  cannot  be  conceived  ex- 
cept as  infinite,  one  and  indivisible  (Props.  8,  5,  and 
12),  is  conceived  by  those  against  whom  I  argue  to 
be  composed  of  finite  parts,  and  to  be  multiplex  and 
divisible,  in  order  that  they  may  prove  it  finite.  Just 
in  the  same  way  others,  after  they  have  imagined  a 
line  to  consist  of  points,  know  how  to  discover  many 
arguments,  by  which  they  show  that  a  line  cannot  be 


OF  GOD.  ,7 

divided  ad  infinitum  ;  and  indeed  it  is  not  less  absurd 
to  suppose  that  corporeal  substance  is  composed  of 
bodies  or  parts  than  to  suppose  that  a  body  is  composed 
of  surfaces,  surfaces  of  lines,  and  that  linos,  linally, 
are  composed  of  points.  Every  one  who  knows  that 
clear  reason  is  infallible  ought  to  admit  this,  and 
especially  those  who  deny  that  a  vacuum  can  exist. 
For  if  corporeal  substance  could  be  so  divided  that  its 
parts  could  be  really  distinct,  why  could  not  one  part 
be  annihilated,  the  rest  remaining,  as  before,  connected 
with  one  another  ?  And  why  must  all  be  so  iitted 
together  that  there  can  be  no  vacuum  ?  For  of  things 
which  are  really  distinct  the  one  from  the  other,  one  can 
be  and  remain  in  its  own  position  without  the  other. 
Since,  therefore,  it  is  supposed  that  there  is  no  vacuum 
in  nature  (about  which  I  will  speak  at  another  time),  but 
that  all  the  parts  must  be  united,  so  that  no  vacuum  can 
exist,  it  follows  that  they  cannot  be  really  distinguished ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  corporeal  substance,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
substance,  cannot  be  divided.  If,  nevertheless,  any  one 
should  now  ask  why  there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  consider 
quantity  as  capable  of  division,  I  reply  that  quantity  is 
conceived  by  us  in  two  ways :  either  abstractly  or  super- 
ficially ;  that  is  to  say,  as  we  imagine  it,  or  else  as  sub- 
stance, in  which  way  it  is  conceived  by  the  intellect  alone. 
If,  therefore,  we  regard  quantity  (as  we  do  very  often  and 
easily)  as  it  exists  in  the  imagination,  we  find  it  to  bo 
finite,  divisible,  and  composed  of  parts ;  but  if  we  regard 
it  as  it  exists  in  the  intellect,  and  conceive  it  in  so  far 
as  it  is  substance,  which  is  very  difficult,  then,  as  we  have 
already  sufficiently  demonstrated,  we  find  it  to  be  infinite, 
one,  and  indivisible.  Tins  will  be  plain  enough  to  all 
who  know  how  to  distinguish  between  the  imagination 
and  the  intellect,  and  more  especially  if  we  remember  that 
matter  is  everywhere  the  same,  and  that,  except  in  so  far 
as  we  regard  it  as  affected  in  different  ways,  parts  are 
not   distinguished  in  it ;    that   is  to  say,  they  are  dis- 

B 


l8  ETHIC. 

tinguislied  with  regard  to  mode,  but  not  with  regard  to 
reality.  For  example,  we  conceive  water  as  being 
divided,  in  so  far  as  it  is  water,  and  that  its  parts  are 
separated  from  one  another  ;  but  in  so  far  as  it  is 
corporeal  substance  we  cannot  thus  conceive  it,  for  as 
such  it  is  neither  separated  nor  divided.  Moreover, 
water,  in  so  far  as  it  is  water,  is  begotten  and  destroyed ; 
but  in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,  it  is  neither  begotten  nor 
destroyed.  By  this  reasoning  I  think  that  I  have  also 
answered  the  second  argument,  since  that  too  is  based 
upon  the  assumption  that  matter,  considered  as  sub- 
stance, is  divisible  and  composed  of  parts.  And  even  if 
what  I  have  urged  were  not  true,  I  do  not  know  why 
matter  should  be  unworthy  of  the  divine  nature,  since 
(Prop.  1 4)  outside  God  no  substance  can  exist  from  which 
the  divine  nature  could  suffer.  All  things,  I  say,  are  in 
God,  and  everything  which  takes  place  takes  place  by  the 
laws  alone  of  the  infinite  nature  of  God,  and  follows  (as  I 
shall  presently  show)  from  the  necessity  of  His  essence. 
Therefore  in  no  way  whatever  can  it  be  asserted  that 
God  suffers  from  anything,  or  that  substance  extended, 
even  if  it  be  supposed  divisible,  is  unworthy  of  the 
divine  nature,  provided  only  it  be  allowed  that  it  is  eternal 
and  infinite.     But  enough  on  this  point  for  the  present. 

Prop.  XVI. — From  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature 
infinite  numbers  of  things  in  infinite  ways  (that  is 
to  say,  all  things  xuhich  can  he  conceived  Toy  the  infinite 
intellect^  must  follow. 

Demonst. — This  proposition  must  be  plain  to  every 
one  who  considers  that  from  the  given  definition  of  any- 
thing a  number  of  properties  necessarily  following  from 
it  (that  is  to  say,  following  from  the  essence  of  the  thing 
itself)  are  inferred  by  the  intellect,  and  just  iu  proportion 
as  the  definition  of  the  thing  expresses  a  greater  reality, 
that  is  to  say,  just  in  proportion  as  the  essence  of  the 


OF  GOD. 


«9 


tiling  defined  involves  a  greater  reality,  will  more  pro- 
perties be  inferred.  But  the  divine  nature  possesses 
absolutely  infinite  attributes  (Def.  6),  each  one  of  which 
expresses  infinite  essence  in  its  own  kind  {in  suo  gcmrc), 
and  therefore,  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature, 
infinite  numbers  of  things  in  infinite  ways  (that  is  to  say, 
all  things  which  can  be  conceived  by  the  infinite  intellect) 
must  necessarily  follow. — q.e.d. 

Cowl.  I. — Hence  it  follows  that  God  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  all  things  which  can  fall  under  the  infinite  in- 
tellect. 

Corol.  2. — It  follow^s,  secondly,  that  God  is  cause 
through  Himself,  and  not  through  that  which  is  con- 
tingent {'per  accidcns). 

Corol.  3. — It  follows,  thirdly,  that  God  is  absolutely     , 
the  first  cause.  (L^v<^  i^''^ 

Peop.  XYII. — God  acts  from  the  laws  of  His  own  nature 
only,  and  is  compelled  hy  no  one. 

Dcmonst.—We  have  just  shown  (Prop.  16)  that  from 
the  necessity,  or  (which  is  the  same  thing)  from  the 
laws  only  of  the  divine  nature,  infinite  numbers  of  things 
absolutely  follow  ;  and  we  have  demonstrated  (Prop.  1 5) 
that  nothing  can  be,  nor  can  be  conceived,  without  CJod, 
but  that  all  things  are  in  God.  Therefore,  outside  Him- 
self, there  can  be  nothing  by  which  He  may  be  deter- 
mined or  compelled  to  act  ;  and  therefore  He  acts  fri.m 
the  laws  of  His  own  nature  only,  and  is  compelled  by 
no  one. — q.e.d. 

Corol.  I.— Hence  it  follows,  firstly,  that  there  is  no 
cause,  either  external  to  God  or  within  Him,  which  can 
excite  Him  to  act  except  the  perfection  of  His  own  nature. 

Coral  2.— It  follows,  secondly,  that  God  alone  is  a 
free  cause  ;  for  God  alone  exists  from  the  necessity 
alone  of  His  own  nature  (Prop.  11,  and  Corol.  I,  Prop- 
14),   and    acts  from    the    necessity  alone  of    His    own 


20  ETHIC. 

nature  (Prop.  17).  Therefore  (Def.  7)  He  alone  is  a 
free  cause. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — There  are  some  who  think  that  God  is  a  free 
cause  because  He  can,  as  they  think,  bring  about  that  those 
things  which  we  have  said  follow  from  His  nature — that 
is  to  say,  those  things  which  are  in  His  power — should 
not  be,  or  should  not  be  produced  by  Him.  But  tliis  is 
simply  saying  that  God  could  bring  about  that  it  should  not 
follow  from  the  nature  of  a  triangle  that  its  three  angles 
should  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  or  that  from  a  given 
cause  an  effect  should  not  follow,  which  is  absurd.  But 
I  shall  show  farther  on,  without  the  help  of  this  proposi- 
tion, that  neither  intellect  nor  will  pertain  to  the  nature 
of  God. 

I  know,  indeed,  that  there  are  many  who  think  them- 
selves able  to  demonstrate  that  intellect  of  the  highest 
order  and  freedom  of  will  both  pertain  to  the  nature  of 
God,  for  they  say  that  they  know  nothing  more  perfect 
which  they  can  attribute  to  Him  than  that  which  is  the 
chief  perfection  in  ourselves.  But  although  they  con- 
ceive God  as  actually  possessing  the  highest  intellect, 
they  nevertheless  do  not  believe  that  He  can  bring  about 
that  all  those  things  should  exist  which  are  actually  in 
His  intellect,  for  they  think  that  by  such  a  supposi- 
tion they  would  destroy  His  power.  If  He  had  created, 
they  say,  all  things  which  are  in  His  intellect.  He  could 
have  created  nothing  more,  and  this,  they  believe,  does 
not  accord  with  God's  omnipotence ;  so  then  they  prefer 
to  consider  God  as  indifferent  to  all  things,  and  creating 
nothing  excepting  that  which  He  has  decreed  to  create 
by  a  certain  absolute  will.  But  I  think  that  I  have 
shown  with  sufficient  clearness  (Prop.  16)  that  from  the 
supreme  power  of  God,  or  from  His  infinite  nature,  infinite 
things  in  infinite  ways,  that  is  to  say,  all  things,  have 
necessarily  flowed,  or  continually  follow  by  the  same 
necessity,  in  the  same  way  as  it  follows  from  the  nature 
of  a  triangle,   from   eternitv  and   to    eteruitv,    that   its 


OF  GOD.  J, 

three  angles  are  equal  to  two  riglit  angles.  The  omni- 
potence of  God  lias  therefore  been  actual  from  eternity, 
and  in  the  same  actuality  will  remain  to  eternity.  In 
this  way  the  omnipotence  of  God,  in  my  opinion,  is  far 
more  firmly  established.  My  adversaries,  indeed  (if  I 
may  be  permitted  to  speak  plainly),  seem  to  deny  the 
omnipotence  of  God,  inasmuch  as  they  are  forced  to 
admit  that  He  has  in  His  mind  an  infinite  number  of 
things  which  might  be  created,  but  which,  nevertheless, 
He  will  never  be  able  to  create,  for  if  He  were  to  create 
all  things  which  He  has  in  His  mind.  He  would,  accord- 
ing to  them,  exhaust  His  omnipotence  and  make  Himself 
imperfect.  Therefore,  in  order  to  make  a  perfect  God, 
they  are  compelled  to  make  Him  incapable  of  doing  all 
those  tlnngs  to  which  His  power  extends,  and  anytliing 
more  absurd  than  this,  or  more  opposed  to  God's  omni- 
potence, I  do  not  think  can  be  imagined.  Moreover — to 
say  a  word,  too,  here  about  the  intellect  and  will  wliicli  we 
commonly  attribute  to  God — if  intellect  and  will  pertain 
to  His  eternal  essence,  these  attributes  cannot  be  under- 
stood in  the  sense  in  which  men  generally  use  them,  for 
the  intellect  and  will  which  could  constitute  His  essence 
would  have  to  differ  entirely  from  our  intellect  and  will, 
and  could  resemble  ours  in  nothing  except  in  name.  There 
could  be  no  further  likeness  than  that  between  the  celestial 
constellation  of  the  Dog  and  the  animal  which  barks.  Tliis 
I  will  demonstrate  as  follows.  K  intellect  pertains  to  the 
divine  nature,  it  cannot,  like  (jur  intellect,  follow  the 
things  which  are  its  object  (as  many  suppose),  nor  can  it 
be  simultaneous  in  its  nature  with  them,  since  God  is 
prior  to  all  things  in  causality  (Corel,  i,  Prop.  i6) ;  but, 
on  the  contrary,  the  truth  and  formal  essence  of  things 
is  what  it  is,  because  as  such  it  exists  objectively  in 
God's  intellect.  Therefore  the  intellect  of  God,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  conceived  to  constitute  His  essence,  is  in  truth 
the  cause  of  things,  both  of  their  essence  and  of  their 
existence, — a  truth  which  seems  to  have  been  understood 


22  ETHIC. 

by  those  who  have  maiatained  that  Gods  intellect,  will, 
and  power  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Since,  therefore, 
God's  intellect  is  the  sole  cause  of  things,  both  of  their 
essence  and  of  their  existence  (as  we  have  already 
shown),  it  must  necessarily  differ  from  them  with  regard 
both  to  its  essence  and  existence;  for  an  effect  differs 
from  its  cause  precisely  in  that  which  it  has  from  its 
cause.  For  example,  one  man  is  the  cause  of  the  exist- 
ence but  not  of  the  essence  of  another,  for  the  essence  is 
an  eternal  truth ;  and  therefore  witli  regard  to  essence  the 
two  men  may  exactly  resemble  one  another,  but  with 
regard  to  existence  they  must  differ.  Consequently  if 
the  existence  of  one  should  perish,  that  of  the  other  will 
not  therefore  perish ;  but  if  the  essence  of  one  could  be 
destroyed  and  become  false,  the  essence  of  the  other 
would  be  likewise  destroyed.  Therefore  a  thing  which  is 
the  cause  both  of  the  essence  and  of  the  existence  of  any 
effect  must  differ  from  that  effect  both  with  regard  to 
its  essence  and  with  regard  to  its  existence.  But  the 
intellect  of  God  is  the  cause  both  of  the  essence  and  exis- 
tence of  our  intellect ;  therefore  the  intellect  of  God,  so 
far  as  it  is  conceived  to  constitvite  the  divine  essence, 
differs  from  our  intellect  both  with  regard  to  its  essence 
and  its  existence,  nor  can  it  coincide  with  our  intellect  in 
anything  except  the  name,  which  is  what  we  essayed  to 
prove.  The  same  demonstration  may  be  applied  to  the 
will,  as  any  one  may  easily  see  for  himself. 

PEOr.  XVIII. — God  is  the  immanent,  and  not  the  transitive^ 
cause  of  all  things. 

Demonst. — All  things  which  are,  are  in  God  and  must 
be  conceived  through  Him  (Prop.  15),  and  therefore 
(Corol.  I,  Prop.  16)  He  is  the  cause  of  the  things  which 
are  in  Himself.  This  is  the  first  thing  which  was  to  be 
proved.      Moreover,  outside  God  there  can  be  no  sub- 

^   Transiens,  passing  over  and  into  from  the  outside. 


OF  GOD.  2, 

stance  (Prop.  14),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  3),  outsiile  Ilim 
nothing  can  exist  which  is  in  itself.  This  was  the  second 
thing  to  be  proved.  God,  therefore,  is  the  immanent,  but 
not  the  transitive  cause  of  all  things. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XIX. — God  is  eternal,  or,  in  other  iconls,  all  //;,< 
attributes  are  eternal. 

Ifemonst. — For  God  (Def.  6)  is  substance,  which  (Prop. 
1 1)  necessarily  exists,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7),  a  sub- 
stance  to  whose  nature  it  pertains  to  exist,  or  (which 
is  the  same  thing)  a  substance  from  the  definition  of 
which  it  follows  that  it  exists,  and  therefore  (Def.  8) 
He  is  eternal.  Again,  by  the  attributes  of  God  is  to  be 
understood  that  which  (Def.  4)  expresses  the  essence  of 
the  divine  substance,  that  is  to  say,  that  which  pertains  to 
substance.  It  is  this,  I  say,  which  the  attributes  tliem- 
selves  must  involve.  But  eternity  pertains  to  the  nature 
of  substance  (Prop.  7).  Therefore  each  of  the  attributes 
must  involve  eternity,  and  therefore  all  are  eternal. — 

Q.E.D. 

Schol. — This  proposition  is  as  clear  as  possible,  too,  from 
the  manner  in  which  (Prop.  1 1)  I  have  demonstrated 
the  existence  of  God.  From  that  demonstration  I  say 
it  is  plain  that  the  existence  of  God,  like  His  essence,  is 
an  eternal  truth.  Moreover  (Prop.  1 9  of  the  "  Principles 
of  the  Cartesian  Philosophy  "),  I  have  demonstrated  by 
another  method  the  eternity  of  God,  and  there  is  no  need 
to  repeat  the  demonstration  here. 

Prop.  XX. — The  existence  of  God  a7id  His  essence  are  one 
and  the  same  thing. 
God  (Prop.  19)  and  all  His  attributes  are  eternal; 
that,  is  to  say  (Def.  8),  each  one  of  His  attributes 
expresses  existence.  The  same  attributes  of  God,  there- 
fore, which  (Def.  4)  explain  the  eternal  essence  of  God, 
at  the  same  time  explain  His  eternal  existence ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  very  same  thing  which  constitutes  the  essence  of 


24  ETHIC. 

God  constitutes  at  the  same  time  His  existence,  and  there- 
fore His  existence  and  His  essence  are  one  and  the  same 
thing. — Q.E.D. 

Corol.  I. — Hence  it  follows,  i.  That  the  existence  of 
God,  like  His  essence,  is  an  eternal  truth. 

Corol.  2. — It  follows,  2.  That  God  is  immutable,  or 
(which  is  the  same  thing)  all  His  attributes  are  immutable  ; 
for  if  they  were  changed  as  regards  their  existence,  they 
must  be  changed  also  as  regards  their  essence  (Prop.  20) ; 
that  is  to  say  (as  is  self-evident),  from  being  true,  they 
would  become  false,  which  is  absurd. 

Prop.  XXL — All  things  which  follow  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  must  for  ever  exist, 
and  must  be  infinite  ;  that  is  to  say,  through  that  same 
attribute  they  are  eternal  and  infinite. 

Demonst. — Conceive,  if  possible  (supposing  that  the 
truth  of  the  proposition  is  denied),  that  in  some  attribute 
of  God  something  which  is  finite  and  has  a  determinate 
existence  or  duration  follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of 
that  attribute ;  for  example,  an  idea  of  God  in  thought.^ 
But  thought,  since  it  is  admitted  to  be  an  attribute  of  God, 
is  necessarily  (Prop.  1 1)  in  its  nature  infinite.  But  so  far 
as  it  has  the  idea  of  God  it  is  by  supposition  finite.  But 
(Def.  2)  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  finite  unless  it  be  deter- 
mined by  thought  itself.  But  it  cannot  be  determined 
by  thought  itself  so  far  as  it  constitutes  the  idea  of  God, 
for  so  far  by  supposition  it  is  finite.  Therefore  it  must 
be  determined  by  thought  so  far  as  it  does  not  constitute 
the  idea  of  God,  but  which,  nevertheless  (Prop.  1 1),  neces- 
sarily exists.  Thought,  therefore,  exists  which  does  not 
form  the  idea  of  God,  and  therefore  from  its  nature,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  absolute  thought,  the  idea  of  God  does  not 
necessarily  follow  (for  it  is  conceived  as  forming  and  as 

^  Not  the  idea  which  man  forms     either    interpretation    when    taken 
of  God,  but  rather  one  of  God's  ideas,     without  the  context. — Tb. 
The   original    "idea    Dei"    admits 


OF  GOD.  5j 

not  forming  the  idea  of  God),  which  is  contrary  to  the 
liypothesis.  Therefore,  if  an  idea  of  God  in  thouj;ht,  or 
anything  else  in  any  attribute  of  God,  follow  from  tho 
necessity  of  the  absolute  nature  of  that  attribute  (for  the 
demonstration  being  universal  will  apply  in  every  case), 
that  thing  must  necessarily  be  infinite,  which  was  the 
first  thing  to  be  proved. 

Again,  that  which  thus  follows  from  the  necessity  of 
the  nature  of  any  attribute  cannot  have  a  determinate 
duration.  For,  if  the  truth  of  this  be  denied,  let  it  be 
supposed  that  in  some  attribute  of  God  a  thing  exists 
which  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  the 
attribute — for  example,  an  idea  of  God  in  tliouglit — and 
let  it  be  supposed  that  at  some  time  it  has  either  not 
existed  or  will  not  exist.  But  since  thought  is  supposed 
to  be  an  attribute  of  God,  it  must  exist  both  necessarily 
and  unchangeably  (Prop.  1 1,  and  Corel.  2,  Prop.  20). 
Therefore,  beyond  the  limits  of  the  duration  of  the  idea 
of  God  (for  it  is  supposed  that  at  some  time  it  has  either 
not  existed  or  will  not  exist),  thought  must  exist  with- 
out the  idea  of  God ;  but  this  is  contrary  to  hypothesis, 
for  the  supposition  is  that  thought  being  given,  the  idea 
of  God  necessarily  follows.  Therefore  neither  an  idea 
of  God  in  thought,  nor  anything  else  which  necessarily 
follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of  any  attribute  of  God, 
can  have  a  determinate  duration,  but  through  the  same 
attribute  is  eternal ;  which  was  the  second  thing  to  be 
proved.  Observe  that  what  we  have  affirmed  here  is  true 
of  everything  which  in  any  attribute  of  God  necessarily 
follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of  God. 

Pkop.  XXII. —  JVJiatever  folloivs  from  any  attrihutr  of  God, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  modified  hy  a  modification  which 
through  the  same  attribute  exists  necessarily  and  infi- 
nitely, must  also  exist  necessarily  and  infinitely. 
Demonst. — This   proposition   is   demonstrated    in   tho 

same  manner  as  the  preceding  proposition. 


26  ETHIC. 

Pkop.  XXTII. — Every  mode  which  exists  necessarily  and 
infinitely  must  necessarily  follow  either  from  the  ab- 
solute nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  or  from  some 
attribute  modified  by  a  modification  which  exists  neces- 
sarily and  infinitely. 

Dcmonst. — Mode  is  that  which  is  in  something  else 
through  which  it  must  be  conceived  (Def.  5),  that  is  to 
say  (Prop.  15),  it  is  in  God  alone  and  by  God  alone 
can  be  conceived.  If  a  mode,  therefore,  be  conceived  to 
exist  necessarily  and  to  be  infinite,  its  necessary  existence 
and  infinitude  must  be  concluded  from  some  attribute 
of  God  or  perceived  through  it,  in  so  far  as  it  is  con- 
ceived to  express  infinitude  and  necessity  of  existence, 
that  is  to  say  (Def.  8),  eternity,  or,  in  other  words  (Def. 
6  and  Prop.  19),  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  absolutely. 
A  mode,  therefore,  which  exists  necessarily  and  infinitely 
must  follow  from  the  absolute  nature  of  some  attribute 
of  God,  either  immediately  (Prop.  21),  or  mediately 
through  some  modification  following  from  His  absolute 
nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  22),  a  modification  which 
necessarily  and  infinitely  exists. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXIV. — The  essence  of  things  produced  by  God  does 
not  involve  existence. 

C  -^  '• 

This  is  evident  'from  the  first  Definition ;  for  that 
thing  whose  nature  (considered,  that  is  to  say,  in  itself) 
involves  existence,  is  the  cause  of  itself  and  exists  from 
the  necessity  of  its  own  nature  alone. 

Coral. — Hence  it  follows  that  God  is  not  only  the 
cause  of  the  commencement  of  the  existence  of  things, 
but  also  of  their  continuance  in  existence,  or,  in  other 
words  (to  use  scholastic  phraseology),  God  is  the  caus% 
essendi  rerum.  Por  if  we  consider  the  essence  of  things, 
whether  existing  or  non-existing,  we  discover  that  it 
neither  involves   existence  nor  duration,    and   therefore 


OF  GOD. 


tlie  essence  of  existing  things  cannot  be  the  cause  of 
their  existence  nor  of  their  duration,  but  (Jod  only  is 
the  cause,  to  whose  nature  alone  existence  pertains 
(Corol.  I,  Prop.  14). 


Pkop.  XXV. — God  is  not  only  the  efficient  cauae  0/  th 
existence  of  tilings,  hut  also  of  their  essence. 

Dcmonst. — Suppose  that  God  is  not  the  cause  of  tlio 
essence  of  things ;  then  (Ax.  4)  the  essence  of  things 
can  be  conceived  \vithout  God,  which  (Prop.  15)  is 
absurd.  Therefore  God  is  the  cause  of  tlie  essence  of 
things. — Q.E.D, 

Schol — This  proposition  more  clearly  follows  from 
Prop.  16.  For  from  this  proposition  it  follows  that, 
from  the  existence  of  the  divine  nature,  both  the  essence 
of  things  and  their  existence  must  necessarily  be  con- 
cluded, or,  in  a  word,  in  the  same  sense  in  which  God 
is  said  to  be  the  cause  of  Himself  He  must  be  called  the 
cause  of  all  things.  This  will  appear  still  more  clearly 
from  the  following  corollary. 

Corol. — Individual  things  are  nothing  but  affections  or 
modes  of  God's  attributes,  expressing  those  attributes  in 
a  certain  and  determinate  manner.  This  is  evident  from 
Prop.  15  and  Def.  5.  X 

]/    rrb 

Pkop.  XXVI. — A  thing  which  has  heen  determined  to  any 
action  ivas  necessarily  so  determined  by  God,  and 
that  which  has  not  been  thus  determined  by  God 
cannot  determine  itself  to  action. 

Bemonst. — That  by  which  things  are  said  to  be  deter- 
mined to  any  action  is  necessarily  something  positive 
(as  is  self-evident) ;  and  therefore  God,  from  the  neces- 
sity of  His  nature,  is  the  efficient  cause  both  of  its  essence 
and  of  its  existence  (Props.  25  and  16),  which  was  the 
first  thing  to  be  proved.     From  this  also  the  second  part 


28  ETHIC. 

of  the  proposition  follows  most  clearly.  For  if  a  thing 
which  has  not  been  determined  by  God  could  determine 
itself,  the  first  part  of  the  proposition  would  be  false, 
and  to  suppose  this  possible  is  an  absurdity,  as  we  have 
shown. 

Prop.  XXVII. — A  thing  wJiich  has  been  determined  hij 
God  to  any  action  cannot  render  itself  indeterminate. 

Demonst. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  third 
Axiom. 

Prop.  XXVIII. — An  individual  thing,  or  a  thing  which 
is  finite  and  ivhich  has  a  determinate  existence,  cannot 
exist  nor  he  determined  to  action  unless  it  he  deter- 
mined to  existence  and  action  hy  another  cause  which 
is  also  finite  and  has  a  determinate  existence ;  and 
again,  this  cause  cannot  exist  nor  he  determined  to 
action  unless  hy  another  cause  which  is  also  finite  and 
determined  to  existence  and  action,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum, 

Demonst. — AVhatever  is  determined  to  existence  and 
action  is  thus  determined  by  God  (Prop.  26  and  Corol. 
Prop.  24).  But  that  which  is  finite  and  which  has  a  de- 
terminate existence  could  not  be  produced  by  the  absolute 
nature  of  any  attribute  of  God,  for  whatever  follows  from 
the  absolute  nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  is  infinite 
and  eternal  (Prop.  21).  The  finite  and  determinate 
must  therefore  follow  from  God,  or  from  some  attribute 
of  God,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  considered  to  be  affected 
by  some  mode,  for  besides  substance  and  modes  nothing 
exists  (Ax.  I,  and  Defs.  3  and  5),  and  modes  (Corol. 
Prop.  25)  are  nothing  but  affections  of  God's  attributes. 
But  the  finite  and  determinate  could  not  follow  from 
God,  or  from  any  one  of  His  attributes,  so  far  as  that 
attribute  is  affected  with  a  modification  which  is  eternal 


OF  GOD.  2g 

find  infinite  (Prop.  22).  It  must,  therefore,  follow  or  W 
determined  to  existence  and  action  by  God,  or  by  si.nie 
attribute  of  God,  in  so  far  as  the  attribute  is  modified 
by  a  modification  which  is  finite,  and  which  has  a 
determinate  existence.  This  was  the  first  thing  to  be 
proved.  Again,  this  cause  or  this  mode  (by  the  same 
reasoning  by  which  we  have  already  demonstrated  the 
first  part  of  this  proposition)  must  be  determined  by 
another  cause,  which  is  also  finite,  and  which  has  a 
determinate  existence,  and  this  last  cause  (by  the  same 
reasoning)  must,  in  its  turn,  be  determined  by  another 
cause,  and  so  on  continually  (by  the  same  reasoning)  ad 
infinitum. 

Schol. — Since  certain  things  must  have  been  immediately 
produced  by  God,  that  is  to  say,  those  which  necessarily 
follow  from  His  absolute  nature  ;  these  primary  products 
being  the  mediating  cause  for  those  things  which,  never- 
theless, without  God  can  neither  be  nor  can  be  conceived  ; 
it  follows,  firstly,  that  of  things  immediately  produced 
by  God  He  is  the  proximate  cause  absolutely,  and  not 
in  their  own  kind  (in  siio  gencre),  as  we  say  ;  for  eflocts 
of  God  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived  without  their 
cause  (Prop.  15,  and  CoroL  Prop.  24). 

It  follows,  secondly,  that  God  cannot  be  properly  called 
the  remote  cause  of  individual  things,  unless  for  tlie 
sake  of  distinguishing  them  from  the  things  which  He 
has  immediately  produced,  or  rather  which  follow  from 
His  absolute  nature.  Por  by  a  remote  cause  we  under- 
stand that  which  is  in  no  way  joined  to  its  effect.  But 
all  things  which  are,  are  in  God,  and  so  depend  upon 
Him  that  without  Him  they  can  neither  be  nor  be  con- 
ceived. 

I'kop.  XXIX. — In  nature  there  is  nothing  contiiujcnt,  Ivt 
all  tilings  are  determined  from  the  neccssitij  of  the 
divine  nature  to  exist  and  act  in  a  certain  manner. 


30  ETHIC. 

Demonst. — Whatever  is,  is  in  God  (Prop.  15);  but 
(xod  cannot  be  called  a  contingent  thing,  for  (Prop.  11) 
He  exists  necessarily  and  not  contingently.  Moreover, 
the  modes  of  the  divine  nature  have  followed  from  it 
necessarily  and  not  contingently  (Prop.  16),  and  that, 
too,  whether  it  be  considered  absolutely  (Prop.  21),  or  as 
determined  to  action  in  a  certain  manner  (Prop.  27). 
But  God  is  the  cause  of  these  modes,  not  only  in  so  far 
as  they  simply  exist  (Corol.  Prop.  24),  but  also  (Prop. 
26)  in  so  far  as  they  are  considered  as  determined  to 
any  action.  And  if  they  are  not  determined  by  God 
(by  the  same  proposition),  it  is  an  impossibility  and  not 
a  contingency  that  they  should  determine  themselves ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand  (Prop.  27),  if  they  are  determined 
by  God,  it  is  an  impossibility  and  not  a  contingency  that 
they  should  render  themselves  indeterminate.  Where- 
fore all  things  are  determined  from  a  necessity  of  the 
divine  nature,  not  only  to  exist,  but  to  exist  and  act 
in  a  certain  manner,  and  there  is  nothing  contingent. — 

Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Before  I  go  any  farther,  I  wish  here  to  explain, 
or  rather  to  recall  to  recollection,  what  we  mean  by 
natura  naturans  and  what  by  natura  naturata}  For, 
from  what  has  gone  before,  I  think  it  is  plain  that  by 
natura  naturans  we  are  to  understand  that  which  is  in 
itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself,  or  those  attributes 
of  substance  which  express  eternal  and  infinite  essence, 
that  is  to  say  (Corol.  i.  Prop.  14,  and  Corol.  2,  Prop. 
17),  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  a  free  cause. 
But  by  natura  naturata  I  understand  everything  which 
follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  God,  or  of 
any  one  of  God's  attributes,  that  is  to  say,  all  the  modes 
of  God's  attributes  in  so  far  as  they  are  considered  as 

1  These  are  two  expressions   de-  ■world,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  to 

rived  from  a  scholastic  philosophy  mark   by   a  difference   of    inflexion 

which  strove  to  signify  by  the  same  that  there  was  not  absolute  identity. 

verb  the  oneness  of   God  and  the  — Tb. 


OF  GOD.  3, 

things  which  are  in  God,  and  which  without  God  can 
neither  be  nor  can  be  conceived. 

Prop.  XXX. — The  actual  intellect,'^  irhdhcr  Jhiitc  or  in- 
finite, must  comprehend  the  attrihutes  of  God  and  the 
affections  of  God,  and  nothing  else. 

Demonst. — A  true  idea  must  agree  witli  that  of  which 
it  is  the  idea  (Ax.  6),  that  is  to  say  (as  is  self-evident), 
that  which  is  objectively  contained  in  the  intellect 
must  necessarily  exist  in  nature.  But  in  nature  (Corel,  i, 
Prop.  14)  only  one  substance  exists,  namely,  God,  nor  any 
affections  (Prop.  15)  excepting  those  which  are  in  God, 
and  which  (by  the  same  proposition)  can  neither  be  nor 
be  conceived  without  God.  Therefore  the  actual  intellect, 
whether  finite  or  infinite,  must  comprehend  the  attributes  . 
of  God  and  the  affections  of  God,  and  nothing  else. — Q.E.D.    y 

^^^  ';t. 

Prop.  XXXI. — The  actual  intellect,  whether  it  he  finite  or 
infinite,  together  with  the  will,  desire,  love,  c£r.,  muf't 
he  referred  to  the  natura  naturata  and  not  to  the 
natura  naturans. 

Demonst. — Por  by  the  intellect  (as  is  self-evident)  we 
""do  not  understand  absolute  thought,  but  only  a  certain 
mode  of  thought,  which  mode  differs  from  other  modes, 
such  as  desire,  love,  &c.,  and  therefore  (Def.  5)  must  be 
conceived  through  absolute  thought,  that  is  to  say  (Prop. 
15  and  Def.  6),  it  must  be  conceived  through  some 
attribute  of  God  which  expresses  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  thought  in  such  a  manner  that  witliout  tliat 
attribute  it  can  neither  be  nor  can  be  conceived.  There- 
fore (Schol.  Prop.  29)  the  actual  intellect,  &c.,  must  bo 
referred  to  the  natura  naturata,  and  not  to  the  natura 
naturans,  in  the  same  manner  as  all  other  modes  of 
thought. — Q.E.D. 

^  Distinguished  from  potential  intellect,  Schol.  Trop.  31.— Tb. 


32  ETHIC. 

Schol. — I  do  not  here  speak  of  tlie  actual  intellect 
because  I  admit  that  any  intellect  potentially  exists,  but 
because  I  wish,  in  order  that  there  may  be  no  con- 
fusion, to  speak  of  nothing  excepting  of  that  which  we 
perceive  with  the  utmost  clearness,  that  is  to  say,  the 
understanding  itself,  which  we  perceive  as  clearly  as  we 
perceive  anything.  I'or  we  can  understand  nothing 
through  the  intellect  which  does  not  lead  to  a  more 
perfect  knowledge  of  the  understanding. 

Prop.  XXXII. — The  will  cannot  be  called  a  free  cause, 
but  can  only  be  called  necessary. 

Dcmonst. — The  will  is  only  a  certain  mode  of  thought, 
like  the  intellect,  and  therefore  (Prop.  28)  no  volition 
can  exist  or  be  determined  to  action  unless  it  be  de- 
termined by  another  cause,  and  this  again  by  another, 
and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  And  if  the  will  be  supposed 
infinite,  it  must  be  determined  to  existence  and  action  by 
God,  not  in  so  far  as  He  is  substance  absolutely  infinite, 
but  in  so  far  as  He  possesses  an  attribute  which  expresses 
the  infinite  and  eternal  essence  of  thought  (Prop.  23). 
In  whatever  way,  therefore,  the  will  be  conceived, 
whether  as  finite  or  infinite,  it  requires  a  cause  by  which 
it  may  be  determined  to  existence  and  action,  and  there- 
fore (Def.  7)  it  cannot  be  called  a  free  cause,  but  only 
necessary  or  compelled. — q.e.d. 

Corol.  I. — Hence  it  follows,  firstly,  that  God  does  not 
act  from  freedom  of  the  will. 

Corol.  2. — It  follows,  secondly,  that  will  and  intellect 
are  related  to  the  nature  of  God  as  motion  and  rest,  and 
absolutely  as  all  natural  things,  which  (Prop.  29)  must 
be  determined  by  God  to  existence  and  action  in  a  cer- 
tain manner.  For  the  will,  like  all  other  things,  needs 
a  cause  by  which  it  may  be  determined  to  existence  and 
action  in  a  certain  manner,  and  although  from  a  given 
will  or  intellect  infinite  things  may  follow,  God  cannot 


OF  GOD. 


33 


on  this  account  be  said  to  act  from  freedom  of  will,  any 
more  than  He  can  be  said  to  act  from  freedom  of  motion 
and  rest  by  reason  of  the  things  -^vhich  follow  from  motion 
and  rest  (for  from  motion  and  rest  iuQnite  numbers  of 
things  follow).  Therefore,  will  does  not  appertain  to  the 
nature  of  God  more  than  other  natural  things,  but  is 
related  to  it  as  motion  and  rest  and  all  other  things  are 
related  to  it ;  these  all  following,  as  we  have  shown,  from 
the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  and  beiug  determiued 
to  existence  and  action  in  a  certain  manner. 

Pkop.  XXXIII. — Things  could  have  been  produced  In 
God  in  no  other  manner  nor  in  any  other  order 
than  that  in  which  they  have  been  produced. 

Dcmonst. — All  things  have  necessarily  followed  from 
the  given  nature  of  God  (Prop.  1 6),  and  from  the  neces- 
sity of  His  nature  have  been  determined  to  existence  and 
action  in  a  certain  manner  (Prop.  29).  If,  therefore, 
things  could  have  been  of  another  nature,  or  could  have 
been  determined  in  another  manner  to  action,  so  that 
the  order  of  nature  would  have  been  different,  the  nature 
of  God  might  then  be  different  to  that  which  it  now  is, 
and  hence  (Prop.  1 1)  that  different  nature  would  neces- 
sarily exist,  and  there  might  consequently  be  two  or 
more  Gods,  which  (CoroL  i,  Prop.  14)  is  absurd.  There- 
fore, things  could  be  produced  by  God  in  no  other  manner 
nor  in  any  other  order  than  that  in  which  they  have  been 
produced. — q.e.d. 

Scliol.  I.— Since  I  have  thus  shown,  with  greater  clear- 
ness than  that  of  noonday  light,  that  in  things  there  is 
absolutely  nothing  by  virtue  of  which  they  can  be  called 
contingent,  I  wish  now  to  explain  in  a  few  words  what 
is  to  be  understood  by  contingent,  but  firstly,  what^  is  to 
be  understood  hj  necessary  and  impossiUc.  A  thing  is 
caUed  necessary  either  in  reference  to  its  essence  or  its 
cause.    For  the  existence  of  a  thing  necessarily  follows 


34  ETHIC. 

either  from  the  essence  and  definition  of  the  thing 
itself,  or  from  a  given  efficient  cause.  In  the  same 
way  a  thing  is  said  to  be  impossible  either  because  the 
essence  of  the  thing  itself  or  its  definition  involves  a 
contradiction,  or  because  no  external  cause  exists  deter- 
minate to  the  production  of  such  a  thing.  But  a  thing 
cannot  be  called  contingent  unless  with  reference  to  a 
deficiency  in  our  knowledge.  For  if  we  do  not  know 
that  the  essence  of  a  thing  involves  a  contradiction,  or 
if  we  actually  know  that  it  involves  no  contradiction, 
and  nevertheless  we  can  affirm  nothing  with  certainty 
about  its  existence  because  the  order  of  causes  is  con- 
cealed from  us,  that  thing  can  never  appear  to  us  either 
as  necessary  or  impossible,  and  therefore  we  call  it  either 
contingent  or  possible. 

Schol.  2. — From  what  has  gone  before  it  clearly  follows 
that  things  have  been  produced  by  God  in  the  highest 
degree  of  perfection,  since  they  have  necessarily  followed 
from  the  existence  of  a  most  perfect  nature.  Nor  does 
this  doctrine  accuse  God  of  any  imperfection,  but,  on  the 
contrary.  His  perfection  has  compelled  us  to  affirm  it. 
Indeed,  from  its  contrary  would  clearly  follow,  as  I  have 
shown  above,  that  God  is  not  absolutely  perfect,  since,  if 
things  had  been  produced  in  any  other  fashion,  another 
nature  would  have  had  to  be  assigned  to  Him,  different  from 
that  which  the  consideration  of  the  most  perfect  Being 
compels  us  to  assign  to  Him.  I  do  not  doubt  that  many 
will  reject  this  opinion  as  ridiculous,  nor  will  they  care 
to  apply  themselves  to  its  consideration,  and  this  from 
no  other  reason  than  that  they  have  been  in  the  habit  of 
assigning  to  God  another  liberty  widely  different  from 
that  absolute  will  which  (Def.  6)  we  have  taught.  On 
the  other  hand,  I  do  not  doubt,  if  they  were  willing  to 
study  the  matter  and  properly  to  consider  the  series  of 
our  demonstrations,  that  they  will  altogether  reject  this 
liberty  which  they  now  assign  to  God,  not  only  as  of  no 
value,  but  as  a  great  obstacle  to  knowledge.     Neither  is 


OF  GOD.  ■; 

there  any  need  that  I  shoukl  here  repeat  those  ihin-s 
which  are  said  in  the  scholium  to  Prop.  17.  lUit  fur 
the  sake  of  those  who  differ  from  me,  I  will  here  show 
that  although  it  be  granted  that  will  pertains  to  Ciod's 
essence,  it  follows  nevertheless  from  His  perfection  that 
things  could  be  created  in  no  other  mode  or  order  by 
Him.  This  it  will  be  easy  to  show  if  we  first  consider 
that  which  my  opponents  themselves  admit,  that  it 
depends  upon  the  decree  and  will  of  God  alone  that 
each  thing  should  be  what  it  is,  for  otherwise  Clod 
would  not  be  the  cause  of  all  things.  It  is  also  admitted 
that  all  God's  decrees  were  decreed  by  God  Himself  from 
all  eternity,  for  otherwise  imperfection  and  inconstancy 
would  be  proved  against  Him.  But  since  in  eternity 
there  is  no  when  nor  before  nor  after,  it  follows  from  the 
perfection  of  God  alone  that  He  neither  can  decree  nor 
could  ever  have  decreed  anything  else  tlian  tliat  which 
He  has  decreed  ;  that  is  to  say,  God  has  not  existed 
before  His  decrees,  and  can  never  exist  witliout  them. 
But  it  is  said  that  although  it  be  supposed  that  God  had 
made  the  nature  of  things  different  from  that  which  it 
is,  or  that  from  eternity  He  had  decreed  something  else 
about  nature  and  her  order,  it  would  not  thence  foHow 
that  any  imperfection  exists  in  God.  But  if  this  be  said, 
it  must  at  the  same  time  be  allowed  that  God  can  change 
His  decrees.  For  if  God  had  decreed  something  about 
nature  and  her  order  other  than  that  which  He  has 
decreed — that  is  to  say,  if  He  had  willed  and  conceived 
something  else  about  nature — He  would  necessarily  have 
had  an  intellect  and  a  will  different  from  those  which 
He  now  has.  And  if  it  be  allowed  to  assign  to  God 
another  intellect  and  another  will  without  any  change  of 
His  essence  and  of  His  perfections,  what  is  the  rea.son 
why  He  cannot  now  change  His  decrees  about  creation 
and  nevertheless  remain  equally  perfect  ?  For  His  intel- 
lect and  will  regarding  created  things  and  their  onler 
remain  the  same  in  relationship  to  His  essence  and  per- 


36  ETHIC. 

fection  in  whatever  manner  His  intellect  and  will  are 
conceived.  Moreover,  all  the  philosophers  whom  I  have 
seen  admit  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  intellect 
existing  potentially  in  God,  but  only  an  intellect  existing 
actually.  But  since  His  intellect  and  His  will  are  not 
distinguishable  from  His  essence,  as  all  admit,  it  follows 
from  this  also  that  if  God  had  had  another  intellect  actu- 
ally and  another  will,  His  essence  would  have  been  neces- 
sarily different,  and  hence,  as  I  showed  at  the  beginning, 
if  things  had  been  produced  by  God  in  a  manner  different 
from  that  in  which  they  now  exist,  God's  intellect  and 
will,  that  is  to  say,  His  essence  (as  has  been  granted), 
must  have  been  different,  which  is  absurd. 

Since,  therefore,  things  could  have  been  produced  by 
God  in  no  other  manner  or  order,  this  being  a  truth  which 
follows  from  His  absolute  perfection,  there  is  no  sound 
reasoning  which  can  persuade  us  to  believe  that  God  was 
unwilling  to  create  all  things  which  are  in  His  intellect 
with  the  same  perfection  as  that  in  which  they  exist  in  His 
intellect.  But  we  shall  be  told  that  there  is  no  perfection 
nor  imperfection  in  things,  but  that  that  which  is  in  them 
by  reason  of  which  they  are  perfect  or  imperfect  and  are 
said  to  be  good  or  evil  depends  upon  the  will  of  God  alone, 
and  therefore  if  God  had  willed  He  could  have  effected 
that  that  which  is  now  perfection  should  have  been  the 
extreme  of  imperfection,  and  vice  versa.  But  what  else 
would  this  be  than  openly  to  affirm  that  God,  who  neces- 
sarily understands  what  He  wills,  is  able  by  His  will  to 
understand  things  in  a  manner  different  from  that  in  which 
He  understands  them,  which,  as  I  have  just  shown,  is  a 
great  absurdity  K  1  can  therefore  turn  the  argument  on 
my  opponents  in  this  way.  All  things  depend  upon  the 
power  of  God.  In  order  that  things  may  be  differently 
constituted,  it  would  be  necessary  that  God's  will  should 
be  differently  constituted ;  but  God's  will  cannot  be  other 
than  it  is,  as  we  have  lately  most  clearly  deduced  from 
His  perfection.     Things  therefore  cannot  be  differently 


OF  GOD.  37 

constituted.  I  confess  that  this  opinion,  which  subjoctd 
all  things  to  a  certain  indifferent  God's  will,  and  affirms 
that  all  things  depend  upon  God's  good  pleasure,  is  at  a 
less  distance  from  the  truth  than  the  opinion  of  those 
who  affirm  that  God  does  everything  for  the  sake  of  the 
Good.  For  these  seem  to  place  something  outside  of  God 
which  is  independent  of  Him,  to  which  He  looks  while 
He  is  at  work  as  to  a  model,  or  at  which  He  aims  as  if 
at  a  certain  mark.  This  is  -indeed  nothing  else  than  to 
subject  God  to  fate,  the  most  absurd  thing  which  can  be 
affirmed  of  Him  whom  we  have  shown  to  be  the  first 
and  only  free  cause  of  the  essence  of  all  things  as  woll 
as  of  their  existence.  Therefore  it  is  not  worth  whiU; 
that  I  should  waste  time  in  refuting  this  absurdity. 

Pkop.  XXXIV. — The  poivei'  of  God  is  His  essence  itself. 

Demonst — From  the  necessity  alone  of  the  essence 
of  God  it  follows  that  God  is  the  cause  of  Himself 
(Prop,  ii),  and  (Prop.  i6  and  its  Corel)  the  cause  of 
all  things.  Therefore  the  power  of  God,  by  which  He 
Himself  and  all  things  are  and  act,  is  His  essence  itself. 
— Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXV. —  Whatever  we  conceive  to  be  in  God's  'power 

necessarily  exists. 

Demonst. — For  whatever  is  in  God's  power  must 
(Prop.  34)  be  so  comprehended  in  His  essence  that  it 
necessarily  follows  from  it,  and  consequently  exists  neces- 
sarily.— Q.E.D.  ^         l'\i' 

Prop.  XXXVI. — Nothing  exists  from  whose  nature  an 
effect  does  not  follovj. 

Demonst. — Whatever  exists  expresses  the  nature  or 
the  essence  of  God  in  a  certain  and  determinate  manner 


38  ETHIC. 

(Corol.  Prop.  25);  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  34),  whatever 
exists  expresses  the  power  of  God,  which  is  the  cause  of 
all  things,  in  a  certain  and  determinate  manner,  and 
therefore  (Prop.  16)  some  effect  must  follow  from  it. 


APPEXDIX. 

I  have  now  explained  the  nature  of  God  and  its  pro- 
perties. I  have  shown  that  He  necessarily  exists ;  that 
He  is  one  God  ;  that  from  the  necessity  alone  of  His 
own  nature  He  is  and  acts ;  that  He  is,  and  in  what  way 
He  is,  the  free  cause  of  all  things ;  that  all  things  are  in 
Him,  and  so.  depend  upon  Him  that  without  Him  they 
can  neither  be  nor  can  be  conceived ;  and,  finally,  that 
all  things  have  been  predetermined  by  Him,  not  indeed 
from  a  freedom  of  will  or  from  absolute  good  pleasure, 
j  but  from  His  absolute  nature  or  infinite  power. 

Moreover,  wherever  an  opportunity  was  afforded,  I  have 

endeavoured  to  remove  prejudices  whicli  might  hinder 

the  perception  of  the  truth  of  what  I  have  demonstrated  ; 

but  because  not  a  few  still  remain  which  have  been  and 

are  now  sufficient  to  prove  a  very  great  hindrance  to  the 

comprehension  of  the  connection  of  things  in  the  manner 

in  which  I  have  explained  it,  I  have  thought  it  worth 

while  to  call  them  up  to  be  examined  by  reason.      But 

'all  these  prejudices  which  I  here  undertake  to  point  out  ^■ 

depend  upon  this  solely :  that  it  is  commonly  supposed 

that  all  things  in  nature,  like  men,  work  to  some  end ; 

and  indeed  it  is  thoudit  to  be  certain  that  God  Him-  , 

self  directs  all  things  to  some  sure  end,  for  it  is  said 

that  God  has  made  all  things  for  man,  and  man  that  he 

.  may  worship  God.      This,  therefore,  I  will  first  investi- 

\  gate  by  inquiring,    firstly,   why   so    many   rest  in  this 

\prejudice,   and   why   all    are    so    naturally   inclined    to 

embrace  it  ?      I  shall  then  show  its  falsity,  and,  finally, 

the   manner   in  which   there    have    arisen  from  it  pre- 


I 


OF  GOD.  /T  ,j 

judices  concerning  good  and  evil,  merit  and  iij^i,  prai^f 
and  Ua7ne,  order  and  disorder,  heauty  and  dfformity, 
and  so  forth.  This,  however,  is  not  the  place  to  de- 
duce these  things  from  the  nature  of  the  human  mind. 
It  will  be  sufficient  if  I  here  take  as  an  axiom  that  which 
no  one  ought  to  dispute,  namely,  that  man  is  born  igno- 
rant of  the  causes  of  things,  and  that  he  has  a  desire, 
of  which  he  is  conscious,  to  seek  that  which  is  profitable 
to  him.  From  this  it  follows,  firstly,  that  he  thinks 
himself  free  because  he  is  conscious  of  his  wishes  and 
appetites,  whilst  at  the  same  time  he  is  ignorant  of 
the  causes  by  which  he  is  led  to  wish  and  desire,  not 
dreaming  what  they  are ;  and,  secondly,  it  follows  that 
man  does  everything  for  an  end,  namely,  for  that  which 
is  profitable  to  him,  which  is  what  he  seeks.  Hence  it 
happens  that  he  attempts  to  discover  merely  the  final 
causes  of  that  which  has  happened ;  and  when  he  lias 
heard  them  he  is  satisfied,  because  there  is  no  longer 
any  cause  for  further  uncertainty.  But  if  he  cannot  hear 
from  another  what  these  final  causes  are,  nothing  remains 
but  to  turn  to  himself  and  reflect  upon  the  ends  which 
usually  determine  him  to  the  like  actions,  and  thus  by 
his  own  mind  he  necessarily  judges  that  of  another. 
Moreover,  since  he  discovers,  both  within  and  without 
himself,  a  multitude  of  means  which  contribute  not  a 
little  to  the  attainment  of  what  is  profitable  to  himself 
— for  example,  the  eyes,  which  are  useful  for  seeing,  the 
teeth  for  mastication,  plants  and  animals  for  nourish- 
ment, the  sun  for  giving  light,  the  sea  for  feeding  fish, 
&c. — it  comes  to  pass  that  all  natural  objects  are  con- 
sidered as  means  for  obtaining  what  is  profitable.  These 
too  being  evidently  discovered  and  not  created  by  man, 
hence  he  has  a  cause  for  believing  that  some  other  per- 
son exists,  who  has  prepared  them  for  man's  use.  For 
having  considered  them  as  means  it  was  impossible  to 
believe  that  they  had  created  themselves,  and  so  ho 
was  oblicred  to  infer  from  the  means  which  he  wm  lu 


40  ETHIC. 

the  habit  of  providing  for  himself  that  some  ruler  or 
rulers  of  nature  exist,  endowed  with  human  liberty, 
who  have  taken  care  of  all  things  for  him,  and  have 
made  all  things  for  his  use.  Since  he  never  heard  any- 
thing about  the  mind  of  these  rulers,  he  was  compelled 
to  judge  of  it  from  his  own,  and  hence  he  affirmed 
that  the  gods  direct  everything  for  his  advantage,  in 
order  that  he  may  be  bound  to  them  and  hold  them  in 
the  highest  honour.  This  is  the  reason  why  each  man 
has  devised  for  himself,  out  of  his  own  brain,  a  different . 
mode  of  worshipping  God,  so  that  God  might  love  him 
above  others,  and  direct  all  nature  to  the  service  of  his 
blind  cupidity  and  insatiable  avarice. 

Thus  has  this  prejudice  been  turned  into  a  superstition 
and  has  driven  deep  roots  into  the  mind — a  prejudice 
which  was  the  reason  why  every  one  has  so  eagerly  tried 
to  discover  and  explain  the  final  causes  of  things.  The 
attempt,  however,  to  show  that  nature  does  nothing  in 
vain  (that  is  to  say,  nothing  which  is  not  profitable  to 
man),  seems  to  end  in  showing  that  nature,  the  gods, 
and  man  are  alike  mad. 

Do  but  see,  I  pray,  to  what  all  this  has  led.  Amidst  so 
much  in  nature  that  is  beneficial,  not  a  few  things  must 
liave  been  observed  which  are  injurious,  such  as  storms, 
earthquakes,  diseases,  and  it  was  affirmed  that  these 
things  happened  either  because  the  gods  were  angry 
because  of  wrongs  which  had  been  inflicted  on  them  by 
man,  or  because  of  sins  committed  in  the  method  of  wor- 
shipping them ;  and  although  experience  daily  contradicted 
this,  and  showed  by  an  infinity  of  examples  that  both  the 
beneficial  and  the  injurious  were  indiscriminately  bestowed 
on  the  pious  and  the  impious,  the  inveterate  prejudices 
on  this  point  have  not  therefore  been  abandoned.  For  it 
was  much  easier  for  a  man  to  place  these  things  aside 
with  others  of  the  use  of  which  he  was  ignorant,  and  thus 
retain  his  present  and  inborn  state  of  ignorance,  than  to 
destroy  the  whole  superstructure  and  think  out  a  new 


OF  GOD.  ,, 

one.  Hence  it  was  looked  upon  as  indisputal.lo  that 
the  judgments  of  the  gods  far  surpass  our  coniprehonsiou  ; 
and  this  opinion  alone  would  have  been  suflicicnt  to 
keep  the  human  race  in  darkness  to  all  cterniiv,  if 
mathematics,  which  docs  not  deal  with  ends,  but  with 
the  essences  and  properties  of  forms,  had  not  placed  before 
us  another  rule  of  truth.  In  addition  to  mathematics, 
other  causes  also  might  be  assigned,  which  it  is  super- 
fluous here  to  enumerate,  tending  to  make  men  reflect 
upon  these  universal  prejudices,  and  leading  them  to  a 
true  knowledge  of  things. 

I  have  thus  sufficiently  explained  what  I  promised  in 
the  first  place  to  explain.  There  will  now  be  no  need  of 
many  words  to  show  that  nature  has  set  no  end  before ' 
herself,  and  that  all  final  causes  are  nothing  but  human 
fictions.  For  I  believe  that  this  is  sufficiently  evident 
both  from  the  foundations  and  causes  of  this  prejudice, 
and  from  Prop.  i6  and  Corol.  Prop.  32,  as  well  as 
from  all  those  propositions  in  which  I  have  shown  that 
all  things  are  begotten  by  a  certain  eternal  necessity  of 
nature  and  in  absolute  perfection.  Thus  much,  never- 
theless, I  will  add,  that  this  doctrine  concerning  an  end 
altogether  overturns  nature.  For  that  which  is  in  truth 
the  cause  it  considers  as  the  effect,  and  vice  versa.  Again, 
that  which  is  first  in  nature  it  puts  last ;  and,  finally,  that 
which  is  supreme  and  most  perfect  it  makes  the  most 
imperfect.  For  (passing  by  the  first  two  assertions  as  self- 
evident)  it  is  plain  from  Props.  21,22,  and  23,  tliat  that 
effect  is  the  most  perfect  which  is  immediately  produceil 
by  God,  and  in  proportion  as  intermediate  causes  are 
necessary  for  the  production  of  a  thing  is  it  imperfect. 
But  if  things  which  are  immediately  produced  by  God 
were  made  in  order  that  He  might  obtain  the  end  He  had 
in  view,  then  the  last  things  for  the  sake  of  which  the 
first  exist,  must  be  the  most  perfect  of  all.  '  Again,  thi.s 
doctrine  does  away  with  God's  perfection.  For  if  God 
works  to  obtain  an  end.  He  necessarily  seeks  something 


42  ETHIC. 

of  which  he  stands  in  need.  And  although  theologians 
and  metaphysicians  distinguish  between  the  end  of  want 
and  the  end  of  assimilation  {finem  indigenticc  et  finem 
assimilationis),  they  confess  that  God  has  done  all  things 
for  His  own  sake,  and  not  for  the  sake  of  the  things  to 
be  created,  because  before  the  creation  they  can  assign 
nothing  excepting  God  for  the  sake  of  which  God  could 
do  anything ;  and  therefore  they  are  necessarily  com- 
pelled to  admit  that  God  stood  in  need  of  and  desired 
those  things  for  which  He  determined  to  prepare  means. 
This  is  self-evident.  Nor  is  it  here  to  be  overlooked  that 
the  adherents  of  this  doctrine,  who  have  found  a  pleasure 
in  displaying  their  ingenuity  in  assigning  the  ends  of 
things,  have  introduced  a  new  species  of  argument,  not 
the  redudio  ad  impossibile,  but  the  7xductio  ad  ignorantiam, 
to  prove  their  position,  which  shows  that  it  had  no  other 
method  of  defence  left.  For,  by  way  of  example,  if  a 
stone  has  fallen  from  some  roof  on  somebody's  head 
and  killed  him,  they  will  demonstrate  in  this  manner 
that  the  stone  has  fallen  in  order  to  kill  the  man.  For 
if  it  did  not  fall  for  that  purpose  by  the  will  of  God, 
how  could  so  many  circumstances  concur  through  chance 
(and  a  number  often  simultaneously  do  concur)  ?  You 
will  answer,  perhaps,  that  the  event  happened  because 
the  wind  blew  and  the  man  was  passing  that  way.  But, 
they  will  urge,  why  did  the  wind  blow  at  that  time,  and 
why  did  the  man  pass  that  way  precisely  at  the  same 
moment  ?  If  you  again  reply  that  the  wind  rose  then 
because  the  sea  on  the  preceding  day  began  to  be  stormy, 
the  weather  hitherto  having  been  calm,  and  that  the 
man  had  been  invited  by  a  friend,  they  will  urge  again 
— because  there  is  no  end  of  questioning — But  why 
was  the  sea  agitated  ?  why  was  the  man  invited  at  that 
time  ?  And  so  they  will  not  cease  from  asking  the 
causes  of  causes,  until  at  last  you  fly  to  the  will  of  God, 
the  refuge  for  ignorance.  -^ 

So,  also,  when  they  behold  the  structure  of  the  human 


OF  GOD. 

body/tliej  are  amazed  ;  and  because  tlicy  aro  i-n.  r.int 
of  the  causes  of  such  art,  they  conclude  that  the  IkxIv 
was  made  not  by  mechanical  but  by  a  supernatural  or 
divine  art,  and  has  been  formed  in  such  a  way  so  that, 
the  one  part  may  not  injure  the  other.  Hence  it  lmj)pt'n.< 
that  the  man  who  endeavours  to  find  out  the  true  causes 
of  miracles,  and  who  desires  as  a  wise  man  to  understand 
nature,  and  not  to  gape  at  it  like  a  fool,  is  gonerally  con- 
sidered and  proclaimed  to  be  a  heretic  and  impious  hv 
those  whom  the  vulgar  worship  as  the  interpreters  hotii 
of  nature  and  the  gods.  For  these  know  that  if  ignorance 
be  removed,  amazed  stupidity,  the  sole  ground  on  which 
they  rely  in  arguing  or  in  defending  their  authority,  is 
taken  away  also.  But  these  things  I  leave  and  pass  on 
to  that  which  I  determined  to  do  in  the  third  place. 

After  man  has  persuaded  himself  that  all  things  which 
exist  are  made  for  him,  he  must  in  everything  adjudge 
that  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance  which  is  most  use- 
ful to  him,  and  he  must  esteem  that  to  be  of  surpass- 
ing worth  by  which  he  is  most  beneficially  affectetl.  In 
this  way  he  is  compelled  to  form  those  notions  by  which 
he  explains  nature ;  such,  for  instance,  as  good,  rvil, 
order,  confusion,  heat,  cold,  heautij,  and  deformity,  &c.  ; 
and  because  he  supposes  himself  to  be  free,  notions  like 
those  of  praise  and  hlame,  sin  and  vicrit,  have  arisen. 
These  latter  I  shall  hereafter  explain  when  I  have  treated 
of  human  nature  ;  the  former  I  will  here  briefly  unfold. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  man  has  given  tlie  name 
good  to  everything  which  leads  to  health  and  the  wor- 
ship of  God  ;  on  the  contrary,  everything  which  doe.s 
not  lead  thereto  he  calls  evil.  But  because  those  wlio  do 
not  understand  nature  affirm  nothing  about  things  them- 
selves, but  only  imagine  them,  and  take  the  imagination 
to  be  understanding,  they  therefore,  ignorant  of  thing-s 
and  their  nature,  firmly  believe  an  order  to  be  in  things ; 
for  when  things  are  so  placed  that,  if  they  are  repre- 
sented to  us  through  the  senses,  we  can  easily  imagine 


44  ETHIC. 

them,  and  consequently  easily  rememter  them,  we  call 
them  well  arranged ;  but  if  they  are  not  placed  so  that  we 
can  imagine  and  remember  them,  we  call  them  badly 
arranged  or  confused.  Moreover,  since  those  things  are 
more  especially  pleasing  to  us  wliich  we  can  easily 
imagine,  men  therefore  prefer  order  to  confusion,  as  if 
order  were  something  in  nature  apart  from  our  own 
imagination  ;  and  they  say  that  God  has  created  every- 
thing in  order,  and  in  this  manner  they  ignorantly 
attribute  imagination  to  God,  unless  they  mean  perhaps 
that  God,  out  of  consideration  for  the  human  imagina- 
tion, has  disposed  things  in  the  manner  in  which  they 
can  most  easily  be  imagined.  No  hesitation  either 
seems  to  be  caused  by  the  fact  that  an  infinite  number 
of  things  are  discovered  which  far  surpass  our  imagina- 
tion, and  very  many  which  confound  it  through  its  weak- 
ness. But  enough  of  this.  The  other  notions  which  I 
have  mentioned  are  nothing  but  modes  in  which  the 
imagination  is  affected  in  different  ways,  and  nevertheless 
they  are  regarded  by  the  ignorant  as  being  specially 
attributes  of  things,  because,  as  we  have  remarked,  men 
consider  all  things  as  made  for  themselves,  and  call  the 
nature  of  a  thing  good,  evil,  sound,  putrid,  or  corrupt, 
just  as  they  are  affected  by  it.  For  example,  if  the 
motion  by  which  the  nerves  are  affected  by  means  of 
objects  represented  to  the  eye  conduces  to  well-being, 
the  objects  by  which  it  is  caused  are  called  beautifid ; 
while  those  exciting  a  contrary  motion  are  called  de- 
formed. Those  things,  too,  which  stimulate  the  senses 
through  the  nostrils  are  called  sweet-smelling  or  stink- 
ing ;  those  which  act  through  the  taste  are  called  sweet 
or  bitter,  full-flavoured  or  insipid  ;  those  which  act 
through  the  touch,  hard  or  soft,  heavy  or  light ;  those, 
lastly,  which  act  through  the  ears  are  said  to  make  a 
noise,  sound,  or  harmony,  the  last  having  caused  men  to 
lose  their  senses  to  such  a  degree  that  they  have  believed 
that  God  even  is  delighted  with  it.     Indeed,  philosophers 


OF  GOD.  ^5 

may  be  found  who  have  persuaded  themselves  tliat  the 
celestial  motions  beget  a  harmony.  AH  these  tliinf^ 
sufficiently  show  that  every  one  judges  things  by  iho 
constitution  oiJiis  brain,  or  rather  accepts  the  alTcc- 
tions  of  his  imagination  in  the  place  of  things,  tt 
is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered  at,  as  we  may  ob- 
serve in  passing,  that  all  those  controversies  which  we 
see  have  arisen  amongst  men,  so  that  at  last  scepticism 
has  been  the  result.  For  although  human  bodies  agree 
in  many  things,  they  differ  in  more,  and  therefore  that 
which  to  one  person  is  good  will  appear  to  another  evil, 
that  which  to  one  is  well  arranged  to  another  is  con- 
fused, that  which  pleases  one  will  displease  another,  and 
so  on  in  other  cases  which  I  pass  by  both  because  we 
cannot  notice  them  at  length  here,  and  because  they  are 
within  the  experience  of  every  one.  For  every  one  has 
heard  the  expressions :  So  many  heads,  so  many  ways  of 
thinking;  Every  one  is  satisfied  with  his  own  way  of 
thinking ;  Differences  of  brains  are  not  less  common 
than  differences  of  taste ; — all  which  maxims  show  that 
men  decide  upon  matters  according  to  the  constitution 
of  their  brains,  and  imagine  rather  than  understand 
things.  If  men  understood  things,  they  would,  as  mathe-v 
matics  prove,  at  least  be  all  alike  convinced  if  they  wercj 
not  all  alike  attracted.  We  see,  therefore,  that  all  tliose 
methods  by  which  the  common  people  are  in  the  habit 
of  explaining  nature  are  only  different  sorts  of  imagina- 
tions, and  do  not  reveal  the  nature  of  anything  in  itself, 
but  only  the  constitution  of  the  imagination  ;  and  bo- 
cause  they  have  names  as  if  they  were  entities  existing 
apart  from  the  imagination,  I  call  them  entities  not  of 
the  reason  but  of  the  imagination.  All  argument, 
therefore,  urged  against  us  based  upon  such  notions  can 
be  easily  refuted.  Many  people,  for  instance,  arc  accus- 
tomed to  argue  thus :— If  all  things  have  followed  from 
the  necessity  of  the  most  perfect  nature  of  God,  how  \3 
it  that  so  many  imperfections  have  arisen  in  nature— cor- 


46  ETHIC. 

'  ruption,  for  instance,  of  things  till  they  stink  ;  deformity, 
exciting  disgust ;  confusion,  evil,  crime,  &c.  ?  But,  as  I 
have  just  observed,  all  this  is  easily  answered.  For  the! 
perfection  of  things  is  to  be  judged  by  their  nature  and 
power  alone ;  nor  are  they  more  or  less  perfect  because 
they  delight  or  offend  the  human  senses,  or  because  they 
are  beneficial  or  prejudicial  to  human  nature.  But  to 
those  who  ask  why  God  has  not  created  all  men  in 
such  a  manner  that  they  might  be  controlled  by  the 
dictates  of  reason  alone,  I  give  but  this  answer :  Because 
to  Him  material  was  not  wanting  for  the  creation  of 
everything,  from  the  highest  down  to  the  very  lowest 
grade  of  perfection  ;  or,  to  speak  more  properly,  because 
the  laws  of  His  nature  were  so  ample  that  they  sufficed 
for  the  production  of  everything  which  can  be  con- 
ceived by  an  infinite  intellect,  as  I  have  demonstrated 
in  Prop.  1 6. 

These  are  the  prejudices  which  I  undertook  to  notice 
here.  If  any  others  of  a  similar  character  remain,  they 
can  easily  be  rectified  with  a  little  thought  by  any  one. 


END  OF  THE  FIRST  PART. 


(     47     ) 


ETHIC. 


^ttonXi  ^art. 


OF  THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND. 

I  PASS  on  now  to  explain  those  things  which  must  neces- 
sarily follow  from  the  essence  of  God  or  the  Being  eternal 
and  infinite  ;  not  indeed  to  explain  all  these  things,  for 
we  have  demonstrated  (Prop.  i6,  pt.  i)  that  an  infini- 
tude of  things  must  follow  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways, 
— but  to  consider  those  things  only  which  may  conduct 
us  as  it  were  by  the  hand  to  a  knowledge  of  the  human 
mind  and  its  highest  happiness. 

Definitions. 

I.  By  body.  I  understand  a  mode  which  expresses  in 
a  certain  and  determinate  manner  the  essence  of  Clod  in 
so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  the  thing  extended.  (See 
Corel.  Prop.  25,  pt.  i.) 

II.  I  say  that  to  the  essenrp  of  anything  pertains 
that,  which  being  given,  the  thing  itself  is  necessarily 
posited,  and  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is  necessarily 
taken  ;  or,  in  other  words,  that,|without  which  the  thing 
can  neither  be  nor  be  conceivecl  and  which  in  its  turn 
cannot  be  nor  be  conceived  without  the  thing. 

III.  gY^ea,  I  understand  a  conception  of  the  mincl, 
which  the  mind  forms  because  it  is  a  thinking  thing. 

Exjolanation. — I  use  the  word  conception  rather  than 
perception  because  the  name  perception  seems  to  indicate 


48  ETHIC. 

that  the  mind  is  passive  in  its  relation  to  the  object.  But 
the  word  conception  seems  to  express  the  action  of  the  mind. 

IV.  By_^equatgjde^,  I  understand  an  idea  which, 
in  so  far  as  iFis  considered  in  itself,  without  reference 
to  the  object,  has  all  the  properties  or  internal  signs 
(denominationes  intrinsecas)  of  a  true  idea. 

Explanation. — I  say  internal,  so  as  to  exclude  that 
which  is  external,  the  agreement,  namely,  of  the  idea  with 
its  object. 

V.  ^uratiou^is  the  indefinite  continuation  of  existence. 
Explanation. — I  call  it  indefinite  because  it  cannot  be 

determined  by  the  nature  itself  of  the  existing  thing  nor 
by  the  efficient  cause,  which  necessarily  posits  the  exist- 
ence of  the  thing  but  does  not  take  it  away. 

VI.  ]^yrealit^  and  perfection  I  understand  the  same 
thing.  {  • ) 

VII.  By  individual  things  I  understand  things  which 
are  finite  and  which  have  a  determinate  existence ;  and 
if  a  number  of  individuals  so  unite  in  one  action  that 
they  are  all  simultaneously  the  cause  of  one  effect,  I 
consider  them  all,  so  far,  as  a  one  individual  thing. 

Axioms. 

I.  The  essence  of  man  does  not  involve  necessary 
existence ;  that  is  to  say,  the  existence  as  well  as  the 
non-existence  of  this  or  that  man  may  or  may  not  follow 
from  the  order  of  nature. 

II.  Man  thinks. 

III.  Modes  of  thought^  such  as  love,  desire,  or  the 
affections  of  the  mind,  by  whatever  name  they  may  be 
called,  do  not  exist,  unless  in  the  same  individual  the 
idea  exist  of  a  thing  loved,  desired,  &c.  But  the  idea 
may  exist  although  no  other  mode  of  thinking  exist. 

IV.  We  perceive  that  a  certain  body  is  affected  in 
many  ways. 

V.  No  individual  things  are  felt  or  perceived  by  us 
excepting  bodies  and  modes  of  thought. 

The  postulates  will  be  found  after  Proposition  13. 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.        49 

Peop.  I. — Tlioujht  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  a 
tliinhing  thing. 

Demonst.  —  ludiviJual  thoughts,  or  this  aiul  that 
thought,  are  modes  M'hieh  express  the  nature  of  C.od 
in  a  certain  and  determinate  manner  (Corol.  Prop.  25, 
pt.  i).  God  therefore  possesses  an  attrihute  (Def.  5, 
pt.  1),  the  conception  of  which  is  involved  in  all  indi- 
vidual thoughts,  and  through  which  they  are  conceived. 
Thought,  therefore,  is  one  of  the  infinite  attributes  of 
God  which  expresses  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of 
God  (Def.  6,  pt.  i),  or,  in  other  words,  God  is  a  thinking 
thing. — Q.E.D. 

Scliol. — This  proposition  is  plain  from  the  fact  tliat 
we  can  conceive  an  infinite  thinking  Being.  For  the 
more  things  a  thinking  being  can  think,  the  more  reality 
or  perfection  we  conceive  it  to  possess,  and  therefore 
the  being  which  can  think  an  infinitude  of  things  in 
infinite  ways  is  necessarily  infinite  by  his  power  of 
thinking.  Since,  therefore,  we  can  conceive  an  iufmito 
Being  by  attending  to  thought  alone,  thought  is  neces- 
sarily one  of  the  infinite  attributes  of  God  (Defs.  4  and 
6,  pt.  1),  which  is  the  proposition  we  wished  to  prove. 

Peop.  II. —  Extension  is  an  attrihute  of  God,  or  God  is  an 
extended  iking. 
Demonst. — The  demonstration  of  this  proposition  is  of 
the  same  character  as  that  of  the  last. 

Peop.  III. — In  God  there  necessarily  exists  the  idea  of  His 

essence,  and  of  all  things  which  necessarily  fullmc  from 

His  essence. 

Demonst.— Tov  God   (Prop,    i,   pt.   2)   can   think   nn 

infinitude    of  things  in  infinite  ways,  or  (which  is  the 

same  thing,  by  Prop.  16,  pt.  i)  can  form  an  idea  of  His 

essence  and  of  all  the  things  which  necessarily  follow 

from  it.     But  evcvvthing  wliich  is  in  the  power  of  God 

D 


50  ETHIC. 

is  necessary  (Prop.  35,  pt,  i),  and  therefore  this  idea 
necessarily  exists,  and  (Prop,  i  5,  pt.  i)  it  cannot  exist 
unless  in  God. 

Scliol. — The  common  people  understand  by  God's  power 
His  free  will  and  right  over  all  existing  things,  which 
are  therefore  commonly  looked  upon  as  contingent ;  for 
they  say  that  God  has  the  power  of  destroying  every- 
thing and  reducing  it  to  nothing.  They  very  frequently, 
too,  compare  God's  power  with  the  power  of  kings.  That 
there  is  any  similarity  between  the  two  we  have  disproved 
in  the  first  and  second  Corollaries  of  Prop.  3  2,  pt.  i,  and  in 
Prop.  16,  pt.  I,  we  have  shown  that  God  does  everything 
with  that  necessity  with  which  He  understands  Himself ; 
that  is  to  say,  as  it  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine 
nature  that  God  understands  Himself  (a  truth  admitted  by 
all),  so  by  the  same  necessity  it  follows  that  God  does  an 
infinitude  of  things  in  infinite  ways.  Moreover,  in  Prop. 
34,  pt.  I,  we  have  shown  that  the  power  of  God  is  no- 
thing but  the  active  essence  of  God,  and  therefore  it 
is  as  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  that  God  does  not 
act  as  that  He  does  not  exist.  If  it  pleased  me  to 
go  farther,  I  could  show  besides  that  the  power  which 
the  common  people  ascribe  to  God  is  not  only  a  human 
power  (which  shows  that  they  look  upon  God  as  a  man, 
or  as  being  like  a  man),  but  that  it  also  involves  weak- 
ness. But  I  do  not  care  to  talk  so  much  upon  the  same 
subject.  Again  and  again  I  ask  the  reader  to  consider 
and  reconsider  what  is  said  upon  this  subject  in  the 
first  part,  from  Prop.  16  to  the  end.  For  it  is  not  pos- 
sible for  any  one  properly  to  understand  the  things 
which  I  wish  to  prove  unless  he  takes  great  care  not  to 
confound  the  power  of  God  with  the  human  power  and 
right  of  kings. 

Prop.  IV. — The  idea  of  God^  from  u-hieh  infinite  nunibcrs 
of  things  folloiv  in  infinite  icays,  can  he  one  onli^. 
Demonst. — The  infinite  intellect  comprehends  nothing 

^  Or  God's  idea  {Idea  Dei),  see  p.  24. — Tb. 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       51 

but  the  attributes  of  God  aud  His  afrections  (rrop.  30, 
pt.  i).  But  God  is  one  (Corel,  i,  Trop.  14,  pt  1). 
Therefore  the  idea  of  God,  from  which  infinite  numbers  of 
things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can  be  one  only. — q.e.I). 

Peop.  Y. — The  formal  Being  of  ideas  recognises  God  for 
its  cause  in  so  far  only  as  He  is  considered  as  a 
thinking  thing,  and  not  in  so  far  as  He  is  c,q)laincd 
ly  any  other  attribute  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  ideas  both 
of  God's  attributes  and  of  individtial  things  do  not 
recognise  as  their  efficient  cause  the  objects  of  the  ideas 
or  the  things  which  are  perceived,  but  God  Himself  in 
so  far  as  He  is  a  thinJci7ig  thing. 

Demonst. — This  is  plain,  from  Prop.  3,  pt.  2  ;  for  wo 
there  demonstrated  that  God  can  form  an  idea  of  1 1  is 
own  essence,  and  of  all  things  which  necessarily  follow 
from  it,  solely  because  He  is  a  thinking  thing,  and  not 
because  He  is  the  object  of  His  idea.  Therefore  the 
formal  Being  of  ideas  recognises  God  as  its  cause  in  so 
far  as  Pie  is  a  thinking  thing.  But  the  proposition  can 
be  proved  in  another  way.  The  formal  Being  of  ideas 
is  a  mode  of  thought  (as  is  self-evident) ;  that  is  to  say, 
(CoroL  Prop.  25,  pt.  i),  a  mode  which  expresses  in  a 
certain  manner  the  nature  of  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  a 
thinking  thing.  It  is  a  mode,  therefore  (Prop.  10, 
pt.  i),  that  involves  the  conception  of  no  other  attribute 
of  God,  and  consequently  is  the  effect  (Ax.  4,  pt.  I )  of 
no  other  attribute  except  that  of  thought ;  therefore  the 
formal  Being  of  ideas,  &c. — Q.E.D. 

Peop.  VI. — The  modes  of  any  attribute  have  God  for  a 
cause  only  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under  that 
attribute  of  which  they  are  modes,  and  not  in  so  far 
as  He  is  considered  under  any  other  attribute. 

Demonst. — Each  attribute  is  conceived  by  itsc-lf  and 
without  any  other  (Prop.  lo,  pt.  l).  Therefore  the 
modes  of  any  attribute  involve  the  conception  of  that 


52  ETHIC. 

attribute  and  of  no  other,  and  therefore  (Ax.  4,  pt.  i) 
have  God  for  a  cause  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under 
that  attribute  of  which  they  are  modes,  and  not  so  far  as 
He  is  considered  under  any  other  attribute. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  formal  Being  of 
things  which  are  not  modes  of  thought  does  not  follow 
from  the  divine  nature  because  of  His  prior  knowledge 
of  these  things,  but,  as  we  have  shown,  just  as  ideas 
follow  from  the  attribute  of  thought,  in  the  same  manner 
and  with  the  same  necessity  the  objects  of  ideas  follow 
and  are  concluded  from  their  attributes. 

Peop.  YII. — The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  ^ 
as  the  order  and  connection  of  things. 

This  is  evident  from  Ax.  4,  pt.  i.  For  the  idea  of 
anything  caused  depends  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  cause 
of  which  the  thing  caused  is  the  effect. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  God's  power  of  thinking 
is  equal  to  His  actual  power  of  acting ;  that  is  to  say, 
whatever  follows  formally  from  the  infinite  nature  of  God, 
follows  from  the  idea  of  God  [idea  Dei],  in  the  same 
order  and  in  the  same  connection  ohjectivdy  in  God. 

Schol. — Before  we  go  any  farther,  we  must  here  recall  to 
our  memory  what  we  have  already  demonstrated,  that 
everything  which  can  be  perceived  by  the  infinite  in- 
tellect as  constituting  the  essence  of  substance  pertains 
entirely  to  the  one  sole  substance  only,  and  consequently 
that  substance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one 
and  the  same  substance,  which  is  now  comprehended 
under  this  attribute  and  now  under  that.  Thus,  also, 
a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  one 
and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways — a 
truth  which  some  of  the  Hebrews  appear  to  have  seen 
as  if  through  a  cloud,  since  they  say  that  God,  the 
intellect  of  God,  and  the  things  which  are  the  objects  of 
that  intellect  are  one  and  the  same  thing.      For  example, 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.      53 

the  circle  existing  in  nature  and  the  idea  that  is  in  CKkI 
of  an  existing  circle  are  one  and  the  same  thin;j,  which 
are  explained  by  different  attributes ;  and,  therefore, 
whether  we  think  of  nature  under  the  attribute  of  v\- 
tension,  or  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  or  under  any 
other  attribute  whatever,  we  shall  discover  one  and  tho 
same  order,  or  one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes ; 
that  is  to  say,  in  every  case  the  same  sequence  of  tilings. 
Nor  have  I  had  any  other  reason  for  saying  that  God 
is  the  cause  of  the  idea,  for  example,  of  the  circle  in 
so  far  only  as  He  is  a  thinking  thing,  and  of  the  circle 
itself  in  so  far  as  He  is  an  extended  thing,  but  this,  that 
the  formal  Being  of  the  idea  of  a  circle  can  only  he 
perceived  through  another  mode  of  thought,  as  its  proxi- 
mate cause,  and  this  again  must  be  perceived  through 
another,  and  so  on  ad  injlnitum.  So  that  when  things 
are  considered  as  modes  of  thought,  we  must  explain  the 
order  of  the  whole  of  nature  or  the  connection  of  causes 
by  the  attribute  of  thought  alone,  and  when  things  are 
considered  as  modes  of  extension,  the  order  of  the  whole 
of  nature  must  be  explained  through  the  attribute  of 
extension  alone,  and  so  with  other  attributes.  Therefore 
God  is  in  truth  the  cause  of  things  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves in  so  far  as  He  consists  of  infinite  attributes,  nor 
for  the  present  can  I  explain  the  matter  more  clearly. 

Tkop.  YIII. — The  ideas  of  non-existent  individual  things 
or  modes  are  comprehended  in  the  infinite  idea  of 
God,  in  the  same  way  that  the  formal  essences  of 
individual   things  or    modes  are  contained  in    the 

attributes  of  God. 

Dcmonst. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  pre- 
ceding proposition,  but  is  to  be  understood  more  clearly 
from  the  preceding  scholium. 

Coral. — Hence  it  follows  that  when  individual  things 
do  not  exist  unless  in  so  far  as  they  are  comprehended  lu 


54  ETHIC. 

the  attributes  of  God,  their  objective  Being  or  ideas  do  not 
exist  unless  in  so  far  as  the  infinite  idea  of  God  exists ' 
and  when  individual  things  are  said  to  exist,  not  only 
in  so  far  as  they  are  included  in  God's  attributes,  but 
in  so  far  as  they  are  said  to  have  duration,  their  ideas 
involve  the  existence  through  which  they  are  said  to 
have  duration. 

Schol. — If  any  one  desires  an  instance  in  order  that 
what  I  have  said  may  be  more  fully  understood,  I  cannot 
give  one  which  will  adequately  explain  what  I  have  been 
saying,  since  an  exact  parallel  does  not  exist :  never- 
theless, I  will  endeavour  to  give  as  good  an  illustration 
as  can  be  found. 

The  circle,  for  example,  possesses  this  property,  that 
the  rectangles  contained  by  the  segments  of  all  straight 
lines  cutting  one  another  in  the  same  circle  are  equal; 
therefore   in   a  circle   there    are    contained    an    infinite 
number  of  rectangles  equal  to  one  another,  but  none  of 
them  can  be  said  to  exist  unless  in  so  far  as  the  circle 
exists,  nor  can  the  idea  of  any  one  of  these  rectangles  be 
said  to  exist  unless  in  so  far  as  it  is  comprehended  in  the 
idea  of  the  circle.      Out  of  this  infinite  number  of  rect- 
angles, let   two  only,  E  and  D,  be   conceived  to  exist. 
The  ideas  of  these  two  rectangles 
do  not  now  exist  merely  in  \so  far 
as  they  are  comprehended  in  the 
idea  of  the  circle,  but  because  they 
involve  the  existence  of  their  rect- 
angles, and  it  is  this  which  distin- 
guishes them  from  the  other  ideas 
(\)  ,  .1  of  the  other  rectangles. 


>VJ 


Peop.  IX. — The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually 
existing  has  God  for  a  cause,  not  in  so  far  as  He 
is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  to  be 
afected   by    another   idea   of  an   ijidividual   thing 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       55 

actually  existing,  of  rchich  idea  also  Ih  is  the  cause 
in  so  far  as  He  is  affected  bj  a  third,  and  so  on 

ad  infinitum. 

Demonst. — The  idea  of  any  individual  thing  actuallv 
existing  is  an  individual  mode  of  thouglit,  and  is  distinct 
from  other  modes  of  thought  (Corol.  and  Schol.  rrop.  8, 
pt.  2),  and  therefore  (Prop.  6,  pt.  2)  lias  God  for  a  cause 
in  so  far  only  as  He  is  a  thinking  thing ;  not  indeed  as  a 
thinking  thing  absolutely  (Prop.  28,  pt.  i),  but  in  so 
far  as  He  is  considered  as  affected  by  auother  mode  of 
thought.  Again,  He  is  the  cause  of  this  latter  mode  of 
thought  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  aflected  by 
another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  But  the  order  and 
connection  of  ideas  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  is  the  same  as  the  order 
and  connection  of  causes  ;  therefore  every  individual  idea 
has  for  its  cause  another  idea,  that  is  to  say,  God  in  so  far 
as  He  is  affected  by  another  idea;  while  of  this  second 
idea  God  is  again  the  cause  in  the  same  way,  and  so  on 
ad  infinitum. — Q.E.D. 

Corol. — A  knowledge  of  everything  which  happens  in 
the  individual  object  of  any  idea  exists  in  God  in  so  far 
only  as  He  possesses  the  idea  of  that  object. 

Demonst. — The  idea  of  everything  which  happens  in 
the  object  of  any  idea  exists  in  God  (Prop.  3,  \*i.  2),  nut 
in  so  far  as  He  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  He  is  con- 
sidered as  affected  by  another  idea  of  an  individual  thing 
(Prop.  9,  pt.  2) ;  but  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  the  order  and  con- 
nection of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection 
of  things,  and  therefore  the  knowledge  of  that  which 
happens  in  any  individual  object  will  exist  in  God  in  so 
far  only  as  He  has  the  idea  of  that  object. 

Pp.op.  'K.—TJie  Being  of  substance  does  not  pertain  to  the 
essence  of  man ^  or.,  in  other  words,  substance  dues 
not  constitute  the  form  of  man. 


56  ETHIC. 

Demonst. — The  Being  of  substance  involves  necessary 
existence  (Prop.  7,  pt,  i).  If,  therefore,  the  Being  of 
substance  pertains  to  the  essence  of  man,  the  existence 
of  man  would  necessarily  follow  from  the  existence  of 
substance  (Def.  2,  pt.  2),  and  consequently  he  would 
necessarily  exist,  which  (Ax.  i,  pt.  2)  is  an  absurdity. 
Therefore  the  Being  of  substance  does  not  pertain,  &c. 

Q.E.D. 

Sclwl. — This  proposition  may  be  demonstrated  from 
Prop.  5,  pt.  I,  which  proves  that  there  are  not  two  sub- 
stances of  the  same  nature.  For  since  it  is  possible  for 
more  men  than  one  to  exist,  therefore  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  form  of  man  is  not  the  Being  of  substance. 
This  proposition  is  evident  also  from  the  other  properties 
of  substance ;  as,  for  example,  that  it  is  by  its  nature 
infinite,  immutable,  indivisible,  &c.,  as  any  one  may 
easily  see. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  essence  of  man  con- 
sists of  certain  modifications  of  the  attributes  of  God; 
for  the  Being  of  substance  does  not  pertain  to  the 
essence  of  man  (Prop.  10,  pt.  2).  It  is  therefore  some- 
thing (Prop.  15,  pt.  i)  which  is  in  God,  and  which 
without  God  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived,  or  (Corol. 
Prop.  25,  pt.  i)  an  affection  or  mode  which  expresses 
the  nature  of  God  in  a  certain  and  determinate  manner. 

Schol. — Every  one  must  admit  that  without  God  nothing 
can  be  nor  be  conceived  ;  for  every  one  admits  that 
God  is  the  sole  cause  both  of  the  essence  and  of  the 
existence  of  all  things ;  that  is  to  say,  God  is  not  only 
the  cause  of  things,  to  use  a  common  expression,  secundum 
fieri,  but  also  secundum  esse.  But  many  people  say  that 
that  pertains  to  the  essence  of  a  thing  without  which  the 
thing  can  neither  be  nor  can  be  conceived,  and  they  there- 
fore believe  either  that  the  nature  of  God  belongs  to  the 
essence  of  created  things,  or  that  created  things  can 
be    or    can    be    conceived  without    God :    or,  which    is 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       57 

more  probable,  there  is  no  consistency  in  their  thou'^'ht, 
I  believe  that  the  cause  of  this  confusion  is  tlmt  tln-y 
have  not  observed  a  proper  order  of  philosophic  study. 
For  although  the  divine  nature  ought  to  be  studied  first, 
because  it  is  first  in  the  order  of  knowledge  and  in  the 
order  of  things,  they  think  it  last ;  while,  on  the  otlier 
hand,  those  things  which  are  called  objects  of  the  souses 
are  believed  to  stand  before  everything  else.  Hence  it 
has  come  to  pass  that  there  was  nothing  of  which  men 
thought  less  than  the  divine  nature  while  they  have 
been  studying  natural  objects,  and  when  they  afterwanls 
applied  themselves  to  think  about  God,  there  was  nothing 
of  which  they  could  think  less  than  those  prior  fictions 
upon  which  they  had  built  their  knowledge  of  natural 
things,  for  these  fictions  could  in  no  way  help  to  tlie 
knowledge  of  the  divine  nature.  It  is  no  wonder,  there- 
fore, if  we  find  them  continually  contradicting  themselves. 
But  this  I  pass  by.  For  my  only  purpose  was  to  give  a 
reason  why  I  did  not  say  that  that  pertains  to  the 
essence  of  a  thing  without  which  the  thing  can  neitlier 
be  nor  can  be  conceived ;  and  my  reason  is,  that  indivi- 
dual things  cannot  be  nor  be  conceived  without  God, 
and  yet  God  does  not  pertain  to  their  essence.  I  have 
rather,  therefore,  said  that  the  essence  of  a  thing  is 
necessarily  that  which  being  given,  the  thing  is  posited, 
and  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is  taken  away,  or  that 
without  which  the  thing  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived, 
and  which  in  its  turn  cannot  be  nor  be  conceived  with- 
out the  thing. 

Peop.  XI.— The  first  thing  which  forms  the  actual  Being 
of  the  human  mind  is  nothing  else  than  the  idea 
of  an  individual  thing  actualhj  existing. 

Demonst— The  essence  of  a  man  is  formed  (Cord. 
Prop.  10,  pt.  2)  by  certain  modes  of  the  attrihutcs  of 
God.  that  is  to  say  (Ax.  2,  pt.  2),  modes  of  thought,  the 


58  ETHIC. 

idea  of  all  of  them  being  prior  by  nature  to  the  modes  of 
thought  themselves  (Ax.  3,pt.  2)  ;  and  if  this  idea  exists, 
other  modes  (which  also  have  an  idea  in  nature  prior  to 
them)  must  exist  in  the  same  individual  likewise  (Ax.  3, 
pt.  2).  Therefore  an  idea  is  the  first  thing  which  forms 
the  Being  of  the  human  mind.  But  it  is  not  the  idea 
of  a  non-existent  thing,  for  then  the  idea  itself  (Corol. 
Prop.  8,  pt.  2)  could  not  be  said  to  exist.  It  will,  there- 
fore, be  the  idea  of  something  actually  existing.  Neither 
will  it  be  the  idea  of  an  infinite  thing,  for  an  infinite 
thing  must  always  necessarily  exist  (Props.  21  and  22, 
pt.  i),  and  this  (Ax.  i,  pt.  2)  is  absurd.  Therefore  the 
first  thing  whicli  forms  the  actual  Being  of  the  human 
mind  is  the  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  existing. 
— Q.E.D. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  human  mind  is  a 
part  of  the  infinite  intellect  of  God,  and  therefore,  when 
we  say  that  the  human  mind  perceives  this  or  that  thing, 
we  say  nothing  else  than  that  God  has  this  or  that  idea ; 
not  indeed  in  so  far  as  He  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  He 
is  explained  through  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  or  in 
so  far  as  He  forms  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  ;  and 
when  we  say  that  God  has  this  or  that  idea,  not  merely  in 
so  far  as  He  forms  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  but  in 
so  far  as  He  has  at  the  same  time  with  the  human  mind 
the  idea  also  of  another  thing,  then  we  say  that  the  human 
mind  perceives  the  thing  partially  or  inadequately. 

Schol. — At  this  point  many  of  my  readers  will  no 
doubt  stick  fast,  and  will  think  of  many  things  which 
will  cause  delay ;  and  I  therefore  beg  of  them  to  advance 
slowly,  step  by  step,  with  me,  and  not  to  pronounce 
judgment  until  they,  shall  have  read  everything  which 
I  have  to  say, 

Vrov.  XII. —  Whatever  happens  in  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  must  he  perceived  hy 
the  human  mind  ;  ar,,^  in  other  words,  an  idea  0/  that 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       59 

tJiwg  will  77ecessarib/  exist  in  the  }nnna7i  mitul.  That 
is  to  say,  if  the  object  of  the  idea  constiluting  the 
huma7i  mi?ui  he  a  lady,  nothing  can  happen  in  that 
lady  which  is  not  perceived  by  the  mind. 

Demo?ist. — The  knowledge  of  everything  which  liappcns 
in  the  object  of  any  idea  necessarily  exists  in  God  (Corol. 
Prop.  9,  pt.  2),  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  all'ectcd 
with  the  idea  of  that  object  ;  that  is  to  say  (Trnp  i  i, 
pt.  2),  in  so  far  as  He  forms  the  mind  of  any  ht'in'j. 
The  knowledge,  therefore,  necessarily  exists  in  God  of 
everything  which  happens  in  the  object  of  the  idea  con- 
stituting the  human  mind  ;  that  is  to  say,  it  exists  in 
Him  in  so  -frir  as  He  forms  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind  ;  or,  in  other  words  (Corol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2),  the 
knowledge  of  this  thing  will  necessarily  be  in  the  mind, 
or  the  mind  perceives  it. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — This  proposition  is  plainly  deducible  and  more 
easily  to  be  understood  from  Schol.  Prop.  7,  jit.  2,  t<' 
which  the  reader  is  referred. 

Peop.  XIII. —  The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  huiimn 
mind  is  a  body,  or  a  certain  mode  of  extension  actuall;/ 
existing,  and  nothing  else. 

Bcmonst. — For  if  the  body  were  not  the  object  of  the 
human  mind,  the  ideas  of  the  aflections  of  the  body 
would  not  be  in  God  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  2)  in  so  far  as 
He  has  formed  our  mind,  but  would  be  in  ]Iini  in  so  far 
as  He  has  formed  the  mind  of  anotlier  thing ;  that  is 
to  say  (Corol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2),  the  ideas  of  the  afTections 
of  the  body  would  not  be  in  our  mind.  But  (Ax.  4,  I't. 
2)  we  have  ideas  of  the  affections  of  a  body ;  therefore 
the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is 
a  body,  and  that  too  (Prop,  il,  pt.  2)  actually  existin- 
Again,  if  there  were  also  any  other  object  of  the  mind  be- 
sides a  body,  since  nothing  exists  from  whicli  some  efTect 
does  not  follow  (Prop.  ^6,  pt.  i),  the  idea  of  some  efTect 


6o  ETHIC. 

produced  by  this  object  would  necessarily  exist  in  our 
mind  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2).  But  (Ax.  5,  pt.  2)  there  is  no 
such  idea,  and  therefore  the  object  of  our  mind  is  a  body 
existing,  and  nothing  else. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  man  is  composed  of 
mind  and  body,  and  that  the  human  body  exists  as  we 
perceive  it. 

Scliol. — Hence  we  see  not  only  that  the  human  mind 
is  united  to  the  body,  but  also  what  is  to  be  understood 
by  the  union  of  the  mind  and  body.  But  no  one  can 
understand  it  adequately  or  distinctly  without  know- 
ing adequately  beforehand  the  nature  of  our'  body ; 
for  those  things  which  we  have  proved  hitherto  are 
altogetlier  general,  nor  do  they  refer  more  to  man  than 
to  other  individuals,  all  of  which  are  animate,  although 
in  different  degrees.  For  of  everything  there  necessarily 
exists  in  God  an  idea  of  which  He  is  the  cause,  in  the 
same  way  as  the  idea  of  the  human  body  exists  in  Him  ; 
and  therefore  everything  that  we  have  said  of  the  idea 
of  tlie  human  body  is  necessarily  true  of  the  idea  of 
any  other  thing.  We  cannot,  however,  deny  that  ideas, 
like  objects  themselves,  differ  from  one  another,  and  that 
one  is  more  excellent  and  contains  more  reality  than 
another,  just  as  the  object  of  one  idea  is  more  excel- 
lent and  contains  more  reality  than  another.  There- 
fore, in  order  to  determine  the  difference  between  the 
human  mind  and  other  things  and  its  superiority  over 
them,  we  must  first  know,  as  we  have  said,  the  nature 
of  its  object,  that  is  to  say,  the  nature  of  the  human 
body.  I  am  not  able  to  explain  it  here,  nor  is  such 
an  explanation  necessary  for  what  I  wish  to  demon- 
strate. 

Thus  much,  nevertheless,  I  will  say  generally,  that  in 
proportion  as  one  body  is  better  adapted  than  another 
to  do  or  suffer  many  things,  in  the  same  proportion 
will  the  mind  at  the  same  time  be  better  adapted  to 
perceive  many  things,  and  the   more  the  actions  of  a 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       6| 

body  depend  upon  itself  alone,  and  the  less  otlicr 
bodies  co-operate  with  it  in  action,  the  better  adajitc-J 
will  the  mind  be  for  distinctly  understanding.  Wq 
can  thus  determine  the  superiority  of  one  n'lind  to 
another ;  we  can  also  see  the  reason  why  we  liavu  only 
a  very  confused  knowledge  of  our  body,  together 
with  many  other  things  which  I  shall  deduce  in  what 
follows.  For  this  reason  I  have  thought  it  worth 
while  more  accurately  to  explain  and  demonstrate  the 
truths  just  mentioned,  to  which  end  it  is  necessary  for 
lue  to  say  beforehand  a  few  words  upon  the  nature  uf 
bodies. 

Axiom  i. — All  bodies  are  either  in  a  state  of  motion 
or  rest. 

Axiom  2. — Every  body  moves,  sometimes  slowly,  some- 
times quickly. 

Lemma  I. — Bodies  are  distinguished  from  one  another  in     y 
respect  of  motion  and  rest,  guicJcness  and  slowness,  ^ 
and  7iot  in  respect  of  suhstctnce. 

Demonst. — I  suppose  the  first  part  of  this  proposition 
to  be  self-evident.  But  it  is  plain  that  bodies  are  not 
distinguished  in  respect  of  substance,  both  from  Prop.  5, 
pt.  I,  and  Prop.  8,  pt.  i,  and  still  more  plainly  from 
what  I  have  said  in  the  scholium  to  Prop.  15,  pt.  i. 

Lemma  II. — All  ladies  agree  in  some  reqxdx. 

Demonst.— Y or  all  bodies  agree  in  this,  that  they 
involve  the  conception  of  one  and  the  same  attribute 
(Def.  I,  pt.  2).  They  have,  moreover,  this  in  couiuion, 
that  they  are  capable  generally  of  motion  and  of  rest, 
and  of  motion  at  one  time  quicker  and  at  another 
slower. 

Lemma  III.— ^  hodg  in  motion  or  at  rest  must  Ic  deter- 
mined to  motion  or  rest  ly  another  hodg,  tchich  uas 


62  ETHIC. 

also  determined  to  motion  or  rest  hy  another,  and  that 
in  its  turn  hy  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 

Demonst. — Bodies  (Def.  i,  pt.  2)  are  individual  things, 
"wliicli  (Lem.  i)  are  distinguished  from  one  another  in 
respect  of  motion  and  rest,  and  therefore  (Prop.  28, 
pt.  i)  each  one  must  necessarily  be  deteruiined  to  motion 
or  rest  by  another  individual  thing ;  that  is  to  say  (Prop. 
6,  pt.  I ),  by  another  body  which  (Ax.  i )  is  also  either  in 
motion  or  at  rest.  But  this  body,  by  the  same  reasoning, 
could  not  be  in  motion  or  at  rest  unless  it  had  been 
determined  to  motion  or  rest  by  another  body,  and  this 
again,  by  the  same  reasoning,  must  have  been  determined 
by  a  third,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  a  body  in  motion  will 
continue  in  motion  untd  it  be  determined  to  a  state  of 
rest  by  another  body,  and  that  a  body  at  rest  will  con- 
tinue at  rest  until  it  be  determined  to  a  state  of  motion 
by  another  body.  This  indeed  is  self-evident.  For  if  I 
suppose  that  a  body.  A,  for  example,  is  at  rest,  if  I  pay 
no  regard  to  other  bodies  in  motion,  I  can  say  nothing 
about  the  body  A  except  that  it  is  at  rest.  If  it 
should  afterwards  happen  that  the  body  A  should  move, 
its  motion  could  not  certainly  be  a  result  of  its  former 
rest,  for  from  its  rest  nothing  could  follow  than  that 
the  body  A  should  remain  at  rest.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  A  be  supposed  to  be  in  motion,  so  long  as  we 
regard  A  alone,  the  only  thing  we  can  affirm  about  it  is 
that  it  moves.  If  it  should  afterwards  happen  that  A 
should  be  at  rest,  the  rest  could  not  certainly  be  a  result 
of  the  former  motion,  for  from  its  motion  nothing  could 
follow  but  that  A  should  move  ;  the  rest  must  therefore 
be  a  result  of  something  which  was  not  in  A,  that  is  to 
say,  of  an  external  cause  by  which  it  was  determined 
to  rest. 

Axiom  i  . — All  the  modes  by  which  one  body  is  affected 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       63 

hj  another  follow  from  the  nature  of  the  hotly  affected, 
and  at  the  same  time  from  the  nature  of  the  affectiii;^ 
body,  so  that  one  and  the  same  body  may  be  moved 
in  different  ways  according  to  the  diversity  of  tlio 
nature  of  the  moving  bodies,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
so  that  different  bodies  may  be  moved  in  different  ways 
by  one  and  the  same  body. 

Axiom  2. — When  a  body  in  motion  strikes  against 
another  which  is  at  rest  and  immovable,  it  is  reflected,  in 
order  that  it  may  continue  its  motion,  and  the  angle  of 
the  line  of  reflected  motion  with  the  plane  of  the  body  at 
rest  against  which  it  struck  will  be  equal  to  the  angle 
which  the  line  of  the  motion  of 
incidence    makes     with    the    same       \  ^ 

plane.  ^^ ^ — 

Thus  much   for  simplest  bodies      / 

which   are   distinguished  from   one   /_ _^ 

another  by  motion  and  rest,  speed 

and  slowness  alone ;    let   us   now  advance  to  composite 

bodies. 

Def. — When  a  number  of  bodies  of  the  same  or  of 
different  magnitudes  are  pressed  together  by  others,  so 
that  they  lie  one  upon  the  other,  or  if  they  are  in 
motion  with  the  same  or  with  different  degrees  of  speed, 
so  that  they  communicate  their  motion  to  one  another  in 
a  certain  fixed  proportion,  these  bodies  are  said  to  be 
mutually  united,  and  taken  altogether  they  are  said  to 
compose  one  body  or  individual,  which  is  distinguished 
from  other  bodies  by  this  union  of  bodies. 

Axiom  3. — Whether  it  is  easy  or  difficult  to  force  the 
parts  composing  an  individual  to  change  their  situation, 
and  consequently  whether  it  is  easy  or  difficult  fur  the 
individual  to  change  its  shape,  depends  upon  whether  the 
parts  of  the  individual  or  of  the  compound  body  lie  with 
less,  or  whether  they  lie  with  greater  surfaces  upon  one 
another.  Hence  bodies  whose  parts  lie  upon  each  other 
with  "reater  surfaces  I  will  call  hard ;   those  soft,  whose 


64  ETHIC. 

parts   lie   on    one   another  with  smaller   surfaces  ;   and 
those  flaiJ,  whose  parts  move  amongst  each  other. 

Lemma.  IV. — If  a  certain  numher  of  todies  he  separated 
from  the  hody  or  individual  loliieli  is  composed  of  a 
numler  of  todies,  and  if  their  place  he  supplied  hy 
the  same  numher  of  other  hodies  of  the  same  nature, 
the  individual  ivill  retain  the  nature  ivhich  it  had 
hefore  luithout  any  change  of  form. 

Demonst. — Bodies  are  not  distinguished  in  respect  of 
substance  (Lem.  i)  ;  but  that  which  makes  the  form 
of  an  individual  is  the  union  of  bodies  (by  the  preced- 
ing definition).  This  form,  however  (by  hypothesis),  is 
retained,  although  there  may  be  a  continuous  change  of 
the  bodies.  The  individual,  therefore,  will  retain  its  nature, 
with  regard  both  to  substance  and  to  mode,  as  before. 

Lemma.  V. — If  the  parts  coynposing  an  individual  tecome 
greater  or  less  2J^'opo^'^^07iately,  so  that  they  preserve 
toivards  one  another  the  same  kind  of  motion  and , 
rest,  the  individual  ivill  also  retain  the  nature  luhich 
it  had  tcfore  ivithout  any  change  of  form. 

Demonst. — The  demonstration  is  of  the  same  kind  as 
that  immediately  preceding. 

Lemma  YI. — If  any  numher  of  hodies  composing  an  indi- 
vidual are  compelled  to  divert  into  one  direction  the 
motion  they  pireviously  had  in  another,  hut  are 
nevertheless  ahle  to  continue  and  reciprocally  com- 
municate their  motions  in  the  same  manner  as  hefore, 
the  individual  will  then  rctai?i  its  nature  luithout 
any  change  of  form. 

Demonst. — This  is  self-evident,  for  the  individual  is 
supposed  to  retain  everything  whicli,  according  to  the 
definition,  constitutes  its  form. 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       65 

Lemma  A'II. — The  individual  thus  composed  will,  monovcr, 
retain  its  nature  whether  it  move  as  a  whole  or  he  at 
rest,  or  whetlier  it  move  in  this  or  that  direction,  pro- 
vided that  each  part  retain  its  oivn  motion  and  com- 
municate  it  as  lefore  to  the  rest. 

Demonst. — The  proof  is  evident  from  the  definition 
preceding  Lemma  4. 

Sehol. — We  thus  see  in  what  manner  a  composite 
individual  can  he  affected  in  many  ways  and  yet  retain 
its  nature.  Up  to  this  point  we  have  conceived  an  indi- 
vidual to  be  composed  merely  of  bodies  which  are  dis- 
tmguished  from  one  another  solely  by  motion  and  rest, 
speed  and  slowness,  that  is  to  say,  to  be  composed  of  the 
most  simple  bodies.  If  we  now  consider  an  individual 
of  another  kind,  composed  of  many  individuals  of  diverse 
natures,  we  shall  discover  that  it  may  be  aflected  in 
many  other  ways,  its  nature  nevertheless  being  preserved. 
For  since  each  of  its  parts  is  composed  of  a  number  of 
bodies,  each  part  (by  the  preceding  Lemma),  without  any 
change  of  its  nature,  can  move  more  slowly  or  more 
quickly,  and  consequently  can  communicate  its  motion 
more  quickly  or  more  slowly  to  the  rest.  If  we  now 
imagine  a  third  kind  of  individual  composed  of  these  of 
the  second  kind,  we  shall  discover  that  it  can  be  affected 
in  many  other  w^ays  without  any  change  of  form.  Thus, 
if  we  advance  ad  infinitum,  we  may  easily  conceive  the 
whole  of  nature  to  be  one  individual,  whose  parts,  that  is 
to  say,  all  bodies,  differ  in  infinite  ways  without  any 
change  of  the  whole  individual  If  it  had  been  my 
object  to  consider  specially  the  question  of  a  body,  I 
should  have  had  to  explain  and  demonstrate  these  tiungs 
more  fully.  But,  as  I  have  already  said,  I  have  anotiicr 
end  in  view,  and  I  have  noticed  them  only  becau.sc  I 
can  easily  deduce  from  them  those  things  which  I  have 
proposed  to  demonstrate. 

Fostulatc    I. — The    human    body   is    composud    of   a 


66  ETHIC. 

number  of  individuals  of  diverse  nature,  each  of  which 
is  composite  to  a  high  degree. 

Postulate  2. — Of  the  individuals  of  which  the  human 
body  is  composed,  some  are  fluid,  some  soft,  and  some 
hard. 

Postulate  3. — The  individuals  composing  the  human 
body,  and  consequently  the  human  body  itself,  are  affected 
by  external  bodies  in  many  ways. 

Postulate  4. — The  human  body  needs  for  its  preserva- 
tion many  other  bodies  by  which  it  is,  as  it  were,  con- 
tinually regenerated. 

Postulate  5. — When  a  fluid  part  of  the  human  body  is 
determined  by  an  external  body,  so  that  it  often  strikes 
upon  another  which  is  soft,  the  fluid  part  changes  the 
plane  of  the  soft  part,  and  leaves  upon  it,  as  it  were, 
some  traces  of  the  impelling  external  body. 

Postulate  6. — The  human  body  can  move  and  arrange 
external  bodies  in  many  ways. 

Pkop.  XIV. — The  human  mind  is  adapted  to  the  perception 
of  many  things,  and  its  aptittcde  increases  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  ways  in  which  its  body  can  be 
disposed. 

Demonst. — The  human  body  is  affected  (Post.  3  and 
6)  in  many  ways  by  external  bodies,  and  is  so  dis- 
posed as  to  affect  external  bodies  in  many  ways.  But 
the  human  mind  must  perceive  (Prop.  12,  pt.  2)  every- 
thing which  happens  in  the  human  body.  The  human 
mind  is  therefore  adapted,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XV. — The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal  Being  of 
the  human  miiid  is  not  simple,  but  is  composed  of  a 
number  of  ideas. 

Demonst. — The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal  Being 
of  the  human  mind  is  the  idea  of  a  body  (Prop.  1 3,  pt.  2) 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIXP.       67 

which  (Post.  1)  is  composed  of  a  iiunibcr  of  iiuliviihiala 
composite  to  a  high  degree.  But  aa  idea  of  eacli  indi- 
vidual composing  the  body  must  necessarily  exist  in  (Jod 
(Corol.  Prop.  8,  pt.  2)  ;  therefore  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  the 
idea  of  the  human  body  is  composed  of  these  several 
ideas  of  the  component  parts. — q.e.d. 

PkOP.  XVI. — The  idea  of  every  %cmj  in  which  the  human 
body  is  affected  hy  external  bodies  must  involve  the 
nature  of  the  human  tody,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
nature  of  the  external  hody. 

Demonst. — All  ways  in  which  any  body  is  affected 
follow  at  the  same  time  from  the  nature  of  the  affected 
body,  and  from  the  nature  of  the  affecting  body  (Ax.  i, 
following  Corol.  Lem.  3) ;  therefore  tlie  idea  of  these 
affections  (Ax.  4,  pt.  i)  necessarily  involves  the  nature 
of  each  body,  and  therefore  the  idea  of  each  way  in  which 
the  human  body  is  affected  by  an  external  body  involves 
the  nature  of  the  human  body  and  of  the  external  body. 
— Q.E.D. 

Corol.  I. — Hence  it  follows,  in  the  first  place,  tliat  the 
human  mind  perceives  the  nature  of  many  bodies  together 
with  that  of  its  own  body. 

Corol.  2. — It  follows,  secondly,  tliat  the  ideas  we  liave  of 
external  bodie?  indicate  the  constitution  of  our  own  body 
rather  than  the  nature  of  external  bodies.  This  I  have 
explained  in  the  Appendix  of  the  First  Part  by  many 
examples. 

Prop.  XVII. — If  the  human  hody  he  affected  in  a  way 
which  involves  the  nature  of  any  external  hody,  the 
human  mind  will  contemplate  that  external  hody  as 
actually  existing  or  as  present,  until  the  human  hody 
he  affected  by  an  affect  which  excludes  the  existence  or 
presence  of  the  external  hody. 

Demonst. — This     is    evident.       For   so    long    as    the 


68  ETHIC. 

human  body  is  thus  affected,  so  long  will  the  human 
mind  (Prop.  12,  pt.  2)  contemplate  this  affection  of  the 
external  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop,  16,  pt.  2),  it  will 
have  an  idea  of  a  mode  actually  existing  which  involves 
the  nature  of  the  external  body,  that  is  to  say,  an  idea 
which  does  not  exclude  the  existence  or  presence  of  the 
nature  of  the  external  body,  but  posits  it  ;  and  therefore 
the  mind  (Corol.  i,  Prop.  16,  pt.  2)  will  contemplate  the 
external  body  as  actually  existing,  &c. — q.e.d, 

Corol. — The  mind  is  able  to  contemplate  external  things 
by  which  the  human  body  was  once  affected  as  if  they 
were  present,  although  they  are  not  present  and  do  not 
exist. 

Dcmonst. — When  external  bodies  so  determine  the 
fluid  parts  of  the  human  body  that  they  often  strike  ujDon 
the  softer  parts,  the  fluid  parts  change  the  plane  of  the 
soft  parts  (Post.  5) ;  and  thence  it  happens  that  the  fluid 
parts  are  reflected  from  the  new  planes  in  a  direction 
different  from  that  in  which  they  used  to  be  reflected 
(Ax."  2,  following  Corol.  Lem.  3),  and  that  also  afterwards 
when  they  strike  against  these  new  planes  by  their  own 
spontaneous  motion,  they  are  reflected  in  the  same  way 
as  when  they  were  impelled  towards  those  planes  by  ex- 
ternal bodies.  Consequently  those  fluid  bodies  produce 
an  affection  in  the  human  body  while  they  keep  up  this 
re|[ex  motion  similar  to  that  produced  by  the  presence 
of  an  external  body.  The  mind,  therefore  (Prop.  12,  pt. 
2),  will  think  as  before,  that  is  to  say,  it  will  again  con- 
template the  external  body  as  present  (Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2). 
This  will  happen  as  often  as  the  fluid  parts  of  the 
human  body  strike  against  those  planes  by  their  own 
spontaneous  motion.  Therefore,  although  the  external 
bodies  by  which  the  human  body  was  once  affected  do  not 
exist,  the  mind  will  perceive  them  as  if  they  were  pre- 
sent so  often  as  this  action  is  repeated  in  the  body. 

Scliol. — We  see,  therefore,  how  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
contemplate  things  which  do  not  exist  as  if  they  were 


THE  NATURE  AXD  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIXD.       69 

actually  present.  This  may  indeed  be  produced  by  other 
causes,  but  I  am  satisfied  with  having  here  sliown  ono 
cause  through  which  I  could  explain  it,  just  as  if  I  had 
explained  it  through  the  true  cause.  I  do  not  think, 
however,  that  I  am  far  from  the  truth,  since  no  postulate 
which  I  have  assumed  contains  anything  which  is  not 
confirmed  by  an  experience  that  we  cannot  mistrust  after 
we  have  proved  the  existence  of  the  human  body  as  we 
perceive  it  (Corol.  following  Prop,  i  3,  pt.  2).  ]\Ioreover 
(Corol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2,  and  Corol.  2,  Prop.  16,  pt.  2), 
we  clearly  see  what  is  the  difference  between  the  idea, 
for  example,  of  Peter,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of 
the  mind  itself  of  Peter,  and  the  idea  of  Peter  himself 
which  is  in  another  man  ;  for  example,  in  Paul.  For  the 
former  directly  explains  the  essence  of  the  body  of  Peter 
liimself,  nor  does  it  involve  existence  unless  so  long  as 
Peter  exists  ;  the  latter,  on  the  other  hand,  indicates  rather 
the  constitution  of  the  body  of  Paul  than  the  nature  of 
Peter ;  and  therefore  so  long  as  Paul's  body  exists  with 
that  constitution,  so  long  will  Paul's  mind  contemplate 
Peter  as  present,  although  he  does  not  exist.  But  in 
order  that  we  may  retain  the  customary  phraseology,  we 
will  give  to  those  affections  of  the  human  body,  the  ideas 
of  which  represent  to  us  external  bodies  as  if  they  were 
present,  the  name  of  images  of  things,  although  they  do 
not  actually  reproduce  tlie  forms  of  the  things.  Wh^en 
the  mind  contemplates  bodies  in  this  way,  we  will  say 
that  it  imagines.  Here  I  wish  it  to  be  observed,  in  order 
that  I  may  begin  to  show  what  error  is,  that  these  ima- 
ginations of  the  mind,  regarded  by  themselves,  contain  no 
error,  and  that  the  mind  is  not  in  error  because  it  ima- 
gines, but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  wanting  in 
an  idea  which  excludes  the  existence  of  those  tilings  which 
it  imagines  as  present.  For  if  the  mind,  when  it  ima- 
gines non-existent  things  to  be  present,  could  at  the  same 
time  know  that  those  things  did  not  really  exist,  it  would 
think  its  power  of  imagination  to  be  a  virtue  of  its  nature 


70 


ETHIC. 


and  not  a  defect,  especially  if  this  faculty  of  imagining 
depended  upon  its  own  nature  alone,  that  is  to  say  (Def. 
7,  pt.  i),  if  this  faculty  of  the  mind  were  free. 

Prop.  XVIII. — If  the  huinan  hody  lias  at  any  time  been 
simultaneously  affected  hy  two  or  more  bodies,  when- 
ever the  mind  aftenvards  imagines  one  of  them,  it 
loill  also  remember  the  others. 

Demonst. — The  mind  imagines  a  body  (Corol.  Prop. 
1 7,  pt.  2)  because  the  human  body  is  affected  and  dis- 
posed by  the  impressions  of  an  external  body,  just  as 
it  was  affected  when  certain  of  its  parts  received  an  im- 
pulse from  the  external  body  itself.  But  by  hypothesis, 
the  body  was  at  that  time  disposed  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  mind  imagined  two  bodies  at  once ;  therefore  it 
will  imagine  two  at  once  now,  and  whenever  it  imagines 
one,  it  will  immediately  recollect  the  other. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — We  clearly  understand  by  this  what  memory 
is.  It  is  nothing  else  than  a  certain  concatenation  of 
ideas,  involving  the  nature  of  things  which  are  outside 
the  human  body,  a  concatenation  which  corresponds  in 
the  mind  to  the  order  and  concatenation  of  the  affections  of 
the  human  body.  I  say,  firstly,  that  it  is  a  concatenation 
of  those  ideas  only  which  involve  the  nature  of  things 
which  are  outside  the  human  body,  and  not  of  those 
ideas  which  explain  the  nature  of  those  things,  for  there 
are  in  truth  (Prop.  16,  pt,  2)  ideas  of  the  affections  of 
the  human  body,  which  involve  its  nature  as  well  as  the 
nature  of  external  bodies.  I  say,  in  the  second  place,  that 
this  concatenation  takes  place  according  to  the  order 
and  concatenation  of  the  affections  of  the  human  body, 
that  I  may  distinguish  it  from  the  concatenation  of  ideas 
which  takes  place  according  to  the  order  of  the  intellect, 
and  enables  the  mind  to  perceive  things  through  their 
first  causes,  and  is  the  same  in  all  men.  Hence  we 
can  clearly  understand  how  it  is  that  the  mind  from 
the  thought  of  one  thing  at  once  turns  to  the  thought 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       ;, 

of  another  thing  which  is  not  in  any  way  like  the 
first.  For  example,  from  the  thonght  of  tlie  word  pomnni 
a  Eoman  immediately  turned  to  the  thought  of  the 
fruit,  which  has  no  resemblance  to  the  articulate  sound 
po7mim,  nor  anything  in  common  with  it,  excepting  this, 
that  the  body  of  that  man  was  often  aflected  by  tlio 
thing  and  the  sound ;  that  is  to  say,  he  often  heard  the 
word  po7mwi  when  he  saw  the  fruit.  In  this  manner 
each  person  will  turn  from  one  thought  to  another 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  the  habit  of  each  has 
arranged  the  images  of  things  in  the  body.  The  soldier, 
for  instance,  if  he  sees  the  footsteps  of  a  horse  in  the  sand, 
will  immediately  turn  from  the  thought  of  a  horse  to  the 
thought  of  a  horseman,  and  so  to  the  thought  of  war. 
The  countryman,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  thought  of 
a  horse  will  turn  to  the  thought  of  his  plough,  his  field, 
&c. ;  and  thus  each  person  will  turn  from  one  thought 
to  this  or  that  thought,  according  to  the  manner  in  which 
he  has  been  accustomed  to  connect  and  bind  together  the 
images  of  things  in  his  mind. 

Prop.  XIX. —  The  human  mind  does  not  hiow  the  human 
hody  itself,  nor  does  it  know  that  the  hody  exists, 
except  through  ideas  of  affections  ly  which  the  hody 
is  affected. 

Devionst. — The  human  mind  is  the  idea  itself  or  the 
knowledge  of  the  human  body  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2).  This 
knowledge  (Prop.  9,  pt.  2)  is  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  is 
considered  as  affected  by  another  idea  of  an  individual 
thing.  But  because  (Post.  4)  the  human  body  needs  a 
number  of  bodies  by  which  it  is,  as  it  were,  continu- 
ally regenerated,  and  because  the  order  and  connection 
of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of 
causes  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2),  this  idea  will  be  in  God  in  so 
far  as  He  is  considered  as  affected  by  the  ideas  of  a 
multitude  of  individual  things. 

God,  therefore,  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  or 


72  ETHIC. 

knows  the  human  body  in  so  far  as  He  is  affected  by 
a  multitude  of  other  ideas,  and  not  in  so  far  as  He 
forms  the  nature  of  the  human  mind  ;  that  is  to  say 
(Corol.  II,  pt.  2),  the  human  mind  does  not  know  the 
human  body.  But  the  ideas  of  the  affections  of  the 
body  are  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  forms  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind;  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  12,  pt.  2),  the 
human  mind  perceives  these  affections,  and  consequently 
(Prop.  16,  pt.  2)  the  human  body  itself  actually  existing 
(Prop.  17,  pt.  2).  The  human  mind,  therefore,  perceives 
the  human  body,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XX. — Theix  exists  in  God  the  idea  or  knowledge 
of  the  human  mind,  which  follows  in  Him,  and  is 
related  to  Him  in  the  same  way  as  the  idea  or  knovj- 
ledge  of  the  human  hody. 

Dcmonst. — Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God  (Prop,  i, 
pt.  2),  and  therefore  there  must  necessarily  exist  in  God 
an  idea  of  Himself  (Prop.  3,  pt.  2),  together  with  an  idea 
of  all  His  affections,  and  consequently  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2)  an 
idea  of  the  human  mind.  Moreover,  this  idea  or  know- 
ledge of  the  mind  does  not  exist  in  God  in  so  far  as  He 
is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  He  is  affected  by  another 
idea  of  an  individual  thing  (Prop.  9,  pt.  2).  But  the 
order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order 
and  connection  of  causes  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2).  This  idea  or 
knowledge  of  the  mind,  therefore,  follows  in  God,  and  is 
related  to  God  in  the  same  manner  as  the  idea  or  know- 
ledge of  the  bod}^ — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXL — This  idea  of  the  mind  is  united  to  the  mind 
in  the  same  way  as  the  mind  itself  is  united  to  the  lody. 

Bemonst. — We  have  shown  that  the  mind  is  united  to 
the  body  because  the  body  is  the  object  of  the  mind 
(Props.  12  and  13,  pt.  2),  therefore,  by  the  same  reason- 


THE  NATURE  .AXD  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.        73 

ing,  the  idea  of  the  mind  must  be  united  with  its  ohject. 
the  mind  itself,  in  the  same  way  as  the  mind  itself  is 
united  to  the  body. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — This  proposition  is  to  be  understood  nnu-h 
more  clearly  from  what  has  been  said  in  the  scliolium  to 
Prop.  7,  pt.  2,  for  we  have  there  shown  that  the  idea  of 
the  body  and  the  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2), 
the  mind  and  the  body,  are  one  and  the  same  individual, 
which  at  one  time  is  considered  under  the  attribute  of 
thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of  extension  :  the  idea 
of  the  mind,  therefore,  and  the  mind  itself  are  one  and  the 
same  thing,  which  is  considered  under  one  and  the  same 
attribute,  that  of  thought.  It  follows,  I  say,  that  tlie  idea 
of  the  mind  and  the  mind  itself  exist  in  God  from  tlie 
same  necessity  and  from  the  same  power  of  tliought. 
For,  indeed,  the  idea  of  the  mind,  that  is  to  say,  the  idea 
of  the  idea,  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  the  idea  in  so  far 
as  this  is  considered  as  a  mode  of  thought  and  without 
relation  to  the  object,  just  as  a  person  who  knows 
anything,  by  that  very  fact  knows  that  he  knows,  and 
knows  that  he  knows  that  he  knows,  and  so  on  ad  iiijiiii- 
tum.      But  more  on  this  subject  afterwards. 

Prop.  XXII. — Tlic  human  mind  not  only  perceives  the 
affections   of  the   hody,  hut  also   the  ideas  of  these 

affections. 

Demonst. — The  ideas  of  the  ideas  of  affections  follow 
in  God  and  are  related  to  God  in  the  same  way  as  the 
ideas  themselves  of  affections.  This  is  demonstrated 
like  Prop.  20,  pt.  2.  But  the  ideas  of  the  afTections 
of  the  body  are  in  the  Imman  mind  (Prop.  12,  i«t.  2), 
that  is  to  say,  in  God  (Corol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2),  in  so 
far  as  He  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mintl  ; 
therefore,  the  ideas  of  these  ideas  will  be  in  God  in  so  far 
as  He  has  the  knowledge  or  idea  of  the  liuman  Tiiind  ; 
that  is  to  say  (Prop.   21,  pt.    2),   they  will  be  in  the 


74  ETHIC. 

human  mind  itself,  which,  therefore,  not  only  perceives 
the  affections  of  the  body,  but  also  the  ideas  of  these 
affections. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXIII. — The  inind  does  not  knoiv  itself  except  in 
so  far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  affections  of  the 
body. 

Demonst. — The  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  mind  (Prop. 
20,  pt.  2)  follows  in  God  and  is  related  to  God  in  the 
same  way  as  the  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  body.  But 
since  (Prop.  19,  pt.  2)  the  human  mind  does  not  know 
the  human  body  itself,  that  is  to  say  (Corol,  Prop.  11,  pt. 
2),  since  the  knowledge  of  the  human  body  is  not  re- 
lated to  God  in  so  far  as  He  constitutes  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind,  therefore  the  knowledge  of  the  mind 
is  not  related  to  God  in  so  far  as  He  constitutes  the 
essence  of  the  human  mind ;  and  therefore  (Corol.  Prop. 
II,  pt.  2)  the  human  mind  so  far  does  not  know  itself. 
Moreover,  the  ideas  of  the  affections  by  which  the  body 
is  affected  involve  the  nature  of  the  human  body  itself 
(Prop.  16,  pt.  2),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2), 
they  agree  with  the  nature  of  the  mind ;  therefore  a 
knowledge  of  these  ideas  will  necessarily  involve  a  know- 
ledge of  the  mind.  But  (Prop.  22,  pt.  2)  the  knowledge 
of  these  ideas  is  in  the  human  mind  itself,  and  therefore 
the  human  mind  so  far  only  has  a  knowledge  of  itself. — 

Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIV. — The  human  mind  does  not  involve  an  ade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  parts  composing  the  human 
hody. 

Demonst. — The  parts  composing  the  human  body  per- 
tain to  the  essence  of  the  body  itself  only  in  so  far  as 
they  communicate  their  motions  to  one  another  by  some 
certain  method  (see  Def.  following  Corol.  Lem.  3),  and 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       7- 

not  in  so  far  as  tliey  can  be  consitlevcd  as  individuals 
without  relation  to  the  human  body.  For  the  parts  of 
the  human  body  are  individuals  (Post,  i),  composite  to  a 
high  degree,  parts  of  which  (Lem.  4)  can  be  separated 
from  the  human  body  and  communicate  their  motions 
(Ax.  I,  following  Lem,  3)  to  other  bodies  in  another 
way,  although  the  nature  and  form  of  the  human  body 
itself  is  closely  preserved.  Therefore  (Prop.  3,  pt.  2) 
the  idea  or  knowledge  of  each  part  will  be  in  Goil  in 
so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  affected  (Prop.  9,  pt.  2) 
by  another  idea  of  an  individual  thing,  whicli  indi- 
vidual thing  is  prior  to  the  part  itself  in  tlie  order  of 
nature  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2).  The  same  thing  may  be  saitl  of 
each  part  of  the  individual  itself  composing  the  human 
body,  and  therefore  the  knowledge  of  each  part  compo.s- 
ing  the  human  body  exists  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  is 
affected  by  a  number  of  ideas  of  things,  and  not  in  so 
far  as  He  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  only ;  that  is 
to  say  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2),  the  idea  which  constitutes  the 
nature  of  the  human  mind ;  and  therefore  (Corol.  Prop. 
I  I,  pt.  2)  the  human  mind  does  not  involve  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  the  parts  composing  the  human  body. — 

Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXV. — The  idea  of  each  a^cction  of  the  human  htuhj 
does  not  involve  an  adequate  hiowledyc  of  an  external 
hody. 

Lemonst. — We  have  shown  that  the  idea  of  an  afTcc- 
tion  of  the  human  body  involves  the  nature  of  an  ex- 
ternal body  so  far  as  (Prop.  16,  pt.  2)  the  external  body 
determines  the  human  body  in  some  certain  maniicr. 
But  in  so  far  as  the  external  body  is  an  individual  which 
is  not  related  to  the  human  body,  its  idea  or  knowledj,'e 
is  in  God  (Prop.  9,  pt.  2)  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered 
as  affected  by  the  idea  of  another  thing,  which  idea 
(Prop.  7,  pt.   2)  is  prior  by  nature  to  the  external  bo.ly 


76  ETHIC. 

itself.  Therefore  the  adequate  knowledge  of  an  external 
body  is  not  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  has  the  idea  of  the 
affection  of  the  human  body,  or,  in  other  words,  the  idea 
of  the  affection  of  the  human  body  does  not  involve  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  an  external  body. — q.e.d. 

Pkop.  XXVI. — Tlie  human  mind  2yerccives  no  external 
body  as  actually  existing,  U7ikss  through  the  ideas  of 
the  affections  of  its  body. 

De.jnonst. — If  the  human  body  is  in  no  way  affected 
by  any  external  body,  then  (Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  the  idea  of 
the  human  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 3,  pt.  2),  the 
human  mind,  is  not  affected  in  any  way  by  the  idea  of 
the  existence  of  that  body,  nor  does  it  in  any  way  perceive 
the  existence  of  that  external  body.  But  in  so  far  as 
the  human  body  is  affected  in  any  way  by  any  external 
body,  so  far  (Prop.  16,  pt.  2,  with  its  Corol.)  does  it 
perceive  the  external  body. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — In  so  far  as  the  human  mind  imagines  an 
external  body,  so  far  it  has  not  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  it. 

Demo7ist. — When  the  human  mind  through  the  ideas 
of  the  affections  of  its  body  contemplates  external  bodies, 
we  say  that  it  then  imagines  (Schol.  Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2),  nor 
can  the  mind  (Prop.  26,  pt.  2)  in  any  other  way  imagine 
external  bodies  as  actually  existing.  Therefore  (Prop.  25, 
pt.  2)  in  so  far  as  the  mind  imagines  external  bodies  it 
does  not  possess  an  adequate  knowledge  of  them. — q.e.d. 

Pkop.  XXVII. — The  idea  of  any  nffeefion  of  the  human 
body  docs  not  involve  an  adequate  'knowledge  of  the 
human  body  itself 

Demonst. — Every  idea  of  any  affection  of  the  human 
body  involves  the  nature  of  the  human  body  in  so  far  as 
the  human  body  itself  is  considered  as  affected  in  a  certain 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  Mis: 

manner  (Prop.  i6,  pt.  2).  But  in  so  far  as  the  l.uinun 
body  is  an  individual  which  can  be  alTected  in  a  inulii- 
tude  of  other  ways,  its  idea,  &c.     (See  Demoust.  \'toi>. 

25,  pt.  2.) 

Trot.  XXVIII. — The  ideas  of  the  affections  of  tlu  human 
lady,  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  only  to  the  human 
mind,  are  not  clear  and  distinet,  but  confused. 

Demoust. — The  ideas  of  the  affections  of  tlie  human 
body  involve  the  nature  both  of  external  bodies  and 
of  the  human  body  itself  (Prop.  16,  pt.  2),  and  mu.st 
involve  the  nature  not  only  of  the  human  body,  but 
of  its  parts,  for  the  affections  are  ways  (Post.  3)  in 
which  the  parts  of  the  human  body,  and  consequently 
the  whole  body,  is  affected.  But  (Props.  24  and  25,  jit. 
2)  an  adequate  knowledge  of  external  bodies  and  of  the 
parts  composing  the  human  body  does  not  exist  in  Goil 
in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  affected  by  the  liumau 
mind,  but  in  so  far  as  He  is  affected  by  other  ideas. 
These  ideas  of  affections,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  they  aro 
related  to  the  human  mind  alone,  are  like  conchisiona 
without  premisses,  that  is  to  say,  as  is  self-evident,  they 
are  confused  ideas. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — The  idea  which  forms  the  nature  of  the  mind 
is  demonstrated  in  the  same  way  not  to  be  clear  and 
distinct  when  considered  in  itself.  So  also  with  the 
idea  of  the  human  mind,  and  the  ideas  of  the  ideas 
of  the  affections  of  the  human  body,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  related  to  the  mind  alone,  as  every  one  may  easily 
see. 

Prop.  XXIX. — The  idea  of  the  idea  of  any  afedion  of 
the  human  lody  does  not  involve  an  adcjuulc  knoxc- 
ledge  of  the  human  mind. 

Demonst. — The  idea  of  an  affection  of  tlie  human  body 


78  ETHIC. 

(Prop.  27,  pt.  2)  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  the  body  itself,  or,  in  other  words,  does  not  adequately- 
express  its  nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  13,  pt.  2),  it  does 
not  correspond  adequately  with  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind,  and  therefore  (Ax.  6,  pt.  i)  the  idea  of  this  idea 
does  not  adequately  express  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind,    nor    involve    an    adequate    knowledge    of    it. — 

Q.E.D. 

Corol. — From  this  it  is  evident  that  the  human  mind, 
when  it  perceives  things  in  the  common  order  of  nature, 
has  no  adequate  knowledge  of  itself  nor  of  its  own  body, 
nor  of  external  bodies,  but  only  a  confused  and  mutilated 
knowledge  ;  for  the  mind  does  not  know  itself  unless 
in  so  far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  affections  of  the 
body  (Prop.  23,  pt.  2).  Moreover  (Prop.  19,  pt.  2),  it 
does  not  perceive  its  body  unless  through  those  same 
ideas  of  the  affections  by  means  of  which  alone  (Prop.  26, 
pt.  2)  it  perceives  external  bodies.  Therefore  in  so  far  as 
it  possesses  these  ideas  it  possesses  an  adequate  knowledge 
neither  of  itself  (Prop.  29,  pt.  2),  nor  of  its  body  (Prop. 
27,  pt.  2),  nor  of  external  bodies  (Prop.  25,  pt.  2),  but 
merely  (Prop.  28,  pt.  2,  together  with  the  scholium)  a 
mutilated  and  confused  knowledge. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — I  say  expressly  that  the  mind  has  no  adequate 
knowledge  of  itself,  nor  of  its  body,  nor  of  external  bodies, 
but  only  a  confused  knowledge,  as  often  as  it  perceives 
things  in  the  common  order  of  nature,  that  is  to  say,  as 
often  as  it  is  determined  to  the  contemplation  of  this 
or  that  externally — namely,  by  a  chance  coincidence, 
and  not  as  often  as  it  is  determined  internally — for 
the  reason  that  it  contemplates^  several  things  at  once,  and 
is  determined  to  understand  in  what  they  differ,  agree,  or 
oppose  one  another  ;  for  whenever  it  is  internally  disposed 
in  this  or  in  any  other  way,  it  then  contemplates  things 
clearly  and  distinctly,  as  I  shall  show  presently. 

1  In  this  latter  case. — Tr. 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIX  OF  Til II  .\//.\7).       -,; 

Prop.  XXX. — About  the  duration  of  our  hody  wc  ran 
have  hut  a  very  inadequate  knowledge. 

Demonst. — The  duration  of  our  body  does  not  depend 
upon  its  essence  (Ax.  i,  pt.  2),  nor  upon  tlie  absolute 
nature  of  God  (Prop.  21,  pt.  i),  but  (Prop.  28,  pt.  i)  the 
body  is  determined  to  existence  and  action  by  causes  whicli 
also  are  determined  by  others  to  existence  and  action  in 
a  certain  and  determinate  manner,  \vhilst  these,  again, 
are  determined  by  others,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  The 
duration,  therefore,  of  our  body  depends  upon  the  common 
order  of  nature  and  the  constitution  of  things.  lUit  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  way  in  whicli  things  are  con- 
stituted, exists  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  possesses  the 
ideas  of  all  things,  and  not  in  so  far  as  He  possesses 
only  the  idea  of  the  human  body  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  2). 
Therefore  the  knowledge  of  the  duration  of  our  body  is 
altogether  inadequate  in  God,  in  so  far  as  He  is  only 
considered  as  constituting  the  nature  of  the  human  mind, 
that  is  to  say  (Corol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2),  this  knowledge  in 
our  mind  is  altogether  inadequate. — Q.F..D. 

Prop.  XXXI. — About  the  duration  of  individual  thitu/s 
which  are  outside  us  we  can  have  but  a  very  inadequate 
knowledge. 

Demonst. — Each  individual  thing,  like  the  human  body, 
must  be  determined  to  existence  and  action  by  anotlier 
individual  thing  in  a  certain  and  determinate  nmnnL-r, 
and  this  again  by  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum  (Prop. 
28,  pt.  i).  But  we  have  demonstrated  in  the  preceding 
proposition,  from  this  common  property  of  individual 
things,  that  we  have  but  a  very  inadequate  knowledgi.'  of 
the  duration  of  our  own  body ;  therefore  the  same  con- 
clusion is  to  be  drawn  about  the  duration  of  individual 
things,  that  is  to  say,  that  we  can  have  but  a  very  in- 
adequate knowledge  of  it. — q.e.d. 


Bo  ETHIC. 

Cowl. — Hence  it  follows  that  all  individual  things  are 
contingent  and  corruptible,  for  we  can  have  no  adequate 
knowledge  concerning  their  duration  (Prop.  31,  pt.  2), 
and  this  is  what  is  to  be  understood  by  us  as  their  con- 
tingency and  capability  of  corruption  (Schol.  i ,  Prop.  3  3 , 
pt.  i);  for  (Prop.  29,  pt.  i)  there  is  no  other  contingency 
but  this. 

Pkop.  XXXII. — All  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to 
God,  are  true. 

Demonst. — All  the  ideas  which  are  in  God  always 
agree  with  those  things  of  which  they  are  the  ideas 
(Corol.  Prop.  7,  pt.  2),  and  therefore  (Ax.  6,  pt.  i)  they 
are  all  true. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXXIII. — In  ideas  there  is  nothing  positive  on 
account  of  which  they  are  called  false. 

Demonst. — If  the  contrary  be  asserted,  conceive,  if  it  be 
possible,  a  positive  mode  of  thought  which  shall  consti- 
tute the  form  or  error  of  falsity.  This  mode  of  thought 
cannot  be  in  God  (Prop.  32,  pt.  2),  but  outside  God  it 
can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i),  and 
therefore  in  ideas  there  is  nothing  positive  on  account 
of  which  they  are  called  false. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXXIV. — Every  idea  which  in  vs  is  absolute,  that 
is  to  say,  adequate  and  ijcrfcct,  is  true. 

Demonst. — When  we  say  that  an  adequate  and  perfect 
idea  is  in  us,  w^e  say  nothing  else  than  (Corol.  Prop.  1 1, 
pt.  2)  that  an  adequate  and  perfect  idea  exists  in  God  in 
so  far  as  He  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind, 
and  consequently  (Prop.  32,  pt.  2)  we  say  nothing  else 
than  that  this  idea  is  true. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXV. — Falsity  consists  in  the  privation  of  know- 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       8| 

ledge,  u-hich  inadequate,  that  is  to  say,  mut dated  and 

co7}fuscd  ideas  ijivolve. 

Dcmonst. — There  is  nothing  positive  in  iJcas  which  can 
constitute  a  form  of  falsity  (Prop.  33,  pt.  2).  But  falsity 
cannot  consist  in  absolute  privation  (for  we  say  that  minds 
and  not  bodies  err  and  are  mistaken) ;  nor  can  it  consist  in 
absolute  ignorance,  for  to  be  ignorant  and  to  be  in  error  aro 
different.  Falsehood,  therefore,  consists  in  the  privation 
of  knowledge  which  is  involved  by  inadequate  knowledge 
of  things  or  by  inadequate  and  confused  ideas. — q.F-D. 

Scliol. — In  the  scholium  of  Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2,  I  have  ex- 
plained how  error  consists  in  the  privation  of  knowledge  ; 
but  for  the  sake  of  fuller  explanation,  I  will  give  an 
example.  For  instance,  men  are  deceived  because  they 
think  themselves  free,  and  the  sole  reason  for  thinking 
so  is  that  they  are  conscious  of  their  own  actions,  and 
ignorant  of  the  causes  by  which  those  actions  are  deter- 
mined. Their  idea  of  liberty  therefore  is  this — that  they 
know  no  cause  for  their  own  actions ;  for  as  to  saying 
that  their  actions  depend  upon  their  will,  these  are  words 
to  which  no  idea  is  attached.  What  the  will  is,  and  in 
what  manner  it  moves  the  body,  every  one  is  ignorant, 
for  those  who  pretend  otherwise,  and  devise  seats  and 
dwelling-places  of  the  soul,  usually  excite  our  laughter 
or  disgust.  Just  in  the  same  manner,  when  we  look  at 
the  sun,  we  imagine  his  distance  from  us  to  be  about  200 
feet;  the  error  not  consisting  solely  in  the  imagination, 
but  arising  from  our  not  knowing  what  the  true  distance 
is  when  we  imagine,  and  what  are  the  causes  of  our 
imagination.  For  although  we  may  afterwards  know 
that  the  sun  is  more  than  600  diameters  of  the  eartli 
distant  from  us,  we  still  imagine  it  near  us,  since  wo 
imagine  it  to  be  so  near,  not  because  we  are  ign(jrant  i-f 
its  true  distance,  but  because  an  affection  of  our  body 
involves  the  essence  of  the  sun,  in  so  far  as  our  body 
itself  is  affected  by  it. 


82  ETHIC. 

Peop.  XXXVI. — l7iadc(iuate  and  confused  ideas  follow  ly 
the  same  necessity  as  adequate  or  clear  and  distinct 
ideas. 

Dcmonst. — All  ideas  are  in  God  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i),  and 
in  so  far  as  tliey  are  related  to  Ood  are  true  (Prop.  32, 
pt.  2)  and  (Corol.  Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  adequate.  No  ideas, 
therefore,  are  inadequate  or  confused  unless  in  so  far  as 
they  are  related  to  the  individual  mind  of  some  person 
(see  Props.  24  and  28,  pt.  2).  All  ideas,  therefore,  both 
adequate  and  inadequate,  follow  by  the  same  necessity 
(CoroL  Prop.  6,  pt.  2). 

Peop.  XXXVII. — That  which  is  common  to  everything 
{see  Lemma  2),  and  which  is  egiially  in  the  -part  and 
in  the  ivhole,  forms  the  essence  of  no  individual 
thing. 

Bemonst. — For  if  this  be  denied,  let  that  which  is 
common  be  conceived,  if  possible,  to  constitute  the 
essence  of  some  individual  thing, — the  essence,  for  ex- 
ample, of  B.  Without  B,  therefore  (Def.  2,  pt.  2),  that 
which  is  common  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived.  But 
this  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  Therefore  that 
which  is  common  does  not  pertain  to  the  essence  of 
B,  nor  does  it  form  the  essence  of  any  other  individual 
thing. 

Peop.  XXXVIII. — Those  things  ivhich  are  common  to 
cvcrythiiig,  and  which  are  eqiially  in  the  'part  and  in 
the  whole,  can  only  he  adequately  conceived. 

Bemonst. — Let  there  be  something,  A,  which  is  com- 
mon to  all  bodies,  and  which  is  equally  in  the  part  of 
each  body  and  in  the  whole.  I  say  that  A  can  only  be 
adequately  conceived.  Por  the  idea  of  A  (Corol.  Prop.  7, 
pt.  2)  will  necessarily  be  adequate  in  God,  both  in  so  far 
as  He  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  and  in  so  far  as 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       S^ 

He  has  the  idea  of  its  affections,  which  (Props.  16,  25, 
and  27,  pt.  2)  involve  the  nature  of  the  liuniau  body, 
and  partly  also  the  nature  of  external  bodies ;  that  is  to 
say  (Props.  12  and  i  3,  pt.  2),  this  idea  M'ill  necessarily  be 
adequate  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  constitutes  the  human 
mind,  or  in  so  far  as  He  has  ideas  which  are  in  the  human 
mind.  The  mind,  therefore  (Corel.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2),  neces- 
sarily perceives  A  adequately,  both  in  so  far  as  it  per- 
ceives itself  or  its  own  or  any  external  body ;  nor  can 
A  be  conceived  in  any  other  manner. — q.e.d. 

Cowl — Hence  it  follows  that  some  ideas  or  notions 
exist  which  are  common  to  all  men,  for  (Lem.  2)  all 
bodies  agree  in  some  things,  which  (Prop.  38,  pt.  2) 
must  be  adequately,  that  is  to  say,  clearly  and  distinctly, 
perceived  by  all. 

Prop.  XXXIX. — There  will  exist  in  the  human  mind  an 
adequate  idea  of  that  which  is  common  and  2iroper  to 
the  human  tody,  and  to  any  external  bodies  by  which 
the  human  body  is  generally  affected — of  that  which 
equally  in  the  part  of  each  of  these  external  bodies  and 
in  the  whole  is  common  and  pi'Ojjer. 

Dcynonst. — Let  A  be  something  which  is  common  and 
proper  to  the  human  body  and  certain  external  bodies ; 
let  it  exist  equally  in  the  human  body  and  in  those  ex- 
ternal bodies,  and  let  it  exist  equally  in  the  part  of  each 
external  body  and  in  the  whole.  An  adequate  idea  of  A 
itself  will  exist  in  God  (Corel.  Prop.  7,  pt.  2),  both  in  s^ 
far  as  He  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  and  in  so  far 
as  He  has  the  idea  of  the  given  external  bodies.  Let  it 
be  supposed  that  the  human  body  is  affected  by  an  ex- 
ternal body  through  that  which  it  has  in  common  with 
the  external  body,  that  is  to  say,  by  A.  The  idea  of  this 
affection  will  involve  the  property  of  A  (Prop.  1 6,  pt.  2), 
and  therefore  (Corel.  Prop.  7,  pt.  2)  the  idea  of  this  affec- 
tion, in  so  far  as  it  involves  the  property  of  A,  will  exist 


84  ETHIC. 

adequately  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  affected  by  the 
idea  of  the  human  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 3,  pt.  2), 
in  so  far  as  He  constitutes  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind.  Therefore  (Corel.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2)  this  idea  is 
also  adequate  in  the  human  mind. — q.e.d. 

Carol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  more  things  the 
body  has  in  common  with  other  bodies,  the  more  things 
will  the  mind  be  adapted  to  perceive. 

Peop.  XL. —  Those  ideas  are  also  adequate  wJiicJi  folloio  in 
the  mind  from  ideas  which  are  adequate  in  it. 

Demonst. — This  is  evident.  For  when  we  say  that 
an  idea  follows  in  the  human  mind  from  ideas  which 
are  adequate  in  it,  we  do  but  say  (Corel.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2) 
that  in  the  divine  intellect  itself  an  idea  exists  of  which 
God  is  the  cause,  not  in  so  far  as  He  is  infinite,  nor  in  so 
far  as  He  is  affected  by  the  ideas  of  a  multitude  of  indi- 
vidual things,  but  in  so  far  only  as  He  constitutes  the 
essence  of  the  human  mind. 

Schol. — I  have  thus  explained  the  origin  of  those 
notions  which  are  called  common,  and  which  are  the 
foundations  of  our  reasoning  ;  but  of  some  axioms  or 
notions  other  causes  exist  which  it  would  be  advan- 
tageous to  explain  by  our  method,  for  we  should  thus  be 
able  to  distinguish  those  notions  which  are  more  useful 
than  others,  and  those  which  are  scarcely  of  any  use ; 
those  which  are  common ;  those  which  are  clear  and  dis- 
tinct only  to  those  persons  who  do  not  suffer  from  preju- 
dice ;  and,  finally,  those  which  are  ill-founded.  Moreover, 
it  would  be  manifest  whence  these  notions  which  are  called 
second,  and  consequently  the  axioms  founded  upon  them, 
have  taken  their  origin,  and  other  things,  too,  would  be  ex- 
plained which  I  have  thought  about  these  matters  at  different 
times.  Since,  however,  I  have  set  apart  this  subject  for 
another  treatise,  and  because  I  do  not  wish  to  create  disgust 
with  excessive  prolixity,  I  have  determined  to  pass  by  this 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       85 

matter  here.  But  not  to  omit  anything  which  is  neces- 
sary for  us  to  know,  I  will  biietly  give  the  causes  from 
which  terms  called  Transcendental,  such  as  L'einj,  Thinr/, 
Something,  have  taken  their  origin.  These  terms  have 
arisen  because  the  human  body,  inasmuch  as  it  is  limited, 
can  form  distinctly  in  itself  a  certain  number  only  of 
images  at  once.  (For  the  explanation  of  the  word  imagf, 
see  Schol.  Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2.)  If  this  number  be  exceeded, 
the  images  will  become  confused ;  and  if  the  numk'r  of 
images  which  the  body  is  able  to  form  distinctly  be  greatly 
exceeded,  they  wall  all  run  one  into  another.  Since  this 
is  so,  it  is  clear  (Corol.  Prop.  17,  and  Prop.  18,  pt.  2) 
that  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  images  which  can  be 
formed  at  the  same  time  in  the  body  will  be  the  number 
of  bodies  which  the  human  mind  can  imagine  at  the  same 
tinie.  If  the  images  in  the  body,  therefore,  are  all  con- 
fused, the  mind  will  confusedly  imagine  all  the  bodies 
without  distinguishing  the  one  from  the  other,  and  will 
include  them  all,  as  it  were,  under  one  attribute,  that  of 
being  or  thing.  The  same  confusion  may  also  be  caused  by 
lack  of  uniform  force  in  the  images  and  from  other  analo- 
gous causes,  which  there  is  no  need  to  discuss  here,  the 
consideration  of  one  cause  being  sufficient  for  the  pur- 
pose we  have  in  \dew.  For  it  all  comes  to  this,  that 
these  terms  signify  ideas  in  the  highest  degree  confused. 
It  is  in  this  way  that  those  notions  have  arisen  which 
are  called  Universal,  such  as,  Mctn,  Horse,  Dog,  kc. ;  that 
is  to  say,  so  many  images  of  men,  for  instance,  are  formed 
in  the  human  body  at  once,  that  they  exceed  the  power 
of  the  imagination,  not  entirely,  but  to  such  a  degree  that 
the  mind  has  no  power  to  imagine  the  determinate  number 
of  men  and  the  small  differences  of  each,  such  as  colour 
and  size,  &c.  It  will  therefore  distinctly  imagine  Hint 
only  in  which  all  of  them  agree  in  so  far  as  the  Uxly 
is  affected  by  them,  for  by  that  the  body  was  chielly 
affected,  that  is  to  say,  by  each  individual,  and  this  it 
will  express  by  the  name  man,  covering  thereby  an  inOnite 


86  ETHIC. 

number  of  individuals ;  to  imagine  a  determinate  number 
of  individuals  being  out  of  its  power.  But  we  must  ob- 
serve that  these  notions  are  not  formed  by  all  persons  in 
the  same  way,  but  that  they  vary  in  each  case  according 
to  the  thing  by  which  the  body  is  more  frequently  affected, 
and  which  the  mind  more  easily  imagines  or  recollects. 
Tor  example,  those  who  have  more  frequently  looked 
with  admiration  upon  the  stature  of  men,  by  the  name 
man  will  understand  an  animal  of  erect  stature,  while 
those  who  have  been  in  the  habit  of  fixing  their  thoughts 
on  something  else,  will  form  another  common  image  of 
men,  describing  man,  for  instance,  as  an  animal  capable 
of  laughter,  a  biped  without  feathers,  a  rational  animal, 
and  so  on;  each  person  forming  universal  images  of 
things  according  to  the  temperament  of  his  own  body. 
It  is  not  therefore  to  be  wondered  at  that  so  many  con- 
troversies have  arisen  amongst  those  philosophers  who 
have  endeavoured  to  explain  natural  objects  by  the  images 
of  things  alone. 

Schol.  2. — From  what  has  been  already  said,  it  clearly 
appears  that  we  perceive  many  things  and  form  univer- 
sal ideas : 

1.  From  individual  things,  represented  by  the  senses 
to  us  in  a  mutilated  and  confused  manner,  and  without 
order  to  the  intellect  (Corol.  Prop.  29,  pt.  2).  These 
perceptions  I  have  therefore  been  in  the  habit  of  calling 
knowledge  from  vague  experience. 

2.  From  signs ;  as,  for  example,  when  we  hear  or  read 
certain  words,  we  recollect  things  and  form  certain  ideas 
of  them  similar  to  them,  through  which  ideas  we  imagine 
things  (Schol.  Prop.  18,  pt.  2).  These  two  ways  of 
looking  at  things  I  shall  hereafter  call  knowledge  of  the 
first  kind,  opinion  or  imagination. 

3.  From  our  possessing  common  notions  and  adequate 
ideas  of  the  properties  of  things  (Corol.  Prop.  38,  Prop. 
39,  with  Corol.  and  Prop.  40,  pt.  2).  This  I  shall  call 
reason  and  knowledge  of  the  second  kind. 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.       87 

Besides  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  tlicre  is  a 
third,  as  I  shall  hereafter  show,  which  we  shall  call 
intuitive  science.  This  kind  of  knowing  advances 
from  an  adequate  idea  of  the  formal  essence  of  certain 
attributes  of  God  to  the  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
essence  of  things.  All  this  I  will  explain  by  one  example. 
Let  there  be  three  numbers  given  through  which  it  is 
required  to  discover  a  fourth  which  shall  be  to  the  third 
as  the  second  is  to  the  first.  A  merchant  does  not 
hesitate  to  multiply  the  second  and  third  together  and 
divide  the  product  by  the  first,  either  because  he  has  not 
yet  forgotten  the  things  which  he  heard  without  any 
demonstration  from  his  schoolmaster,  or  because  he  has 
seen  the  truth  of  the  rule  with  the  more  simple  num- 
bers, or  because  from  the  19th  Prop,  in  the  7th  book  of 
Euclid  he  understands  the  common  property  of  all  pro- 
portionals. 

But  with  the  simplest  numbers  there  is  no  need  of  all 
this.  If  the  numbers  i,  2,  3,  for  instance,  be  given, 
every  one  can  see  that  the  fourth  proportional  is  6 
much  more  clearly  than  by  any  demonstration,  because 
from  the  ratio  in  which  we  see  by  one  intuition  that  the 
first  stands  to  the  second  we  conclude  the  fourth. 

Pkop.  XLI. — Knouicdge  of  the  first  kind  alone  is  the  cause 
of  falsity  ;  knowledge  of  the  second  and  third  orders 
is  necessarily  true. 
Dcmonst.—To  knowledge   of   the  first  kind  we  have 
said,   in   the  preceding   scholium,   that   all   those   ideas 
belong  which  are  inadequate  and  confused,  and,  there- 
fore (Prop.  35,  pt.  2),  this  knowledge  alone  is  the  cause 
of  falsity.     Moreover,  to  knowledge  of  the  second  and 
third  kind  we  have  said  that  those  ideas  belong  which 
are  adequate,  and  therefore  this  knowledge  (Prop.  34, 
pt.  2)  is  necessarily  true. 

Prop.  XLII. — It  is  the  knowledge  of  the  second  and  third, 


88  ETHIC. 

and  not  that   of  the  first  hind,  which  teaches  us  to 
distinguish  the  true  from  the  false. 

Demonst. — This  proposition  is  self-evident.  For  he 
■who  knows  how  to  distinguish  between  the  true  and  the 
false  must  have  an  adequate  idea  of  the  true  and  the 
false,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  he  must 
know  the  true  and  the  false  by  the  second  or  third  kind 
of  knowledge. 

Peop.  XLIII. — He  who  has  a  true  idea  knows  at  the  same 
time  that  he  has  a  true  idea,  oior  can  he  douht  the 
truth  of  the  thing. 

Demonst. — A  true  idea  in  us  is  that  which  in  God  is 
adequate,  in  so  far  as  He  is  explained  by  the  nature  of 
the  human  mind  (Corol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2).  Let  us  sup- 
pose, therefore,  that  there  exists  in  God,  in  so  far  as  He 
is  explained  by  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  an  ade- 
quate idea,  A.  Of  this  idea  there  must  necessarily  exist 
in  God  an  idea,  which  is  related  to  Him  in  the  same 
way  as  the  idea  A  (Prop.  20,  pt.  2,  the  demonstration  of 
which  is  universal).  But  the  idea  A  is  supposed  to  be 
related  to  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  explained  by  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind.  The  idea  of  the  idea  A  must  there- 
fore be  related  to  God  in  the  same  manner,  that  is  to 
say  (Corol.  Prop,  i  i,pt.  2),  this  adequate  idea  of  the  idea 
A  will  exist  in  the  mind  itself  which  has  the  adequate 
idea  A.  He  therefore  who  has  an  adequate  idea,  that  is 
to  say  (Prop.  34,  pt.  2),  he  who  knows  a  thing  truly, 
must  at  the  same  time  have  an  adequate  idea  or  a  true 
knowledge  of  his  knowledge,  that  is  to  say  (as  is  self- 
evident)  he  must  be  certain. — q.e.d. 

8chol. — In  the  scholium  to  Prop.  21,  pt.  2,  I  have 
explained  what  is  the  idea  of  an  idea,  but  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  preceding  proposition  is  evident  by 
itself.      For  no  one  who   has  a  true  idea  is   icrnorant 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       ^ 

that  a  true  idea  involves  tlie  highest  certitude ;  to  have 
a  true  idea  signifying  just  this,  to  know  a  thing  iicrfcctly 
or  as  well  as  possible.  No  one,  in  fact,  can  doubt  this, 
unless  he  supposes  an  idea  to  be  something  duml),  like  a 
picture  on  a  tablet,  instead  of  being  a  mode  of  thought,  that 
is  to  say,  intelligence  itself.  Moreover,  I  ask  wlio  can 
know  that  he  understands  a  thing  unless  he  first  of  all 
understands  that  thing  ?  that  is  to  say,  who  can  know  tliat 
he  is  certain  of  anything  unless  he  is  first  of  all  certain 
of  that  thing  ?  Then,  again,  what  true  idea  can  be  given 
more  clearly  and  surely  which  shall  be  the  standard  of 
truth  ?  Just  as  light  reveals  both  itself  and  the  dark- 
ness, so  truth  is  the  standard  of  itself  and  of  the  false. 
I  consider  what  has  been  said  to  be  a  sufficient  answer 
to  the  objection  that  if  a  true  idea  is  distinguished  from  a 
false  idea  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  said  to  agree  with  that  of 
which  it  is  the  idea,  the  true  idea  therefore  has  no  reality 
nor  perfection  above  the  false  idea  (since  they  are  dis- 
tinguished by  an  external  sign  alone),  and  consequently 
the  man  who  has  true  ideas  will  have  no  greater  reahty 
or  perfection  than  he  who  has  false  ideas  only.  I  con- 
sider, too,  that  I  have  already  replied  to  those  who  inquire 
why  men  have  false  ideas,  and  how  a  man  can  certainly 
know  that  he  has  ideas  which  agree  with  those  thing.s  of 
which  they  are  the  ideas.  For  with  regard  to  the  dif- 
ference between  a  true  and  a  false  idea,  it  is  evident 
from  Prop.  3  5,  pt.  2,  that  the  former  is  related  to  the 
latter  as  being  is  to  non-being.  The  causes  of  falsity, 
too,  I  have  most  clearly  shown  in  Props.  19-35.  including 
the  scholium  to  the  last.  From  what  has  there  been 
said,  the  nature  of  the-  difference  between  a  man  who 
has  true  ideas  and  one  who  has  only  false  ideas  is 
clear.  AVith  regard  to  the  last-mentioned  point— how  a 
man  can  know  that  he  has  an  idea  which  agrees  witli 
that  of  which  it  is  the  idea— I  have  shown  almost  more 
times  than  enough  that  he  knows  it  simply  because  he 
has  an  idea  which  agrees  with  that  of  which  it  is  the 


90  ETHIC. 

idea,  that  is  to  say,  because  truth  is  its  own  standard. 
We  must  remember,  besides,  that  our  mind,  in  so  far  as 
it  truly  perceives  things,  is  a  part  of  the  infinite  intellect 
of  God  (Corol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2),  and  therefore  it  must  be 
that  the  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  the  mind  are  as  true 
as  those  of  God. 


Peop.  XLIV. — It  is  not  of  the  nature  of  reason  to  con- 
sider things  as  contingent  hut  as  necessary. 

Bemonst. — It  is  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  perceive 
things  truly  (Prop.  41,  pt.  2),  that  is  to  say  (Ax.  6, 
pt.  i),  as  they  are  in  themselves,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  29, 
pt.  i),  not  as  contingent  but  as  necessary. — q.e.d. 

Corol.  I. — Hence  it  follows  that  it  is  through  the 
imagination  alone  that  we  look  upon  things  as  contin- 
gent both  with  reference  to  the  past  and  the  future. 

^chol. — How  this  happens  I  will  explain  in  a  few 
words.  We  have  shown  above  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2,  with 
Corol.)  that  unless  causes  oppose  preventing  the  present 
existence  of  things,  the  mind  always  imagines  them  pre- 
sent before  it,  even  if  they  do  not  exist.  Again  (Prop. 
18,  pt.  2),  we  have  shown  that  if  the  human  body  has 
once  been  simultaneously  affected  by  two  external  bodies, 
whenever  the  mind  afterwards  imagines  one  it  will  imme- 
diately remember  the  other ;  that  is  to  say,  it  will  look 
upon  both  as  present  before  it,  unless  causes  oppose  which 
prevent  the  present  existence  of  the  things.  N"o  one 
doubts,  too,  that  we  imagine  time  because  we  imagine 
some  bodies  to  move  with  a  velocity  less,  or  greater  thau, 
or  equal  to  that  of  others.  Let  us  therefore  suppose 
a  boy  who  yesterday,  for  the  first  time,  in  the  morning 
saw  Peter,  at  midday  Paul,  in  the  evening  Simeon,  and 
to-day  in  the  morning  again  sees  Peter.  It  is  plain 
from  Prop.  18,  pt.  2,  that  as  soon  as  he  sees  the 
morning  light  he  will  imagine  the  sun  passing  through 
the  same  part  of  the  sky  as  on  the  day  preceding ;  that 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND.      91 

is  to  say,  he  will  imagine  the  whole  day,  and  at  the  snin« 
time  Peter  will  be  connected  in  his  imagination  with 
the  morning,  Paul  with  midday,  and  Simeon  with  the 
evening.  In  the  morning,  therefore,  the  existence  of 
Paul  and  Simeon  will  be  imagined  in  relation  to  future 
time,  while  in  the  evening,  if  the  boy  should  see  Simeon, 
he  will  refer  Peter  and  Paul  to  the  past,  since  they  will 
be  connected  with  the  past  in  his  imagination.  This 
process  will  be  constant  in  proportion  to  the  regularity 
with  which  he  sees  Peter,  Paul,  and  Simeon  in  this  order. 
If  it  should  by  some  means  happen  that  on  some  other 
evening,  in  the  place  of  Simeon,  he  should  see  James, 
on  the  following  morning  he  will  connect  in  his  imagina- 
tion with  the  evening  at  one  time  Simeon  and  at  another 
James,  but  not  both  together.  For  he  is  supposed  to 
have  seen  one  and  then  the  other  in  the  evening,  but  not 
both  together.  His  imagination  will  therefore  fluctuate, 
and  he  will  connect  with  a  future  evening  first  one  and 
then  the  other ;  that  is  to  say,  he  will  consider  neither 
as  certain,  but  both  as  a  contingency  in  the  future. 

This  fluctuation  of  the  imagination  will  take  place  in 
the  same  way  if  the  imagination  is  dealing  with  things 
which  we  contemplate  in  the  same  way  with  reference 
to  past  or  present  time,  and  consequently  we  imagine 
things  related  to  time  past,  present,  or  future  as  con- 
tingent. 

Corol.  2. — It  is  of  the  nature  of  reason  to  perceive 
things  under  a  certain  form  of  eternity. 

Demonsf. — It  is  of  the  nature  of  reason  to  consider 
things  as  necessary  and  not  as  contingent  (Prop.  44.  pt.  2). 
This  necessity  of  things  it  perceives  truly  (Prop.  41, 
pt.  2);  that  is  to  say  (Ax.  6,  pt.  i),  as  it  is  in  itself. 
But  (Prop.  16,  pt.  i)  this  necessity  of  things  is  the 
necessity  itself  of  the  eternal  nature  of  God.  Therefore 
it  is  of  the  nature  of  reason  to  consider  things  under  this 
form  of  eternity.  Moreover,  the  foundations  of  reason  are 
notions  which  explain  those  things  which  are  common 


93  ETHIC. 

to  all  (Prop,  38,  pt.  2),  and  these  things  explain  the 
essence  of  no  individual  thing  (Prop.  37,  pt.  2),  and 
must  therefore  be  conceived  without  any  relation  to  time, 
but  under  a  certain  form  of  eternity. — q.e.d. 

Pkop.  XLV. — Every  idea  of  any  hody  or  actucdly  existing 
ijidividual  tiling  necessarily  involves  the  eternal  and 
infinite  essence  of  God. 

Bemonst. — The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually 
existing  necessarily  involves  both  the  essence  and  ex- 
istence of  the  thing  itself  (Corol.  Prop.  8,  pt.  2).  But 
individual  things  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i)  cannot  be  conceived 
without  God,  and  since  (Prop.  6,  pt.  2)  God  is  their 
cause  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under  that  attribute 
of  which  they  are  modes,  their  ideas  (Ax.  4,  pt.  i)  must 
necessarily  involve  the  conception  of  that  attribute,  or,  in 
other  words  (Def.  6,  pt.  i),  must  involve  the  eternal  and 
infinite  essence  of  God. — q.e.d. 

ScJiol. — By  existence  is  to  be  understood  here  not 
duration,  that  is,  existence  considered  in  the  abstract,  as 
if  it  were  a  certain  kind  of  quantity,  but  I  speak  of 
the  nature  itself  of  the  existence  which  is  assigned  to 
individual  things,  because  from  the  eternal  necessity  of 
the  nature  of  God  infinite  numbers  of  things  follow  in 
infinite  ways  (Prop.  16,  pt.  i).  I  repeat,  that  I  speak  of 
the  existence  itself  of  individual  things  in  so  far  as  they 
are  in  God.  For  although  each  individual  thing  is  de- 
termined by  another  individual  thing  to  existence  in  a 
certain  way,  the  force  nevertheless  by  which  each  thing 
perseveres  in  its  existence  follows  from  the  eternal  neces- 
sity of  the  nature  of  God  (see  Corol.  Prop.  24,  pt.  i). 

Pkop.  XLVI. — The  hnowlcdge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God  which  each  idea  involves  is  adequate 
and  jperfcct. 

Demonst. — The  demonstration  of  the   preceding  pro- 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.       93 

position  is  universal,  and  ^vhether  a  thing  be  considercl 
as  a  part  or  as  a  whole,  its  idea,  whether  it  be  of  a  part 
or  whole,  will  involve  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of 
God  (Prop.  45,  pt.  2).  Therefore  that  which  Rivts  a 
knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God  is 
common  to  all,  and  is  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the 
whole.  This  knowledge  therefore  (Prop.  t,S,  pt.  2)  \YilI 
be  adequate. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  XLVII. — The  human  mind  jJosscsscs  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God. 

Demonst. — The  human  mind  possesses  ideas  (Prop.  22, 
pt.  2)  by  which  (Prop.  23,  pt.  2)  it  perceives  itself  and  its 
own  body  (Prop.  19,  pt.  2),  together  with  (Corol.  i,  Prop. 
16,  and  Prop.  17,  pt.  2)  external  bodies,  as  actually  ex- 
isting. Therefore  (Props,  45  and  46,  pt.  2)  it  possesses 
an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence 
of  God. Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Hence  we  see  that  the  infinite  essence  and  the 
eternity  of  God  are  known  to  all ;  and  since  all  things 
are  in  God  and  are  conceived  through  Him,  it  follows 
that  we  can  deduce  from  this  knowledge  many  things 
which  we  can  know  adequately,  and  that  we  can  thus 
form  that  third  sort  of  knowledge  mentioned  in  Schol.  2, 
Prop.  40,  pt.  2,  of  whose  excellence  and  value  the  Fifth 
Part  will  be  the  place  to  speak.  The  reason  why  we  do 
not  possess  a  knowledge  of  God  as  distinct  as  that  which 
we  have  of  common  notions  is,  that  we  cannot  imagine 
God  as  we  can  bodies ;  and  because  we  have  attaclu-d  tlie 
name  God  to  the  images  of  things  which  we  are  in  the 
habit  of  seeing,  an  error  we  can  hardly  avoid,  ina.snmch 
as  we  are  continually  affected  by  external  bodies.  Many 
errors,  of  a  truth,  consist  merely  in  the  application  of  tlio 
wrong  names  to  things.  For  if  a  man  says  that  the  lines 
which  are  drawn  from  the  centre  of  the  circle  to  the 
circumference  are  not  equal,  he  understands  by  the  circle, 


94  ETHIC. 

at  all  events  for  the  time,  sometliing  else  than  matlie- 
maticians  understand  by  it.  So  when  men  make  errors 
in  calculation,  the  numbers  which  are  in  their  minds 
are  not  those  which  are  upon  the  paper.  As  far  as  their 
mind  is  concerned  there  is  no  error,  although  it  seems  as 
if  there  were,  because  we  think  that  the  numbers  in  their 
minds  are  those  which  are  upon  the  paper.  If  we  did 
not  think  so,  we  should  not  believe  them  to  be  in  error. 
For  example,  when  I  lately  heard  a  man  complaining 
that  his  court  had  flown  into  one  of  his  neighbour's 
fowls,  I  understood  what  he  meant,  and  therefore  did 
not  imagine  him  to  be  in  error.  This  is  the  source  from 
which  so  many  controversies  arise — that  men  either  do 
not  properly  explain  their  own  thoughts,  or  do  not 
properly  interpret  those  of  other  people ;  for,  in  truth, 
when  they  most  contradict  one  another,  they  either  think 
the  same  things  or  something  different,  so  that  those 
things  which  they  suppose  to  be  errors  and  absurdities  in 
another  person  are  not  so. 

^  ^   Tkop.  XLVIII. — In   the   mind    there   is  no    absolute  or 

1  free  loill,  hut  the  mind  is  determined  to  this  or  that 

volition    ly    a   cause,   which   is  also   determined   hy 

another  cause,  and  this  again  hy  another,  and  so  on 

ad  infinitum. 

Demonst. — The  mind  is  a  certain  and  determinate 
mode  of  thought  (Prop,  ii,  pt.  2),  and  therefore  (CoroL 
2,  Prop.  17,  pt.  i)  it  cannot  be  the  free  cause  of  its  own 
actions,  or  have  an  absolute  faculty  of  willing  or  not 
willing,  but  must  be  determined  to  this  or  that  volition 
(Prop.  28,  pt.  i)  by  a  cause  which  is  also  determined  by 
another  cause,  and  this  again  by  another,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum. — q.e.d. 

S>chol. — In  the  same  manner  it  is  demonstrated  that  in 
the  mind  there  exists  no  absolute  faculty  of  understand- 
ing, desiring,  loving,  &c.     These  and  the  like  faculties, 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  Ml/fp. 

therefore,  are  either  altogether  fictitious,  or^^^lso  are 
nothing  but  metaphysical  or  universal  entities,  \nuch  wo 
are  in  the  habit  of  forming  from  individual  cases.  The 
intellect  and  will,  therefore,  are  related  to  this  or  that 
idea  or  volition  as  rockiness  is  related  to  this  or  that 
rock,  or  as  man  is  related  to  Peter  or  Paul.  The  reason 
why  men  imagine  themselves  to  be  free  we  have  explained 
in  the  Appendix  to  the  Pirst  Part.  Before,  however,  I 
advance  any  farther,  I  must  observe  that  by  tlic  will  I 
understand  a  faculty  of  affirming  or  denying,  but  not  a 
desire ;  a  faculty,  I  say,  by  which  the  mind  affirms  or 
denies  that  which  is  true  or  false,  and  not  a  desire  by 
which  the  mind  seeks  a  thing  or  turns  away  from  it. 
But  now  that  we  have  demonstrated  that  these  faculties 
are  universal  notions  which  are  not  distinguishable  from 
the  individual  notions  from  which  they  are  formed,  we 
must  now  inquire  whether  the  volitions  themselves  are 
anything  more  than  the  ideas  of  things.  We  must 
inquire,  I  say,  whether  in  the  mind  there  exists  any 
other  affirmation  or  negation  than  that  which  the  idea 
involves  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  idea.  Por  this  purpose  see 
the  following  proposition,  together  with  Def.  3,  pt.  2,  so 
that  thought  may  not  fall  into  pictures.  For  by  ideas 
I  do  not  understand  the  images  which  are  formed  at  the 
back  of  the  eye,  or,  if  you  please,  in  the  middle  of  the 
brain,  but  rather  the  conceptions  of  thought. 

Prop.  XLIX. — l7i  the  mind  there  is  no  volition  or  affirma- 
tion and  negation  excelling  that  which  the  idea,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  an  idea,  invohcs. 

Demonst. — In  the  mind  there  exists  (Prop.  48,  \\.  2) 
no  absolute  faculty  of  willing  or  not  willing.  Unly 
individual  volitions  exist,  that  is  to  say,  tliis  and  that 
affirmation  and  this  and  that  negation.  Let  us  conceivM 
therefore,  any  individual  volition,  that  is,  any  mode  of 
thought,  by  which  the  mind  affirms  that  the  three  angles 


96  ETHIC. 

of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  This 
affirmation  involves  the  conception  or  idea  of  the  triangle, 
that  is  to  say,  without  it  the  affirmation  cannot  be  con- 
ceived. For  to  say  that  A  must  involve  the  conception 
B,  is  the  same  as  saying  that  A  cannot  be  conceived 
without  B.  Moreover,  without  the  idea  of  the  triangle 
this  affirmation  (Ax.  3,  pt.  2)  cannot  be,  and  it  can 
therefore  neither  "be  nor  be  conceived  without  that 
idea.  But  this  idea  of  the  triangle  must  involve  this 
same  affirmation  that  its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  Therefore  also,  vice  versa,  this  idea  of  the 
triangle  without  this  affirmation  can  neither  be  nor  be 
conceived.  Therefore  (Def.  2,  pt.  2)  this  affirmation  per- 
tains to  the  essence  of  the  idea  of  the  triangle,  nor  is  it 
anything  else  besides  this.  Whatever  too  we  have  said 
of  this  volition  (since  it  has  been  taken  arbitrarily)  applies 
to  all  other  volitions,  that  is  to  say,  they  are  nothing 
but  ideas. — Q.e.d. 

Cowl. — The  will  and  the  intellect  are  one  and  the 
same. 

Demonst. — The  will  and  the  intellect  are  nothing  but 
the  individual  volitions  and  ideas  themselves  (Prop.  48, 
pt.  2,  and  its  Schol.)  But  the  individual  volition  and 
idea  (Prop.  49,  pt.  2)  are  one  and  the  same.  Therefore 
the  will  and  the  intellect  are  one  and  the  same. — q.e.d. 

Scliol. — I  have  thus  removed  what  is  commonly  thought 
to  be  the  cause  of  error.  It  has  been  proved  above  that 
falsity  consists  solely  in  the  privation  which  mutilated  and 
confused  ideas  involve.  A  false  idea,  therefore,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  false,  does  not  involve  certitude.  '  Consequently, 
when  we  say  that  a  man  assents  to  what  is  false  and  does 
not  doubt  it,  we  do  not  say  that  he  is  certain,  but  merely 
that  he  does  not  doubt,  that  is  to  say,  that  he  assents 
to  what  is  false,  because  there  are  no  causes  sufficient 
to  make  his  imagination  waver  (Schol.  Prop.  44,  pt.  2). 
Although,  therefore,  a  man  may  be  supposed  to  adhere  to 
what  is  false,  we  shall  never  on  that  account  say  that  he 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISn:       97 

is  certain.  For  by  certitude  wc  understaiul  soiuelhin-^' 
positive  (Prop.  43,  pt.  2,  with  the  Schol.),  and  not  the 
privation  of  doubt ;  but  by  the  privation  of  certitude  we 
understand  falsity.  If  the  preceding  proposition,  how- 
ever,  is  to  be  more  clearly  comprehended,  a  word  or  two 
must  be  added ;  it  yet  remains  also  tliat  I  should  answer 
the  objections  which  may  be  brought  against  our  doctrine, 
and  finally,  in  order  to  remove  all  scruples,  I  have  thought 
it  worth  while  to  indicate  some  of  its  advantages.  I  suy 
some,  as  the  principal  advantages  will  be  better  understood 
when  we  come  to  the  Fifth  Part.  I  begin,  therefore,  with 
the  first,  and  I  warn  my  readers  carefully  to  distinguish 
between  an  idea  or  conception  of  the  mind  and  the 
images  of  things  formed  by  our  imagination.  Secondly, 
it  is  necessary  that  we  should  distinguish  between  ideas 
and  the  words  by  which  things  are  signified.  For  it  is 
because  these  three  things,  images,  words,  and  ideas,  are 
by  many  people  either  altogether  confounded  or  not  dis- 
tinguished with  sufficient  accuracy  and  care  that  such 
ignorance  exists  about  this  doctrine  of  the  will,  so  neces- 
sary to  be  known  both  for  the  purposes  of  speculation 
and  for  the  wise  government  of  life.  Those  who  think 
that  ideas  consist  of  images,  which  are  formed  in  us  by 
meeting  with  external  bodies,  persuade  themselves  that 
those  ideas  of  things  of  which  we  can  form  no  similar 
image  are  not  ideas,  but  mere  fancies  constructed  by  the 
free  power  of  the  will.  They  look  upon  ideas,  therefore, 
as  dumb  pictures  on  a  tablet,  and  being  prepossessed 
with  this  prejudice,  they  do  not  see  that  an  idea,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  an  idea,  involves  affirmation  or  negation. 
Again,  those  who  confound  words  with  the  idea,  or  with 
the  affirmation  itself  which  the  idea  involves,  think  that 
they  can  will  contrary  to  their  perception,  because  they 
affirm  or  deny  something  in  words  alone  contrary  to  their 
perception.  It  will  be  easy  for  us,  however,  to  divest 
ourselves  of  these  prejudices  if  we  attend  to  the  nature 
of  thought,  which  in  no  way  involves  the  conception  of 


98  ETHIC. 

extension,  and  by  doing  this  "we  clearly  see  that  an  idea, 
since  it  is  a  mode  of  thought,  is  not  an  image  of  any- 
thing, nor  does  it  consist  of  words.  For  the  essence  of 
words  and  images  is  formed  of  bodily  motions  alone, 
which  involve  in  no  way  whatever  the  conception  of 
thought. 

Let  thus  much  suffice  under  this  head.  I  pass  on 
now  to  the  objections  to  which  I  have  already  alluded. 

The  first  is,  that  it  is  supposed  to  be  certain  that  the 
will  extends  itself  more  widely  than  the  intellect,  and  is 
therefore  different  from  it.  The  reason  why  men  suppose 
that  the  will  extends  itself  more  widely  than  the  intellect 
is  because  they  say  they  have  discovered  that  they  do 
not  need  a  larger  faculty  of  assent — that  is  to  say,  of 
affirmation — and  denial  than  that  which  they  now  have 
for  the  purpose  of  assenting  to  an  infinite  number  of 
other  things  which  we  do  not  perceive,  but  that  they  do 
need  a  greater  faculty  for  understanding  them.  The  will, 
therefore,  is  distinguished  from  the  intellect,  the  latter 
being  finite,  the  former  infinite.  The  second  objection 
which  can  be  made  is  that  there  is  nothing  which  experi- 
ence seems  to  teach  more  clearly  than  the  possibility  of 
suspending  our  judgment,  so  as  not  to  assent  to  the  things 
we  perceive  ;  and  we  are  strengthened  in  this  opinion 
because  no  one  is  said  to  be  deceived  in  so  far  as  he  ]Der- 
ceives  a  thing,  but  only  in  so  far  as  he  assents  to  it  or 
dissents  from  it.  For  example,  a  man  who  imagines  a 
winged  horse  does  not  therefore  admit  the  existence  of  a 
winged  horse ;  that  is  to  say,  he  is  not  necessarily  de- 
ceived, unless  he  grants  at  the  same  time  that  a  winged 
horse  exists.  Experience,  therefore,  seems  to  show  nothing 
more  plainly  than  that  the  will  or  faculty  of  assent  is  free, 
and  different  from  the  faculty  of  the  intellect. 

Thirdly,  it  may  be  objected  that  one  affirmation  does 
not  seem  to  contain  more  reality  than  another  ;  that  is  to 
say,  it  does  not  appear  that  we  need  a  greater  power  for 
affirming  a  thing   to   be  true   which   is   true  than   for 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIM),        ,,^ 

affirming  a  tiling  to  be  true  which  is  false.  Xeverthe- 
less,  we  observe  that  one  idea  contains  more  reality  or 
perfection  than  another,  for  as  some  oltjects  are  nohk-r 
than  others,  in  the  same  proportion  are  their  idt-as  more 
perfect.  It  appears  indisputable,  therefore,  that  there 
is  a  difference  between  the  will  and  the  intellect. 

Fourthly,  it  may  be  objected  that  if  a  man  does  not  act 
from  freedom  of  the  will,  what  would  lie  do  if  lie  were 
in  a  state  of  equilibrium,  like  the  ass  of  Buridanus  ? 
Would  he  not  perish  from  hunger  and  thirst  ?  and  if 
this  be  granted,  do  we  not  seem  to  conceive  him  as  a 
statue  of  a  man  or  as  an  ass  ?  If  I  deny  that  he  would 
thus  perish,  he  will  consequently  determine  himself  and 
possess  the  power  of  going  where  he  likes  and  doing 
what  he  likes. 

There  may  be  other  objections  besides  these,  but  as  I 
am  not  bound  to  discuss  what  every  one  may  dream,  I 
shall  therefore  make  it  my  business  to  answer  as  briclly 
as  possible  those  only  which  I  have  mentioned.  In 
reply  to  the  first  objection,  I  grant  that  the  will  extends 
itself  more  widely  than  the  intellect,  if  by  the  intellect 
we  understand  only  clear  and  distinct  ideas ;  but  I  deny 
that  the  will  extends  itself  more  widely  than  the  percep- 
tions or  the  faculty  of  conception ;  nor,  indeed,  do  I  see 
why  the  faculty  of  will  should  be  said  to  be  infinite  any 
more  than  the  faculty  of  feeling ;  for  as  by  the  same 
faculty  of  will  we  can  affirm  an  infinite  number  of  things 
(one  after  the  other,  for  we  cannot  affirm  an  inlinite 
number  of  things  at  once),  so  also  by  the  same  faculty 
of  feeling  we  can  feel  or  perceive  (one  after  another)  an 
infinite  number  of  bodies.  If  it  be  said  that  tliere  are 
an  infinite  number  of  things  which  we  cannot  ])erceive, 
I  reply  that  such  things  as  these  we  can  reach  hy  "o 
thought,  and  consequently  by  no  faculty  of  will.  But  it 
is  said  that  if  God  wished  us  to  perceive  those  things, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  Ilim  to  give  us  a  larger 
faculty  of  perception,  but  not  a  larger  faculty  of  will  than 


100  ETHIC. 

He  lias  already  given  us,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  say- 
ing that  if  God  wished  ns  to  understand  an  infinite 
number  of  other  beings,  it  would  be  necessary  for  Him 
to  give  us  a  greater  intellect,  but  not  a  more  universal 
idea  of  being  (in  order  to  embrace  that  infinite  number 
of  beings),  than  He  has  given  us.  For  we  have  shown 
that  the  will  is  a  universal  being,  or  the  idea  by  which 
we  explain  all  individual  volitions,  that  is  to  say,  that 
which  is  common  to  them  all.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at,  therefore,  that  those  who  believe  this  common  or 
universal  idea  of  all  the  volitions  to  be  a  faculty  should 
say  that  it  extends  itself  infinitely  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  intellect.  For  the  universal  is  predicated  of  one  or 
of  many,  or  of  an  infinite  number  of  individuals. 

The  second  objection  I  answer  by  denying  that  we 
have  free  power  of  suspending  judgment.  For  when  we 
say  that  a  person  suspends  judgment,  we  only  say  in 
other  words  that  he  sees  that  he  does  not  perceive  the 
thing  adequately.  The  suspension  of  the  judgment,  there- 
fore, is  in  truth  a  perception  and  not  free  will.  In  order 
that  this  may  be  clearly  understood,  let  us  take  the  case 
of  a  boy  who  imagines  a  horse  and  perceives  nothing 
else.  Since  this  imagination  involves  the  existence  of 
the  horse  (Corol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2),  and  the  boy  does  not 
perceive  anything  which  negates  its  existence,  he  will 
necessarily  contemplate  it  as  present,  nor  will  he  be  able 
to  doubt  its  existence  although  he  may  not  be  certain  of 
it.  This  is  a  thing  which  we  daily  experience  in  dreams, 
nor  do  I  believe  that  there  is  any  one  w^ho  thinks  that  he 
has  the  free  power  during  dreams  of  suspending  his  judg- 
ment upon  those  things  which  he  dreams,  and  of  causing 
himself  not  to  dream  those  things  which  he  dreams  that 
he  sees ;  and  yet  in  dreams  it  nevertheless  happens  that 
we  suspend  our  judgment,  for  we  dream  that  we  dream. 

I  grant,  it  is  true,  that  no  man  is  deceived  in  so  far 
as  he  perceives ;  that  is  to  say,  I  grant  that  the  imagina- 
tions of  the  mind  considered  in  themselves  involve  no 


THE  NATURE  AXD  ORIGIX  OF  THE  .U/.\7).      ,oi 

error  (Scliol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2);  but  I  deny  tlmt  a  man 
in  so  far  as  he  perceives  affirms  notlung.  For  what 
else  is  it  to  perceive  a  winged  liorse  than  to  alhrm  of 
the  horse  that  it  has  wings  ?  For  if  the  mind  per- 
ceived nothing  else  but  this  winged  horse,  it  would 
regard  it  as  present,  nor  would  it  have  any  reason  fur 
doubting  its  existence,  nor  any  power  of  refusing  assent 
to  it,  unless  the  imagination  of  the  winged  horse  be 
joined  to  an  idea  which  negates  its  existence,  or  the  mind 
perceives  that  the  idea  of  the  winged  horse  which  it 
has  is  inadequate.  In  either  of  the  two  latter  cases 
it  will  necessarily  deny  or  doubt  the  existence  of  tiie 
horse. 

With  regard  to  the  third  objection,  what  has  been  said 
will  perhaps  be  a  sufficient  answer, — namely,  tliat  the 
will  is  something  universal,  which  is  predicated  of  all 
ideas,  and  that  it  signifies  that  only  which  is  common 
to  them  all,  that  is  to  say,  affirmation.  Its  adequate 
essence,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  is  thus  considered  in  the 
abstract,  must  be  in  every  idea,  and  in  this  sense  only 
must  it  be  the  same  in  all;  but  not  in  so  far  as  it  is 
considered  as  constituting  the  essence  of  an  idea,  for  so 
far,  the  individual  affirmations  differ  just  as  the  ideas 
differ.  For  example,  the  affirmation  which  the  idea  of 
a  circle  involves  differs  from  that  which  the  idea  of 
a  triangle  involves,  just  as  the  idea  of  a  circle  dillers 
from  the  idea  of  a  triangle.  Again,  I  absolutely  deny 
that  we  need  a  power  of  thinking  in  order  to  atlirm 
that  to  be  true  which  is  true,  equal  to  that  which  we 
need  in  order  to  affirm  that  to  be  true  which  is  false. 
For  these  two  affirmations,  if  we  look  to  the  mind,  are 
related  to  one  another  as  being  and  non-being,  for  there 
is  nothing  positive  in  ideas  which  constitutes  a  form  of 
falsity  (Prop.  35,  pt.  2,  with  its  Schol.,  and  Schol.  t.» 
Prop.  47,  pt.  2). 

Here  therefore  particularly  is  it  to  be  observed  how 
easily  we  are  deceived  when  we  confuse  universal  with 


102  ETHIC. 

individuals,  and  the  entities  of  reason  and  abstractions 
with  realities. 

With  regard  to  the  fourth  objection,  I  say  that  I 
entirely  grant  that  if  a  man  were  placed  in  such  a  state 
of  equilibrium  he  would  perish  of  hunger  and  thirst,  sup- 
posing he  perceived  nothing  but  hunger  and  thirst,  and 
the  food  and  drink  which  were  equidistant  from  him. 
If  you  ask  me  whether  such  a  man  would  not  be  thought 
an  ass  rather  than  a  man,  I  reply  that  I  do  not  know; 
nor  do  I  know  what  ought  to  be  thought  of  a  man  who 
hangs  himself,  or  of  children,  fools,  and  madmen. 

It  remains  for  me  now  to  show  what  service  to  our 
own  lives  a  knowledge  of  this  doctrine  is.  This  we 
shall  easily  understand  from  the  remarks  which  follow. 
Xotice — 

1.  It  is  of  service  in  so  far  as  it  teaches  us  that  we 
do  everything  by  the  will  of  God  alone,  and  that  we 
are  partakers  of  the  divine  nature  in  proportion  as  our 
actions  become  more  and  more  perfect  and  we  more  and 
more  understand  God.  This  doctrine,  therefore,  besides 
giving  repose  in  every  way  to  the  soul,  has  also  this 
advantage,  that  it  teaches  us  in  what  our  highest  happi- 
ness or  blessedness  consists,  namely,  in  the  knowledge  of 
God  alone,  by  which  we  are  drawn  to  do  those  things 
only  which  love  and  piety  persuade.  Hence  we  clearly 
see  how  greatly  those  stray  from  the  true  estimation  of 
virtue  who  expect  to  be  distinguished  by  God  with  the 
highest  rewards  for  virtue  and  the  noblest  actions  as 
if  for  the  completest  servitude,  just  as  if  virtue  itself 
and  the  service  of  God  were  not  happiness  itself  and  the 
highest  liberty. 

2.  It  is  of  service  to  us  in  so  far  as  it  teaches  us  how 
we  ought  to  behave  with  regard  to  the  things  of  fortune, 
or  those  which  are  not  in  our  power,  that  is  to  say, 
which  do  not  follow  from  our  own  nature ;  for  it  teaches 
us  with  equal  mind  to  wait  for  and  bear  each  form  of 
fortune,  because  we  know  that  all  thinc^s   follow  from 


THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MISD.      ,03 

the  eternal  decree  of  God,  according  to  that  same  noccssitv 
by  which  it  follows  from  the  essence  of  a  triun-de  that 
its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  riglit  angles. 

3.  This  doctrine  contributes  to  the  welfare  of  our 
social  existence,  since  it  teaches  us  to  hate  no  one,  to 
despise  no  one,  to  mock  no  one,  to  be  angry  with  no 
one,  and  to  envy  no  one.  It  teaches  every  one,  mor.;- 
over,  to  be  content  with  his  own,  and  to  be  helpful  to 
his  neighbour,  not  from  any  womanish  pity,  from  par- 
tiality, or  superstition,  but  by  the  guidance  of  reason 
alone,  according  to  the  demand  of  time  and  circunistanci.', 
as  I  shall  show  in  the  Third  Part. 

4.  This  doctrine  contributes  not  a  little  to  the  advan- 
tage of  common  society,  in  so  far  as  it  teaches  us  by 
what  means  citizens  are  to  be  governed  and  led ;  not  in 
order  that  they  may  be  slaves,  but  that  they  may  freely 
do  those  things  which  are  best. 

Thus  I  have  discharged  the  obligation  laid  upon  nn^ 
in  this  scholium,  and  with  it  I  make  an  end  of  the  Secoml 
Part,  in  which  I  think  that  I  have  explained  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind  and  its  properties  at  suflicient  length, 
and,  considering  the  difficulties  of  the  subject,  with  sulli- 
cient  clearness.  I  think,  too,  that  certain  truths  liave 
been  established,  from  which  much  that  is  noblf,  most 
useful,  and  necessary  to  be  known  can  be  deduced,  as  wt^ 
shall  partly  see  from  what  follows. 


END  OF  THE  SECOND  TART. 


(     I04    ) 


ETHIC. 


EJirti  Part 


ON  THE  ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

Most  persons  who  have  written  about  the  affects  and 
man's  conduct  of  life  seem  to  discuss,  not  the  natural 
things  which  follow  the  common  laws  of  nature,  but 
things  which  are  outside  her.  They  seem  indeed  to 
consider  man  in  nature  as  a  kingdom  within  a  king- 
dom. For  they  believe  that  man  disturbs  rather  than 
follows  her  order ;  that  he  has  an  absolute  power  over 
his  own  actions ;  and  that  lie  is  altogether  self-deter- 
mined. They  then  proceed  to  attribute  the  cause  of 
human  weakness  and  changeableness,  not  to  the  common 
power  of  nature,  but  to  some  vice  of  human  nature, 
which  they  therefore  bewail,  laugli  at,  mock,  or,  as  is 
more  generally  the  case,  detest ;  whilst  he  who  knows 
how  to  revile  most  eloquently  or  subtilly  the  weakness  of 
the  mind  is  looked  upon  as  divine.  It  is  true  that  very 
eminent  men  have  not  been  wanting,  to  whose  labour 
and  industry  we  confess  ourselves  much  indebted,  who 
have  written  many  excellent  things  about  the  right 
conduct  of  life,  and  who  have  given  to  mortals  counsels 
full  of  prudence,  but  no  one  so  far  as  I  know  has  deter- 
mined the  nature  and  strength  of  the  affects,  and  what  the 
mind  is  able  to  do  towards  controlling  them.     I  remember. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 


los 


indeed,  that  the  celebrated  Descartes,  although  he  believed 
that  the  mind  is  absolute  master  over  its  own  actions, 
tried  nevertheless  to  explain  by  their  first  causes  human 
affects,  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  the  way  by 
•which  the  mind  could  obtain  absolute  power  over  them ; 
but  in  my  opinion  he  has  shown  nothing  but  the  acute- 
ness  of  his  great  intellect,  as  I  shall  make  evident  in  the 
proper  place,  for  I  wish  to  return  to  those  who  prefer 
to  detest  and  scoff  at  human  affects  and  actious  than 
understand  them.  To  such  as  these  it  will  doubt- 
less seem  a  marvellous  thing  for  me  to  endeavour  to 
treat  by  a  geometrical  method  the  vices  and  follies  of 
men,  and  to  desire  by  a  sure  method  to  demonstrate  those 
things  which  these  people  cry  out  against  as  being  opposed 
to  reason,  or  as  being  vanities,  absurdities,  and  monstrosi- 
ties. The  following  is  my  reason  for  so  doing.  Xothing 
happens  in  nature  which  can  be  attributed  to  any  vice 
of  nature,  for  she  is  always  the  same  and  everywhere 
one.  Her  virtue  is  the  same,  and  her  power  of  acting ; 
that  is  to  say,  her  laws  and  rules,  according  to  which  all 
things  are  and  are  changed  from  form  to  form,  are  every- 
where and  always  the  same  ;  so  that  there  must  also  be 
one  and  the  same  method  of  understanding  the  nature  c>f 
all  things  whatsoever,  that  is  to  say,  by  the  universal  laws 
and  rules  of  nature.  The  affects,  therefore,  of  hatred, 
anger,  envy,  considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  tht; 
same  necessity  and  virtue  of  nature  as  other  individual 
things  ;  they  have  therefore  certain  causes  through  wliich 
they  are  to  be  understood,  and  certain  properties  which 
are  just  as  worthy  of  being  known  as  the  properties  of 
any  other  thing  in  the  contemplation  alone  of  which  we 
delight.  I  shall,  therefore,  pursue  the  same  metliod  in 
considering  the  nature  and  strength  of  the  affects  and 
the  power  of  the  mind  over  tliem  which  I  pursued  in 
our  previous  discussion  of  God  and  the  mind,  and  I 
sliall  consider  human  actions  and  appetites  just  as  if  I 
were  considering  lines,  planes,  or  bodies. 


io6  ETHIC. 

Def.  I. — I  call  tliat  an  adequate  cause  -^liose  effect 
can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  perceived  by  means  of  the 
cause.  I  call  that  an  inadequate  or  partial  cause  whose 
effect  cannot  be  understood  by  means  of  the  cause  alone. 

Def.  II. — I  say  that  we  act  when  anything  is  done, 
either  within  us  or  without  us,  of  which  we  are  the 
adequate  cause,  that  is  to  say  (by  the  preceding  Def.), 
when  from  our  nature  anything  follows,  either  within  us 
or  without  us,  which,  by  that  nature  alone  can  be  clearly 
and  distinctly  understood.  On  the  other  hand,  I  say  that 
we  suffer  when  anything  is  done  within  us,  or  when  any- 
thing follows  from  our  nature,  of  which  we  are  not  the 
cause  excepting  partially. 

Def.  III. — By  affect  I  understand  the  affections  of 
the  body,  by  which  the  power  of  acting  of  the  body 
itself  is  increased,  diminished,  helped,  or  hindered,  toge- 
ther with  the  ideas  of  these  affections. 

If,  therefore,  we  can  be  the  adequate  cause  of  any  of 
these  affections,  I  understand  the  affect  to  be  an  action, 
otherwise  it  is  a  passion. 

Postulate  I . — The  human  body  can  be  affected  in  many 
ways  by  which  its  power  of  acting  is  increased  or 
diminished,  and  also  in  other  ways  which  make  its 
power  of  acting  neither  greater  nor  less. 

This  postulate  or  axiom  is  based  upon  Post,  i  and 
Lems.  5  and  7,  following  Prop.  13,  pt.  2. 

Postulate  2. — The  human  body  is  capable  of  suffering 
many  changes,  and,  nevertheless,  can  retain  the  impres- 
sions or  traces  of  the  objects  (Post.  5,  pt.  2),  and  conse- 
quently the  same  images  of  things.  (For  the  definition 
of  images  see  Scliol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2.) 


Peop.  I. — Our  mind  acts  at  times  and  at  times  suffers  :  in  so 
far  as  it  has  adequate  ideas,  it  necessarily  acts  ;  and  in 
so  far  as  it  has  inadequate  ideas,  it  necessarily  suffers. 

Demonst. — In    every    human    mind     some    ideas    are 


ORIGIX  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        r- 

adequate,  and  others  mutilatea  and  confused  (Sc-hol. 
Prop.  40,  pt.  2).  But  the  ideas  which  in  any  mind  are 
adequate  are  adequate  in  God  in  so  far  as  He  fornn 
the  essence  of  tliat  mind  (Corol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  2).  whilt? 
those  again  which  are  inadequate  in  tlie  mind  are  nlsd 
adequate  in  God  (by  the  same  Corol.),  not  in  so  far  a.^ 
He  contains  the  essence  of  that  mind  only,  but  in  so  far 
as  He  contains  the  ideas  ^  of  other  things  at  the  same 
time  in  Himself.  Again,  from  any  given  idea  some 
efiect  must  necessarily  follow  (Prop.  36,  pt.  i),  of  whicli 
God  is  the  adequate  cause  (Def.  i,  pt.  3),  not  in  so  far  as 
He  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  as  ant'ct<.'J 
with  the  given  idea  (Prop.  9,  pt.  2).  P>ut  of  that 
effect  of  which  God  is  the  cause,  in  so  far  as  He  is 
affected  by  an  idea  which  is  adequate  in  any  mind,  that 
same  mind  is  the  adequate  cause  (Corol.  Prop,  i  i , 
pt.  2).  Our  mind,  therefore  (Def.  2,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  ii 
has  adequate  ideas,  necessarily  at  times  acts,  which  i.s 
the  first  thing  we  had  to  prove.  Again,  if  there  be  any- 
thing which  necessarily  follows  from  an  idea  which  is 
adequate  in  God,  not  in  so  far  as  He  contains  within 
Himself  the  mind  of  one  man  only,  but  also,  togetluT 
with  this,  the  ideas  ^  of  other  things,  then  the  mind  of 
that  man  (Corol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  2)  is  not  the  adequatt' 
cause  of  that  thing,  but  is  only  its  partial  cause,  ami 
therefore  (Def.  2,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  the  mind  has 
inadequate  ideas,  it  necessarily  at  times  sufTers.  Tiiis 
was  the  second  thing  to  be  proved.     Therefore  our  miml. 

&c. Q.E.D. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  mind  is  subject  to 
passions  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  inadequate  ideas 
which  it  has,  and  that  it  acts  in  proportion  to  llie 
number  of  adequate  ideas  which  it  has. 


1  "Mentes,"  both  in  Paulus,  Bru-  2,  will  show.      Kirchrr.ann  ^  (••  -    > 

der.  and  Van  Vloten  and  Land,  but  tion  omits  "  nientes  '   in     i-'   ; 

obviously  a  mistake  for  "  ideas,"  as  passage  marked,  ami  rfii.l.-n-.  ■". 

a    referencetoCorol.Prop.il,   pt.  fern  er  andere Dingo  m .ich  cuU»*it. 


ic8  ETHIC. 

Peop.  II. — The  hody  cannot  determine  the  mind  to  tlionglit, 
neither  can  the  mind  determine  the  hody  to  motion  nor 
rest,  nor  anything  else,  if  there  he  anything. 

Demonst. — All  modes  of  thought  have  God  for  a 
cause  in  so  far  as  He  is  a  thinking  thing,  and  not  in  so 
far  as  He  is  explained  by  any  other  attribute  (Prop.  6, 
pt.  2).  That  which  determines  the  mind  to  thought, 
therefore,  is  a  mode  of  thought  and  not  of  extension, 
that  is  to  say  (Def.  i,  pt.  2),  it  is  not  the  body.  This  is 
the  first  thing  which  was  to  be  proved.  Again,  the 
motion  and  rest  of  the  body  must  be  derived  from  some 
other  body,  M'hich  has  also  been  determined  to  motion  or 
rest  by  another,  and,  absolutely,  whatever  arises  in  the 
body  must  arise  from  God,  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered 
as  affected  by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  in  so  far 
as  He  is  considered  as  affected  by  any  mode  of  thought 
(Prop.  6,  pt.  2),  that  is  to  say,  whatever  arises  in  the  body 
cannot  arise  from  the  mind,  which  is  a  mode  of  thought 
(Prop.  II,  ])t  2).  This  is  the  second  thing  which  was 
to  be  proved.      Therefore,  the  body  cannot  determine,  &c. 

— -Q.E.D. 

Schol. — This  proposition  will  be  better  understood 
from  what  has  been  said  in  the  scholium  of  Prop.  7, 
pt.  2,  that  is  to  say,  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one 
and  the  same  thing,  conceived  at  one  time  under  the 
attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of  ex- 
tension. For  this  reason,  the  order  or  concatenation  of 
things  is  one,  whether  nature  be  conceived  under  this  or 
under  that  attribute,  and  consequently  the  order  of  the 
actions  and  passions  of  our  body  is  coincident  in  nature 
with  the  order  of  .the  actions  and  passions  of  the  mind. 
This  is  also  plain  from  the  manner  in  which  we  have 
demonstrated  Prop.  12,  pt.  2. 

Although  these  things  are  so,  and  no  ground  for  doubting 
remains,  I  scarcely  believe,  nevertheless,  that,  without  a 
proof  derived  from  experience,  men  will  be  induced  calmly 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AIFECTS.        lo, 

to  weigh  what  has  been  said,  so  firmly  are  they  per- 
suaded that,  solely  at  the  bidding  of  the  miiul,  the  bodv 
moves  or  rests,  and  does  a  number  of  things  whicii 
depend  upon  the  will  of  the  mind  alone,  and  upon  tlio 
power  of  thought.  For  what  the  body  can  do  no  one  has 
hitherto  determined,  that  is  to  say,  experience  has  taught 
no  one  hitherto  what  the  body,  without  being  determined 
by  the  mind,  can  do  and  what  it  cannot  do  from  the  laws 
of  nature  alone,  in  so  far  as  nature  is  considered  merely 
as  corporeal.  For  no  one  as  yet  has  understood  the 
structure  of  the  body  so  accurately  as  to  be  able  to  explain 
all  its  functions,  not  to  mention  the  fact  that  many  things 
are  observed  in  brutes  which  far  surpass  human  sagacity, 
and  that  sleep-walkers  in  their  sleep  do  very  many  thinLj.s 
which  they  dare  not  do  when  awake ;  all  this  showing 
that  the  body  itself  can  do  many  things  from  the  laws  of 
its  own  nature  alone  at  which  the  mind  belonging  to 
that  body  is  amazed.  Again,  nobody  knows  by  what 
means  or  by  what  method  the  mind  moves  the  body, 
nor  how  many  degrees  of  motion  it  can  communicate  to 
the  body,  nor  with  what  speed  it  can  move  the  body. 
So  that  it  follows  that  when  men  say  that  this  or  tliat 
action  of  the  body  springs  from  the  mind  which  has  com- 
mand over  the  body,  they  do  not  know  what  they  say, 
and  they  do  nothing  but  confess  with  pretentious  words 
that  they  know  nothing  about  the  cause  of  the  action, 
and  see  nothing  in  it  to  wonder  at.  But  they  will  say, 
that  whether  they  know  or  do  not  know  by  what  means 
the  mind  moves  the  body,  it  is  nevertheless  in  their  ex- 
perience  that  if  the  mind  were  not  fit  for  thinking  the 
body  would  be  inert.  They  say,  again,  it  i^  in  their  ex- 
perience that  the  mind  alone  has  power  both  to  sjtcak 
and  be  silent,  and  to  do  many  other  things  which  thoy 
therefore  think  to  be  dependent  on  a  decree  of  tl>o 
mind.  But  with  regard  to  the  first  assertion,  I  ask  them 
if  experience  does  not  also  teach  that  if  the  body  bo 
slui:,^gish    the   mind    at    the   same    time  is    not    fit    for 


no  ETHIC. 

thinking  ?  When  the  body  is  asleep,  the  mind  slum- 
bers "with  it,  and  has  not  the  power  to  think,  as  it  has 
wlien  the  body  is  awake.  Again,  I  believe  that  all 
have  discovered  that  the  mind  is  not  always  equally 
fitted  for  thinking  about  the  same  subject,  but  in  pro- 
portion to  the  fitness  of  the  body  for  this  or  that  image 
to  be  excited  in  it  will  the  mind  be  better  fitted  to 
contemplate  this  or  that  object.  But  my  opponents  will 
say,  that  from  the  laws  of  nature  alone,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
considered  to  be  corporeal  merely,  it  cannot  be  that  the 
causes  of  architecture,  painting,  and  things  of  this  sort, 
which  are  the  results  of  human  art  alone,  could  be  deduced, 
and  that  the  human  body,  unless  it  were  determined  and 
guided  by  the  mind,  would  not  be  able  to  build  a  temple. 
I  have  already  shown,  however,  that  they  do  not  know 
what  the  body  can  do,  nor  what  can  be  deduced  from  the 
consideration  of  its  nature  alone,  and  that  they  find  that 
many  things  are  done  merely  by  the  laws  -of  nature 
which  they  would  never  have  believed  to  be  possible 
without  the  direction  of  the  mind,  as,  for  example,  those 
things  which  sleep-walkers  do  in  their  sleep,  and  at  which 
they  themselves  are  astonished  when  they  wake.  I  adduce 
also  here  the  structure  itself  of  the  human  body,  which 
so  greatly  surpasses  in  w^orkmanship  all  those  things 
which  are  constructed  by  human  art,  not  to  mention 
what  I  have  already  proved,  that  an  infinitude  of  things 
follows  from  nature  under  whatever  attribute  it  may  be 
considered. 

With  regard  to  the  second  point,  I  should  say  that 
human  affairs  w'ould  be  much  more  happily  conducted 
if  it  were  equally  in  the  power  of  men  to  be  silent  and 
to  speak ;  but  experience  shows  over  and  over  again  that 
there  is  nothing  which  men  have  less  power  over  than 
the  tongue,  and  that  there  is  nothing  which  they  are  less 
able  to  do  than  to  govern  their  appetites,  so  that  many 
persons  believe  that  we  do  those  things  only  with  freedom 
which  we  seek  indifferently ;  as  the  desire  for  such  things 


ORIGIX  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        ni 

can  easily  be  lessened  by  the  recollection  of  another  thiiiii 
which  we  frequently  call  to  mind  ;  it  being  iniiK)ssiblts 
on  the  other  hand,  to  do  those  tilings  with  freedom 
which  we  seek  with  such  ardour  that  tlie  recollection  of 
another  thing  is  unable  to  mitigate  it.  But  if,  however, 
we  had  not  found  out  that  we  do  many  things  whicli  wo 
afterwards  repent,  and  that  when  agitated  by  conlUcting 
affects  we  see  that  which  is  better  and  follow  that  whicli 
is  worse,  nothing  would  hinder  us  from  believing  that  we 
do  everything  with  freedom.  Thus  the  infant  believes 
that  it  is  by  free  will  that  it  seeks  the  breast ;  the  angry 
boy  believes  that  by  free  will  he  wishes  vengeance ;  the 
timid  man  thinks  it  is  with  free  will  he  seeks  llight ;  the 
drunkard  believes  that  by  a  free  command  of  his  mind 
he  speaks  the  things  which  when  sober  he  wishes  he  had 
left  unsaid.  Thus  the  madman,  the  chatterer,  the  boy, 
and  others  of  the  same  kind,  all  believe  that  they  speak 
by  a  free  command  of  the  mind,  whilst,  in  truth,  they 
have  no  power  to  restrain  the  impulse  which  they  have  to 
speak,  so  that  experience  itself,  no  less  than  reason,  clearly 
teaches  that  men  believe  themselves  to  be  free  simply 
because  they  are  conscious  of  their  own  actions,  knowing 
nothing  of  the  causes  by  which  they  are  determined :  it 
teaches,  too,  that  the  decrees  of  the  mind  are  nothing  but 
the  appetites  themselves,  which  differ,  therefore,  according 
to  the  different  temper  of  the  -body.  For  every  man 
determines  all  things  from  his  affect ;  those  who  are  agi- 
tated by  contrary  affects  do  not  know  what  they  want, 
whilst  those  who  are  agitated  by  no  aflect  are  easily 
driven  hither  and  thither.  All  this  jdainly  shows  that 
the  decree  of  the  mind,  the  appetite,  and  determination 
of  the  body  are  coincident  in  nature,  or  rather  that  they 
are  one  and  the  same  thing,  which,  when  it  is  considered 
under  the  attribute  of  thought  and  explained  by  timt,  is 
called  a  decree,  and  when  it  is  considered  under  the 
attribute  of  extension  and  is  deduced  from  the  laws  of 
motion  and  rest,  is  called  a  determination.     This,  how- 


112  ETHIC. 

ever,  will  Le  better  miJerstood  as  we  go  on,  for  there  is 
another  thing  which  I  wish  to  be  observed  here — that  we 
cannot  by  a  mental  decree  do  a  thing  unless  we  recollect 
it.  We  cannot  speak  a  word,  for  instance,  unless  we  re- 
collect it.  But  it  is  not  in  the  free  power  of  the  mind 
either  to  recollect  a  thing  or  to  forget  it.  It  is  believed, 
therefore,  that  the  power  of  the  mind  extends  only  thus 
far — that  from  a  mental  decree  we  can  speak  or  be  silent 
about  a  thing  only  when  we  recollect  it.  But  when  we 
dream  that  we  speak,  we  believe  that  we  do  so  from  a 
free  decree  of  the  mind ;  and  yet  we  do  not  speak, 
or,  if  we  do,  it  is  the  result  of  a  spontaneous  motion  of 
the  body.  We  dream,  again,  that  we  are  concealing 
things,  and  that  we  do  this  by  virtue  of  a  decree  of  the 
mind  like  that  by  which,  when  awake,  we  are  silent 
about  things  we  know.  We  dream,  again,  that,  from  a 
decree  of  the  mind,  we  do  some  things  which  we  should 
not  dare  to  do  when  awake.  And  I  should  like  to  know, 
therefore,  whether  there  are  two  kinds  of  decrees  in  the 
mind — one  belonging  to  dreams  and  the  other  free. 
If  this  be  too  great  nonsense,  we  must  necessarily  grant 
that  this  decree  of  the  mind,  which  is  believed  to  be  free, 
is  not  distinguishable  from  the  imagination  or  memory, 
and  is  nothing  but  the  affirmation  which  the  idea 
necessarily  involves  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  idea  (Prop. 
49,  pt.  2).  These  decrees  of  the  mind,  therefore,  arise 
in  the  mind  by  the  same  necessity  as  the  ideas  of 
things  actually  existing.  Consequently,  those  who  be- 
lieve that  they  speak,  or  are  silent,  or  do  anything  else 
from  a  free  decree  of  the  mind,  dream  with  their  eyes 
open. 

Peop.  III. — The  actions  of  the  mind  arise  from  adequate 
ideas  alone,  hut  the  passions  depend  upon  those  alone 
u'hich  are  inadequate. 

Dcmonst. — The  first  thinc^  which  constitutes  the  essence 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        113 

of  the  mind  is  nothing  but  the  idea  of  an  actually  existing; 
body  (Props.  1 1  and  13,  pt.  2).  This  idea  is  composed 
of  a  number  of  others  (Prop,  I  5,  pt.  2),  some  of  which 
are  adequate  and  others  inadequate  (Corol.  Prop.  38,  pt 
2,  and  Corol.  Prop.  29,  pt.  2).  Everything,  therefore,  of 
which  the  mind  is  the  proximate  cause,  and  which  follows 
from  the  nature  of  the  mind,  through  which  it  must  bo 
understood,  must  necessarily  follow  from  an  adequate  or 
from  an  inadequate  idea.  But  in  so  far  as  the  mind 
(Prop.  I,  pt.  3)  has  inadequate  ideas,  so  far  it  necessarily 
suffers ;  therefore  the  actions  of  the  mind  follow  from 
adequate  ideas  alone,  and  the  mind  therefore  suffers  only 
because  it  has  inadequate  ideas. 

Schol. — We  see,  therefore,  that  the  passions  are  not 
related  to  the  mind,  unless  in  so  far  as  it  possesses 
something  which  involves  negation;  in  other  words, 
unless  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  a  part  of  nature, 
which  by  itself  and  without  the  other  parts  cannot  be 
clearly  and  distinctly  perceived.  In  the  same  way  I 
could  show  that  passions  are  related  to  individual 
things,  just  as  they  are  related  to  the  mind,  and  that 
they  cannot  be  perceived  in  any  other  way ;  but  my  pur- 
pose is  to  treat  of  the  human  mind  alone. 


Peop.  IY. — A  thing  cannot  he  destroyed  except  ly  an 
external  cause. 

Dcmonst.  —  This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  tlie 
definition  of  any  given  thing  affirms  and  does  not  deny 
the  existence  of  the  thing ;  that  is  to  say,  it  posits  the 
essence  of  the  thing  and  does  not  negate  it.  So  long, 
therefore,  as  we  attend  only  to  the  thing  itself,  and  .not 
to  external  causes,  we  shall  discover  nothing  in  it  which 
can  destroy  it. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  V. — 171  so  far  as  one  thinrj  is  allc  to  destroy  another 


114  ETHIC. 

are  they  of  contrary  natures  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  can- 
not exist  in  the  same  suhject. 

Bemonst. — If  it  were  possible  for  them  to  come  to- 
gether, or  to  coexist  in  the  same  subject,  there  would 
then  be  something  in  that  subject  able  to  destroy  it, 
■which  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3)  is  absurd.  Therefore,  in  so  far, 
&c. — Q.E.D. 

Peop.  VI. — Each  thing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  itself 
endeavours  to  persevere  in  its  being. 

Demonst. — Individual  things  are  modes  by  which  the 
attributes  of  God  are  expressed  in  a  certain  and  deter- 
minate manner  (Corol.  Prop.  25,  pt.  i)  ;  that  is  to  say 
(Prop.  34,  pt.  i),  they  are  things  which  express  in  a 
certain  and  determinate  manner  the  power  of  God,  by 
which  He  is  and  acts,  A  thing,  too,  has  nothing  in 
itself  through  which  it  can  be  destroyed,  or  which  can 
negate  its  existence  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3),  but,  on  the  contrary, 
it  is  opposed  to  everything  which  could  negate  its  exist- 
ence (Prop.  5,  pt.  3).  Therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  can  and 
is  in  itself,  it  endeavours  to  persevere  in  its  own  being. 

Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VII. —  The  effort  hy  which  each  tiling  endeavours 
to  persevere  in  its  own  being  is  nothing  hut  the  actual 
essence  of  the  thing  itself. 

Demonst. — From  the  given  essence  of  anything  certain 
things  necessarily  follow  (Prop.  36,  pt.  i);  nor  are  things 
able  to  do  anything  else  than  what  necessarily  follows 
from  their  determinate  nature  (Prop.  29,  pt.  i).  There- 
fore, the  power  of  a  thing,  or  the  effort  by  means  of 
which  it  does  or  endeavours  to  do  anything,  either  by 
itself  or  with  others — that  is  to  say  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3),  the- 
power  or  effort  by  which  it  endeavours  to  persevere  in 
its  being — is  nothing  but  the  given  or  actual  essence  of 
the  thing  itself. — q.e.d. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        n- 

PeOP.  VIII. —  The  effort  hj  which  each  thing  cndcnvourH 
to  persevere  in  its  own  Icing  does  not  involve  Jinitc 

hut  indefinite  time. 

Demonsf. — If  it  involved  a  limited  time,  which  would 
determine  the  duration  of  the  thing,  then  from  that 
power  alone  by  which  the  thing  exists  it  would  follow 
that,  after  that  limited  time,  it  could  not  exist  but  must 
be  destroyed.  But  this  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3)  is  absurd.  The 
effort,  therefore,  by  which  a  thing  exists  does  not  involve 
definite  time,  but,  on  the  contrary  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3),  if  the 
thing  be  destroyed  by  no  external  cause,  by  the  same 
power  by  which  it  now  exists  it  will  always  continue  to 
exist,  and  this  effort,  therefore,  by  which  it  endeavours 
to  persevere,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  IX. — The  mind,  both  in  so  faf  as  it  has  clear  and 
distinct  ideas,  and  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused  ideas, 
endeavours  to  persevere  in  its  heing  for  an  indefinite 
time,  and  is  conscious  of  this  effort. 

Demonst. — The  essence  of  the  mind  is  composed  of 
adequate  and  inadequate  ideas  (as  we  have  shown  in 
Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  both  in  so 
far  as  it  has  the  former  and  in  so  far  as  it  has  the  latter, 
it  endeavours  to  persevere  in  its  being,  and  endeavours 
to  persevere  in  it  for  an  indefinite  time  (Prop.  8,  pt.  3). 
But  since  the  mind  (Prop.  23,  pt.  2),  through  the  ideas  of 
the  affections  of  the  body,  is  necessarily  conscious  of  itself, 
it  is  therefore  conscious  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3)  of  its  effort. 

Schol. — This  effort,  when  it  is  related  to  the  mind 
alone,  is  called  will,  but  when  it  is  related  at  the  same 
time  both  to  the  mind  and  the  body,  is  called  appetite, 
which  is  therefore  nothing  but  the  very  essence  of  man, 
from  the  nature  of  which  necessarily  follow  those  tilings 
which  promote  his  preservation,  and  tlms  he  is  deter- 
mined to  do  those  things.      Hence  there  is  no  difference 


ii6  ETHIC. 

between  appetite  and  desire,  unless  in  tliis  particular, 
that  desire  is  generally  related  to  men  in  so  far  as  they 
are  conscious  of  tlieir  appetites,  and  it  may  therefore  be 
defined  as  appetite  of  which  we  are  conscious.  From 
'  -what  has  been  said  it  is  plain,  therefore,  that  we  neither 
strive  for,  wish,  seek,  nor  desire  anything  because  we  think 
it  to  be  good,  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  adjudge  a  thing  to 
be  good  because  we  strive  for,  wish,  seek,  or  desire  it. 

PnOP,  X. — There  can  he  no  idea  in  the  mind  v:hich  ex- 
cludes the  existence  of  the  hody,  for  such  an  idea  is 
contrary  to  the  mind. 

Dcmonst. — There  can  be  nothing  in  our  body  which  is 
able  to  destroy  it  (Prop.  5,  pt.  3),  and  there  cannot  be, 
therefore,  in  God  an  idea  of  any  such  thing  in  so  far  as 
He  has  the  idea  of  the  body  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  2) ;  that 
is  to  say  (Props.  1 1  and  13,  pt.  2),  no  idea  of  any  such 
thing  can  exist  in  our  mind,  but,  on  the  contrary,  since 
(Props.  1 1  and  I  3,  pt.  2)  the  first  thing  which  constitutes 
the  essence  of  the  mind  is  the  idea  of  a  body  actually 
existing,  the  first  and  chief  thing  belonging  to  our  mind 
is  the  effort  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3)  to  affirm  the  existence  of  our 
body,  and  therefore  the  idea  which  denies  the  existence 
of  our  body  is  contrary  to  our  mind. — q.e.d. 

Piior.  XI. — If  anything  increases,  diminishes,  helps,  or 
limits  our  lady's  'power  of  action,  the  idea  of  that 
thing  increases,  diminishes,  helps,  or  limits  our 
mind's  power  of  thought. 

Dcmonst. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  Prop.  7, 
pt.  2,  and  also  from  Prop.  14,  pt.  2. 

Schol. — We  thus  see  that  the  mind  can  suffer  great 
changes,  and  can  pass  now  to  a  greater  and  now  to  a 
lesser  perfection  ;  these  passions  explaining  to  us  the 
affects  of  joy  and  sorrow.      By  Joy,   therefore,  in  what 


ORIGIN  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        117 

follows,  I  shall  understand  the  passion  by  which  tho 
mind  passes  to  a  greater  perfection ;  by  sorrow,  on  tho 
other  hand,  the  passion  by  which  it  passes  to  a  less 
perfection.  The  affect  of  joy,  related  at  the  same  time 
both  to  the  mind  and  the  body,  I  call  pleasurable  excite- 
ment {titillatio)  or  cheerfulness ;  that  of  sorrow  I  call  pain 
or  melancholy.  It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  tliat  pleasur- 
able excitement  and  pain  are  related  to  a  man  when  one 
of  his  parts  is  affected  more  than  the  others ;  cheerful- 
ness and  melancholy,  on  the  other  hand,  when  all  parts 
are  equally  affected.  What  the  nature  of  desire  is  I 
have  explained  in  the  scholium  of  Prop.  9,  pt.  3  ;  and 
besides  these  three — ^joy,  sorrow,  and  desire — I  know 
of  no  other  primary  affect,  the  others  springing  from 
these,  as  I  shall  show  in  what  follows.  But  before  I 
advance  any  farther,  I  should  like  to  explain  more  fully 
Prop.  10,  pt.  3,  so  that  we  may  more  clearly  understand 
in  what  manner  one  idea  is  contrary  to  another. 

In  the  scholium  of  Prop.  17,  pt.  2,  we  have  shown 
that  the  idea  which  forms  the  essence  of  the  mind  in- 
volves the  existence  of  the  body  so  long  as  tlie  body 
exists.  Again,  from  Corol.  Prop.  8,  pt.  2,  and  its  scholium, 
it  follows  that  the  present  existence  of  our  mind  depends 
solely  upon  this — that  the  mind  involves  the  actual 
existence  of  the  body.  Finally,  we  have  shown  tliat  tlie 
power  of  the  mind  by  which  it  imagines  and  remembers 
things  also  depends  upon  this — that  it  involves  the 
actual  existence  of  the  body  (Props.  17  and  18,  pt.  2, 
with  the  Schol.)  From  these  things  it  follows,  tliat  the 
present  existence  of  the  mind  and  its  power  of  imagina- 
tion are  negated  as  soon  as  the  mind  ceases  to  afTinn 
the  present  existence  of  the  body.  But  the  cause  by 
which  the  mind  ceases  to  affirm  this  existence  of  the 
body  cannot  be  the  mind  itself  (Prop.  4,  pt.  2),  nor  can 
it  be  the  body's  ceasing  to  be;  for  (Prop.  6,  pt.  2)  the 
mind  does  not  affirm  the  existence  of  the  body  because 
the  body  began  to  exist,  and  therefore,  by  the  same  reason- 


ii8  ETHIC. 

ing,  it  does  not  cease  to  affirm  the  existence  of  tlie  body 
because  the  body  ceases  to  be,  but  (Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2)  because 
of  another  idea  excluding  the  present  existence  of  our 
body,  and  consequently  of  our  mind,  and  contrary,  there- 
fore, to  the  idea  ^vhich  forms  the  essence  of  our  mihd. 

Prop.  XII. — The  mind  endeavours  as  much  as  possible  to 
imagine  those  things  tvhich  increase  or  assist  the 
hodys  pou-cr  of  acting. 

Dcmonst. — The  human  mind  will  contemplate  any 
external  body  as  present  so  long  as  the  human  body  is 
affected  in  a  way  which  involves  the  nature  of  that 
external  body  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2),  and  consequently  (Prop. 
7,  pt.  2)  as  long  as  the  human  mind  contemplates  any 
external  body  as  present,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  1 7, 
pt.  2),  imagines  it,  so  long  is  the  human  body  affected 
in  a  way  which  involves  the  nature  of  that  external 
body.  Consequently  as  long  as  the  mind  imagines  those 
things  which  increase  or  assist  our  body's  power  of 
action,  so  long  is  the  body  affected  in  a  way  which 
increases  or  assists  that  power  (Post,  i,  pt.  3),  and  con- 
sequently (Prop.  II,  pt,  3)  so  long  the  mind's  power  of 
thought  is  increased  or  assisted ;  therefore  (Props.  6  and 
9,  pt.  3)  the  mind  endeavours  as  much  as  possible  to 
imagine  those  things. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XIII. —  JFJie7iever  the  mind  imagines  those  things 
which  lessen  or  limit  the  hodi/s  power  of  action,  it 
endeavours  as  much  as  possible  to  recollect  vjhat  ex- 
cludes the  existence  of  these  things. 

Demonst. — So  long  as  the  mind  imagines  anything  of 
this  sort,  the  power  of  the  body  and  of  the  mind  is 
lessened  or  limited  (as  we  have  shown  in  the  preced- 
ing proposition).  ISTevertheless  the  mind  will  continue 
to  imagine  these  things  until  it  imagines  some  other 
thing  which  will  exclude  their  present  existence  (Prop. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        119 

1 7,  pt.  2) ;  that  is  to  say,  as  wc  have  just  shown,  tho 
power  of  the  mind  and  of  the  body  is  diiuinishi-d  or 
limited  until  the  mind  imagines  something  wliich  ex- 
cludes the  existence  of  these  things.  This,  thfreforo 
(Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  the  mind  will  endeavour  to  imagiue  or 
recollect  as  much  as  possible. — q.e.d. 

Cowl. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  mind  is  averse  to 
imagine  those  things  which  lessen  or  hinder  its  power  and 
that  of  the  body. 

ScJwl. — From  what  has  been  said  we  can  clearly  see 
what  love  is  and  what  hatred  is.  Love  is  nothing  but 
joy  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause,  and 
hatred  is  nothing  but  sorrow  with  the  accompanying  idea 
of  an  external  cause.  We  see  too  that  he  who  loves  a 
thing  necessarily  endeavours  to  keep  it  before  him  and  to 
preserve  it,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  who  hates  a  thing 
necessarily  endeavours  to  remove  and  destroy  it.  But  we 
shall  speak  at  greater  length  upon  these  points  in  what 
follows. 

Prop.  XIV. — If  the  mind  at  any  time  has  been  simul- 
tancouslij  affected  hj  two  affects,  whenever  it  is  after- 
wards affected  ly  one  of  them,  it  will  also  he  affected 
hy  the  other. 

Bemonst. — If  the  human  body  has  at  any  time  been 
simultaneously  affected  by  two  bodies,  whenever  the 
mind  afterwards  imagines  one  of  them,  it  will  imme- 
diately remember  the  other  (Prop.  18,  pt.  2).  IJut  the 
imaginations  of  the  mind  indicate  rather  the  affects  of  our 
body  than  the  nature  of  external  bodies  (Corol.  2,  Prop.  1 6, 
pt.  2),  and  therefore  if  the  body,  and  consequeully  tho 
mind(Def.  3,  pt.  3),  has  been  at  any  time,  &c. — g.K.D. 

Prop.  XV. — Anything  may  he  accidentally  the  cause 

of  Joy,  sorrovj,  or  desire. 
Bemonst.— LQt  the  mind  be  supposed  to  be  affected 


120  ETHIC. 

at  the  same  time  by  two  affects,  its  power  of  action 
not  being  increased  or  diminished  by  one,  while  it  is  in- 
creased or  diminished  by  the  other  (Post,  i,  pt.  3).  From 
the  preceding  proposition  it  is  plain  that  when  the  mind 
is  afterwards  affected  by  the  first  affect  through  its  true 
cause,  which  (by  hypothesis)  of  itself  neither  increases 
nor  diminishes  the  mind's  jpower  of  thinking,  it  will  at 
the  same  time  be  affected  by  the  other  affect,  which  does 
increase  or  diminish  that  power,  that  is  to  say  (Schol. 
Prop.  II,  pt.  3),  it  will  be  affected  with  joy  or  sorrow ; 
and  thus  the  thing  itself  will  be  the  cause  of  joy  or  of 
sorrow,  not  of  itself,  but  accidentally.  In  the  same  way 
it  can  easily  be  shown  that  the  same  thing  may  acciden- 
tally be  the  cause  of  desire. — q.e.d. 

Co7vl. — The  fact  that  we  have  contemplated  a  thing 
with  an  affect  of  joy  or  sorrow,  of  which  it  is  not  the 
efficient  cause,  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  being  able  to  love 
or  hate  it. 

Dcmonst. — For  this  fact  alone  is  a  sufficient  reason 
(Prop.  14,  pt.  3)  for  its  coming  to  pass  that  the  mind  in 
imagining  the  thing  afterwards  is  affected  with  the  affect 
of  joy  or  sorrow,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  that  the 
power  of  the  mind  and  of  the  body  is  increased  or  dimi- 
nished, &c.,  and,  consequently  (Prop.  12,  pt.  3),  that  the 
mind  desires  to  imagine  the  thing  or  (Corol.  Prop.  1 3, 
pt.  3)  is  averse  to  doing  so,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop. 
13,  pt.  3),  that  the  mind  loves  the  thing  or  hates  it. 

Schol. — We  now  understand  why  we  love  or  hate 
certain  things  from  no  cause  which  is  known  to  us,  but 
merely  from  sympathy  or  antipathy,  as  they  say.  To 
this  class,  too,  as  we  shall  show  in  the  following  proposi- 
tions, are  to  be  referred  those  objects  which  affect  us  with 
joy  or  sorrow  solely  because  they  are  somewhat  like 
objects  which  usually  affect  us  with  those  affects.  I  know 
indeed  that  the  writers  who  first  introduced  the  w^ords 
"  Sympathy  "  and  "  Antipathy  "  desired  thereby  to  signify 
certain   hidden   qualities   of  things,   but  nevertheless   I 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       i:i 

believe   that   we  shall   be  permitted  to  tinderstaiiil  by 
those  names  qualities  which  are  plain  and  Wfll  known. 

Prop.  XVI. — If  v:c  imagine  a  certain  thing  to poaufss  ttovif- 
thing  which  resembles  an  object  which  vsuallij  afftcU 
the  mind  with  joy  or  sorroiv,  although  the  qunlitij  in 
tvhich  the  thing  resembles  the  object  is  not  the  eficitnt 
cause  of  these  affects,  we  shall  ncrcrtheless,  by  virtue 
of  the  resemblance  alone,  love  or  hate  the  thing. 

Demonst. — The  quality  in  which  tlie  thing  resembles 
the  object  we  have  contemplated  in  the  object  itself 
(by  hypothesis)  with  the  affect  of  joy  or  sorrow,  and  since 
(Prop.  14,  pt.  3),  whenever  the  mind  is  affected  by  tho 
image  of  this  quality,  it  is  also  affected  by  tiie  former  or 
latter  affect,  the  thing  which  is  perceived  by  us  to  possess 
this  quality  will  be  (Prop.  15,  pt.  3)  accidentally  tlic 
cause  of  joy  or  sorrow.  Therefore  (by  the  preceding 
Corol.),  although  the  equality  in  which  the  thing  resembles 
the  object  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  these  affects,  we 
shall  nevertheless  love  the  thing  or  hate  it. 

Prop.  XYII. — If  u-e  imagine  that  a  thing  that  usually 
affects  ns  ivith  the  affect  of  sorrow  has  any  rcscm- 
hlance  to  an  ohject  which  visually  affects  vs  equally 
with  a  great  affect  of  joy,  we  shall  at  the  same  time 
hate  the  thing  and  love  it. 

Demonst — This  thing  (by  h}-pothesis)  is  of  itself  tho 
cause  of  sorrow,  and  (Schol.  Prop,  i  3,  pt.  3)  in  so  far  aa 
we  imagine  it  with  this  affect  we  hate  it ;  but  in  so  far  as 
we  imagine  it  to  resemble  an  object  which  usually  affecU 
us  equally  with  a  great  affect  of  joy  do  we  love  it  with 
an  equally  great  effort  of  joy  (Prop.  16,  pt.  3),  and  so  we 
shall  both  hate  it  and  love  it  at  the  same  time.— y.HD. 

Schol. — This  state  of  mind,  which  arises  from  two  con- 
trary affects,  is  called  vacillation  of  the  miml.  It  is 
related  to  affect   as   doubt  is  related  to  the  imaginutiuii 


122  ETHIC. 

(Schol.  Prop.  44,  pt.  2).  Xor  do  vacillation  and  doubt 
differ  from  one  another  except  as  greater  and  less.  It  is 
to  be  observed  that  in  the  preceding  proposition  I  have 
deduced  these  vacillations  of  the  mind  from  causes  which 
occasion  the  one  affect  directly  and  the  other  contingently. 
This  I  have  dgne  because  the  affects  could  thus  be  more 
easily  deduced  from  what  preceded,  and  not  because  I 
deny  that  these  vacillations  often  originate  from  the 
object  itself  which  is  the  efficient  cause  of  both  affects. 
For  the  human  body  (Post,  i,  pt.  2)  is  composed  of  a 
number  of  individuals  of  different  natures,  and  therefore 
(Ax.  I,  after  Lem.  3,  following  Prop.  13,  pt.  2)  it  can 
be  affected  by  one  and  the  same  body  in  very  many  and 
in  different  ways.  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  object 
can  be  affected  in  a  number  of  different  ways,  and  con- 
sequently can  affect  the  same  part  of  the  body  in  different 
ways.  It  is  easy,  therefore,  to  see  how  one  and  the  same 
object  may  be  the  cause  of  many  and  contrary  affects. 

Pkop.  XYIII. — A  man  is  affected  ly  the  i7)iage  of  a  past 
or  future  thing  with  the  same  affect  of  joy  or  sorrov: 
as  that  with  ivhieh  he  is  affected  hy  the  image  of  a 
present  thing. 

Demonst. — As  long  as  a  man  is  affected  by  the  image 
of  anything,  he  will  contemplate  the  thing  as  present 
although  it  does  not  exist  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2,  with  Corol.), 
nor  does  he  imagine  it  as  past  or  future,  unless  in  so  far 
as  its  image  is  connected  with  that  of  past  or  future  time 
(Schol.  Prop.  44,  pt.  2).  Therefore  the  image  of  the 
thing  considered  in  itself  alone  is  the  same  whether  it 
be  related  to  future,  past,  or  present  time ;  that  is  to  say 
(Corol.  2,  Prop.  16,  pt.  2),  the  state  of  the  body  or  the 
affect  is  the  same  whether  the  image  be  that  of  a  past, 
present,  or  future  thing.  The  affect,  therefore,  of  joy 
and  sorrow  is  the  same  whether  the  image  be  that  of  a 
past,  present,  or  future  thing. — q.e.d. 


ORIGIN  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       123 

Schol.  I. — I  call  a  thing  here  past  or  future  in  so  far 
as  we  have  been  or  shall  be  affected  by  it;  for  exaini'l.-. 
in  so  far  as  we  have  seen  a  thing  or  are  about  to  soJ  it* 
in  so  far  as  it  has  strengthened  us  or  will  strengthen  us ; 
has  injured  or  will  injure  us.  For  in  so  far  as  we  thus 
imagine  it  do  we  affirm  its  existence ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  body  is  affected  by  no  affect  which  excludes  tlio 
existence  of  the  thing,  and  therefore  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2) 
the  body  is  affected  by  the  image  of  the  thing  in  tlie 
same  way  as  if  the  thing  itself  were  present.  But  because 
it  generally  happens  that  those  who  possess  much  ex- 
perience hesitate  when  they  think  of  a  tiling  as  past  or 
future,  and  doubt  greatly  concerning  its  issue  (Schol. 
Prop.  44,  pt.  2),  therefore  the  affects  which  spring 
from  such  images  of  things  are  not  so  constant,  but 
are  generally  disturbed  by  the  images  of  other  things, 
until  men  become  more  sure  of  the  issue. 

Schol.  2. — From  what  has  now  been  said  we  understand 
the  nature  of  Hope,  Fear,  Confidence,  Despair,  Gladness, 
Eemorse.  ITojje  is  nothing  but  unsteady  joy,  arising 
from  the  image  of  a  future  or  past  thing  about  whoso 
issue  we  are  in  doubt.  Feai',  on  the  other  hand,  is.  an 
unsteady  sorrow,  arising  from  the  image  of  a  doubtful 
thing.  If  the  doubt  be  removed  from  these  affects,  tlien 
hope  and  fear  become  Confidence  and  De>ipair,  that  is  to 
say,  joy  or  sorrow,  arising  from  the  image  of  a  thing  for 
which  we  have  hoped  or  which  we  have  feared.  Glad- 
ness, again,  is  joy  arising  from  the  image  of  a  past  thing 
whose  issues  we  have  doubted.  Hcmorse  is  the  sorrow 
which  is  opposed  to  gladness. 

Prop.  XIX. — Re  vjJio  imagines  that  vhat  hr  loirs  is 
destroyed  will  soirow,  hut  if  he  imajiiies  that  it  w 
preserved  he  will  rejoice. 

Demonst. — The  mind  endeavours  as  much  as  it  can  to 
imadue  those  things  which  increase  or  assist  the  body  s 


124  ETHIC. 

power  of  action  (Prop.  12,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Scbol. 
Prop.  I  3,  pt.  3),  to  imagine  those  things  which  it  loves. 
Put  the  imagination  is  assisted  by  those  things  whicli 
posit  the  existence  of  the  object  and  is  restrained  by 
those  whicli  exclude  its  existence  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2). 
Therefore  the  images  of  things  which  posit  the  existence 
of  the  beloved  object  assist  the  mind's  effort  to  imagine 
it,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  3),  they  affect  the 
mind  with  joy ;  whilst  those,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
exclude  the  existence  of  the  beloved  ol)ject  restrain  that 
same  effort  of  the  mind,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1 , 
pt.  3),  they  affect  the  mind  with  sorrow.  He,  therefore, 
who  imagines  that  what  he  loves  is  destroyed,  &c. — 
Q.E.D, 

Pkop.  XX. — JIc  who  imagines  that  what  he  hates  is 
destroyed  ivill  rejoice. 

Dcmonst. — The  mind  (Prop.  13,  pt.  3)  endeavours  to 
imagine  those  things  which  exchide  the  existence  of 
whatever  lessens  or  limits  the  body's  power  of  action ; 
that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  it  endeavours  to 
imagine  those  things  which  exclude  the  existence  of 
what  it  hates,  and  therefore  the  image  of  the  thing  which 
excludes  the  existence  of  what  the  mind  hates  assists 
this  .endeavour  of  the  mind,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop. 
II,  pt.  3),  affects  the  mind  with  joy.  He,  therefore, 
who  imagines  that  what  he  hates  is  destroyed  will  re- 
joice.— Q.E.D. 

Pkop.  XXI. — He  who  imagines  that  vjhat  he  loves  is 
affected  with  joy  or  sorrow  will  also  he  affected  with 
joy  or  sorrow,  and  these  affects  will  he  greater  or  less 
171  the  lover  as  they  are  greater  or  less  in  the  thi7ig 
loved. 

Demonst. — The  images  of  things  (Prop.  19,  pt.  3)  which 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

posit  the  existence  of  the  beloved  object  assist  the  tlluit 
of  the  mind  to  imagine  it ;  but  joy  posits  the  existence  of 
the  thing  which  rejoices,  and  the  greater  the  joy  the 
more  is  existence  posited,  for  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1 ,  pt.  \)  \ny 
is  the  transition  to  a  greater  perfection.  The  ima^e,  there- 
fore, in  the  lover  of  the  joy  of  the  beloved  object  assists 
the  effort  of  his  mind  to  imagine  the  object,  that  is  to 
say  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  affects  the  lover  with  joy 
proportionate  to  the  joy  of  the  object  he  loves.  This 
was  the  first  thing  to  be  proved.  Again,  in  so  far  as 
anything  is  affected  with  sorrow,  so  far  is  it  destroyed, 
and  the  destruction  is  greater  as  the  sorrow  with  which 
it  is  affected  is  greater  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1 ,  pt.  3).  Therefore 
(Prop.  19,  pt.  3)  he  who  imagines  that  what  he  loves  is 
affected  with  sorrow  will  also  be  affected  with  sorrow, 
and  it  will  be  greater  as  this  affect  shall  have  been 
greater  in  the  object  beloved. 

Prop.  XXII. — If  we  imagine  that  a  pcrsoji  affects  with 
joy  a  thing  which  v:e  love,  we  shall  he  affected  with 
love  towards  him.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  imagine 
that  he  affects  it  with  sorrow,  we  shall  also  be  affected 
vjith  hatred  tovjards  him. 

Demonst. — He  who  affects  with  joy  or  sorrow  the 
thing  we  love  affects  us  also  with  joy  or  sorrow  when- 
ever we  imagine  the  beloved  object  so  affected  (Prop.  2  1, 
pt.  3).  But  this  joy  or  sorrow  is  supposed  to  exist  in 
us  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause; 
therefore  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3)  if  we  imagine  tliat  a 
person  affects  with  joy  or  sorrow  a  thing  which  we  love, 
we  shall  be  affected  with  love  or  hatred  towards  him. — 

Q.E.D. 

Schol — Prop.  21  explains  to  us  what  commiseration 
is,  which  we  may  define  as  sorrow  which  springs  from 
another's  loss.  By  what  name  the  joy  is  to  be  called 
which  springs  from  another's  good  I  do  not  know,     Luvo 


126  ETHIC. 

toward  the  person  who  has  done  good  to  another  we  shall 
call  favour  {favor),  whilst  hatred  towards  him  who  has 
done  evil  to  another  we  shall  call  i?idignation  (indignatio). 
It  is  to  be  observed,  too,  that  we  not  only  feel  pity  for 
the  object  which  we  have  loved,  as  we  showed  in  Prop.  2  i, 
but  also  for  that  to  which  we  have  been  attached  by  no 
affect ;  provided  only  -we  adjudge  it  to  be  like  ourselves 
(as  I  shall  show  hereafter),  and  so  we  shall  regard  with 
favour  him  who  has  done  any  good  to  the  object  which 
is  like  us,  and,  on  the  contrary,  be  indignant  with  him 
who  has  done  it  any  harm. 

Prop.  XXIII. — He  wJio  imagines  that  what  he  hates  is 
affected  with  sorroio  will  rejoice ;  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  imagines  it  to  he  affected  with  joy  he  tvill  he 
sad ;  and  these  affects  ivill  he  greater  or  less  in  him 
in  proportion  as  their  contraries  are  greater  or  iess 
in  the  ohject  he  hates. 

Demonst. — In  so  far  as  the  hated  thing  is  affected 
with  sorrow  is  it  destroyed,  and  the  destruction  is  greater 
as  the  sorrow  is  greater  (Schol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  3).  He, 
therefore  (Prop.  20,  pt.  3),  who  imagines  that  the  thing 
which  he  hates  is  affected  with  sorrow  will  on  the  con- 
trary be  affected  with  joy,  and  the  joy  will  be  the  greater 
in  proportion  as  he  imagines  the  hated  thing  to  be  affected 
with  a  greater  sorrow.  This  was  the  first  thing  to  be 
proved.  Again,  joy  posits  the  existence  of  the  thing 
which  rejoices  (SchoL  Prop.  11,  pt.  3),  and  it  does  so 
the  more  in  proportion  as  the  joy  is  conceived  to  be 
greater.  If  a  person,  therefore,  imagines  that  he  whom 
he  hates  is  affected  with  joy,  this  idea  (Prop,  i  3,  pt.  3) 
will  restrain  the  effort  of  the  mind  of  him  who  hates, 
that  is  to  say  (SchoL  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  he  will  be  affected 
with  sorrow. — q.kd. 

Schol. — This  joy  can  hardly  be  solid  and  free  from  any 
mental  conflict.     For,  as  I  shall  show  directly  in  Prop. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

27,  in  so  far  as  we  imngine  that  what  is  like  oursclvtii 
is  affected  with  sorrow,  we  nmst  be  sad  ;  and,  011  tlie  con- 
trary, if  we  imagine  it  to  be  affected  with  joy,  we  rejoice. 
Here,  however,  we  are  considering  merely  hatred. 


Prop.  XXIV. — If  we  imagine  that  a  person  ajfccts  vith 
joy  a  thing  lohich  tve  hate,  we  are  therefore  ajfatcd 
with  hatred  toivards  him.  On  the  other  haiul,  if  ire 
imagine  that  he  affects  it  with  sorrow,  ice  are  t/urc' 
fore  affected  with  love  toivards  him. 

Dcmonst. — This  proposition  is  proved  in  the  same 
manner  as  Prop.  22,  pt.  3,  which  see. 

Schol. — These  and  the  like  affects  of  hatred  are  related 
to  envy,  which  is  therefore  nothing  but  hatred  in  so  far 
as  it  is  considered  to  dispose  a  man  so  that  he  rejoices 
over  the  evil  and  is  saddened  by  the  good  which  befals 
another. 

Prop.  XXV. —  We  endeawur  to  affirm  everything,  loth  con- 
cerning ourselves  and  concerning  the  beloved  object  which 
we  imagine  will  affect  us  or  the  object  with  joy,  ami, 
on  the  contrary,  we  endeavoiir  to  deny  everything  that 
will  effect  either  it  or  ourselves  with  sorroiv. 

Bemonst. — Everything  which  we  imagine  as  affecting 
the  beloved  object  with  joy  or  sorrow  affects  us  also  with 
joy  or  sorrow  (Prop.  2  i,  pt.  3).  But  the  mind  (Prop,  i  2, 
pt.  3)  endeavours  as  much  as  it  can  to  imagine  those 
things  which  affect  us  with  joy,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 7, 
pt.  2  and  its  CoroL),  it  endeavours  to  consider  them  as 
present.  On  the  contrary  (Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  it  endea- 
vours to  exclude  the  existence  of  what  affects  us  with 
sorrow  :  therefore  we  endeavour  to  affirm  everything  both 
concerning  ourselves  and  concerning  the  beloved  object 
which  we  imagine  will  affect  us  or  it  with  joy,  &c.— Q.K.i>. 


128  ETHIC. 

Peop.  XXVI. — If  vje  hate  a  thing,  vje  endeavour  to  affirm 
concerning  it  everything  ivhich  we  imagine  will  affect 
it  tvith  sorroiu,  and,  on  the  other  hand.,  to  deny  every- 
thing concerning  it  ivhich  vje  imagine  will  affect  it 
with  joy. 

Demooist. — This  proposition  follows  from  Prop.  23,  as 
the  preceding  proposition  follows  from  Prop.  2  i . 

Schol. — We  see  from  this  how  easily  it  may  happen, 
that  a  man  should  think  too  much  of  himself  or  of  the 
Ijeloved  object,  and,  on  the  contrary,  should  think  too 
little  of  what  he  hates.  When  a  man  thinks  too  much 
of  himself,  this  imagination  is  called  pride,  and  is  a  kind 
of  delirium,  because  he  dreams  with  his  eyes  open,  that 
he  is  able  to  do  all  those  things  to  which  he  attains  in 
imagination  alone,  regarding  them  therefore  as  realities, 
and  rejoicing  in  them  so  long  as  he  cannot  imagine  any- 
thing to  exclude  their  existence  and  limit  his  power  of 
action.  Pride,  therefore,  is  that  joy  which  arises  from  a 
man's  thinking  too  much  of  himself.  The  joy  which 
arises  from  thinking  too  much  of  another  is  called  over- 
estimation,  and  that  which  arises  from  thinking  too  little 
of  another  is  called  contempt. 

Prop.  XXVII. — Although  we  may  not  have  hccn  moved 
towards  a  thing  by  any  affect,  yet  if  it  is  like  our- 
selves, ivhenever  we  imagine  it  to  he  affected  ty  any 
affect  tve  are  therefore  affected  hy  the  same. 

Bemonst. — The  images  of  things  are  affections  of  the 
human  body,  and  the  ideas  of  these  affections  represent  to 
us  external  bodies  as  if  they  were  present  (Schol.  Prop.  1 7, 
pt.  2),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 6,  pt.  2),  these  ideas  involve 
both  the  nature  of  our  own  body  and  at  the  same  time 
the  present  nature  of  the  external  body.  If,  therefore, 
the  nature  of  the  external  body  be  like  that  of  our  body, 
then  the  idea  of  the  external  body  which  we  imagine 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        1:9 

will  involve  an  affection  of  our  body  like  tliat  of  tho 
external  body.  Therefore,  if  we  imagine  any  one  who 
is  like  onrselves  to  be  affected  with  any  atrect,  this 
imagination  will  exj-jress  an  afiection  of  our  body  liko 
that  affect,  and  therefore  we  shall  be  affected  with  a 
similar  affect  ourselves,  because  we  imagine  sometiiing  liko 
us  to  be  affected  with  the  same.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  hate  a  thing  which  is  like  ourselves,  we  shall  so  far 
(Prop.  23,  pt.  3)  be  affected  with  an  affect  contrary  and 
not  similar  to  that  with  which  it  is  affected. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — This  imitation  of  affects,  when  it  is  connected 
with  sorrow,  is  called  commiseration  (see  Schol.  Prop.  22, 
pt.  3),  and  where  it  is  connected  with  desire  is  called 
emulation,  which  is  nothing  else  than  the  desire  which  is 
engendered  in  ns  for  anything,  because  we  imagine  that 
other  persons,  who  are  like  ourselves,  possess  the  same 
desire. 

Corol.  I. — If  we  imagine  that  a  person  to  whom  we 
have  been  moved  by  no  affect,  affects  with  joy  a  thing 
which  is  like  us,  we  shall  therefore  be  affected  with  love 
towards  him.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  imagine  that  he 
affects  it  with  sorrow,  we  shall  be  affected  with  hatred 
towards  him. 

Bcmonst. — This  Corol.  follows  from  the  preceding  pro- 
position, just  as  Prop.  22,  pt.  3,  follows  from  Prop.  21, 

pt.  3- 

Corol.  2. — If  we  pity  a  thing,  the  fact  that  its  misery 
affects  us  with  sorrow  will  not  make  us  hate  it. 

Demonst. — If  we  could  hate  the  thing  for  this  reason, 
we  should  then  (Prop.  23,  pt.  3)  rejoice  over  its  sorrow, 
which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis. 

Corol.  3. — If  we  pity  a  thing,  we  shall  endeavour  as 
much  as  possible  to  free  it  from  its  misery. 

Demonst. — That  which  affects  with  sorrow  the  thing 
that  we  pity,  affects  us  likewise  with  the  same  sorrow 
(Prop.  27,  pt.  3),  and  we  shall,  therefore,  endeavour  to 
devise  every  means  by  which  we  may  take  away  or  destroy 


I30  ETHIC. 

the  existence  of  tlie  cause  of  the  sorrow  (Prop,  i  3,  pt.  3)  ; 
that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  we  shall  seek  to 
destroy  it,  or  sliall  be  determined  thereto,  and  therefore 
we  shall  endeavour  to  free  from  its  misery  the  thing 
we  pity. 

Scliol. — This  will  or  desire  of  doing  good,  arising  from 
our  pity  for  the  object  which  we  want  to  benefit,  is 
called  henevolence,  which  is,  therefore,  simply  the  desire 
which  arises  from  commiseration.  AVith  regard  to  the 
love  or  hatred  towards  the  person  who  has  done  good  or 
evil  to  the  thing  we  imagine  to  be  like  ourselves,  see 
Schol.  Prop.  22,  pt.  3. 

PiiOP.  XXVIII. —  IVe  endeavour  to  hring  into  existence 
everything  icliicK  we  imagine  conduces  to  joy,  and  to 
remove  or  destroy  everything  oji-posed  to  it,  or  ivhich 
conduces  to  sorroto. 


Demonst. — We  endeavour  to  imagine  as  much  as  pos- 
sible all  those  things  which  we  think  conduce  to  joy 
(Prop.  12,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  17,  pt.  2),  we 
strive  as  much  as  possible  to  perceive  them  as  present  or 
actually  existing.  But  the  mind's  effort  or  power  in 
thinking  is  equal  to  and  correspondent  with  the  body's 
effort  or  power  in  acting,  as  clearly  follows  from  Corol. 
Prop.  7,  pt.  2,  and  CoroL  Prop.  11,  pt.  2,  and  therefore 
absolutely  whatever  conduces  to  joy  Ave  endeavour  to 
make  exist,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  we  seek 
after  it  and  aim  at  it.  This  is  the  first  thing  which  was 
to  be  proved.  Again,  if  we  imagine  that  a  thing  which 
we  believe  causes  us  sorrow,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop. 
13,  pt.  3),  which  we  hate  is  destroyed,  we  shall  rejoice 
(Prop.  20,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  (by  the  first  part  of  this 
demonstration)  we  shall  endeavour  to  destroy  it,  or  (Prop. 
I  3,  pt.  3)  to  remove  it  from  us,  so  that  we  may  not  per- 
ceive it  as  present.  This  is  the  second  thing  which  was 
to  be  proved.  We  endeavour,  therefore,  to  bring  into 
existence,  &c. — q.e.d. 


ORIGIN  AND  XATCRE  OF  TUB  AIFECTS.       131 

PiiOP.  XXIX. —  We  shall  endeavour  to  do  everything  ichich 
we  imagine  nien^  loill  look  upon  with  joy,  and,  on  the 
contrary,  we  slmll  he  averse  to  doing  anything  to  which 

we  imagine  men  are  averse. 

Dcmonst. — If  we  imagine  men  to  love  or  liate  a  thin?, 
we  shall  therefore  love  or  hate  it  (Prop.  27,  pt.  3);  that 
is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  1 3,  pt.  3),  we  shall  tlierefore  re- 
joice or  be  sad  at  the  presence  of  the  thing,  and  therefore 
(Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  everything  which  we  imagine  that  men 
love  or  look  upon  with  joy,  we  shall  endeavour  to  do,  &c. 

Q.E.D. 

Schol.  —  This  effort  to  do  some  things  and  omit 
doing  others,  solely  because  we  wish  to  please  men,  i.s 
called  avibition,  especially  if  our  desire  to  please  tlio 
common  people  is  so  strong  that  our  actions  or  omissions 
to  act  are  accompanied  with  injury  to  ourselves  or  to 
others.  Otherwise  this  endeavour  is  usually  called 
humanity.  Again,  the  joy  with  which  we  imagine 
another  person's  action,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to 
delight  us,  I  call  ^j^razsc,  and  the  sorrow  with  whicli 
we  turn  away  from  an  action  of  a  contrary  kind  1  call 
hlame. 

Pkop.  XXX. — If  a  person  has  done  anything  which  he 
imagines  tvill  affect  others  with  joy,  lie  also  will  he 
affected  with  joy,  accompanied  with  an  idea  of  himself 
as  its  cause  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  u'ill  look  upon  himself 
with  joy.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  has  done  any- 
thvng  tvhich  he  imagines  will  affect  others  with  sorrow, 
he  will  look  up)on  himself  with  surroiu. 

Demonst — He  who  imagines  that  he  affects  others 
with  joy  or  sorrow  will  necessarily  be  affected  with  joy 
or  sorrow  (Prop.  27,  pt.  3).     Lut  since  man  is  conscious 

1  Both  here  and  in  what  follows    to  whom  we  are  moved  by  no  alTtrt 
I  understand  by  the  word  men,  men     (Sp.) 


132  ETHIC. 

of  liimself  (Props.  19  and  23,  pt.  2)  by  means  of  the 
affections  by  which  he  is  determined  to  act;  therefore 
he  who  has  done  anything  which  he  imagines  will  affect 
others  with  joy  will  be  affected  with  joy  accompanied 
with  a  consciousness  of  himself  as  its  cause ;  that  is  to 
say,  he  will  look  upon  himself  with  joy,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — Since  love  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3)  is  joy 
attended  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause,  and  hatred 
is  sorrow  attended  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause, 
the  joy  and  sorrow  spoken  of  in  this  proposition  will  be 
a  kind  of  love  and  hatred.  But  because  love  and  hatred 
are  related  to  external  objects,  we  will  therefore  give  a 
different  name  to  the  affects  which  are  the  subject  of 
this  proposition,  and  we  will  call  this  kind  of  joy  which 
is  attended  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause  sclf- 
exaltation,  and  the  sorrow  oj)posed  to  it  we  will  call 
shame.  The  reader  is  to  understand  that  this  is  the 
case  in  which  joy  or  sorrow  arises  because  the  man 
believes  that  he  is  praised  or  blamed,  otherwise  I  shall 
call  this  joy  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external 
cause  contentment  with  one's-self,  and  the  sorrow  opposed 
to  it  repentance.  Again,  since  (Corol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2) 
it  may  happen  that  the  joy  with  which  a  person 
imagines  that  he  affects  other  people  is  only  imaginary, 
and  since  (Prop.  25,  pt.  3)  every  one  endeavours  to 
imagine  concerning  himself  what  he  supposes  will  affect 
himself  with  joy,  it  may  easily  happen  that  the  self- 
exalted  man  becomes  proud,  and  imagines  that  he 
is  pleasing  everybody  when  he  is  offensive  to  every- 
body. 

Prop.  XXXI. — If  ive  imagine  that  a  person  loves,  desires, 
or  hates  a  thing  which  we  ourselves  love,  desire,  or 
hate,  we  shall  on  that  account  love,  desire,  or  hate  the 
thing  more  steadily.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  imagine 
that  he  is  averse  to  the  thing  we  love  or  loves  the  thing 


ORIGIX  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       133 

to  n-kick  we  arc  averse,  ur  shall  tlini  sufcr  vacillation 

of  mind. 

Dcmonst. — If  we  imagine  tliat  another  person  loves  a 
thing,  on  that  very  account  we  shall  love  it  (I'rop.  27. 
pt.  3).  But  we  suppose  that  we  love  it  independently 
of  this,  and  a  new  cause  for  our  love  is  therefore  added. 
by  which  it  is  strengthened,  and  consequently  the  object 
we  love  will  be  loved  by  us  on  this  account  the  more 
steadily.  Again,  if  we  imagine  that  a  person  is  averse 
to  a  thing,  on  that  very  account  we  shall  be  averse  to  it 
(Prop.  27,  pt.  3);  but  if  we  suppose  that  we  at  the  same 
time  love  it,  we  shall  both  love  the  thing  and  be  averse 
to  it,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  3),  we  shall 
suffer  vacillation  of  mind. — q.e.d. 

Corol — It  follows  from  this  proposition  and  from  Prop. 
28,  pt.  3,  that  every  one  endeavours  as  much  as  possible 
to  make  others  love  what  he  loves,  and  to  hate  what  he 
hates.     Hence  the  poet  says — 

"  Speremus  pariter,  pariter  metuainus  amantes; 
Ferreus  est,  si  (|uis,  ijuod  siiiit  aller,  aiiiat." 

This  effort  to  make  every  one  approve  what  we  love  or 
hate  is  in  truth  ambition  (Schoh  Prop.  29,  pt.  3),  and  so 
we  see  that  each  person  by  nature  desires  that  other 
persons  should  live  according  to  his  way  of  thinking; 
but  if  every  one  does  this,  then  all  are  a  hindrance  to  one 
another,  and  if  every  one  wishes  to  be  praised  or  beloved 
by  the  rest,  tl^en  they  all  hate  one  another. 

PiiOP.  XXXII. — If  we  imagine  that  a  person  delights  in  a 
thing  ivhich  only  one  can  jJossess,  we  do  all  u'c  ran  (0 
lirevent  his  possessing  it. 

Dcmonst.— li  we  imagine  that  a  person  delights  in  a 
thing,  that  will  be  a  sufficient  reason  (Prop.  27,  pt  3. 
with  Corol.  i)  for  makmg  us  love  the  thing  and  desiring 


134  ETHIC. 

to  delight  in  it.  But  (by  hypothesis)  we  imagine  that 
his  delighting  in  the  thing  is  an  obstacle  to  our  joy,  and 
therefore  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  we  endeavour  to  prevent  his 
possessing  it. — Q.E.D. 

Scliol. — We  see,  therefore,  that  the  nature  of  man  is 
generally  constituted  so  as  to  pity  those  who  are  in  ad- 
versity and  envy  those  who  are  in  prosperity,  and  (Prop. 
32,  pt.  3)  he  envies  with  a  hatred  which  is  the  greater  in 
proportion  as  he  loves  what  he  imagines  another  possesses. 
We  see  also  that  from  the  same  property  of  human  nature 
I'rom  which  it  follows  that  men  pity  one  another  it  also 
follows  that  they  are  envious  and  ambitious.  If  we  will 
consult  experience,  we  shall  find  that  she  teaches  the  same 
doctrine,  especially  if  we  consider  the  first  years  of  our  life. 
For  we  find  that  children,  because  their  body  is,  as  it  were, 
continually  in  equilibrium,  laugh  and  cry  merely  because 
they  see  others  do  the  same ;  whatever  else  they  see 
others  do  they  immediately  wish  to  imitate ;  everything 
which  they  think  is  pleasing  to  other  people  they  want. 
And  the  reason  is,  as  we  have  said,  that  the  images  of 
things  are  the  affections  themselves  of  the  human  body, 
or  the  ways  in  which  it  is  affected  by  external  causes 
and  disposed  to  this  or  that  action. 

Prop.  XXXIII. — If  ive  love  a  thing  which  is  like  ourselves, 
v-e  endeavour  as  much  as  possible  to  make  it  love  us 
ill  return. 

Demonst. — We  endeavour  as  much  as  possible  to  ima- 
gine before  everything  else  the  thing  we  love  (Prop,  i  2, 
pt.  3).  If,  therefore,  it  be  like  ourselves,  we  shall  en- 
deavour to  affect  it  with  joy  before  everything  else  (Prop. 
29,  pt.  3)  ;  that  is  to  say,  we  shall  endeavour  as  much  as 
possible  to  cause  the  beloved  object  to  be  affected  with  joy 
attended  with  the  idea  of  ourselves,  or,  in  other  words 
(Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  we  try  to  make  it  love  us  in 
return. — Q.E.D. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        135 

Pkop.  XXXI Y. —  T/fc  grcatci'  the.  ajfcd  vUh  vhich  xrr 
imagine  that  a  beloved  object  is  affected  towards  us, 
the  greater  ivill  be  our  seJf-excdtation. 

Demonst. — We  endeavour  as  much  as  possiMe  to  make 
a  beloved  object  love  us  in  return  (Prop.  33,  pt.  3),  that 
is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  to  cause  it  to  be 
affected  with  joy  attended  with  the  idea  of  ourselves. 
In  proportion,  therefore,  as  we  iuiagine  the  beloved  object 
to  be  affected  with  a  joy  of  which  we  are  the  cause,  will 
our  endeavour  be  assisted,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 1 ,  pL  3 
with  Schol.),  will  be  the  greatness  of  the  joy  with  which 
we  are  affected.  But  since  we  rejoice  because  we  have 
affected  with  joy  another  person  like  ourselves,  we  shall 
look  upon  ourselves  with  joy  (Prop.  30,  pt.  3);  and 
therefore  the  greater  the  affect  with  whicli  we  imagine 
that  the  beloved  object  is  affected  towards  us,  the  j^reater 
will  be  the  joy  with  which  we  shall  look  upon  ourselves, 
that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  30,  pt.  3),  the  greater  will  bo 
our  self-exaltation. — q.e.d. 


Prop.  XXXV. — Jf  I  imagine  that  an  object  hclored  hj/  me 
is  iinited  to  another  jJerson  by  the  same,  or  by  a  closer 
bond  of  friendship  than  that  by  which  I  myself  (dont 
held  the  object,  I  shcdl  be  affected  with  hatred  towards 
the  beloved  object  itself  and  shall  envy  that  other 
person. 

Demonst. — The  greater  the  love  M'itli  wliich  a  person 
imagines  a  beloved  object  to  be  affected  towaixls  him,  the 
greater  will  be  his  self-exaltation  (Prop.  34,  pt.  3),  tlmt 
is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  30,  pt.  3),  the  more  will  he 
rejoice.  Therefore  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  he  will  emleavour 
as  much  as  he  can  to  imagine  the  beloved  object  united 
to  him  as  closely  as  possible,  and  this  effort  or  desiro 
is    strengthened    if   he    imagines    that   another   pereon 


136  ETHIC. 

desires  for  himself  the  same  oLject  (Prop.  31,  pt.  3). 
But- this  effort  or  desire  is  supposed  to  be  checked  by 
the  image  of  the  beloved  object  itself  attended  by  the 
image  of  the  person  whom  it  connects  with  itself.  There- 
fore (Schol.  Prop.  II,  pt.  3)  the  lover  on  this  account 
will  be  affected  with  sorrow  attended  with  the  idea  of  the 
beloved  object  as  its  cause  together  with  the  image  of 
another  person;  that  is-^to  say  (Schoh  Prop.  13,  pt.  3), 
he  will  be  affected  with  hatred  towards  the  beloved  object 
and  at  the  same  time  towards  this  other  person  (Corol. 
Prop.  I5,pt.  3),  whom  he  will  envy  (Proj).  23,  pt.  3)  as 
being  delighted  with  it. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — This  hatred  towards  a  beloved  object  when 
joined  with  envy  is  called  Jealousy,  wdiich  is  there- 
fore nothing  but  a  vacillation  of  the  mind  springing  from 
the  love  and  hatred  both  felt  together,  and  attended  with 
the  idea  of  another  person  whom  we  envy.  Moreover, 
this  hatred  towards  the  beloved  object  will  be  greater  in 
proportion  to  the  joy  with  which  the  jealous  man  has  been 
usually  affected  from  the  mutual  affection  between  him 
and  his  beloved,  and  also  in  proportion  to  the  affect  with 
which  he  had  been  affected  towards  the  person  who  is 
imagined  to  unite  to  himself  the  beloved  object.  Por  if 
he  has  hated  him,  he  will  for  that  very  reason  hate  the 
beloved  object  (Prop.  24,  pt.  3),  because  he  imagines  it 
to  affect  with  joy  that  which  he  hates,  and  also  (Corol. 
Prop.  15,  pt.  3)  because  he  is  compelled  to  connect  the 
image  of  the  beloved  object  with  the  image  of  him  whom 
he  hates.  This  feeling  is  generally  excited  when  the 
love  is  love  towards  a  woman.  The  man  who  imagines 
that  the  woman  he  loves  prostitutes  herself  to  another  is 
not  merely  troubled  because  his  appetite  is  restrained, 
but  he  turns  away  from  her  because  he  is  obliged  to  con- 
nect the  image  of  a  beloved  object  with  the  privy  parts 
and  with  what  is  excremental  in  another  man ;  and  in 
addition  to  this,  the  jealous  person  is  not  received  with 
the  same  favour  which  the  beloved  object  formerly  be- 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS,       137 

stowed  on  him, — a  new  cause  of  sorrow  to  the  luver,  m 
1  shall  show. 

Trot.  XXXVI. — JIc  ivho  recollects  a  thing  vith  vhich  hr 
has  once  been  clclighted,  desires  to  possess  it  wil/i  rrrrif 
condition  which  existed  when  he  was  first  dclighied 
with  it. 

JDcmonst. — Whatever  a  man  has  seen  toj^cthcr  with  an 
ohject  which  has  delighted  him  will  be  (rrop.  i  5,  pt  3) 
contingently  a  cause  of  joy,  and  therefore  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3) 
he  will  desire  to  possess  it  all,  together  witli  the  object 
which  has  delighted  him,  that  is  to  say,  he  will  desire  to 
possess  the  object  with  every  condition  which  existed  whcu 
he  was  first  delighted  with  it. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — If,  therefore,  the  lover  discovers  that  one  of 
these  conditions  be  wanting,  he  will  be  sad. 

Dcmonst. — For  in  so  far  as  he  discovers  that  any  one 
condition  is  wanting  does  he  imagine  something  whicli 
excludes  the  existence  of  the  object.  But  since  (I'rop. 
36,  pt.  3)  he  desires  the  object  or  condition  from  love,  ho 
will  therefore  be  sad  (Prop.  19,  pt.  3)  in  so  far  as  lie 
imagines  that  condition  to  be  wanting. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — This  sorrow,  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  the 
absence  of  what  we  love,  is  called  longing. 

I'rop.  XXXVII. — The  desire  which  springs  from  sorrow  or 
joy,  from  hatred  or  love,  is  greater  in  piroportion  as  the 

affect  is  greater. 

Demonsi. — Sorrow  lessens  or  limits  a  man's  power  of 
action  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7.  pL 
3),  it  lessens  or  limits  the  effort  by  wliich  a  man  endea- 
vours to  persevere  in  his  own  being,  and  tlierefore  (Prop.  5, 
pt.  3)  it  is  opposed  to  this  effort ;  consequently,  if  ft  man 
be  affected  with  sorrow,  the  first  thing  lie  attempts  is  to 
remove  that  sorrow ;  but  (by  the  defmition  of  sorrow) 


138  ETHIC. 

the  greater  it  is,  the  greater  is  the  human  power  of  action 
to  which  it  must  be  opposed,  and  so  much  the  greater, 
therefore,  will  be  the  power  of  action  with  which  the 
man  will  endeavour  to  remove  it ;  that  is  to  say  (Schol. 
Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  with  the  greater  eagerness  or  desire  will 
he  struggle  to  remove  it.  Again,  since  joy  (Schol.  Prop. 
II,  pt.  3)  increases  or  assists  a  man's  power  of  action,  it 
is  easily  demonstrated,  by  the  same  method,  that  there  is 
nothing  which  a  man  who  is  affected  with  joy  desires 
more  than  to  preserve  it,  and  his  desire  is  in  proportion 
to  his  joy.  Again,  since  hatred  and  love  are  themselves 
affects  either  of  joy  or  sorrow,  it  follows  in  the  same 
manner  that  the  effort,  desire,  or  eagerness  which  arises 
from  hatred  or  love  will  be  greater  in  proportion  to  the 
hatred  or  love. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXVIII. — If  a  man  lias  begun  to  hate  a  helovccl 
thing,  so  that  his  love  to  it  is  altogether  destroyed,  he 
ivill  for  this  very  reason,  hate  it  more  than  he  would 
have  done  if  he  had  never  loved  it,  and  his  hatred  will 
he  in  greater  2'>'>''oportion  to  his  previous  love. 

Demonst. — If  a  man  begins  to  hate  a  thing  which  he 
loves,  a  constraint  is  put  upon  more  appetites  than  if  he 
had  never  loved  it.  For  love  is  joy  (Schol.  Prop.  13, 
pt.  3),  which  a  man  endeavours  to  preserve  as  much  as 
possible  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3),  both  by  looking  on  the  beloved 
object  as  present  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  and  by  affect- 
ing it  with  joy  as  much  as  possible  (Prop.  21,  pt.  3); 
this  effort  (Prop.  37,  pt.  3)  to  preserve  the  joy  of  love 
being  the  greater  in  proportion  as  his  love  is  greater, 
and  so  also  is  the  effort  to  bring  the  beloved  object  to 
love  him  in  return  (Prop.  33,  pt.  3).  But  these  efforts 
are  restrained  by  the  hatred  towards  the  beloved  object 
(Corol.  Prop.  13,  and  Prop.  23,  pt.  3) ;  therefore  the  lover 
(Schol.  Prop.  I  I,  pt.  3)  for  this  reason  also  will  be  affected 
with  sorrow,  and  that  the  more  as  the  love  had  been 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       139 

greater ;  that  is  to  say,  in  adilition  to  tlie  sorrow  which  wtui 
the  cause  of  the  hatred  there  is  anotlior  i)roauce(l  l.y  his 
having  loved  the  object,  and  consequently  he  will  con- 
template with  a  greater  affect  of  sorrow  the  beloved 
object;  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Trop.  13,  pt.  3),  he  will  hato 
it  more  than  he  would  have  done  if  he  had  not  loved  it, 
and  his  hatred  will  be  in  proportion  to  his  previous 
love. — Q.E.D 


Prop.  XXXIX. — If  a  man  hates  another  Jic  will  cndca%y)ur 
to  do  him  evil,  unless  he  fears  a  greater  evil  will  there- 
from arise  to  himself;  ami,  on  the  other  hand,  ht 
who  loves  another  will  endeavour  to  do  him  fjoinl  bi/ 

the  same  rule. 

Dcmonst. — To  hate  a  person  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3) 
is  to  imagine  him  as  a  cause  of  sorrow,  and  therefore 
(Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  he  who  hates  another  will  endea- 
vour to  remove  or  destroy  him.  But  if  he  fears  lest  a 
greater  grief,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  a  greater  evil, 
should  fall  upon  himself,  and  one  wliich  he  thinks  he 
can  avoid  by  refraining  from  inflicting  the  evil  ho 
meditated,  he  wall  desire  not  to  do  it  (Prop.  28, 
pt.  3) ;  and  this  desire  will  be  stronger  than  the  former 
with  which  he  was  possessed  of  inflicting  the  evil,  and 
will  prevail  over  it  (Prop.  37,  pt.  3).  This  is  the  first 
part  of  the  proposition.  The  second  is  demonstrated 
in  the  same  way.  Therefore  if  a  man  hates  another,  &c. 
—  Q.E.D. 

Schol. — By  good,  I  understand  here  every  kind  nf  joy 
and  everything  that  conduces  to  it;  chielly,  however, 
anything  that  satisfies  longing,  whatever  that  thing  may 
be.  By  evil,  I  understand  every  kind  of  sorrow,  and 
chiefly  whatever  thwarts  longing.  For  we  have  shown 
above  (SchoL  Prop.  9,  pt.  3)  that  we  do  not  desire  o 
thing  because  we  adjudge  it  to  be  good,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, we  call  it  good  because  we  desire  it,  and  couse- 


I40  ETHIC. 

quently  everything  to  wliicli  we  are  averse  we  call  evil. 
Each  person,  therefore,  according  to  his  affect  judges  or 
estimates  what  is  good  and  what  is  evil,  what  is  better 
and  what  is  worse,  and  what  is  the  best  and  what  is  the 
worst.  Thus  the  covetous  man  thinks  plenty  of  money 
to  be  the  best  thing  and  poverty  the  worst.  The  ambitious 
man  desires  nothing  like  glory,  and  on  the  other  hand 
dreads  nothing  like  shame.  To  the  envious  person,  again, 
nothing  is  more  pleasant  than  the  misfortune  of  another, 
and  nothing  more  disagreeable  than  the  prosperity  of 
another.  And  so  each  person  according  to  his  affect 
judges  a  thing  to  be  good  or  evil,  useful  or  useless.  We 
notice,  moreover,  that  this  affect,  by  which  a  man  is  so 
disposed  as  not  to  will  the  thing  he  wills,  and  to  will 
that  which  he  does  not  will,  is  called  fear,  which  may 
therefore  be  defined  as  that  apprehension  which  leads  a 
man  to  avoid  an  evil  in  the  future  by  incurring  a  lesser 
evil  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3).  If  the  evil  feared  is  shame,  then 
the  fear  is  called  modesty.  If  the  desire  of  avoiding 
the  future  is  restrained  by  the  fear  of  another  evil, 
so  that  the  man  does  not  know  what  he  most  wishes, 
then  this  apprehension  is  called  consternation,  especially 
if  both  the  evils  feared  are  very  great. 

Prop.  XL. — If  we  imagine  that  we  are  hated  hy  another 
unthoid  having  given  him  any  cause  for  it,  loe  shall 
hate  him  in  return. 

Demonst. — If  we  imagine  that  another  person  is 
affected  with  hatred,  on  that  account  we  shall  also  be 
affected  with  it  (Prop.  27,  pt.  3)  ;  that  is  to  say,  we 
shall  be  affected  with  sorrow  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3), 
accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.  But  (by 
hypothesis)  we  imagine  no  cause  for  this  sorrow  excepting 
the  person  himself  wlio  hates  us,  and  therefore,  because  we 
imagine  ourselves  hated  by  another,  we  shall  be  affected 
with  sorrow  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  him  who  hates 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        14, 

US  ;  that  is  to  say  (Scliol.  Prop,  i  3,  j.t.  3),  we  shall  halo 
him. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — If  we  imagine  that  we  have  given  just  cause 
for  the  hatred,  we  shall  then  (Prop.  30,  pt.  3.  with  its 
Schol.)  be  affected  with  shame.  This,  however  (Prop.  25. 
pt.  3),  rarely  happens. 

This  reciprocity  of  hatred  may  also  arise  from  the  fact 
that  hatred  is  followed  by  au  attempt  to  bring  evil' upon 
him  who  is  hated  (Prop.  39,  pt.  3).  If,  therefore,  we  ima- 
gine that  we  are  hated  by  any  one  else,  we  shall  imagine 
them  as  the  cause  of  some  evil  or  sorrow,  and  thus  we 
shall  be  affected  with  sorrow  or  apprehension  accorapanied 
with  the  idea  of  the  person  who  hates  us  as  a  cause  ;  that 
is  to  say,  we  shall  hate  him  in  return,  as  we  have  said 
above. 

Cowl.  I. — If  we  imagine  that  the  person  we  love  is 
affected  with  hatred  towards  us,  vre  shall  be  agitated  at 
the  same  time  both  with  love  and  hatred.  For  in  so  far 
as  we  imagine  that  we  are  hated  are  we  determined  (Prop. 
40,  pt.  3)  to  hate  him  in  return.  But  (by  hypothesis)  wo 
love  him  notwithstanding,  and  therefore  we  shall  be  agi- 
tated both  by  love  and  hati-ed. 

Corol.  2. — If  we  imagine  that  an  evil  has  been  brought 
upon  us  through  the  hatred  of  some  person  towards  whom 
we  have  hitherto  been  moved  by  no  affect,  we  shall 
immediately  endeavour  to  return  that  evil  upon  him. 

Demoyist. — If  we  imagine  that  another  person  is 
affected  with  hatred  towards  us,  we  shall  hate  him  in 
return  (Prop.  40,  pt.  3),  and  (Prop.  26,  pt.  3)  we  sliall 
endeavour  to  devise  and  (Prop.  39,  pt.  3)  bring  ujton  him 
everything  which  can  affect  him  with  sorrow.  But  (by 
hypothesis)  the  first  thing  of  this  kind  we  imagine  is 
the  evil  brought  upon  ourselves,  and  therefore  we  sliall 
immediately  endeavour  to  bring  that  upon  him. — Q.E.I). 

Schol — The  attempt  to  bring  evil  on  those  we  hate 
is  called  anger,  and  the  attempt  to  return  the  evil  in- 
flicted on  ourselves  is  called  tengeancc. 


142  ETHIC. 

Prop.  XLI. — If  we  imagine  that  we  are  hclovcd  ly  a  per- 
son without  having  given  any  cause  for  the  love 
(which  may  he  the  case  hy  Corol.  Prop.  1$,  pt.  3,  a?id 
by  Prop.  1 6,  pt.  3),  loe  shall  love  him  in  return. 

Demonst — This  proposition  is  demonstrated  in  tlie 
same  way  as  the  preceding,  to  the  scholium  of  which  the 
reader  is  also  referred. 

S>chol. — If  we  imagine  that  we  have  given  just  cause 
for  love,  we  shall  pride  ourselves  upon  it  (Prop.  30, 
pt.  3,  with  its  Schol.)  This  frequently  occurs  (Prop.  25, 
pt.  3),  and  we  have  said  that  the  contrary  takes  place 
when  we  believe  that  we  are  hated  by  another  person 
(Schol.  Prop.  40,  pt.  3).  This  reciprocal  love,  and  conse- 
quently (Prop.  39,  pt.  3)  this  attempt  to  do  good  to  the 
person  who  loves  us,  and  who  (by  the  same  Prop.  39, 
pt.  3)  endeavours  to  do  good  to  us,  is  called  thankful- 
ness or  gratitude,  and  from  this  we  can  see  how  much 
readier  men  are  to  revenge  themselves  than  to  return  a 
benefit. 

Oorol. — If  we  imagine  that  we  are  loved  by  a  person 
we.  hate,  we  shall  at  the  same  time  be  agitated  both  by 
love  and  hatred.  This  is  demonstrated  in  the  same  way 
as  the  preceding  proposition. 

Schol. — If  the  hatred  prevail,  we  shall  endeavour  to 
bring  evil  upon  the  person  by  whom  we  are  loved.  This 
affect  is  called  Cruelty,  especially  if  it  is  believed  that 
the  person  who  loves  has  not  given  any  ordinary  reason 
for  hatred. 

Prop.  XLII. — If,  moved  hy  love  or  hope  of  self -exaltation, 
we  have  conferred  a  favour  upon  another  person,  we 
shall  he  sad  if  we  see  that  the  favour  is  received  with 
ingratitude. 

Demonst. — If  we  love  a  thing  which  is  of  the  same 
nature  as  ourselves,  we  endeavour  as  much  as  possible  to 


ORIGIN  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       ,43 

cause  it  to  love  us  in  return  (rrop.  ^^,  pt  3).  If  wo 
confer  a  favour,  therefore,  upon  any  one  because  of  our  love 
towards  him,  we  do  it  with  a  desire  by  which  we  aro 
possessed  that  we  may  be  loved  in  return ;  that  is  to  gay 
(rrop.  34,  pt.  3),  from  the  hope  of  self-exaltation,  or 
(Schol.  rrop.  30,  pt.  3)  of  joy,  and  we  shall  consequelitly 
(Prop.  1 2,  pt.  3)  endeavour  as  much  as  possible  to  ima- 
gine  this  cause  of  self-exaltation,  or  to  contenijilate  it  as 
actually  existing.  But  (by  hypothesis)  we  imagine  some- 
thing else  which  excludes  the  existence  of  that  cause, 
and,  therefore  (Prop.  19,  pt.  3),  this  will  make  us  sad.— 

Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIII. — Hatred  is  increased  throiujh  return  i^f 
hatred,  hut  may  he  destroyed  hy  love. 

Dcmonst. — If  we  imagine  that  the  person  we  liate  is 
affected  with  hatred  towards  us,  a  new  hatred  is  tliereby 
produced  (Prop.  40,  pt.  3),  the  old  hatred  still  remaining 
(by  hypothesis).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  imagine  him  to 
be  affected  with  love  towards  us,  in  so  far  as  we  imagine 
it  (Prop.  30,  pt.  3)  shall  we  look  upon  ourselves  with  joy, 
and  endeavour  (Prop.  29,  pt.  3)  to  please  him ;  that  is  to 
say  (Prop.  41,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  shall  we  endeavour  not 
to  hate  him  nor  to  affect  him  with  sorrow.  This  effort 
(Prop.  37,  pt.  3)  will  be  greater  or  less  as  the  affect  from 
which  it  arises  is  greater  or  less,  and,  therefore,  should 
it  be  greater  than  that  which  springs  from  hatred,  and 
by  which  (Prop.  26,  pt.  3)  we  endeavour  to  affect  with 
sorrow  the  object  we  hate,  then  it  will  prevail  and  banish 
hatred  from  the  mind. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIY. — Hatred  vjhich  is  altogether  overcome  hy  lott 
2KISSCS  rata  love,  and  the  love  is  there/ore  greater  than 
if  hatred  had  not  ^preceded  it. 

Deriionst. — The  demonstration  is  of  the  same  kiml  as 


144  ETHIC. 

that  of  Prop.  38,  pt.  3.  For  if  we  begin  to  love  a  tliiug 
which  we  hated,  or  upon  which  we  were  in  the  habit  of 
looking  with  sorrow,  we  shall  rejoice  for  the  very  reason 
that  we  love,  and  to  this  joy  which  love  involves  (see  its 
definition  in  the  Schol.  of  Prop.  1 3,  pt.  3)  a  new  joy 
is  added,  which  springs  from  the  fact  that  the  effort  to 
remove  the  sorrow  which  hatred  involves  (Prop.  37, 
pt.  3)  is  so  much  assisted,  there  being  also  present 
before  us  as  the  cause  of  our  joy  the  idea  of  the  person 
whom  we  hated. 

Schol. — Notwithstanding  the  truth  of  this  proposition, 
no  one  wall  try  to  hate  a  thing  or  will  wish  to  be  affected 
with  sorrow  in  order  that  he  may  rejoice  the  more ;  that 
is  to  say,  no  one  will  desire  to  inflict  loss  on  himself  in 
the  hope  of  recovering  the  loss,  or  to  become  ill  in  the 
hope  of  getting  well,  inasmuch  as  every  one  will  always 
try  to  preserve  his  being  and  to  remove  sorrow  from 
himself  as  much  as  possible.  Moreover,  if  it  can  be 
imagined  that  it  is  possible  for  us  to  desire  to  hate  a  per- 
son in  order  that  we  may  love  him  afterwards  the  more, 
we  must  always  desire  to  continue  the  hatred.  For  tlie 
love  will  be  the  greater  as  the  hatred  has  been  greater, 
and  therefore  w^e  shall  always  desire  the  hatred  to  be 
more  and  more  increased.  Upon  the  same  principle  we 
shall  desire  that  our  sickness  may  continue  and  increase 
in  order  that  we  may  afterwards  enjoy  the  greater  plea- 
sure when  we  get  well,  and  therefore  we  shall  always 
desire  sickness,  which  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3)  is  absurd. 

Prop.  XLV. — If  ive  imagine  that  any  one  like  ourselves  is 
affected  loith  hatred  toivards  an  ohjeet  like  ourselves 
ivhich  we  love,  we  shall  hate  him. 

Demonst. — The  beloved  object  hates  him  who  hates  it 
(Prop.  40,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  we  who  love  it,  who  imagine 
that  any  one  hates  it,  imagine  also  that  it  is  affected 
with  hatred;  that  is  to  say,  with  sorrow  (Schol.  Prop.  13, 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        ,4; 

pt.  3),  aud  consequently  (Prop.  21,  pt.  3)  we  arc  sn.l 
our  sadness  being  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  the 
person,  as  the  cause  thereof,  who  liatcs  the  beloved  object ; 
that  is  to  say  (Schol  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  we  shall  hate  him! 

Q.E.D. 

Peop.  XLYL— If  wt  have  been  affected  with  j,vf  or  sor- 
roio  hy  any  one  who  Iclongs  to  a  class  or  nation 
different  from  our  own,  and  if  our  joy  or  sorrow  w 
accompanied  ivith  the  idea  of  this  person  as  its  catute, 
under  the  common  name  of  his  class  or  nation,  tr«f 
shall  not  love  or  hate  him  merely,  hit  the  whole  of 
the  class  or  nation  to  which  he  hclonys. 

Dcmonst. —  This  proposition  is  demonstrated  in  the 
same  way  as  Prop.  16,  pt.  3. 

PliOr.  XL VI I. — Tlte  joy  which  arises  from  onr  imarfin- 
ing  that  what  ive  hate  has  been  destroyed  or  has  been 
injured  is  not  unaccomixinied  with  some  sorrow. 

Dcmonst. — This  is  evident  from  Prop.  27,  ])t.  3  ;  for 
in  so  far  as  we  imagine  an  object  like  ourstdves  allecteJ 
with  sorrow  shall  we  be  sad. 

Schol. — This  proposition  may  also  be  demonstrated 
from  Corol.  Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2.  For  as  often  as  we  recollect 
the  object,  although  it  does  not  actually  exist,  we  con- 
template it  as  present,  and  the  body  is  affected  in  the 
same  way  as  if  it  were  present.  Tiierefore,  so  long  as 
the  memory  of  the  object  remains,  we  are  so  determined 
as  to  contemplate  it  with  sorrow,  and  this  determination, 
while  the  image  of  the  object  abides,  is  restrained  by 
the  recollection  of  those  things  which  exclude  the  e.\i.st- 
ence  of  the  object,  but  is  not  altogether  removed.  There- 
fore we  rejoice  only  so  far  as  the  deterniinatiou  is 
restrained,  and  hence  it  happens  that  the  juy  which 
springs  from  the  misfortune  of  the  object  we  liate  is  re- 
newed as  often  as  we  recollect  the  object.     For,  as  wo 

K 


146  ETHIC. 

have  already  shown,  whenever  its  image  is  excited,  inas- 
much as  this  involves  the  existence  of  the  ohject,  we  are 
so  determined  as  to  contemplate  it  with  the  same  sorrow 
with  which  we  were  accustomed  to  contemplate  it  when 
it  really  existed.  But  because  we  have  connected  with 
this  image  other  images  which  exclude  its  existence,  the 
determination  to  sorrow  is  immediately  restrained,  and 
we  rejoice  anew ;  and  this  happens  as  often  as  this 
repetition  takes  place.  This  is  the  reason  why  we  rejoice 
as  often  as  we  call  to  mind  any  evil  that  is  past,  and 
why  we  like  to  tell  tales  about  the  dangers  we  have 
escaped,  since  whenever  we  imagine  any  danger,  we  con- 
template it  as  if  it  were  about  to  be,  and  are  so  determined 
as  to  fear  it — a  determination  which  is  again  restrained 
by  the  idea  of  freedom,  which  we  connected  with  the  idea 
of  the  danger  when  we  were  freed  from  it,  and  this  idea  of 
freedom  again  makes  us  fearless,  so  that  we  again  rejoice. 

Peop.  XLVIII. — Zove  and  hatred  toivards  any  ohject,  for 
example,  towards  Peter,  are  destroyed  if  the  joy  and 
the  sorrotv  which  they  respectively  involve  he  joined  to 
the  idea  of  another  cause;  and  they  are  respectively 
diminished  in  proportion  as  we  ima/jine  that  Peter 
has  not  been  their  sole  cause. 

Pemo?isf. — This  is  plain  from  the  very  definition  of 
love  and  hatred  (see  Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  joy  being 
called  love  to  Peter  and  sorrow  being  called  hatred  to 
him,  solely  because  he  is  considered  to  be  the  cause  of 
this  or  that  affect.  Whenever,  therefore,  we  can  no 
longer  consider  him  either  partially  or  entirely  its  cause, 
the  affect  towards  him  ceases  or  is  diminished. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XLIX. — For  the  same  reason,  love  or  hatred  towards 
an  ohject  vje  imagine  to  he  free  must  he  greater  than 
towards  an  ohject  which  is  under  necessity. 

Demonst. — An  object  which  we  imagine  to  be  free  must 


ORIGIN  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AI-TLCIS.        147 

(Uef.  7,  pt.  i)  be  perceived  throu";!!  itself  ami  without 
others.  If,  therefore,  we  imagine  it  to  be  the  cnuso  of 
joy  or  sorrow,  w^e  shall  for  that  reason  alone  love  or  halo 
it  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  and  that  too  with  the  <,'reat«st 
love  or  the  greatest  hatred  which  can  spring  from  tlio 
given  affect  (Prop.  48,  pt.  3).  But  if  wq  iniagiiin  that 
the  object  which  is  the  cause  of  that  affect  is  necessary, 
then  (by  the  same  Def.  7,  pt.  i)  we  shall  imagine  it  as 
the  cause  of  that  affect,  not  alone,  but  together  with  otlior 
causes,  and  so  (Prop.  48,  pt.  3)  our  love  or  hatred  towards 
it  will  be  less. — q.e.d. 

Sc/iol. — Hence  it  follows  that  our  hatred  or  love  to- 
wards one  another  is  greater  than  towards  otlior  things, 
because  we  think  we  are  free.  We  must  take  into  account 
also  the  imitation  of  affects  which  we  have  discussed  in 
Props.  27,  34,  40,  and  43,  pt.  3. 

Prop.  L. — Anything  may  he,  accidentally  ihr  mus,  <  illicr 
of  hope  or  fear. 

This  proposition  is  demonstrated  in  the  same  way  as 
Prop.  15,  pt.  3,  which  see,  together  with  Schol.  2,  Trop. 
18,  pt.  3. 

Schol. — Things  which  are  accidentally  the  causes  either 
of  hope  or  fear  are  called  good  or  evil  oinen.s.  In  so  far 
as  the  omens  are  the  cause  of  hope  and  fear  (by  the  Def. 
of  hope  and  fear  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  18,  pt.  3)  are  they 
the  cause  of  joy  or  of  sorrow,  and  consequently  (Corol. 
Prop.  15,  pt.  3)  so  far  do  we  love  them  or  hate  them, 
and  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  endeavour  to  use  them  as  means  to 
obtain  those  things  for  which  we  hope,  or  to  remove  tliem 
as  obstacles  or  causes  of  fear.  It  follows,  too,  fr<jm  Prop. 
25,  pt.  3,  that  our  natural  constitution  is  such  that  wo 
easily  believe  the  things  we  hope  for,  and  believe  with 
difficulty  those  we  fear,  and  that  we  think  too  much 
of  the  former  and  too  little  of  the  latter.  Tli»i3  have 
superstitions  arisen,  by  which  men  are  everywh-T.'  di.s- 


148  ETHIC. 

quieted.  I  do  not  consider  it  worth  while  to  go  any 
farther,  and  to  explain  here  all  those  vacillations  of 
mind  which  arise  from  hope  and  fear,  since  it  follows 
from  the  definition  alone  of  these  affects  that  hope  can- 
not exist  without  fear,  nor  fear  without  hope  (as  we  shall 
explain  more  at  length  in  the  proper  place).  Besides, 
in  so  far  as  we  hope  for  a  thing  or  fear  it,  we  love  it 
or  hate  it,  and  therefore  everything  which  has  been 
said  about  hatred  and  love  can  easily  be  applied  to  hope 
and  fear. 

Pkop.  LT. — Different  men  may  he  affected  hy  one  mid  the 
same  object  in  different  ways,  and  the  same  maji  may 
he  affected  hy  one  and  the  same  ohjcct  in  different 
ways  at  different  times. 

Bcmonst. — Tlie  human  body  (Post.  3,  pt.  2)  is  affected 
by  external  bodies  in  a  number  of  ways.  Two  men, 
tiierefore,  may  be  affected  in  different  ways  at  the  same 
time,  and,  therefore  (Ax.  i,  after  Lemma  3,  following 
Prop.  13,  pt.  2),  tliey  can  be  affected  by  one  and  the 
same  object  in  different  ways.  Again  (Post.  3,  pt.  2), 
the  human  body  may  be  affected  now  in  this  and  now  in 
that  way,  and  consequently  (by  the  axiom  just  quoted) 
it  may  be  affected  by  one  and  the  same  object  in  different 
ways  at  different  times. — q.e.d. 

Bchol. — We  thus  see  that  it  is  possible  for  one  man  to 
love  a  thing  and  for  another  man  to  hate  it ;  for  this 
man  to  fear  what  this  man  does  not  fear,  and  for  the 
same  man  to  love  what  before  he  hated,  and  to  dare  to 
do  what  before  he  feared.  Again,  since  each  judges 
according  to  his  own  affect  what  is  good  and  what  is 
evil,  what  is  better  and  what  is  worse  (Schol.  Prop.  39, 
pt.  3),  it  follows  that  men  may  change  in  their  judgment 
as  they  do  in  their  affects,^  and  hence  it  comes  to  pass  that 
when  we  compare  men,  we  distinguish  them  solely  by 

1  That    this    may   be    the    case,     the  divine  intellect,  we  have  shown 
althuiiL;h  the  human  mind  is  part  of     in  Corol.  Prop,  ii,  pt.  2  (Sp.) 


ORIGIN  AND  XATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        t^) 

the  difference  in  their  affects,  callini;  some  brave,  otlh-rs 
timid,  and  others  by  other  names.  For  cxanipU',  I  slmll 
call  a  man  hrave  who  despises  an  evil  which  I  usually  fear, 
and  if,  besides  this,  I  consider  the  fact  that  his  desire  of 
doing  evil  to  a  person  whom  he  hates  or  doing  goc.d  to 
one  whom  he  loves  is  not  restrained  by  that  fear  of  evil 
by  which  I'  am  usually  restrained,  I  call  him  aiofnrums. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  man  who  fears  an  evil  wliich  I 
usually  despise  will  appear  timid,  and  if,  besides  this,  I 
consider  that  his  desire  is  restrained  by  the  fear  of  an  evil 
which  has  no  power  to  restrain  me,  I  call  him  pu.fil- 
lanimous  ;  and  in  this  way  everybody  will  pass  judgment. 
Finally,  from  this  nature  of  man  and  the  inconstancy  of 
his  judgment,  in  consequence  of  wliich  he  often  judges 
things  from  mere  affect,  and  the  things  which  he  believes 
contribute  to  his  joy  or  his  sorrow,  and  which,  therefore, 
he  endeavours  to  bring  to  pass  or  remove  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3), 
are  often  only  imaginary — to  say  nothing  about  what  wo 
have  demonstrated  in  the  Second  Part  of  this  book  about 
the  uncertainty  of  things — it  is  easy  to  see  that  a  man 
may  often  be  himself  the  cause  of  his  sorrow  or  his  joy, 
or  of  being  affected  with  sorrow  or  joy  accomi-anied  with 
the  idea  of  himself  as  its  cause,  so  that  we  can  easily 
understand  what  repentance  and  what  self-approval  are. 
Piepentance  is  sorrow  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  ones 
self  as  the  cause,  and  self-approval  is  joy  accompanied 
with  the  idea  of  one's  self  as  the  cause ;  and  these  alVeels 
are  very  intense  because  men  believe  themselves  free 
(Prop.  49,  pt.  3). 

Prop.  LI  I. — An  object  which  v.-c  have  sent,  hrfure  tofjtthn- 
ivith  other  objects,  or  tvhich  v:e  imarjinc  posnessfH 
nothinrj  which  is  not  common  to  it  with  many  othrr 
objects,  we  shall  not  contemplate  so  long  as  that  w/iir/t 

we  imar/ine  jjossesscs  somcthinrj  prruhar. 

Dcmonst. — Whenever  we  imagine  an  object  whicli  wo 


I50  ETHIC. 

have  seen  with  others,  we  immediately  call  these  to  mind 
(Prop.  1 8,  pt.  2,  with  Schol.),  and  thus  from  the  con- 
templation of  one  object  we  immediately  fall  to  contem- 
plating another.  This  also  is  our  way  with  an  object 
which  we  imagine  to  possess  nothing  except  what  is 
common  to  a  number  of  other  objects.  For  this  is  the 
same  thing  as  supposing  that  we  contemplate  nothing  in 
it  which  we  have  not  seen  before  with  other  objects. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  suppose  ourselves  to  imagine  in 
an  object  something  peculiar  which  we  have  never  seen 
before,  it  is  the  same  as  saying  that  the  mind,  while  it 
contemplates  that  object,  holds  nothing  else  in  itself  to 
the  contemplation  of  which  it  can  pass,  turning  away 
from  the  contemplation  of  the  object,  and  therefore  it  is 
determined  to  the  contemplation  solely  of  the  object. 
Therefore  an  object,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — This  affection  of  the  mind  or  imagination  of  a 
particular  thing,  in  so  far  as  it  alone  occupies  the  mind, 
is  called  astonishment,  and  if  it  is  excited  by  an  object 
we  dread,  we  call  it  consternation,  because  astonishment 
at  the  evil  so  fixes  us  in  the  contemplation  of  itself,  that 
we.  cannot  think  of  anything  else  by  which  we  might 
avoid  the  evil.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  objects  at 
which  we  are  astonished  are  human  wisdom,  industry,  or 
anything  of  this  kind,  inasmuch  as  we  consider  that  their 
possessor  is  by  so  much  superior  to  ourselves,  the  astonish- 
ment goes  by  the  name  of  veneration ;  whilst,  if  the 
objects  are  human  anger,  envy,  or  anything  of  this  sort, 
it  goes  by  the  name  of  liorror.  Again,  if  we  are 
astonished  at  the  wisdom  or  industry  of  a  man  we  love, 
then  our  love  on  that  account  (Prop.  12,  pt.  3)  will  be 
greater,  and  this  love,  united  to  astonishment  or  venera- 
tion, we  call  elevotion.  In  the  same  manner  it  is  possible 
to  conceive  of  hatred,  hope,  confidence,  and  other  affects 
being  joined  to  astonishment,  so  that  more  affects  may 
be  deduced  than  can  be  named  by  the  received  vocabu- 
lary.    From  this  we  see  that  names  have  been  invented 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       J51 

for  afiects  from  common  usage,  ratlior  than  from  accurate 
knowledge  of  them. 

To  astonishment  is  opposed  contempt,  which  is  usually 
caused,  nevertheless,  by  our  being  determined  to  astonish- 
ment, love,  or  fear  towards  an  object  either  because  we  see 
that  another  person  is  astonished  at,  loves  or  fears  this 
same  object,  or  because  at  first  sight  it  appears  like  other 
objects,  at  which  we  are  astonished  or  which  we  love  or 
fear  (Prop.  15,  with  Corol.  pt.  3,  and  Prop.  27,  pt  3). 
But  if  the  presence  of  the  object  or  a  more  careful  con- 
templation of  it  should  compel  us  to  deny  that  there 
exists  in  it  any  cause  for  astonishment,  love,  fear,  &c., 
then  from  its  presence  itself,  the  mind  remains  deter- 
mined to  think  rather  of  those  things  which  are  not  in 
it  than  of  those  which  are  in  it,  although  from  the  pre- 
sence of  an  object  the  mind  is  accustomed  to  think  chiefly 
about  what  is  in  the  object.  We  may  also  observe  that 
as  devotion  springs  from  astonishment  at  a  tiling  we  love, 
so  derision  springs  from  the  contempt  of  a  thing  we  hate 
or  fear,  whilst  scoim  arises  from  tlie  contempt  of  folly,  as 
veneration  arises  from  astonishment  at  wisdom.  "We  may 
also  conceive  of  love,  hope,  glory,  and  other  affects  being 
joined  to  contempt,  and  thus  deduce  other  affects  which  also 
we  are  not  in  the  habit  of  distinguishing  by  separate  words. 

Prop.  LIII. —  When  the  mind  contemplates  itself  and  its 
oivn  iJoiver  of  acting,  it  rejoices,  and  it  rejoices  in 
proportion  to  the  distinctness  with  which  it  imai/iius 

itself  and  its  power  of  action. 

Demonst. — Man  has  no  knowledge  of  himself  except 
through  the  affections  of  his  own  body  and  their  idcjis 
(Props.  19  and  23,  pt.  2)  ;  whenever,  therefore,  it  hapiHjn.-J 
that  the  mind  is  able  to  contemplate  itself,  it  is  thereby  sujh 
posed  to  pass  to  a  greater  perfection,  that  is  to  say  (SchoL 
Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  it  is  supposed  to  be  affected  with  joy. 
and  the  joy  is  greater  in  proportion  to  the  distinctness  with 


153  ETHIC. 

•which  it   imagines   itself    and   its    power    of    action. — 

Q.E.D. 

Corol. — The  more  a  man  imagines  that  he  is  praised 
by  other  men,  the  more  is  this  joy  strengthened ;  for 
the  more  a  man  imagines  that  he  is  praised  by  others, 
the  more  does  he  imagine  that  he  affects  others  with  joy 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself  as  a  cause  (Schol. 
Prop.  29,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  (Prop.  27,  pt.  3)  he  is 
affected  with  greater  joy  accompanied  with  the  idea  of 
himself. — Q.E.D. 

Peop.  LIV. — The  mind  endeavours  to  imagine  those  things 
only  v:hich  j^osit  its  power  of  acting. 

Demonst. — The  effort  or  power  of  the  mind  is  the 
essence  of  the  mind  itself  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  but  the  essence 
of  the  mind,  as  is  self-evident,  affirms  only  that  which 
the  mind  is  and  is  able  to  do,  and  does  not  affirm  that 
which  the  mind  is  not  and  cannot  do,  and  therefore  the 
mind  endeavours  to  imagine  those  things  only  which 
affirm  or  posit  its  power  of  acting. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  LV. —  When  the  mind  imagines  its  own  weahncss  if 
7ieccssarily  sorrovjs. 

Demonst. — The  essence  of  the  mind  affirms  only  that 
which  the  mind  is  and  is  able  to  do,  or,  in  other  words, 
it  is  the  nature  of  the  mind  to  imagine  those  things  only 
which  posit  its  power  of  acting  (Prop,  54,  pt.  3).  If  we 
say,  therefore,  that  the  mind,  while  it  contemplates  itself, 
imagines  its  owm  weakness,  we  are  merely  saying  in  other 
words  that  the  effort  of  the  mind  to  imagine  something 
which  posits  its  power  of  acting  is  restrained,  that  is  to 
say  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  the  mind  is  sad. — Q.E.D. 

Corol. — This  sorrow  is  strengthened  in  proportion  as 
the  mind  imagines  that  it  is  blamed  by  others.  This  is 
demonstrated  in  the  same  way  as  Corol.  Prop.  53,  pt.  3. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        153 

ScJwI. — This  sorrow,  accompanied  \vitli  tlie  i.lea  of 
our  own  weakness,  is  called  humiUfy,  and  the  joy  which 
arises  from  coutemplating  ourselves  is  called  sdf-Unx  or 
self-approval.  Inasmuch  as  this  joy  recurs  as  often  as 
a  man  contemplates  his  own  virtues  or  his  own  power  of 
acting,  it  comes  to  pass  that  every  one  loves  to  tell  of 
his  own  deeds,  and  to  display  the  powers  both  of  his 
body  and  mind ;  and  that  for  this  reason  men  become  an 
annoyance  to  one  another.  It  also  follows  that  men  aro 
naturally  envious  (Schol.  Prop.  24,  and  Schol.  Prop.  32, 
pt.  3),  that  is  to  say,  they  rejoice  over  the  weaknesses  of 
their  equals  and  sorrow  over  their  virtues.  For  whenever 
a  person  imagines  his  own  actions  he  is  affected  with  joy 
(Prop.  53,  pt.  3),  and  his  joy  is  the  greater  in  proportion 
as  he  imagines  that  his  actions  express  more  i)erfection, 
and  he  imagines  them  more  distinctly ;  that  is  to  .say  (hy 
what  has  been  said  in  Schol.  i.  Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  in  pro- 
portion as  he  is  able  to  distinguish  them  from  others,  and 
to  contemplate  them  as  individual  objects.  A  man's  joy 
in  contemplating  himself  will  therefore  be  greatest  when 
he  contemplates  something  in  himself  which  lie  denies 
of  other  people.  For  if  he  refers  that  which  he  artirms  of 
himself  to  the  universal  idea  of  man  or  of  animal  nature, 
he  will  not  so  much  rejoice;  on  the  other  hand,  he  will 
be  sad  if  he  imagines  that  his  own  actions  when  compared 
with  those  of  other  people  are  weaker  than  theirs,  and 
this  sorrow  he  will  endeavour  to  remove  (Prop.  28,  pt  3), 
either  by  misinterpreting  the  actions  of  his  equals,  or  giving 
as  great  a  lustre  as  possible  to  his  own.  It  appears,  there- 
fore, that  men  are  by  nature  inclined  to  hatred  and  envy, 
and  we  must  add  that  their  education  assists  them  in 
this  propensity,  for  parents  are  accustomed  to  excite  their 
children  to  follow  virtue  by  the  stimulus  of  honour  and 
envy  alone.  But  an  objection  perhaps  may  be  rai-sed  that 
we  not  unfrequently  venerate  men  and  admire  their 
virtues.  In  order  to  remove  this  objection  I  will  add  tlie 
following  corollary. 


154  ETHIC. 

Corol. — No  one  envies  the  virtue  of  a  person  who  is 
not  his  equal. 

Dcmond. — Envy  is  nothing  but  hatred  (Schol.  Prop. 
24,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  sorrow, 
or,  in  other  words  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  an  affection 
l)y  which  the  effort  of  a  man  or  his  power  of  action  is 
restrained.  But  (Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3)  a  man  neither 
endeavours  to  do  nor  desires  anything  excepting  what 
can  follow  from  his  given  nature,  therefore  a  man  will 
not  desire  to  af&rm  of  himself  any  power  of  action,  or, 
which  il||^'the  same  thing,  any  virtue  which  is  peculiar 
to  another  nature  and  foreign  to  his  own.  His  desire, 
therefore,  cannot  be  restrained,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop. 
1 1,  pt.  3),  he  cannot  feel  any  sorrow  because  he  contem- 
plates a  virtue  in  another  person  altogether  unlike  himself, 
and  consequently  he  cannot  envy  that  person,  but  will 
only  envy  one  who  is  his  own  equal,  and  who  is  supposed 
to  possess  the  same  nature. 

Scliol. — Since,  therefore,  we  have  said  in  Schol.  Prop. 
52,  pt.  3,  that  we  venerate  a  man  because  we  are  astonished 
at  his  wisdom  and  bravery,  &c.,  this  happens  because 
(as  is  evident  from  the  proposition  itself)  we  imagine 
that  he  specially  possesses  these  virtues,  and  that  they 
are  not  common  to  our  nature.  We  therefore  envy  them 
no  more  than  we  envy  trees  their  height  or  lions  their 
bravery. 

Prop.  LVI. — Of  joy,  sorrow,  and  desire,  and  consequently 
of  every  affect  which  either,  like  vacillation  of  mind, 
is  compounded  of  these,  or,  like  love,  hatred,  hope,  and 
fear,  is  derived  from  them,  there  are  just  as  many 
kinds  as  there  are  kinds  of  objects  by  which  ive  are 
affected. 

Dcmonst. — Joy  and  sorrow,  and  consequently  the  affects 
which  are  compounded  of  these  or  derived  from  them, 
are  passions  (Schol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  3).     But  (Prop,   i,  pt. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  .1/-T£fi^.--     ,j; 

3)  we  necessarily  suffer  in  so  far  as  we  have  ihai(oiiimt4i 
ideas,  and  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3)  only  in  so  far  as  wc  haw 
them ;  that  is  to  say  (see  Schol,  Prop.  40,  i)t.  2),  wi; 
necessarily  suffer  only  in  so  far  as  we  ima^'ino,  or  (seu 
Prop.  17,  pt.  2,  with  its  Schol.)  in  so  far  as  we  are 
affected  with  an  affect  which  involves  the  nature  of  our 
body  and  that  of  an  external  body.  The  nature,  therefoR', 
of  eacli  passion  must  necessarily  be  explaiued  iu  sucli  a 
manner,  that  the  nature  of  the  object  by  whicli  we  are 
affected  is  expressed.  The  joy,  for  example,  wliith  sprini^s 
from  an  object  A.  involves  the  nature  of  that  dijjoct  A., 
and  the  joy  which  springs  from  B.  involves  tile  nature  of 
that  object  B.,  and  therefore  these  two  affects  of  joy  an» 
of  a  different  nature,  because  they  arise  from  causes  of  a 
different  nature.  In  like  manner  the  affect  of  sorrow 
which  arises  from  one  object  is  of  a  different  kind  from 
that  which  arises  from  another  cause,  and  the  same  tiling 
is  to  be  understood  of  love,  hatred,  hope,  fear,  vacilhition 
of  mind,  &c. ;  so  that  there  are  necessarily  just  as  many 
kinds  of  joy,  sorrow,  love,  hatred,  &c.,  as  there  are  kinds 
of  objects  by  whicli  vre  are  affected.  But  desire  is  the 
essence  itself  or  nature  of  a  person  in  so  far  as  this  nature 
is  conceived  from  its  given  constitution  as  determined 
towards  any  action  (Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  as 
a  person  is  affected  by  external  causes  with  this  or  tliat 
kind  of  joy,  sorrow,  love,  hatred,  &c.,  that  is  to  say,  as  his 
nature  is  constituted  iu  this  or  that  way,  so  umst  his 
desire  vary  and  the  nature  of  one  desire  differ  from  that  of 
another,  just  as  the  affects  from  which  each  desire  arises 
differ.  There  are  as  many  kinds  of  desires,  therefore,  as 
there  are  kinds  of  joy,  sorrow,  love,  &c.,  and,  consc(iuenlly 
(as  we  have  just  shown),  as  there  are  kinds  of  objects  by 
which  we  are  affected. — Q.E.D. 

/S'c/w^.— Amongst  the  different  kinds  of  affects,  which 
(by  the  preceding  Prop.)  must  be  very  great  in  nuniher,  the 
most  remarkable  are  voluptuoiisness,  drunkcmuss,  lust, 
avarice,  and    amhUlon,   which   are   notliing  but   uotioua 


156  ETHIC. 

of  love  or  desire,  which  exphaiu  the  nature  of  this  or 
that  affect  through  the  objects  to  which  they  are  related. 
For  by  voluptuousness,  drunkenness,  lust,  avarice,  and 
ambition  we  understand  nothing  but  an  immoderate  love 
or  desire  for  good  living,  for  drinking,  for  women,  for 
riches,  and  for  glory.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  these  af- 
fects, in  so  far  as  we  distinguish  them  by  the  object  alone 
to  which  they  are  related,  have  no  contraries.  For  tem- 
pcranee,  sobriety,  and  chastity,  which  we  are  in  the  habit 
of  opposing  to  voluptuousness,  drunkenness,  and  lust, 
are  not  affects  nor  passions  :  but  merely  indicate  the 
power  of  the  mind  which  restrains  these  affects. 

The  remaining  kinds  of  affects  I  cannot  explain  here  (for 
they  are  as  numerous  as  are  the  varieties  of  objects),  nor, 
if  I  could  explain  them,  is  it  necessary  to  do  so.  For  it 
is  sufficient  for  the  purpose  we  have  in  view,  the  deter- 
mination, namely,  of  the  strength  of  the  affects  and  the 
mind's  powder  over  them,  to  have  a  general  definition  of 
each  kind  of  affect.  It  is  sufficient  for  us,  I  say,  to  under- 
stand the  common  properties  of  the  mind  and  the  affects, 
so  that  we  may  determine  what  and  how  great  is  the 
power  of  the  mind  to  govern  and  constrain  the  affects. 
Although,  therefore,  there  is  a  great  difference  between 
this  or  that  affect  of  love,  of  hatred,  or  of  desire — 
for  example,  between  the  love  towards  children  and  the 
love  towards  a  wife — it  is  not  worth  while  for  us  to  take 
cognisance  of  these  differences,  or  to  investigate  the  nature 
and  origin  of  the  aff'ects  any  furtlier. 

PPtOP.  LVII. — The  affect  of  one  'person  differs  from  the  cor- 
responding affect  of  a.nother  as  much  as  the  essence  of 
the  one  p)crson  differs  from  that  of  the  other. 

Demonst.— This  proposition  is  evident  from  Ax.  i, 
following  Lem.  3,  after  Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  2.  Neverthe- 
less, we  will  demonstrate  it  from  the  definitions  of  the 
three  primitive  affects.     All  affects  are  related  to  desire, 


ORIGIN  AND  XATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       157 

joy,  or  sorrow,  as  the  definitions  show  wliich  wo  hnve 
given  of  those  affects.  But  desire  is  the  very  nature  or 
essence  of  a  person  (Schoh  Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  and  therefore 
the  desire  of  one  person  differs  from  the  desire  of 
another  as  much  as  the  nature  or  essence  of  tlic  one 
differs  from  that  of  the  other.  Again,  joy  and  sorrow  arc 
passions  by  wliich  the  power  of  a  person  or  Ids  effort  to 
persevere  in  his  own  being  is  increased  or  diminished, 
helped,  or  limited  (Prop.  11,  pt.  3,  with  its  Schol.) 
But  by  the  effort  to  persevere  in  his  own  being,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  related  at  the  same  time  to  the  mind  and  the 
body,  we  understand  appetite  and  desire  (Schol.  Prop.  9, 
pt.  3),  and  therefore  joy  and  sorrow  are  desire  or  appetite 
in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  increased,  diminished,  helped, 
or  limited  by  external  causes ;  that  is  to  say  (Schol. 
Prop.  9,  pt.  3),  they  are  the  nature  itself  of  eacli  person. 

The  joy  or  sorrow  of  one  person  therefore  differs  from 
the  joy  or  sorrow  of  another  as  much  as  the  nature  or 
essence  of  one  person  differs  from  that  of  the  other,  and 
consequently  the  affect  of  one  person  differs  from  the 
corresponding  affect  of  another,  &c. — q.e.d. 

ScJwl. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  affects  of  animals 
which  are  called  irrational  (for  after  we  have  learnt  the 
origin  of  the  mind  we  can  in  no  way  doubt  that  brutes 
feel)  differ  from  human  affects  as  much  as  the  nature  of 
a  brute  differs  from  that  of  a  man.  Both  the  man  and 
the  horse,  for  example,  are  swayed  by  the  lust  to  proi)a- 
gate,  but  the  horse  is  swayed  by  equine  lust  and  the  man 
by  that  which  is  human.  The  lusts  and  appetites  of 
insects,  fishes,  and  birds  must  vary  in  the  same  way  ;  and 
so,  although  each  individual  lives  contented  with  its  own 
nature  and  delights  in  it,  nevertheless  the  life  with  which 
it  is  contented  and  its  joy  are  nothing  but  tlie  idea  or  soul 
of  that  individual,  and  so  the  joy  of  one  differs  in  diaracter 
from  the  joy  of  the  other  as  much  as  the  essence  of  the  one 
differs  from  the  essence  of  the  otlier.  Finally,  it  follows 
from  the  preceding  proposition  that  the  joy  by  which  tho 


158  ETHIC. 

drunkard  is  enslaved  is  altogether  different  from  the 
joy  which  is  the  portion  of  the  philosopher, — a  thing  I 
wished  just  to  hint  in  passing.  So  much,  therefore,  for 
the  affects  which  are  related  to  man  in  so  far  as  he  suffers. 
It  remains  that  I  should  say  a  few  words  about  those 
things  which  are  related  to  him  in  so  far  as  he  acts. 

Peop.  LYIII.  —  Besides  the  Joys  and  sorroius  which  are 
passions,  there  are  other  affects  of  joy  and  sorrow  which 
are  i^elated  to  2cs  in  so  far  as  ive  act. 

Bemonst. — When  the  mind  conceives  itself  and  its 
own  power  of  acting,  it  is  rejoiced  (Prop.  53,  pt.  3). 
But  the  mind  necessarily  contemplates  itself  whenever 
it  conceives  a  true  or  adequate  idea  (Prop.  43,  pt.  2); 
and  as  (Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2)  it  does  conceive  some 
adequate  ideas,  it  is  rejoiced  in  so  far  as  it  conceives 
them,  or,  in  other  words  (Prop,  i,  pt.  3).  in  so  far  as  it 
acts.  Again,  the  mind,  both  in  so  far  as  it  has  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  and  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused  ideas,  en- 
deavours to  persevere  in  its  own  being  (Prop.  9,  pt.  3). 
But  by  this  effort  we  understand  desire  (Schol.  Prop.  9, 
pt.  3),  and  therefore  desire  also  is  related  to  us  in  so  far 
as  we  think  ;  that  is  to  say  (Prop.i,  pt,  3),  in  so  far  as 
we  act. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LIX.  —  Amongst  all  the  affects  which  are  related  to 
the  mind  in  so  far  as  it  acts,  there  are  none  which  are 
not  related  to  joy  or  desire. 

Bemonst. — All  the  affects  are  related  to  desire,  joy,  or 
sorrow,  as  the  definitions  we  have  given  of  them  show. 
By  sorrow,  however,  we  understand  that  the  mind's  power 
of  acting  is  lessened  or  limited  (Prop.  11,  pt.  3,  and  its 
Schol.),  and  therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  mind  suffers 
sorrow  is  its  power  of  thinking,  that  is  to  say  (Prop,  i, 
pt.  3),  its  power  of  acting,  lessened  or  limited.     There- 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        159 

fore  no  affects  of  sorrow  can  be  related  to  the  niiinl  in 
so  far  as  it  acts,  but  only  affects  of  joy  and  di'sire,  whicli 
(by  the  preceding  Prop.)  are  also  so  far  related  to  the 
mind. — q.e.d. 

Sc/iol. — All  the  actions  which  follow  from  the  affects 
which  are  related  to  the  mind  in  so  far  as  it  thinks  I 
ascribe  to  fortitude,  which  I  divide  into  strength  of  mind 
(cinimositas)  and  generosity.  By  strength  of  mind,  I  nioun 
the  desire  by  which  each  person  endeavours  from  the 
dictates  of  reason  alone  to  preserve  his  own  being.  I5y 
generosity,  I  mean  the  desire  by  which  from  the  dictates 
of  reason  alone  each  person  endeavours  to  help  other 
people  and  to  join  them  to  him  in  friendship.  Those 
actions,  therefore,  which  have  for  their  aim  the  advantapo 
only  of  the  doer  I  ascribe  to  strength  of  mind,  wliilst 
those  which  aim  at  the  advantage  of  others  I  ascribe  l«» 
generosity.  Temperance,  therefore,  sobriety,  and  presence 
of  mind  in  danger,  are  a  species  of  strength  of  mind,  while 
moderation  and  mercy  are  a  species  of  generosity. 

I  have  now,  I  think,  explained  the  princi])al  affects 
and  vacillations  of  the  mind  which  are  compounded  of 
the  three  primary  affects,  desire,  joy,  and  sorrow,  ami 
have  set  them  forth  through  their  first  causes.  From 
what  has  been  said  it  is  plain  that  we  are  disturbed 
by  external  causes  in  a  number  of  ways,  and  that,  like 
the  waves  of  the  sea  agitated  by  contrary  winds,  wo 
fluctuate  in  our  ignorance  of  our  future  and  destiny.  I 
have  said,  however,  that  I  have  only  explained  the  jirin- 
cipal  mental  complications,  and  not  all  which  may  exist. 
For  by  the  same  method  which  we  have  pursued  above 
it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  love  unites  it.self  to  re- 
pentance, scorn,  shame,  &c. ;  but  I  think  it  has  already 
been  made  clear  to  all  that  the  affects  can  be  combined 
in  so  many  ways,  and  that  so  many  variations  can  arise, 
that  no  limits  can  be  assigned  to  their  number.  It  is 
sufficient  for  my  purpose  to  have  enumerated  only  tho.H« 
which  are  of  consequence;  the  rest,  of  which  1  have 


i6o  ETHIC. 

taken  no  notice,  being  more  curious  than  important. 
There  is  one  constantly  recurring  characteristic  of  love 
which  I  have  yet  to  notice,  and  that  is,  that  while  we  are 
enjoying  the  thing  which  we  desired,  the  body  acquires 
from  that  fruition  a  new  disposition  by  which  it  is 
otherwise  determined,  and  the  images  of  other  things  are 
excited  in  it,  and  the  mind  begins  to  imagine  and  to 
desire  other  things.  For  example,  when  we  imagine 
anything  which  usually  delights  our  taste,  we  desire 
to  enjoy  it  by  eating  it.  But  whilst  we  enjoy  it  the 
stomach  becomes  full,  and  the  constitution  of  the  body 
becomes  altered.  If,  therefore,  the  body  being  now  other- 
wise disposed,  the  image  of  the  food,  in  consequence  of 
its  being  present,  and  therefore  also  the  effort  or  desire  to 
eat  it,  become  more  intense,  then  this  new  disposition  of 
the  body  will  oppose  this  effort  or  desire,  and  consequently 
the  presence  of  the  food  which  we  desired  will  become 
hateful  to  us,  and  this  hatefulness  is  what  we  call  loathing 
or  disgust.  As  for  the  external  affections  of  the  body 
which  are  observed  in  the  affects,  such  as  trembling,  pale- 
ness, sobbing,  laughter,  and  the  like,  I  have  neglected 
to  notice  them,  because  they  belong  to  the  body  alone 
without  any  relationship  to  the  mind.  A  few  things 
remain  to  be  said  about  the  definitions  of  the  affects,  and 
I  will  therefore  here  repeat  the  definitions  in  order,  ap- 
pending to  them  what  is  necessary  to  be  observed  in  each. 

The  Affects. — Def.  I. — Desire  is  the  essence  itself 
of  man  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as  determined  to  any 
action  by  any  one  of  his  affections. 

Ex'planation. — We  have  said  above,  in  the  Schol.  of 
Prop.  9,  pt.  3,  that  desire  is  appetite  which  is  self-con- 
scious, and  that  appetite  is  the  essence  itself  of  man  in  so 
far  as  it  is  determined  to  such  acts  as  contribute  to  his 
preservation.  But  in  the  same  scholium  I  have  taken  care 
to  remark  that  in  truth  I  cannot  recognise  any  difference 
between  human  appetite  and  desire.  For  whether  a  man 
be  conscious   of  his  appetite  or  not,  it  remains  one  and 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       ,6i 

the  same  appetite,  and  so,  lest  I  might  appear  to  Iw  j:uiltv 
of  tautology,  I  have  not  exphiined  desire  by  appetite,  but 
have  tried  to  give  such  a  delinitiou  of  desire  as  woiilj 
include  all  the  efforts  of  human  nature  to  which  we  "ivo 
the  name  of  appetite,  desire,  will,  or  impulse.  For  I 
might  have  said  that  desire  is  the  essence  itself  of  man 
in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  determined  to  any  action ; 
hut  from  this  definition  it  would  not  follow  (I'rop.  23, 
pt.  2)  that  the  mind  could  be  conscious  of  its  desire  or 
appetite,  and  therefore,  in  order  that  I  might  include 
the  cause  of  this  consciousness,  it  was  necessary  (by  the 
same  proposition)  to  add  the  words,  in  so  far  an  it  w 
conceived  as  determined  to  any  action  hj  any  one  of  his 
affections.  For  by  an  affection  of  the  human  essence  we 
understand  any  constitution  of  that  essence,  whether  it 
be  innate,  whether  it  be  conceived  through  the  attribute 
of  thought  alone  or  of  extension  alone,  or  whether  it  be 
related  to  both.  By  the  word  "desire,"  therefore,  I 
understand  all  the  efforts,  impulses,  appetites,  and  voli- 
tions of  a  man,  which  vary  according  to  his  changing 
disposition,  and  not  unfrequently  are  so  opposed  to  one 
another  that  he  is  drawn  hither  and  thither,  and  knows 
not  whither  he  ought  to  turn. 

II,  Joy  is  man's  passage  from  a  less  to  a  greater  per- 
fection. 

III.  Sorroiu  is  man's  passage  from  a  greater  to  a  less 
perfection. 

Explanation. — I  say  passage,  for  joy  is  not  perfection 
itself.  If  a  man  were  born  with  the  perfection  to  which 
he  passes,  he  would  possess  it  without  the  affect  of  joy ; 
a  truth  which  will  appear  the  more  clearly  from  tlio 
affect  of  sorrow,  which  is  the  opposite  to  joy.  For  that 
sorrow  consists  in  the  passage  to  a  less  perfection,  but 
not  in  the  less  perfection  itself,  no  one  can  deny,  since  in 
so  far  as  a  man  shares  any  perfection  he  cannot  bo  sail. 
Nor  can  we  say  that  sorrow  consists  in  tlie  privation  of 
a  greater  perfection,  for  privation  is  nothing.     But  the 


1 62  ETHIC. 

affect  of  sorro-w  is  a  reality,  and  it  therefore  must  be  the 
reality  of  the  passage  to  a  lesser  perfection,  or  the  reality 
by  which  man's  power  of  acting  is  diminished  or  limited 
(Schol.  Prop.  II,  pt.  3).  As  for  the  definitions  of  cheer- 
fulness, pleasurable  excitement,  melancholy,  and  grief,  I 
pass  these  by,  because  they  are  related  rather  to  the  body 
than  to  the  mind,  and  are  merely  different  kinds  of  joy 
or  of  sorrow. 

TV.  Asto7iisJimcnt  is  the  imagination  of  an  object  in 
which  the  mind  remains  fixed  because  this  particular 
imagination  has  no  connection  with  others. 

Explanation. — In  the   Schol.  of  Prop.   18,  pt.   2,   we 
liave  shown  that  that  which  causes  the  mind  from  the 
contemplation  of  one  thing  immediately  to  pass  to  the 
thought  of  another  is  that  the  images  of  these  things 
are  connected  one   with  the   other,  and  are  so  arranged 
that  the  one  follows  the  other;  a   process   which  can- 
not be  conceived  when  the  image  of  the  thing  is  new, 
for  the  mind  will  be  held  in  the  contemplation  of  the 
same  object  until  other  causes  determine  it  to  think  of 
other  things.     The  imagination,  therefore,  considered  in 
itself,  of  a  new  object  is  of  the  same  character  as  other 
imaginations  ;  and  for  this  reason  I  do  not  class  astonish- 
ment among  the  affects,  nor  do  I  see  any  reason  why  I 
should  do  it,  since  this  abstraction  of  the  mind  arises 
from  no  positive  cause  by  which  it  is  abstracted  from 
other  things,  but  merely  from  the  absence  of  any  cause 
by  which  from  the  contemplation  of  one  thing  the  mind 
is   determined  to   think  other  things,      I  acknowledge, 
therefore  (as  I  have  shown  in  Schol.  Prop.    1 1,  pt.  3), 
only  three  primitive  or  primary  affects,  those  of  joy,  sorrow, 
and  desire ;  and  the  only  reason  which  has  induced  me 
to  speak  of  astonishment  is,  that  it  has  been  the  custom 
to  give  other  names  to  certain  affects  derived  from  the 
three  primitives  whenever  these  affects  are   related  to 
objects  at  which  we  are  astonished.      This  same  reason 
also  induces  me  to  add  the  definition  of  contempt. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  111 II  Am 


;cn. 


V.  Contempt  is  the  imagination  of  an  object  wl.Jch 
so  little  touches  the  mind  that  tl.e  mind  is  movoil  by 
the  presence  of  the  object  to  inia-iue  those  qualitie-H 
which  are  not  iu  it  rather  than  tlioso  wliich  are  in  it. 
(See  Schol.  Prop.  52,  pt.  3.) 

The  definitions  of  veneration  and  scorn  I  pass  by 
here,  because  they  give  a  name,  so  far  as  1  know,  to 
none  of  the  affects. 

VI.  Love  is  joy  with  the  accompanying  idea  of  an 
external  cause. 

JExplanation. — This  definition  explains  with  sunicient 
clearness  the  essence  of  love;  that  which  is  given  by 
some  authors,  who  define  love  to  be  the  will  of  the 
lover  to  unite  himself  to  the  beloved  object,  expressing 
not  the  essence  of  love  but  one  of  its  properties,  and  in  a.s 
much  as  these  authors  have  not  seen  with  sufHcient  clear- 
ness what  is  the  essence  of  love,  they  could  not  have 
a  distinct  conception  of  its  properties,  and  consequently 
their  definition  has  by  everybody  been  thought  very  ob- 
scure. I  must  observe,  however,  when  I  say  that  it  is  a 
property  in  a  lover  to  will  a  union  with  the  beloved  object, 
that  I  do  not  understand  by  will  a  consent  or  delilK-Mlion 
or  a  free  decree  of  the  mind  (for  that  this  is  a  fiction  wo 
have  demonstrated  in  Prop.  48,  pt.  2),  nor  even  a  desire 
of  the  lover  to  unite  himself  with  the  beloved  object  when 
it  is  absent,  nor  a  desire  to  continue  in  its  presence  when 
it  is  present,  for  love  can  be  conceived  without  either  one 
or  the  other  of  these  desires ;  but  by  will  I  understand 
the  satisfaction  that  the  beloved  object  produces  iu  tiio 
lover  by  its  presence,  by  virtue  of  which  the  joy  of  the 
lover  is  strengthened,  or  at  any  rate  supported. 

VII.  Hatred  is  sorrow  with  the  accoiiii)anying  idea  of 
an  external  cause. 

Uxplanation. — What  is  to  be  observed  here  will  i-'a-iiy 
be  seen  from  what  has  been  said  in  the  explanation  of 
the  preceding  definition.  (See,  moreover,  Schol.  Prop,  i  3, 
pt.  3) 


1 64  ETHIC 

VIII.  Inclination  (jj»?'q2JC7iszo)  is  joy  with  the  accom- 
panying idea  of  some  object  as  being  accidentally  the 
cause  of  the  joy. 

IX.  Aversion  is  sorrow  with  the  accompanying  idea 
of  some  object  which  is  accidentally  the  cause  of  the 
sorrow.      (See  Schol.  Prop.  15,  pt.  3.) 

X.  Devotion  is  love  towards  an  object  which  aston- 
ishes us. 

Explanation.  —  That  astonishment  arises  from  the 
novelty  of  the  object  we  have  shown  in  Prop.  52,  pt.  3. 
If,  therefore,  it  should  happen  that  we  often  imagine  the 
object  at  which  we  are  astonished,  we  shall  cease  to  be 
astonished  at  it,  and  hence  we  see  that  the  affect  of 
devotion  easily  degenerates  into  simple  love. 

XL  Derision  is  joy  arising  from  the  imagination  that 
something  we  despise  is  present  in  an  object  we  hate. 

Explanation. — In  so  far  as  we  despise  a  thing  we  hate 
do  we  deny  its  existence  (Schol.  Prop.  52,  pt.  3),  and  so 
far  (Prop.  20,  pt.  3)  do  we  rejoice.  But  inasmuch  as 
we  suppose  that  a  man  hates  what  he  ridicules,  it 
follows  that  this  joy  is  not  solid.      (See  Schol.  Prop.  47, 

pt.  30 

XII.  Hope  is  a  joy  not  constant,  arising  from  the  idea 
of  something  future  or  past,  about  the  issue  of  which  we 
sometimes  doubt. 

XIII.  Fear  is  a  sorrow  not  constant,  arising  from  the 
idea  of  something  future  or  past,  about  tlie  issue  of 
which  we  sometimes  doubt.     (See  Schol.    2,   Prop.    18, 

pt.  3-) 

Explanation. — From  these  definitions  it  follows  that 
there  is  no  hope  without  fear  nor  fear  without  hope,  for 
the  person  who  wavers  in  hope  and  doubts  concerning 
the  issue  of  anything  is  supposed  to  imagine  something 
which  may  exclude  its  existence,  and  so  far,  therefore, 
to  be  sad  (Prop.  19,  pt.  3),  and  consequently  while  he 
wavers  in  hope,  to  fear  lest  his  wishes  should  not  be 
accomplished.      So   also  the  person  who  fears,  that  is 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  Til II  Al'riXTS.       tft 

to  sa}^  who  doubts  whether  avIkU  he  liatcs  will  not 
come  to  pass,  imagines  something  wliich  oxdiulcs  the 
existence  of  what  he  hates,  and  therefore  (Prop.  20,  pt, 
3)  is  rejoiced,  and  consequently  so  far  hopes  that  it  will 
not  happen. 

XIV.  Confidence  is  joy  arishig  from  tlic  idea  of  a 
past  or  future  object  from  whicli  cause  for  doubtiii"  is 
removed. 

XV.  Despair  is  sorrow  arising  from  the  idea  of  a  pa-st 
or  future  object  from  wliich  cause  for  doubting  is  removed. 

Explanation. — Confidence,  therefore,  springs  from  hope 
and  despair  from  fear,  whenever  the  reason  for  d(iul»tin'» 
the  issue  is  taken  away;  a  case  which  occurs  either  because 
we  imagine  a  thing  past  or  future  to  be  present  and  con- 
template it  as  present,  or  because  we  imagine  other 
things  which  exclude  the  existence  of  those  which  madi» 
us  to  doubt. 

For  although  we  can  never  be  sure  about  the  issue  of 
individual  objects  (CoroL  Prop.  31,  pt.  2),  it  may  never- 
theless happen  that  we  do  not  doubt  it.  For  else- 
where we  have  shown  (SchoL  Prop.  49,  pt.  2)  that  it  is 
one  thing  not  to  doubt  and  another  to  possess  certitude, 
and  so  it  may  happen  that  from  the  image  of  an  object 
either  past  or  future  we  are  affected  with  the  same  afTect 
of  joy  or  sorrow  as  that  by  which  we  sliould  be  affected 
from  the  image  of  an  object  present,  as  we  have  demon- 
strated in  Prop.  18,  pt.  3,  to  which,  together  with  the 
scholium,  the  reader  is  referred. 

XVI.  Gladness  {gaudium)  is  joy  with  the  accomi»any- 
ing  idea  of  something  past,  wliich,  unlioi)ed  for,  lias 
happened. 

XVII.  Remorse  is  sorrow  with  the  accompanying  idea 
of  something  past,  which,  unhoped  for,  has  happened. 

XVIII.  Commiseration  is  sorrow  witli  the  accompany- 
ing idea  of  evil  which  has  happened  to  some  one  whom 
we  imagine  like  ourselves  (Schol.  Prop  22,  and  Schol. 
Prop.  27,  pt.  3). 


1 66  ETHIC. 

Ecqylanation. — Between  commiseration  and  compassion 
there  seems  to  be  no  difference,  excepting  perhaps  that 
commiseration  refers  rather  to  an  individual  affect  and 
compassion  to  it  as  a  habit. 

XIX.  Favour  is  love  towards  those  who  have  benefited 
others. 

XX.  Indignation  is  hatred  towards  those  who  have 
injured  others. 

Explanation. — I  am  aware  that  these  names  in  common 
bear  a  different  meaning.  But  my  object  is  not  to  ex- 
plain the  meaning  of  words  but  the  nature  of  things, 
and  to  indicate  them  by  words  whose  customary  meaning 
shall  not  be  altogether  opposed  to  the  meaning  which  I 
desire  to  bestow  upon  them.  I  consider  it  sufficient  to 
have  said  this  once  for  all.  As  far  as  the  cause  of  these 
affects  is  concerned,  see  Corol.  i,  Prop.  27,  pt.  3,  and 
SchoL  Prop.  22,  pt.  3. 

XXI.  Over-estimation  consists  in  thinking  too  highly 
of  another  person  in  consequence  of  our  love  for  him. 

XXII.  Contempt  consists  in  thinking  too  little  of 
another  person  in  consequence  of  our  hatred  for  him. 

Explanation. — Over-estimation  and  contempt  are  there- 
fore respectively  effects  or  properties  of  love  or  hatred, 
and  so  over-estimation  may  be  defined  as  love  in  so 
far  as  it  affects  a  man  so  that  he  thinks  too  much  of 
the  beloved  object;  and,  on  the  contrary,  contempt  may 
be  defined  as  hatred  in  so  far  as  it  affects  a  man  so  that 
he  thinks  too  little  of  the  object  he  hates.  (See  SchoL 
Prop.  26,  pt.  3.) 

XXIII.  Eiuy  is  hatred  in  so  far  as  it  affects  a  man 
so  that  he  is  sad  at  the  good  fortune  of  another  person 
and  is  glad  when  any  evil  happens  to  him. 

Explanation. — To  envy  is  generally  ojjposed  com- 
passion (miscricordia),  which  may  therefore  be  defined  as 
follows,  notwithstanding  tlie  usual  signification  of  the 
word : — 

XXIY.    Compassio7i  is  love  in  so   far  as  it  affects  a 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        ,67 

man  so  that  he  is  glad  at  the  prosperity  of  another  iK?r- 
sou  and  is  sad  when  any  evil  liappens  to  him. 

Explanation. — Witli  regard  to  the  other  properties  of 
envy,  see  SchoL  Prop.  24,  and  Schol.  Prop.  32,  pt.  3. 
These  are  affects  of  joy  and  sorrow  which  are  attended 
by  the  idea  of  an  external  object  as  their  cau.se,  either 
of  itself  or  accidentally.  I  pass  now  to  consider  other 
affects  which  are  attended  by  the  idea  of  something  within 
us  as  the  cause. 

XXV.  Self-satisfaction  is  the  joy  which  is  produced 
by  contemplating  ourselves  and  our  own  power  uf 
action. 

XXVI.  Humility  is  the  sorrow  which  is  produced  by 
contemplating  our  impotence  or  helplessuess. 

Self-satisfaction  is  opposed  to  humility  in  so  far  as 
we  understand  by  the  former  the  joy  which  arises  from 
contemplating  our  power  of  action,  but  in  so  far  as  we 
understand  by  it  joy  attended  with  the  idea  of  something 
done,  which  we  believe  has  been  done  by  a  free  decree 
of  our  mind,  it  is  opposed  to  repentance,  which  we  may 
thus  define : — 

XXVII.  Bepentancc  is  sorrow  accompanied  with  the 
idea  of  something  done  which  we  believe  has  been  doue 
by  a  free  decree  of  our  mind. 

Explanation. — We  have  shown  what  are  the  causes  of 
these  affects  in  Schol.  Prop.  51,  pt.  3,  Props.  53  and  54, 
pt.  3,  and  Prop.  55,  pt.  3,  together  with  its  Schol.  With 
regard  to  a  free  decree  of  the  mind,  see  Schol.  Prop.  35, 
pt.  2.  Here,  however,  I  must  observe,  that  it  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at  that  sorrow  should  always  follow  all  those 
actions  which  are  from  custom  called  wicked,  and  that 
joy  should  follow  those  which  are  called  good.  But  tliat 
this  is  chiefly  the  effect  of  education  will  be  evident 
from  what  we  have  before  said.  Parents,  by  reprobat- 
ing what  are  called  bad  actions,  and  frequently  blaming 
their  children  whenever  they  commit  them,  while  they 
persuade  them  to  what  are  called  good  actions,  and  praise 


1 68  ETHIC. 

their  cliildren  when  they  perform  them,  have  caused  the 
emotions  of  sorrow  to  connect  themselves  with  the  former, 
and  those  of  joy  with  the  latter.  Experience  proves 
this,  for  custom  and  religion  are  not  the  same  every- 
where ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  things  Avhich  are  sacred  to 
some  are  profane  to  others,  and  what  are  honourable  with 
some  are  disgraceful  with  others.  Education  alone,  there- 
fore, will  determine  whether  a  man  will  repent  of  any 
deed  or  boast  of  it. 

XXVIII.  Pride  is  thinking  too  much  of  ourselves, 
through  self-love. 

Explanatioji. — Pride  differs,  therefore,  from  over-esti- 
mation, inasmuch  as  the  latter  is  related  to  an  external 
object,  but  pride  to  the  man  himself  who  thinks  of 
himself  too  highly.  As  over-estimation,  therefore,  is  an 
effect  or  property  of  love,  so  pride  is  an  effect  or  pro- 
perty of  self-love,  and  it  may  therefore  be  defined  as  love 
of  ourselves  or  self-satisfaction,  in  so  far  as  it  affects  us 
so  that  we  think  too  highly  of  ourselves.  (See  Schol. 
Prop.  26,  pt.  3.) 

To  this  affect  a  contrary  does  not  exist,  for  no  one, 
through  hatred  of  himself,  thinks  too  little  of  himself; 
indeed,  we  may  say  that  no  one  thinks  too  little  of  him- 
self, in  so  far  as  he  imagines  himself  unable  to  do  this 
or  that  thing.  Eor  whatever  he  imagines  that  he  cannot 
do,  that  thing  he  necessarily  imagines,  and  by  his  imagina- 
tion is  so  disposed  that  he  is  actually  incapable  of  doing 
what  he  imagines  he  cannot  do.  So  long,  therefore,  as  he 
imagines  himself  unable  to  do  this  or  that  thing,  so  long 
is  he  not  determined  to  do  it,  and  consequently  so  long 
it  is  impossible  for  him  to  do  it.  If,  however,  we  pay 
attention  to  what  depends  upon  opinion  alone,  we  shall 
be  able  to  conceive  it  possible  for  a  man  to  think  too 
little  of  himself,  for  it  may  haj^pen  that  while  he  sorrow- 
fully contemplates  his  own  weakness  he  will  imagine 
himself  despised  by  everybody,  although  nothing  could 
be  further  from  their  thoughts  than  to  despise   him.     A 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.        169 

man  may  also  think  too  little  of  himself  if  in  the  pre- 
sent he  denies  something  of  himself  in  relation  to  a  future 
time  of  which  he  is  not  sure  ;  for  example,  wlien  he  denies 
that  he  can  conceive  of  nothing  with  certitude,  and  tliat 
he  can  desire  and  do  nothing  which  is  not  wicked  and 
hase.  AVe  may  also  say  that  a  man  thinks  too  little  of 
himself  when  we  see  that,  from  an  excess  of  fear  or 
shame,  he  does  not  dare  to  do  M'hat  others  who  are  his 
equals  dare  to  do.  This  affect,  to  which  I  will  give 
the  name  of  Despondency,  may  therefore  he  opposed  to 
pride ;  for  as  self-satisfaction  springs  from  pride,  so 
despondency  springs  from  humility,  and  it  may  therefore 
be  defined  thus — 

XXIX.  Despondency  is  thinking  too  little  of  ourselves 
through  sorrow. 

Explanation. — We  are,  nevertheless,  often  in  the  hahit 
of  opposing  humility  to  pride,  but  only  when  we  attend 
to  their  effects  rather  than  to  their  nature.  For  we  are 
accustomed  to  call  a  man  proud  who  boasts  too  much 
(Schol.  Prop.  30,  pt.  3),  who  talks  about  nothing  but 
his  own  virtues  and  other  people's  vices,  who  wislics 
to  be  preferred  to  everybody  else,  and  who  marches 
along  with  that  stateliness  and  pomp  which  belong  to 
others  whose  position  is  far  above  his.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  call  a  man  humble  who  often  blushes,  who 
confesses  his  own  faults  and  talks  about  the  virtues  of 
others,  who  yields  to  every  one,  who  walks  with  bended 
head,  and  who  neglects  to  adorn  himself.  These 
affects,  humility  and  despondency,  are  very  rare,  ^  for 
human  nature,  considered  in  itself,  struggles  against 
them  as  much  as  it  can  (Props.  13  and  54,  pt.  3), 
and  hence  those  who  have  the  most  credit  for  bein;; 
abject  and  humble  are  generally  the  most  ambitious  and 
envious. 

XXX.  Self-exaltation  is  joy  with  the  accompanying 
idea  of  some  action  we  have  done,  wlii'-h  wr  mmgmo 
people  praise. 


17  o  ETHIC. 

XXXI.  Shame  is  sorrow,  with  the  accompanying  idea 
of  some  action  which  we  imagine  people  blame. 

Explanation. — With  regard  to  these  affects  see  Schol. 
Prop.  30,  pt.  3.  A  difference,  however,  is  here  to  be  ob- 
served between  shame  and  modesty.  Shame  is  sorrow 
which  follows  a  deed  of  which  we  are  ashamed.  Modesty 
is  the  dread  or  fear  of  shame,  which  keeps  a  man  from 
committing  any  disgraceful  act.  To  modesty  is  usually 
opposed  impudence,  which  indeed  is  not  an  affect,  as  I 
shall  show  in  the  proper  place  ;  but  the  names  of  affects, 
as  I  have  already  said,  are  matters  rather  of  custom  than 
indications  of  tlie  nature  of  the  affects.  I  have  thus 
discharged  the  task  which  I  set  myself  of  explaining  the 
affects  of  joy  and  sorrow.  I  will  advance  now  to  those 
which  I  ascribe  to  desire. 

XXXII.  Begret  is  the  desire  or  longing  to  possess 
something,  the  affect  being  strengthened  by  the  memory 
of  the  object  itself,  and  at  the  same  time  being  restrained 
by  the  memory  of  other  things  which  exclude  the  exist- 
ence of  the  desired  object. 

Explanation. — Whenever  we  recollect  a  thing,  as  we 
have  often  said,  we  are  thereby  necessarily  disposed  to 
contemplate  it  with  the  same  affect  as  if  it  were  present 
before  us.  But  this  disposition  or  effort,  while  we  are 
awake,  is  generally  restrained  by  the  images  of  things 
which  exclude  the  existence  of  the  thing  which  we 
recollect.  Whenever,  therefore,  we  recollect  a  thing 
which  affects  us  with  any  kind  of  joy,  we  thereby 
endeavour  to  contemplate  it  with  the  same  affect  of 
joy  as  if  it  were  present, — an  attempt  which  is,  how- 
ever, immediately  restrained  by  the  memory  of  that 
which  excludes  the  existence  of  the  thing.  Eegret, 
therefore,  is  really  a  sorrow  which  is  opposed  to  the  joy 
which  arises  from  the  absence  of  what  we  hate.  (See 
Schol.  Prop.  47,  pt.  3.)  But  because  the  name  regi'et 
seems  to  connect  this  affect  with  desire,  I  therefore 
ascribe  it  to  desire. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       171 

XXXIII.  Emulation  is  the  desire  wliicli  is  begotten  in 
us  of  a  thing  because  we  imagine  that  other  persons  have 
the  san^e  desire. 

JSxjjIatiation. — He  who  seeks  flight  because  others  .seek 
it,  he  who  fears  because  he  sees  others  fear,  or  even  ho 
who  withdraws  his  hand  and  moves  his  body  as  if  his 
hand  were  burning  because  he  sees  that  another  person 
has  burnt  his  hand,  such  as  these,  I  say,  althougli  thev 
may  indeed  imitate  the  affect  of  another,  are  not  said  lu 
emulate  it ;  not  because  we  have  recognised  one  cause  for 
emulation  and  another  for  imitation,  but  because  it  has 
been  the  custom  to  call  that  man  only  emulous  who 
imitates  what  we  think  noble,  useful,  or  pleasant.  With 
regard  to  the  cause  of  emulation,  see  also  Prop.  27, 
pt.  3,  with  the  Schol.  Por  the  reason  why  envy  is 
generally  connected  with  this  affect,  see  Prop.  32,  pt.  3, 
with  its  Schol. 

XXXIV.  Thanlcfulncss  or  gratitude  is  the  desire  or 
endeavour  of  love  with  which  we  strive  to  do  good  to 
others  who,  from  a  similar  affect  of  love,  have  done  good 
to  us  (Prop.  39,  with  Schol.  Prop.  41,  pt.  3). 

XXXV.  Benevolence  is  the  desire  to  do  good  to  tho.-e 
whom  we  pity  (SchoL  Prop.  27,  pt.  3). 

XXXVI.  Anger  is  the  desire  by  which  we  are  inipelh-d, 
through    hatred,   to  injure  those   whom  we   hate  (I'rop. 

39,  pt.  3)- 

XXXVII.  Vengeance  is  the  desire  whicli,  springing 
from  mutual  hatred,  urges  us  to  injure  those  who,  from  a 
similar  affect,  have  injured  us  (Corol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  3, 
with  Schol.) 

XXXVIII.  Cruelty  ov  ferocitij  is  the  desire  by  which  a 
man  is  impelled  to  injure  any  one  whom  we  love  or  pity. 

Explanation. — To  cruelty  is  opposed  mercy,  whicli  is 
not  a  passion,  but  a  power  of  the  mind  by  which  a  man 
restrains  anger  and  vengeance. 

XXXIX.  Fear  is  the  desire  of  avoiding  the  greater  of 
two  dreaded  evHs  by  the  less  (Schol.  Prop.  39.  I't-  3)- 


172  ETHIC. 

XL.  Audacity  is  the  desire  by  wliicli  we  are  impelled  to 
do  something  which  is  accompanied  with  a  danger  which 
our  equals  fear  to  meet. 

XLI.  A  person  is  said  to  be  'pusillanimous  whose 
desire  is  restrained  by  the  fear  of  a  danger  which  his 
equals  dare  to  meet. 

Explanation. — Pusillanimity,  therefore,  is  nothing  but 
the  dread  of  some  evil  which  most  persons  do  not  usually 
fear,  and  therefore  I  do  not  ascribe  it  to  the  affects  of 
desire.  I  wished,  notwithstanding,  to  explain  it  here, 
because  in  so  far  as  we  attend  to  desire,  pusillanimity 
is  the  true  opposite  of  the  affect  of  audacity. 

XLII.  Consternation  is  affirmed  of  the  man  whose 
desire  of  avoiding  evil  is  restrained  by  astonishment  at 
the  evil  which  he  fears. 

Explanation. — Consternation  is  therefore  a  kind  of 
pusillanimity.  But  because  consternation  springs  from  a 
double  fear,  it  may  be  more  aptly  defined  as  that  dread 
which  holds  a  man  stupefied  or  vacillating,  so  that  he  can- 
not remove  an  evil.  I  say  stupefied,  in  so  far  as  we  under- 
stand his  desire  of  removing  the  evil  to  be  restrained  by 
his  astonishment.  I  say  also  vacillating,  in  so  far  as  we 
conceive  the  same  desire  to  be  restrained  by  the  fear  of 
another  evil  which  equally  tortures  him,  so  that  he  does 
not  know  which  of  the  two  evils  to  avoid.  See  Schol. 
Prop.  39,  and  Schol.  Prop.  52,  pt.  3.  With  regard  to 
pusillanimity  and  audacity,  see  Schol.  Prop.  51,  pt.  3. 

XLIII.  Courtesy  or  moderation  is  the  desire  of  doing 
those  things  which  please  men  and  omitting  those  which 
displease  them. 

XLIV.  Amhition  is  the  immoderate  desire  of  glory. 

Explanation. —  Ambition  is  a  desire  wliich  increases 
and  strengthens  all  the  affects  (Props.  27  and  31,  pt.  3), 
and  that  is  the  reason  why  it  can  hardly  be  kept  under 
control.  For  so  long  as  a  man  is  possessed  by  any  desire, 
he  is  necessarily  at  the  same  time  possessed  by  this. 
Every  noble  man,  says  Cicero,  is  led  by  glory,  and  even 


ORIGIN  AXD  NATURE  OF  THE  AFFECTS.       173 

the  pliilosophers  who  write  books  about  despising  glon- 
place  their  names  on  the  title-page. 

XLV.  Luxuriousness  is  the  immoderate  desire  or  lovo 
of  good  living. 

XLYI.  Drunkenness  is  the  immoderate  desire  and 
love  of  drinking. 

XLVII.  Avarice  is  the  immoderate  desire  and  love  of 
riches. 

XLVIII.  Lust  is  the  immoderate  desire  and  love  of 
sexual  intercourse. 

Explanation. — This  desire  of  sexual  intercourse  '\a 
usually  called  lust,  whether  it  be  held  within  bounds  or 
not.  I  may  add  that  the  five  last-mentioned  affects  (as 
we  have  shown  in  Schol.  Prop.  56,  pt.  3)  have  no  con- 
traries, for  moderation  is  a  kind  of  ambition  (see  Schol. 
Prop.  29,  pt.  3),  and  I  have  already  observed  that  tem- 
perance, sobriety,  and  chastity  show  a  power  and  not  a 
passion  of  the  mind.  Even  supposing  that  an  avaricious, 
ambitious,  or  timid  man  refrains  from  an  excess  of  eating, 
drinking,  or  sexual  intercourse,  avarice,  ambition,  and 
fear  are  not  therefore  the  opposites  of  voluptuousness, 
drunkenness,  or  lust.  For  the  avaricious  man  gent-rally 
desires  to  swallow  as  much  meat  and  drink  as  he  can, 
provided  only  it  belong  to  another  person.  The  ambitious 
man,  too,  if  he  hopes  he  can  keep  it  a  secret,  will  restrain 
himself  in  nothing,  and  if  he  lives  amongst  drunkards 
and  libertines,  will  be  more  inclined  to  their  vices  just 
because  he  is  ambitious.  The  timid  man,  too,  does  what 
he  does  not  will ;  and  although,  in  order  to  avoid  death, 
he  may  throw  his  riches  into  the  sea,  he  remains  avaricious ; 
nor  does  the  lascivious  man  cease  to  be  lascivious  because 
he  is  Sorry  that  he  cannot  gratify  his  desire.  Absolutely, 
therefore,  these  affects  have  reference  not  so  much  to  the 
acts  themselves  of  eating  and  drinking  as  to  the  appetite 
and  love  itself.  Consequently  nothing  can  be  opposed  to 
these  affects  but  nobility  of  soul  and  strength  of  mind,  as 
we  shall  see  afterwards. 


174  ETHIC. 

The  definitions  of  jealousy  and  the  other  vacillations  of 
the  mind  I  pass  over  in  silence,  both  because  they  are 
compounded  of  the  affects  which  we  have  already  de- 
fined, and  also  because  many  of  them  have  no  names, — a 
fact  which  shows  that,  for  the  purposes  of  life,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  know  these  combinations  generally.  Moreover, 
it  follows  from  the  definitions  of  the  affects  which  we 
have  explained  that  they  all  arise  from  desire,  joy,  or 
sorrow,  or  rather  that  there  are  none  but  these  three, 
which  pass  under  names  varying  as  their  relations  and 
external  signs  vary.  If,  therefore,  we  attend  to  these 
primitive  affects  and  to  what  has  been  said  above  about 
the  nature  of  the  mind,  we  shall  be  able  here  to  define 
the  affects  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to  the  mind  alone. 

General  definition  of  the  affects. — Affect,  which  is  called 
animi  pathema,  is  a  confused  idea  by  which  the  mind 
affirms  of  its  body,  or  any  part  of  it,  a  greater  or  less 
power  of  existence  than  before ;  and  this  increase  of 
power  being  given,  the  mind  itself  is  determined  to  one 
particular  thought  rather  than  to  another. 

Explanation. — I  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  an  affect 
or  passion  of  the  mind  is  a  confused  idea.  For  we  have 
shown  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3)  that  the  mind  suffers  only  in  so 
far  as  it  has  inadequate  or  confused  ideas.  I  say  again, 
ty  which  the  mind  affirms  of  its  hody,  or  any  part  of  it,  a 
greater  or  less  power  of  existence  than  before.  For  all  ideas 
which  we  possess  of  bodies  indicate  the  actual  constitu- 
tion of  our  body  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  external 
body  (Corol.  2,  Prop.  16,  pt.  2);  but  this  idea,  which 
constitutes  the  form  of  an  affect,  must  indicate  or  express 
the  constitution  of  the  body,  or  of  some  part  of  it ;  which 
constitution  the  body  or  any  part  of  it  possesses  from 
the  fact  that  its  power  of  action  or  force  of  existence 
is  increased  or  diminished,  helped  or  limited.  But  it  is 
to  be  observed,  that  when  I  say  a  greater  or  less  power  of 
existence  than  hefore,  I  do  not  mean  that  the  mind  com- 
pares the  present  with  the  past  constitution  of  the  body, 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  AFI-IICTS.       175 

Imt  that  the  idea  which  constitutes  the  form  of  nflVct 
affirms  something  of  the  body  which  actually  involves 
more  or  less  reality  than  before.  Moreover,  since  the 
essence  of  the  mind  (Props.  1 1  and  13,  pt.  2)  consists  in 
its  affirmation  of  the  actual  existence  of  its  body,  and 
since  we  understand  by  perfection  the  essence  itself  of 
the  thing,  it  follows  that  the  mind  passes  to  a  greater 
or  less  perfection  when  it  is  able  to  affirm  of  its  body, 
or  some  part  of  it,  something  which  involves  a  greater 
or  less  reality  than  before.  "When,  therefore,  I  have 
said  that  the  mind's  power  of  thought  is  increased  or 
diminished,  I  have  wished  to  be  understood  as  mean- 
ing nothing  else  than  that  the  mind  has  formed  an  idea 
of  its  body,  or  some  part  of  its  body,  which  expresses 
more  or  less  reality  than  it  had  hitherto  aflirmed  of  the 
body.  For  the  value  of  ideas  and  the  actual  power  of 
thought  are  measured  by  value  of  the  object.  Finally,  I 
added,  ivhicli  being  given,  the  mind  itself  is  dctcrmiiud  to 
one  ^particular  tliouglit  rather  than  to  another,  that  I  might 
also  express  the  nature  of  desire  in  addition  to  that  of 
joy  and  sorrow,  which  is  explained  by  the  first  part  of 
the  definition. 


END    OF    THE    TIIIItD    PART. 


I' 


f 


(  176  ) 
ETHIC. 


^ 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE  OR  OF  THE  STRENGTH 
OF  THE  AFFECTS. 

PREFACE. 

The  impotence  of  man  to  govern  or  restrain  the  afifects 
I  call  bondage,  for  a  man  who  is  under  their  control  is 
not  his  own  master,  but  is  mastered  by  fortune,  in  whose 
power  he  is,  so  that  he  is  often  forced  to  follow  the  worse, 
although  he  sees  the  better  before  him.  I  propose  in  this 
part  to  demonstrate  why  this  is,  and  also  to  show  what 
of  good  and  evil  the  affects  possess.  But  before  I  begin 
I  should  like  to  €ay  a  few  words  about  perfection  and 
imperfection,  and  about  good  and  evil.  If  a  man  has  pro- 
posed to  do  a  thing  and  has  accomplished  it,  he  calls  it 
perfect,  and  not  only  he,  but  every  one  else  who  has 
really  known  or  has  believed  that  he  has  known  the  mind 
and  intention  of  the  author  of  that  work  will  call  it 
perfect  too.  For  example,  having  seen  some  work  (which 
I  suppose  to  be  as  yet  not  finished),  if  we  know  that  the 
intention  of  the  author  of  that  work  is  to  build  a  house,  we 
shall  call  the  house  imperfect;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  shall  call  it  perfect  as  soon  as  we  see  the  work  has 
been  brought  to  the  end  which  the  author  had  determined 
for  it.  But  if  we  see  any  work  such  as  we  have  never 
seen  before,  and  if  we  do  not  know  the  mind  of  the 
workman,  we  shall  then  not  be  able  to  say  whether  the 


OF  II UMAX  DOXDAGE.  ,-, 

work  is  perfect  or  imperfect.^  This  seems  to  have  hem 
the  first  siguification  of  these  words;  but  aftorwanU 
men  began  to  form  universal  ideas,  to  think  out  for 
themselves  types  of  houses,  buildings,  castles,  and  to  pn- 
fer  some  types  of  things  to  others ;  and  so  it  happened 
that  each  person  called  a  thing  perfect  which  seemed  to 
agree  with  the  universal  idea  which  he  had  formed  of 
that  thing,  and,  on  the  other  baud,  he  called  a  thin" 
imperfect  which  seemed  to  agree  less  with  his  typal  con- 
ception, although,  according  to  the  intention  of  the  work- 
man, it  had  been  entirely  completed.  This  appears  to  be 
the  only  reason  why  the  words  perfect  and  imperfect  are 
commonly  applied  to  natural  objects  which  are  not  made 
with  human  hands ;  for  men  are  in  the  habit  of  forming', 
both  of  natural  as  well  as  of  artificial  objects,  universal 
ideas  which  they  regard  as  types  of  things,  and  which 
they  think  nature  has  in  view,  setting  them  before  Ijer- 
self  as  types  too ;  it  being  the  common  opinion  that  she 
does  nothing  except  for  the  sake  of  some  end.  When, 
therefore,  men  see  something  done  by  nature  wliich  does 
not  altogether  answer  to  that  typal  conception  which 
they  have  of  the  thing,  they  think  that  nature  herself  ha3 
failed  or  committed  an  error,  and  that  she  has  left  the 
thing  imperfect.  Thus  we  see  that  the  custom  of  apj)ly- 
ing  the  words  perfect  and  imperfect  to  natural  objects  lm>< 
arisen  rather  from  prejudice  than  from  true  knowledge  of 
them.  For  we  have  shown  in  the  Appendix  to  the  First 
Part  of  this  work  that  nature  does  notliing  for  the  sake  of 
an  end,  for  that  eternal  and  infinite  Being  whom  we 
call  God  or  Nature  acts  by  the  same  necessity  by  which 
He  exists  ;  for  we  have  shown  that  He  acts  by  the 
same  necessity  of  nature  as  that  by  whicli  He  exists 
(Prop.  1 6,  pt.  i).      The  reason  or  cause,  therefore,  why 

1  A  translation  cannot  show  the  however,  to  hear  in  mind  that  r'r/rrf 

etymology  of  the  word  j^erfwt  as  it  and  accomjihhtd  are  cxprt-^blB  i..r 

is  shown  in   the  original  Latin,  so  the  same  word  in  Latin,  »"'•"'"* 

that  this  passage  may  perhaps  seem  accomjAUh  u  the  pnuiary  meaning  ci 

rather  obscure.     It  is  only  necessary,  pe/;/(Vere.— Tiu-vs. 


178  ETHIC. 

God  or  nature  acts  and  the  reason  why  He  exists  are 
one  and  the  same.  Smce,  therefore,  He  exists  for  no  end, 
He  acts  for  no  end  ;  and  since  He  has  no  principle  or 
end  of  existence,  He  has  no  principle  or  end  of  action. 
A  final  cause,  as  it  is  called,  is  nothing,  therefore,  but 
human  desire,  in  so  far  as  this  is  considered  as  the  prin- 
ciple or  primary  cause  of  anything.  For  example,  when 
we  say  that  the  having  a  house  to  live  in  was  the  final 
cause  of  this  or  that  house,  we  merely  mean  that  a  man, 
because  he  imagined  the  advantages  of  a  domestic  life, 
desired  to  build  a  house.  Therefore,  having  a  house  to 
live  in,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  a  final  cause,  is 
merely  this  particular  desire,  which  is  really  an  efficient 
cause,  and  is  considered  as  primary,  because  men  are 
usually  ignorant  of  the  causes  of  their  desires  ;  for,  as  I 
have  often  said,  we  are  conscious  of  our  actions  and 
desires,  but  ignorant  of  the  causes  by  which  we  are 
determined  to  desire  anything.  As  for  the  vulgar 
opinion  that  nature  sometimes  fails  or  commits  an  error, 
or  produces  imperfect  things,  I  class  it  amongst  those 
fictions  mentioned  in  the  Appendix  to  the  First  Part. 

Perfection,  therefore,  and  imperfection  are  really  only 
modes  of  thought ;  that  is  to  say,  notions  which  we  are 
in  the  habit  of  forming  from  the  comparison  with  one 
another  of  individuals  of  the  same  species  or  genus,  and 
this  is  the  reason  why  I  have  said,  in  Def.  6,  pt.  2,  that 
by  reality  and  perfection  I  understand  the  same  thing ; 
for  we  are  in  the  habit  of  referring  all  individuals  in 
nature  to  one  genus,  wliich  is  called  the  most  general ; 
that  is  to  say,  to  the  notion  of  being,  which  embraces  ab- 
solutely all  the  individual  objects  in  nature.  In  so  far, 
therefore,  as  we  refer  the  individual  objects  in  nature  to 
this  genus,  and  compare  them  one  wuth  another,  and 
discover  that  some  possess  more  being  or  reality  than 
others,  in  so  far  do  we  call  some  more  perfect  than 
others ;  and  in  so  far  as  we  assign  to  the  latter  anything 
which,  like  limitation,  termination,  impotence,  &c.,  involves 


OF  H  UMA  N  BOX  DA  GE.  , .  ^ 

negation,  shall  we  call  them  imperfect,  becauso  thoy  tU. 
not  affect  our  minds  so  strongly  as  those  we  call  perfect, 
but  not  because  anything  which  really  belongs  to  tliein  is 
wanting,  or  because  nature  has  committed  an  error.  For 
nothing  belongs  to  the  nature  of  anything  excepting  that 
which  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  tlie  efli- 
cient  cause,  and  whatever  follows  from  the  necessity  of 
the  nature  of  the  efficient  cause  necessarily  liappens. 

With  regard  to  good  and  evil,  these  terms  indicate 
nothing  positive  in  things  considered  in  themselves,  nor 
are  they  anything  else  than  modes  of  thought,  or  notions 
which  w^e  form  from  the  comparison  of  one  thing  with 
another.  For  one  and  the  same  thing  may  at  the  sanjo 
time  be  both  good  and  evil  or  indillerent.  Music,  for  ex- 
ample, is  good  to  a  melancholy  person,  bad  to  one  mourning, 
wdiile  to  a  deaf  man  it  is  neither  good  nor  bad.  I'ut 
although  things  are  so,  we  must  retain  these  words.  For 
since  we  desire  to  form  for  ourselves  an  idea  of  man  upon 
which  we  may  look  as  a  model  of  human  nature,  it  will 
be  of  service  to  us  to  retain  these  expressions  in  the  sense 
I  have  mentioned.  By  good,  therefore,  I  understand  in  the 
following  pages  everything  which  we  are  certain  is  a  means 
by  which  we  may  approach  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  moilel 
of  human  nature  we  set  before  us.  By  evil,  on  the  con- 
trary, I  understand  everything  which  we  are  certain  hin- 
ders us  from  reaching  that  model.  Again,  I  shall  call 
men  more  or  less  perfect  or  imperfect  iu  so  far  as  they 
approach  more  or  less  nearly  to  this  same  model.  For  it 
is  to  be  carefully  observed,  that  when  1  say  that  an  indi- 
vidual passes  from  a  less  to  a  greater  perfection  and  ri<r 
versa,  I  do  not  understand  that  from  one  essence  or  form 
he  is  changed  into  another  (for  a  horse,  for  instance, 
would  be  as  much  destroyed  if  it  were  changed  into  a 
man  as  if  it  were  changed  into  an  insect),  but  rather 
we  conceive  that  his  power  of  action,  in  so  far  as  it  ia 
understood  by  his  own  nature,  is  increased  or  dimin- 
ished.    Finally,   by  perfection  generally,  I  umlcrstand, 


i8o  ETHIC. 

as  I  have  said,  reality ;  that  is  to  say,  the  essence  of 
any  object  in  so  far  as  it  exists  and  acts  in  a  certain 
manner,  no  regard  being  paid  to  its  duration.  "For  no 
individual  thing  can  be  said  to  be  more  perfect  because 
for  a  longer  time  it  has  persevered  in  existence ;  inas- 
much as  the  duration  of  things  cannot  be  determined 
by  their  essence,  the  essence  of  things  involving  no  fixed 
or  determined  period  of  existence ;  any  object,  whether 
it  be  more  or  less  perfect,  always  being  able  to  persevere 
in  existence  with  the  same  force  as  that  with  which  it 
commenced  existence.  All  things,  therefore,  are  equal 
in  this  respect. 

Definitions. 

I. — By  good,  I  understand  that  which  we  certainly 
know  is  useful  to  us. 

II.  By  evil,  on  the  contrary,  I  understand  that  which 
we  certainly  know  hinders  us  from  possessing  anything 
that  is  good. 

With  regard  to  these  two  definitions,  see  the  close  of 
the  preceding  preface. 

III.  I  call  individual  things  contingent  in  so  far  as 
we  discover  nothing,  whilst  we  attend  to  their  essence 
alone,  wliich  necessarily  posits  their  existence  or  which 
necessarily  excludes  it. 

IV.  I  call  these  individual  things  possible,  in  so  far  as 
we  are  ignorant,  whilst  we  attend  to  the  causes  from  which 
they  must  be  produced,  whether  these  causes  are  deter- 
mined to  the  production  of  these  things.  In  Schol.  I, 
Prop.  3  3,  pt.  1,1  made  no  difference  between  possible  and 
contingent,  because  there  w^as  no  occasion  there  to  dis- 
tinguish them  accurately. 

V.  By  contrary  affects,  I  understand  in  the  following  pages 
those  which,  although  they  may  be  of  the  same  kind,  draw 
a  man  in  different  directions  ;  such  as  voluptuousness  and 
avarice,  which  are  both  a  species  of  love,  and  are  not  con- 
trary to  one  another  by  nature,  but  only  by  accident. 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDACR.  ,g, 

YI.  What  1  unJerstaiuI  by  alTect  towanU  a  thin;' 
future,  present,  and  past,  I  have  explained  in  Scl>ol.  i 
and  2,  Prop.  1 8,  pt.  3,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred. 

Here,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed  tliat  it  is  the  samo 
M-ith  time  as  it  is  %yith  place ;  for  as  beyond  a  certain 
limit  we  can  form  no  distinct  imagination  of  distance — 
that  is  to  say,  as  we  nsually  imagine  all  objects  to  be 
equally  distant  from  us,  and  as  if  they  were  on  the  same 
plane,  if  their  distance  from  us  exceeds  200  feet,  or  if  their 
distance  from  the  position  we  occupy  is  greater  tiian  w« 
can  distinctly  imagine — so  we  imagine  all  objects  to  be 
equally  distant  from  the  present  time,  and  refer  them  as 
if  to  one  moment,  if  the  period  to  which  their  existence 
belongs  is  separated  from  the  present  by  a  longer  interval 
than  we  can  usually  imagine  distinctly. 

VII.  By  end  for  the  sake  of  which  we  do  anything,  I 
understand  appetite. 

VIII.  By  virtue  and  power,  I  understand  the  same 
thing ;  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  virtue,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  related  to  man,  is  the  essence  itself  or  nature  of  the 
man  in  so  far  as  it  has  the  power  of  effecting  certain  things 
which  can  be  understood  through  the  laws  of  its  nature 

alone.  >    $r  S<    1^ 

Axiom.  ^    d) 

There  is  no  individual  thing  in  nature  which  is  not 
surpassed  in  strength  and  power  by  some  other  thing,  but 
any  individual  thing  being  given,  another  and  a  stronger 
is  also  given,  by  which  the  former  can  be  destroyed. 

Prop.   I. — Nothing  positive  contained  in  a  false  ulra  w 
removed  by  the  presence  of  the  true  in  so  fir  " 
true. 
Demonst.—Y^\s\iy  consists  in  nothing  but  the  privation 

of  knowledge  which  inadequate  ideas  involve  (I'rop.  35. 

pt.  2),  nor  do  they  possess  anything  positive  on  account 

of  which  they  are  called  false  (I'rop.  33.  V^-  2))  on  the 


1 82  ETHIC. 

contrary,  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to  God,  they  are 
true  (Prop.  32,  pt.  2).  If,  therefore,  anything  positive 
contained  in  a  false  idea  were  removed  by  the  presence 
of  the  true  in  so  far  as  it  is  true,  a  true  idea  would  be 
removed  by  itself,  which  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3 )  is  absurd.  No- 
thing positive,  therefore,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Schol.  —  This  proposition  can  be  understood  more 
clearly  from  Corol.  2,  Prop.  16,  pt.  2.  For  an  imagina- 
tion is  an  idea  which  indicates  the  present  constitution 
of  the  human  body  rather  than  the  nature  of  an  external 
body,  not  indeed  distinctly  but  confusedly,  so  that  the 
mind  is  said  to  err.  For  example,  when  we  look  at  the 
sun,  we  imagine  his  distance  from  us  to  be  about  200 
feet,  and  in  this  we  are  deceived  so  long  as  we  remain  in 
ignorance  of  the  true  distance.  When  this  is  known,  the 
error  is  removed,  but  not  the  imagination,  that  is  to  say, 
the  idea  of  the  sun  which  explains  his  nature  in  so  far 
only  as  the  body  is  affected  by  him ;  so  that  although  we 
know  his  true  distance,  we  nevertheless  imagine  him  close 
to  us.  For,  as  we  have  shown  in  Schol.  Prop.  35,  pt.  2, 
it  is  not  because  we  are  ignorant  of  the  sun's  true  distance 
that  we  imagine  him  to  be  so  close  to  us,  but  because 
the  mind  conceives  the  magnitude  of  the  sun  just  in  so 
far  as  the  body  is  affected  by  him.  So  when  the  rays  of 
the  sun  falling  upon  a  suiface  of  water  are  reflected  to 
our  eyes,  we  imagine  him  to  be  in  the  water,  although  his 
true  place  is  known  to  us.  So  with  the  other  imagina- 
tions by  which  the  mind  is  deceived ;  whether  they  indi- 
cate the  natural  constitution  of  the  body  or  an  increase 
or  diminution  in  its  power  of  action,  they  are  not  opposed 
to  the  truth,  nor  do  they  disappear  with  the  presence  of 
the  truth.  We  know  that  when  we  groundlessly  fear 
any  evil,  the  fear  vanishes  when  we  hear  correct  intel- 
ligence ;  but  we  also  know,  on  the  other  hand,  that  when 
we  fear  an  evil  which  will  actually  come  upon  us,  the 
fear  vanishes  when  we  hear  false  intelligence,  so  tliat 
the  imaginations  do  not  disappear  with    the  presence  of 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDAGE.  ,53 

the  truth,  in  so  far  as  it  is  true,  but  because  other  i!naj,'inu. 
tions  arise  which  are  stronger,  and  which  exchule"  the 
present  existence  of  the  objects  we  imagine,  as  we  liavc 
shown  in  Trop.  17,  pt.  2. 

PKOr.  11. —  JVe  suffer  in  so  far  as  we  are  apart  of  nature, 
which  part  cannot  Ic  conceived  hj  itself  nur  vithnut 
the  other  ]parts. 

Demonst. — We  are  said  to  suffer  when  anythini^  occurs 
in  us  of  which  we  are  only  the  partial  cause  (Pef.  2,  i)t. 
3),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  i,  pt.  3),  anything  wliich  cannot 
be  deduced  from  the  laws  of  our  own  nature  alone ;  wo 
suffer,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  we  are  a  part  of  nature, 
which  part  cannot  be  conceived  by  itself  nor  without  tlje 
other  parts. — q.e.d. 

PiiOP.  III. — The  force  hj  which  man  perseveres  in  existern-^ 

is  limited,  and  infinitely/  sinpassed  hi/  the  poircr  of 

exteriial  causes. 

Demonst. — This  is  evident  from  the  Axiom,  pt.  4.  Fur 
any  man  being  given,  there  is  given  something  else — fur 
example,  A — more  powerful  than  he  is,  and  A  being  given, 
there  is  again  given  something,  B,  more  powerful  than 
A,  and  so  on  ad  ii^finitum.  Hence  the  power  of  niati  i.s 
limited  by  the  power  of  some  other  object,  and  is  infi- 
nitely surpassed  by  the  power  of  external  causes. — Q.E.I». 

ritop.  lY. — It  is  impossille  that  a  man  shoidd  not  he  a 

part  of  nature,  and  that  he  shoidd  svftr  no  chanyt-^ 

hut  those  which  can  he  understood  thruiKjh  his  oicn 

nature  cdone,  and  of  which  he  is  the  adupuUe  cauit. 

Demonst. — The  power  by  which  individual  things  and 

consequently   man   preserve   their    being  is   the  actual 

power  of  God  or  nature  (Corel.  Prop.  24,  pt.  l),  not  in 

so  far  as  it  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  explamwi 

by  the   actual   essence   of  man  (Prop.  7,  p?     ''       ^'"^ 


1 84  ETHIC. 

power  therefore  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it  is  explained  by 
his  actual  essence,  is  part  of  the  infinite  power  of  God 
or  nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  34,  pt.  i),  part  of  His 
essence.  This  was  the  first  thing  to  be  proved.  Again, 
if  it  were  possible  that  man  could  suffer  no  changes  but 
those  which  can  be  understood  through  his  nature  alone, 
it  would  follow  (Props.  4  and  6,  pt.  3)  that  he  could 
not  perish,  but  that  he  would  exist  for  ever  necessarily  ; 
and  this  necessary  existence  must  result  from  a  cause 
w^hose  power  is  either  finite  or  infinite,  that  is  to  say, 
either  from  the  power  of  man  alone,  wdiicli  would  be  able 
to  place  at  a  distance  from  himself  all  other  changes 
which  could  take  their  origin  from  external  causes,  or  it 
must  result  from  the  infinite  power  of  nature  by  which 
all  individual  things  would  be  so  directed  that  man  could 
suffer  no  changes  but  those  tending  to  his  preservation. 
But  the  first  case  (by  the  preceding  proposition,  whose  de- 
monstration is  universal  and  capable  of  application  to  all 
individual  objects)  is  absurd  ;  therefore  if  it  were  possible 
for  a  man  to  suffer  no  changes  but  those  which  could  be 
understood  through  his  own  nature  alone,  and  conse- 
quently (as  we  have  shown)  that  he  should  always  neces- 
sarily exist,  this  must  follow  from  the  infinite  power  of 
God;  and  therefore  (Prop.  16,  pt.  i)  from  the  necessity 
of  the  divine  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  affected 
by  the  idea  of  any  one  man,  the  whole  order  of  nature,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  conceived  under  the  attributes  of  thought 
and  extension,  would  have  to  be  deduced.  From  this  it 
would  follow  (Prop.  21,  pt.'  i)  that  man  would  be  infinite, 
which  (by  the  first  part  of  this  demonstration)  is  an  ab- 
surdity. It  is  impossible,  therefore,  that  a  man  can  suffer 
no  changes  but  those  of  which  he  is  the  adequate  cause. 

Q.E.D. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  a  man  is  necessarily 
always  subject  to  passions,  and  that  he  follows  and  obeys 
the  common  order  of  nature,  accommodating  himself  to 
it  as  far  as  the  nature  of  things  requires. 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDAGE.  ,85 

Tlior.  Y. — The  force  mid  increase  of  am/  paaniun  ami  ii» 
perseverance  i7i  existence  are  not  limited  hj  the  potrtr 
by  luliich  ive  endeavour  to  persevere  in  cxistauc,  but 
hi/  the  poivcr  of  an  external  cause  compared  xcith  our 

own  poiccr. 

Lemonst. — The  essence  of  a  passion  cannot  le  c-.\i»laincil 
by  our  essence  alone  (Defs.  i  and  2,  pt.  3) ;  that  is  to 
say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  the  power  of  a  passion  cannot  bo 
limited  by  the  power  by  which  we  endeavour  to  jxjrse- 
vere  in  our  being,  but  (as  has  been  shown  in  Proj).  16. 
pt.  2)  must  necessarily  be  limited  by  the  power  of  an 
external  cause  compared  with  our  own  power. — y.K.i). 

Pkop.  VI. — The  other  actions  or  poicer  of  a  man  may  he 
so  far  surpassed  hy  force  of  some  p)assion  or  ajffct, 
that  the  affect  may  ohstinatcly  cling  to  him. 

Dcmo?2st. — The  force  and  increase  of  any  passion  and 
its  perseverance  in  existence  are  limited  by  the  power 
of  an  external  cause  compared  with  our  own  jx)wer 
(Prop.  5,  pt.  4),  and  therefore  (Prop.  3,  pt.  4)  may  sur- 
pass the  power  of  man. — q.e.d. 

Piior.  VII. — An  affect  cannot  le  restrained  nor  rnnoird 
unless  hy  an  opposed  ami  stronger  affect. 

Demonst. — An  affect,  in  so  far  as  it  is  rehitcd  to  tho 
mind,  is  an  idea  by  which  the  mind  allirnis  a  <,'roater  or 
less  power  of  existence  for  its  body  than  the  boily  pos- 
sessed before  (by  the  general  definition  of  aHect-s  nt  tlio 
I  -end  of  Third  Part).  AVhenever,  therefore,  the  mind  is 
agitated  by  any  affect,  the  body  is  at  the  same  tiuie 
affected  with  an  affection  by  which  its  power  of  action  is 
increased  or  diminished.  Again,  this  afiection  of  the 
body  (Prop.  5,  pt.  4)  receives  from  its  own  cause  a  jiowtT 
to  persevere  in  its  own  being,  a  power,  therefore,  whidi 
cannot  be  restrained  nor  removed   uii!'->s   hy  a   bo«h.y 


1 86  ETHIC. 

cause  (Prop.  6,  pt.  2)  affecting  tlie  body  with  an  affection 
contrary  to  the  first  (Prop.  5,  pt.  3),  and  stronger  than  it 
(Ax.  I,  pt.  4).  Thus  the  mind  (Prop.  1 2,  pt.  2)  is  affected 
by  the  idea  of  an  affection  stronger  than  the  former 
and  contrary  to  it ;  that  is  to  say  (by  the  general  defini- 
tion of  the  affects),  it  will  be  affected  with  an  affect 
stronger  than  tlie  former  and  contrary  to  it,  and  this 
stronger  affect  will  exclude  the  existence  of  the  other  or 
remove  it.  Thus  an  affect  cannot  be  restrained  nor 
removed   unless   by  an  opposed   and   stronger  affect. — 

Q.E.D. 

Cowl. — An  affect,  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  the 
mind,  cannot  be  restrained  nor  removed  unless  by  the 
idea  of  a  bodily  affection  opposed  to  that  which  we  suffer 
and  stronger  than  it.  For  the  affect  which  we  suffer 
cannot  be  restrained  nor  ]'e moved  unless  by  an  opposed 
and  stronger  affect  (Prop.  7,  pt.  4) ;  that  is  to  say  (by  the 
general  definition  of  the  affects),  it  cannot  be  removed 
unless  by  the  idea  of  a  bodily  affection  stronger  than 
that  which  affects  us,  and  opposed  to  it. 

Prop.  A^III. — Knouiedgc  of  good  or  evil  is  nothing  hut 
an  affect  of  Jog  or  sorrow  in  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
scious of  it. 

Demonst. — We  call  a  thing  good  which  contributes  to 
the  preservation  of  our  being,  and  we  call  a  thing  evil  if 
it  is  an  obstacle  to  the  preservation  of  our  being  (Defs.  i 
and  2,  pt.  4) ;  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt,  3),  a  thing  is 
called  by  us  good  or  evil  as  it  increases  or  diminishes, 
helps  or  restrains,  our  power  of  action.  In  so  far,  there- 
fore (Defs.  of  jog  and  sorrow  in  Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3), 
as  we  perceive  that  any  object  affects  us  with  joy  or 
sorrow  do  we  call  it  good  or  evil,  and  therefore  the  know- 
ledge of  good  or  evil  is  nothing  but  an  idea  of  joy  or 
sorrow  which  necessarily  follows  from  the  affect  itself  of 
joy  or  sorrow  (Prop.  22,  pt.  2).     But  this  idea  is  united 


OF  HUMAN  DOS  DAG  E.  ,S; 

to  the  affect  in  the  same  way  as  the  mind  is  unil.-.l  l.* 
the  body  (Prop.  21,  pt.  2),  or,  in  other  words  (as  we  l.nvo 
shown  in  the  Schol.  to  Prop.  21,  pt.  2),  this  idea  is  nut 
actually  distinguished  from  the  afiect  itself;  that  is  tosny 
(by  the  general  definition  of  the  affects),  it  is  not  actually 
distinguished  from  the  idea  of  ihe  aflection  of  the  lx)dy, 
unless  in  conception  alone.  This  knowledge,  therefore,' 
of  good  and  evil  is  nothing  but  the  affect  itself  of  joy 
and  sorrow  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  of  it.— y.i:.i). 

Peop.  IX. — If  we  imagine  the  cause  of  an  affcd  to  If 
actually  present  with  us,  that  affect  will  he  stronger 
than  if  tec  imagined  the  cause  not  to  he  })rcscnt. 

Demonst. — The  imagination  is  an  idea  by  which  the 
mind  contemplates  an  object  as  present  (see  the  delinitittn 
of  the  imagination  in  Schol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2),  an  idea 
which  nevertheless  indicates  the  constitution  of  tlie  liunian 
body  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  external  object  (Corol. 
2,  Prop.  1 6,  pt.  2).  Imagination,  therefore  (by  the  general 
definition  of  the  affects),  is  an  affect  in  so  far  as  it  indi- 
cates the  constitution  of  the  body.  But  the  imagination 
(Prop.  17,  pt.  2)  increases  in  intensity  in  proportion  as 
we  imagine  nothing  wdiich  excludes  the  present  existence 
of  the  external  object.  If,  therefore,  we  imagine  tlio 
cause  of  an  affect  to  be  actually  present  with  us,  that 
affect  will  be  intenser  or  stronger  than  if  we  imagined 
the  cause  not  to  be  present. — q.e.d. 

Carol. — When  I  said  (in  Prop,  i  8,  pt.  3)  that  wc  are 
affected  by  the  image  of  an  object  in  the  future  or  the 
past  with  the  same  affect  with  which  we  should  be 
affected  if  the  object  we  imagined  were  actually  present, 
I  was  careful  to  warn  the  reader  that  this  was  true  in 
so  far  only  as  we  attend  to  the  image  alone  of  the  object 
itself,  for  this  is  of  the  same  nature  whether  wo  have 
imagined  the  object  or  not ;  but  I  have  not  di-nied  thai 
the  image  becomes  weaker  when  we  contemj'Ialo  as  pre- 


iS8  ETHIC. 

sent  otlier  objects  whicli  exclude  the  present  existence  of 
the  future  object.  This  exception  I  neglected  to  make, 
because  I  had  determined  to  treat  in  this  part  of  my  work 
of  the  strength  of  the  affects. 

Corol. — The  image  of  a  past  or  future  object,  that  is 
to  say,  of  an  object  which  we  contemplate  in  relation  to 
the  past  or  future  to  the  exclusion  of  the  present,  other 
things  being  equal,  is  weaker  than  the  image  of  a  pre- 
sent object,  and  consequently  the  affect  towards  a  future 
or  past  object,  other  things  being  equal,  is  weaker  then 
than  the  affect  towards  a  present  object. 

Prop.  X. —  We  are  affected  with  regard  to  a  future  object 
which  we  imarjine  will  soon  he  present  more  -poxoer- 
fully  than  if  we  imagine  that  the  time  at  which  it 
luill  exist  is  further  removed  from  the  present,  and 
the  memory  of  an  object  which  toe  imagine  has  but  just 
passed  away  also  effects  us  more  powerfully  than  if  v:e 
imagine  the  object  to  have  passed  away  some  time  ago. 

Dcmonst. — In  so  far  as  we  imagine  that  an  object 
will  quickly  be  present  or  has  not  long  since  passed 
away,  do  we  imagine  something  which  excludes  the 
presence  of  the  object  less  than  if  we  imagine  that  the 
time  of  its  existence  is  at  a  great  distance  from  the 
present,  either  in  the  future  or  the  past  (as  is  self-evi- 
dent), and  therefore  (Prop.  9,  pt.  4)  so  far  shall  we  be 
affected  more  strongly  with  regard  to  it. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — From  the  observations  which  we  made  upon 
Def.  6,  pt.  4,  it  follows  that  all  objects  which  are  separated 
from  the  present  time  by  a  longer  interval  than  our  ima- 
gination has  any  power  to  determine  affect  us  equally 
slightly,  although  we  know  them  to  be  separated  from 
one  another  by  a  large  space  of  time. 

Prop.  XL — The  affect  towards  an  object  which  we  ima- 
gine as  necessary,  other  things  being  equal,  is  stronger 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDAGE.  ,3^ 

than  that  toicards  an  ohjcH  that  «;)«,.<.;/,/,•  ,..,., ^z,,-^,,/ 
or  not  necessary. 

Demonst.—ln  so  far  as  we  imagine  any  object  to  bo 
necessary  do  ^ye  affirm  its  existence,  and,  on  tlie  other  hand, 
we  deny  its  existence  in  so  far  as  we  imagine  it  to  ho 
not  necessary  (Schol.  i,  Prop.  33,  pt.  1),  and  tliereforo 
(Prop.  9,  pt.  4)  the  affect  towards  a  necessary  ohject, 
other  things  being  equal,  is  stronger  than  tliat  which  wo 
feel  towards  one  that  is  not  necessary. 

Peop.  XII. — The  affect  towards  an  ohject  which  vc  hwir 
does  not  exist  m  the  present,  and  which  we  imagine  as 
possible,  other  thiyigs  being  equal,  is  stronger  than  the 
affect  toicards  a  contingent  object. 

Demonst. — In  so  far  as  we  imagine  an  object  as  con- 
tingent, we  are  not  affected  by  the  image  of  any  other 
object  which  posits  the  existence  of  the  first  (Def.  3,  pt. 
4),  but,  on  the  contrary  (by  hypothesis),  we  imagine 
some  tilings  which  exclude  its  present  existence.  l>ut  in 
so  far  as  we  imagine  any  object  in  the  future  to  bo 
possible  do  we  imagine  some  things  which  posit  its 
existence  (Def.  4,  pt.  4),  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  2,  Prop. 
1 8,  pt.  3),  things  wliich  foster  hope  or  fear,  and  there- 
fore the  affect  towards  a  possible  object  is  stronger,  &c. 

Q.E.D. 

Corol. — The  affect  towards  an  object  wluch  we  know 
does  not  exist  in  the  present,  and  which  we- imagine  as 
contingent,  is  mucli  weaker  llian  if  we  imagined  that  the 
object  were  j)resent  to  us. 

Bemonst. — The  affect  towards  an  object  which  wo 
imagined  to  exist  in  the  present  is  stronger  than  if  wo 
imagined  it  as  future  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  4),  and  is  much 
stronger  if  w^e  imagined  the  future  to  be  at  no  grt-at 
distance  from  the  present  time  (Prop.  10,  pt.  4).  Tho 
affect,  therefore,  towards  an  object  which  we  imngino  will 


l$o  ETHIC. 

not  exist  for  a  long  time  is  so  much  feebler  than  if  we 
imagined  it  as  present,  and  nevertheless  (Prop.  1 2,  pt.  4) 
is  stronger  than  if  we  imagined  it  as  contingent ;  and 
therefore  the  affect  towards  a  contingent  object  is  much 
feebler  than  if  we  imagined  the  object  to  be  present  to 
us. Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XIII. — The  affect  towards  a  contingent  oljject  which 
ive  Icnoiv  does  not  exist  in  the  present,  other  things 
being  equal,  is  much  weaker  than  the  affect  towards  a 
past  object. 

Demonst. — In  so  far  as  we  imagine  an  object  as  con- 
tingent, we  are  affected  with  no  image  of  any  other 
object  which  posits  the  existence  of  the  first  (Def.  3,  pt. 
4).  On  the  contrary,  we  imagine  (by  hypothesis)  certain 
things  which  exclude  its  present  existence.  But  in  so  far 
as  we  imagine  it  in  relationship  to  past  time  are  we  sup- 
posed to  imagine  something  which  brings  it  back  to  the 
memory  or  which  excites  its  image  (Prop.  1 8,  pt.  2,  with 
the  Schol.),  and  therefore  so  far  causes  us  to  contem- 
plate it  as  present  (Corol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2).  Therefore 
(Prop.  9,  pt.  4),  the  affect  towards  a  contingent  object 
which  we  know  does  not  exist  in  the  present,  other 
things  being  equal,  will  be  weaker  than  the  affect 
towards  a  past  object. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  XIV. — No  affect  can  he  restrained  hj/  the  trice  hiow- 
Icdge  of  good  and  evil  in  so  far  as  it  is  true,  hut  only 
in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  an  affect. 

Demonst. — An  affect  is  an  idea  by  which  the  mind 
affirms  a  greater  or  less  power  of  existence  for  the 
body  than  it  possessed  before  (by  the  general  definition 
of  the  affects);  and  therefore  (Prop,  i,  pt.  4)  this  idea 
has  nothing  positive  which  can  be  removed  by  the  pre- 
sence of  the  truth,  and  consequently  the  true  knowledge 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDACn.  ,,, 

of  good  and  evil,  in  so  far  as  it  is  true,  can  restrain  no 
affect.  But  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  affect  (see  Proji.  8,  j.i. 
4)  ^viU  it  restrain  any  other  affect,  provided  tlmt'tlie 
latter  be  the  weaker  of  the  two  (Prop.  7,  pt.  4). q.^i,. 

J  Prop.  XV. — Desire  wJiich  arises  from  a  fntc  Inojclah/r  of 
(jood  and  evil  can  he  extinguished  or  reslrainol  hi/ 
meiny  other  desires  tvliich  take  their  orit/in  from  the 

affects  hi/  which  we  are  agitated. 

Demonst. — From  the  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil, 
in  so  far  as  this  (Prop.  8,  pt.  4)  is  an  alfect,  necessarily 
arises  desire  (Def.  i  of  the  affects,  pt.  3),  which  is  greater 
in  proportion  as  the  affect  from  which  .it  springs  is 
greater  (Prop.  37,  pt.,  3).  But  this  desire  (by  hypothesis), 
because  it  springs  from  onr  understanding  something 
truly,  follows  therefore  in  us  in  so  far  as  we  act  (I'rop. 
I,  pt.  3),  and  therefore  must  be  understood  througli  our 
essence  alone  (Def.  2,  pt.  3),  and  consequently  its  strength 
and  increase  must  be  limited  by  human  power  nlone 
(Prop.  7,  pt.  3).  But  the  desires  which  spring  from  the 
affects  by  which  we  are  agitated  are  greater  as  the  alTect.s 
themselves  are  greater,  and  therefore  their  strength  and 
increase  (Prop.  5,  pt.  4)  must  be  limited  by  the  power 
of  external  causes,  a  power  which,  if  it  be  comjiare«l 
with  our  own,  indefinitely  surpasses  it  (Prop.  3,  pt  4). 
The  desires,  therefore,  which  take  their  origin  frum  such 
affects  as  these  may  be  much  stronger  than  that  which 
takes  its  origin  from  a  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil. 
and  the  former  (Prop.  7,  pt.  4)  may  be  able  to  restrain 
and  extinguish  the  latter. — q.e.d. 

//  Peop.  XVI. —  The  desire  which  springs  from  a  knowUdge  of 
good  and  evil  can  he  easily  cxiinguishal  or  rc^Urainfd, 
in  so  far  as  this  knouicdge  is  connected  %nth  the 
future,  hy  the  desire  of  things  which  in  the  presait  are 
sweet. 


192  ETHIC. 

Demonst. — The  affect  towards  an  object  wliicli  \ve 
imagine  as  future  is  weaker  than  towards  that  which  we 
imagine  as  present  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  4).  But  the 
desire  which  springs  Jrom  a  true  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil,  even  although  the  knowledge  be  of  objects  which 
are  good  at  the  present  time,  may  be  extinguished 
or  restrained  by  any  casual  desire  (Prop.  15,  pt.  4, 
the  demonstration  of  this  proposition  being  universal), 
and  therefore  the  desire  which  springs  from  a  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil,  in  so  far  as  this  knowledge  is  con- 
nected with  the  future,  can  be  easily  restrained  or 
extinguished. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XVII. — The  desire  wJiicJi  springs  from  a  true  know- 
ledge of  good  and  evil  can  he  still  more  easily  restrained, 
in  so  far  as  this  knowledge  is  connected  ivith  objects 
which  are  contingent,  hj  the  desire  of  ohjects  ivhich  are 
preseiit. 

Demonst. — This  proposition  is  demonstrated  in  the  same 
way  as  the  preceding  proposition  from  CoroL  Prop.  1 2, 
pt.  4.       ^ 

Schol. — In  these  propositions  I  consider  that  I  have 
explained  why  men  are  more  strongly  influenced  by  an 
opinion  than  by  true  reason,  and  why  the  true  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil  causes  disturbance  in  the  mind,  and 
often  gives  way  to  every  kind  of  lust,  whence  the  saying 
of  the  poet,  "  Video  mcliora  j^roboque,  deteriora  scquor." 
The  same  thought  appears  to  have  been  in  the  mind  of 
the  Preacher  when  he  said,  "  He  that  increaseth  know- 
ledge increaseth  sorrow-."  I  say  these  things  not  because 
I  would  be  understood  to  conclude,  therefore,  that  it  is 
better  to  be  ignorant  than  to  be  wise,  or  that  the  wise 
man  in  governing  his  passions  is  nothing  better  than  the 
fool,  but  I  say  them  because  it  is  necessary  for  us  to 
know  both  the  strength  and  weakness  of  our  nature,  so 
that  we  may  determine  what  reason  can  do  and  what  it 


OF  HUMAN  BOSDACn.  ,93 

cannot  do  in  governing  our  affects.  This,  moreover,  let 
it  be  remembered,  is  the  Part  in  which  I  meant  to  treat 
of  human  weakness  alone,  all  consideration  of  the  power 
of  reason  over  the  passions  being  reserved  for  a  future 
portion  of  the  boolc 

//  Prop.  XVIII. — The  desire  which  springs  from  joy,  other 
things  being  equal,  is  stronger  than  that  which  springs 
from  sorrow. 

Deriionst. — Desire  is  the  very  essence  of  man  (Def.  i 
of  the  Affects,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  tho 
effort  by  which  a  man  strives  to  persevere  in  liis  being. 
The  desire,  therefore,  which  springs  from  joy,  by  tliat  very 
affect  of  joy  (by  the  definition  of  joy  in  Schol.  Prop.  1 1, 
pt.  3)  is  assisted  or  increased,  while  that  which  sprintj.s 
from  sorrow,  by  that  very  affect  of  sorrow  (by  the  same 
Schol.)  is  lessened  or  restrained,  and  so  the  force  of  tho 
desire  which  springs  from  joy  must  be  limited  by  Imman 
power,  together  with  the  power  of  an  external  cause, 
while  that  which  springs  from  sorrow  must  be  limited 
by  human  power  alone.  The  latter  is,  therefore,  weaker 
than  the  former.— q.e.d. 

Schol. — I  have  thus  briefly  explained  the  cau.ses  of 
human  impotence  and  want  of  stability,  and  why  men 
do  not  obey  the  dictates  of  reason.  It  remains  for  mo 
now  to  show  what  it  is  which  reason  prescribes  to  u.^, 
which  affects  agree  with  the  rules  of  human  reason,  and 
which,  on  the  contrary,  are  opposed  to  these  rules.  Ik- 
fore,  however,  I  begin  to  demonstrate  these  things  by  our 
full  geometrical  method,  I  should  like  briefly  to  sot  forth 
here  these  dictates  of  reason,  in  order  that  what  I  have 
in  my  mind  about  them  may  be  easily  comprehended  by 
aU.  /  Since  reason  demands  nothing  which  is  opposed  to 
nature,  it  demands,  therefore,  that  every  person  shouM 
love  himself,  should  seek  his  own  profit,— what  is  tru  y 
profitable  to  him,— should  desire  everything  that  really 


194         ■  ETHIC. 

leads  man  to  greater  perfection,  and  absolutely  that  every 
one  should  endeavour,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  to  preserve 
his  own  being.  This  is  all  true  as  necessarily  as  that  the . 
whole  is  greater  than  its  part  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3),  Again, 
since  virtue  (Def.  8,  pt.  4)  means  nothing  but  acting 
according  to  the  laws  of  our  own  nature,  and  since  no 
one  endeavours  to  preserve  his  being  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3) 
except  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  his  own  nature,  it 
follows :  Firstly,  That  the  foundation  of  virtue  is  that 
endeavour  itself  to  preserve  our  own  being,  and  that 
happiness  consists  in  this — that  a  man  can  preserve  his 
own  being.  Secondly,  It  follows  that  virtue  is  to  be 
desired  for  its  own  sake,  nor  is  there  anything  more 
excellent  or  more  useful  to  us  than  virtue,  for  the  sake 
of  which  virtue  ought  to  be  desired.  Thirdly,  It  fol- 
lows that  all  persons  who  kill  themselves  are  impotent 
in  mind,  and  have  been  thoroughly  overcome  by  external 
causes  opposed  to  their  nature.  Again,  from  Post.  4, 
pt.  2,  it  follows  that  we  can  never  free  ourselves  from 
the  need  of  something  outside  us  for  the  preservation  of 
our  being,  and  that  we  can  never  live  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  have  no  intercourse  with  objects  which  are  outside 
us.  Indeed,  so  far  as  the  mind  is  concerned,  our  intellect 
would  be  less  perfect  if  the  mind  were  alone,  and  under- 
stood nothing  but  itself.  There  are  many  things,  there- 
fore, outside  us  which  are  useful  to  us,  and  which,  there- 
fore, are  to  be  sought.  Of  all  these,  none  more  excellent 
can  be  discovered  than  those  which  exactly  agree  with 
our  nature.  If,  for  example,  two  individuals  of  exactly 
the  same  nature  are  joined  together,  they  make  up  a 
single  individual,  doubly  stronger  than  each  alone. 
Nothing,  therefore,  is  more  useful  to  man  than  man. 
Men  can  desire,  I  say,  nothing  more  excellent  for  the 
preservation  of  their  being  than  that  all  should  so  agree 
at  every  point  that  the  minds  and  bodies  of  all  should 
form,  as  it  were,  one  mind  and  one  body ;  that  all  should 
together  endeavour  as  much  as  possible  to  preserve  their 


i 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDAGE.  ,95 

being,  and  that  all  should  together  seek  the  conunon  ^'(xxl 
of  all.  Trom  this  it  follows  that  men  who  are  <,'ovcrned 
by  reason, — that  is  to  say,  men  who,  under  the  ;,'uidanco 
of  reason,  seek  their  own  profit, — desire  nothing  for  tiiem- 
selves  which  they  do  not  desire  for  other  men,  and  thai. 
therefore,  they  are  just,  faithful,  and  honourable. 

These  are  those  dictates  of  reason  which  1  |>urposi'<l 
briefly  to  set  forth  before  commencing  their  demonstration 
by  a  fuller  method,  in  order  that,  if  possible,  I  niigiit  win 
the  attention  of  those  who  believe  that  this  principle, — that 
every  one  is  bound  to  seek  his  own  profit, — is  the  founda- 
tion of  impiety,  and  not  of  virtue  and  piety.  Having 
now  briefly  shown  that  this  belief  of  theirs  is  the  con- 
trary of  the  truth,  I  proceed,  by  the  same  metliod  as  that 
which  we  have  hitherto  pursued,  to  demonstrate  what  1 
have  said. 

Peop.  XIX. — Accordiiuj  to  the  laws  of  his  oivn  miturc  aic/t 
person  necessarily  desires  that  which  he  considers  to 
he  good,  and  avoids  that  which  he  considers  to  he  ecU. 

Demonst. — The  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  (Prop.  8, 
pt.  4)  is  the  affect  itself  of  joy  or  sorrow,  in  so  far  as  we 
are  conscious  of  it,  and,  therefore  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3),  each 
person  necessarily  desires  that  which  he  considers  to  bo 
good,  and  avoids  that  which  he  considers  to  be  evil.  liut 
this  desire  is  nothing  but  the  essence  itself  or  nature  of 
man  (Def.  of  appetite  in  Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3,  and  Def. 
I  of  the  Affects,  pt.  3)-  Therefore,  according  to  the 
laws  of  his  own  nature  alone,  he  necessarily  desires  or 
avoids,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XX. — The  more  eaxh  person  strives  and  is  nUt  to 
seek  his  own  profit,  that  is  to  say,  to  preserve  hU  being, 
the  more  virtue  does  he  possess;  on  tlu  other  htnd,  in 
so  far  as  each  person  neglects  his  own  profit,  that  u 
to  say,  neglects  to  preserve  his  own  being.  «  h^ 
impotent. 


196  ETHIC. 

Dcmonst. — Virtue  is  human  power  itself,  wliich  is 
limited  by  the  essence  alone  of  man  (Def.  8,  pt.  4),  that 
is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  which  is  limited  by  the  effort 
alone  by  which  man  endeavours  to  persevere  in  his  being. 
The  more,  therefore,  each  person  strives  and  is  able  to 
preserve  his  being,  the  more  virtue  does  he  possess,  and 
consequently  (Props.  4  and  6,  pt.  3),  in  proportion  as  he 
neglects  to  preserve  his  being  is  he  impotent. 

Schol. — ISTo  one,  therefore,  unless  defeated  by  exter- 
nal causes  and  those  which  are  contrary  to  his  nature, 
neglects  to  seek  his  own  profit  or  preserve  his  being. 
No  one,  I  say,  refuses  food  or  kills  himself  from  a  ne- 
cessity of  his  nature,  but  only  when  forced  by  external 
causes.  The  compulsion  may  be  exercised  in  many  ways. 
A  man  kills  himself  under  compulsion  by  another  when 
that  other  turns  the  right  hand,  with  which  the  man  had 
by  chance  laid  hold  of  a  sword,  and  compels  him  to 
direct  the  sword  against  his  own  heart ;  or  the  command 
of  a  tyrant  may  compel  a  man,  as  it  did  Seneca,  to  open 
his  own  veins,  that  is  to  say,  he  may  desire  to  avoid  a 
greater  evil  by  a  less.  External  and  hidden  causes  also 
may  so  dispose  his  imagination  and  may  so  affect  his 
body  as  to  cause  it  to  put  on  another  nature  contrary  to 
that  which  it  had  at  first,  and  one  whose  idea  cannot 
exist  in  the  mind  (Prop.  10,  pt.  3);  but  a  very  little 
reflection  will  show  that  it  is  as  impossible  that  a  man, 
from  the  necessity  of  his  nature,  should  endeavour  not  to 
exist,  or  to  be  changed  into  some  other  form,  as  it  is 
that  something  should  be  begotten  from  nothing. 

Prop.  XXI. — iVo  one  can  desire  to  he  happy,  to  act  well 
and  live  well,  who  does  not  at  the  same  time  desire  to 
he,  to  act,  and  to  live,  that  is  to  say,  actually  to  exist. 

Dcmonst. — The  demonstration  of  this  proposition,  or 
rather  the  proposition  itself,  is  self-evident,  and  is  also 
evident  from  the  definition  of  desire.     Por  desire  (Def.  i 


OF  HUMAN  DON  DAG  n. 

of  the  Affects,  pt.  3),  whether  it  be  desire  of  liviu-  or 
acting  happily  or  well,  is  the  very  essence  of  man.  tlmt 
is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  the  endeavour  by  which  rvery 
one  strives  to  preserve  his  own  being.     Xo  one,  thtTL-furo. 

can  desire,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Pnor.  XXII. — iVb  virtue  can  be  concciird  prior  to  this  {th( 
endeavour,  namely,  after  self -preservation). 

Dcriionst. — The  endeavour  after  self-preservation  is 
the  essence  itself  of  a  thing  (Prop.  7,  ])t.  3).  If,  there- 
fore, any  virtue  could  be  conceived  prior  to  tliis  of  self- 
preservation,  the  essence  itself  of  the  thing  would  be 
conceived  (Def.  8,  pt.  4)  as  prior  to  itself,  which  (as  is 
self-evident)  is  absurd.     Xo  virtue,  therefore,  &c. — g.E.n. 

Co7vl. — The  endeavour  after  self-preservation  is  the 
primary  and  only  foundation  of  virtue.  For  itrior  to 
this  principle  no  other  can  be  conceived  (Prop,  22, 
pt.  4),  and  without  it  (Prop.  21,  pt.  4)  no  virtue  run 
be  conceived. 

Prop.  XXIII. — In  so  far  as  a  man  is  determined  to  anti 

action  because  he  has  inadequate  ideas,  he  cannot  hf 

absolutely  said  to  act  in  conformity  unth  rirtue,  hut 

only  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  because  hi  undo-' 

stands. 

Demonst. — In  so  far  as  a  man  is  determined  to  action 

because   he  has   inadequate  ideas  (Prop,    i,  pt.   3),  he 

suffers,  that  is  to  say  (Defs.   i  and  2,  pt   3),  lie  does 

something  which  through  his  essence  alone  cannot  be 

perceived,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  8,  pt.  4),  which  does  not 

follow  from  his  virtue.     But  in  so  far  as  he  is  deter- 

mined    to  any  action  because   he    understands,  he  acta 

(Prop.  I,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  2,  pt  3).  he  «loe« 

something  which  is  perceived  through  liis  essence  alone, 

or  (Def.    8,  pt.  4)  which  aderiuately  follows  from   his 

virtue. — q.e.d. 


iqS  ethic. 

PROr.  XXIV. —  To  act  absolutely  in  conformity  with  virtue 
is,  in  us,  nothing  hut  acting,  living,  and  preserving 
our  being  (these  three  things  have  the  same  meaning) 
as  reason  dii-ects,  from  the  ground  of  seeking  our  own 
profit. 

Demonst. — To  act  absolutely  in  conformity  with  virtue 
is  nothing  (Def.  8,  pt.  4)  but  acting  according  to  the 
laws  of  our  own  proper  nature.  But  only  in  so  far  as 
we  understand  do  we  act  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3).  Therefore, 
to  act  in  conformity  with  virtue  is  nothing  but  acting, 
living,  and  preserving  our  being  as  reason  directs,  and 
doing  so  (Corol.  Prop.  22,  pt.  4)  from  the  ground  of 
seeking  our  own  profit. 

Prop.  XXV. — No  one  endeavours  to  preserve  his  own  heing 
for  the  sake  of  another  object, 

Demonst. — The  effort  by  which  any  object  strives  to 
persevere  in  its  own  being  is  limited  solely  by  the 
essence  of  the  object  itself  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  and  from 
this  given  essence  alone  it  necessarily  follows  (and  not 
from  the  essence  of  any  other  object)  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3) 
that  each  object  strives  to  preserve  its  being.  This  pro- 
position is  also  evident  from  Corol.  Prop.  22,  pt.  4.  Por 
if  a  man  endeavoured  to  preserve  his  being  for  the  sake 
of  any  other  object,  this  object  would  then  become  the 
primary  foundation  of  virtue  (as  is  self-evident),  which 
(by  the  Corol.  just  quoted)  is  an  absurdity.  N"o  one, 
therefore,  endeavours  to  preserve  his  being,  &c. — Q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXVI. — All  efforts  tvhich  we  make  through  reason 
are  nothing  but  efforts  to  understand,  and  the  onind, 
in  so  far  as  it  uses  reason,  adjudges  nothing  as  pro- 
fitdble  to  itself  excepting  that  which  conduces  to  under- 
standing. 

Demonst. — The    endeavour    after  self-preservation   is 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE.  „^, 

nothing  but  the  essence  of  the  object  itself  (Trop.  7,  pi, 
3),  which,  in  so  far  as  it  exists,  is  conceived  to  havo 
power  to  persevere  in  existence  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3),  ami  to  do 
those  things  which  necessarily  follow  from  its  givuu  naturi-. 
(See  the  definition  of  desire  in  Schol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  3.) 
But  the  essence  of  reason  is  nothing  but  our  mind,  in  so 
far  as  it  clearly  and  distinctly  understands.  (See  detinitinu 
of  clear  and  distinct  understanding  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40, 
pt.  2.)  Therefore  (Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  all  efforts  wliich  we 
make  through  reason  are  nothing  else  than  efTorta  to 
understand.  Again,  since  this  effort  of  the  mind,  by 
which  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  reasons,  endeavours  to 
preserve  its  being,  is  nothing  but  the  effort  to  understand 
(by  the  first  part  of  this  demonstration),  it  follows  (Corul. 
Prop.  22,  pt.  4),  that  this  effort  to  understand  is  the 
primary  and  sole  foundation  of  virtue,  and  that  (Prop. 
25,  pt.  4)  we  do  not  endeavour  to  understand  things  for 
the  sake  of  any  end,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  mind,  in 
so  far  as  it  reasons,  can  conceive  nothing  as  being  go<Kl 
for  itself  except  that  which  conduces  to  understanding 
(Def.  I,  pt.  4). Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVII. —  TVe  do  not  know  that  anythiwj  is  urtainhj 
good  or  evil  excepting  that  vMch  actually  conducts  to 
understanding,  or  vMch  can  prevent  ns  from  uruitr- 

standing. 

Demonst. — The  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  reasons  desires 
nothing  but  to  understand,  nor  does  it  adjudge  aiiyth:u- 
to  be  profitable  to  itself  excepting    what   condu 
understanding  (Prop.  26,  pt.  4).      But  the  mind  .1 
41  and  43,  pt.  2,  with  the  Schol.)  possesses  no  cer 
unless  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  adequate  ideas,  or  ; 
by  Schol.  Prop.  40,  pt.  2,  is  the  same  thing)  in  so  far  u. 
it  reasons.     We  do  not  know,  therefore,  that  anyllnng  .s 
certainly  good,  excepting  that  which  actually  conduce. 
to  understanding,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  kuuw 


/ 


200  ETHIC. 

that  anything  is  evil  excepting  that  which  can  hinder 
"US  from  understanding. — q.e.d. 


Peop.  XXVIII. — The  highest  good  of  the  mind  is  the 
knowledge  of  God,  and  the  highest  viiiue  of  the  mind 
is  to  know  God. 

Demonst. — The  highest  thing  which  the  mind  can 
understand  is  God,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  6,  pt.  i),  Being 
absolutely  infinite,  and  without  whom  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i) 
nothing  can  be  nor  can  be  conceived,  and  therefore  (Props. 
26  and  27,  pt.  4)  that  which  is  chiefly  profitable  to  the 
mind,  or  (Def.  i,  pt.  4)  which  is  the  highest  good  of  the 
mind,  is  the  knowledge  of  God.  Again,  the  mind  acts 
only  in  so  far  as  it  understands  (Props,  i  and  3,  pt.  3), 
and  only  in  so  far  (Prop.  23,  pt.  4)  can  it  be  absolutely 
said  to  act  in  conformity  with  virtue.  To  understand, 
therefore,  is  the  absolute  virtue  of  the  mind.  But  the 
highest  thing  which  the  mind  can  understand  is  God  (as 
we  have  already  demonstrated),  and  therefore  the  highest 
virtue  of  the  mind  is  to  understand  or  know  God. — q.e.d. 


PiiOP.  XXIX. — JVo  individual  ohject  whose  nature  is  alto- 
gether different  from  our  own  can  either  help  or 
restrain  our  power  of  acting,  and  alsolutely  nothing 
can  he  to  us  either  good  or  evil  unless  it  possesses 
something  in  common  with  ourselves. 

Demonst. — The  power  of  an  individual  object,  and  con- 
sequently (Corol.  Prop.  10,  pt.  2)  that  of  man,  by  which 
he  exists  and  acts,  is  determined  only  by  another  indivi-  ■ 
dual  object  (Prop.  28,  pt.  i),  whose  nature  (Prop.  6,  pt. 
2)  must  be  understood  through  the  same  attribute  as  that 
by  means  of  which  human  nature  is  conceived.  Our 
power  of  acting,  therefore,  in  whatever  way  it  may  be 
conceived,  can  be  determined,  and  consequently  helped  or 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  E,  ^, 

restraiued,  by  the  power  of  another  individual  ohjoct  jmjs- 
sessing  something  in  common  ^Yith  us,  and  cannot  be 
thus  determined  by  the  power  of  an  object  whose  nature 
is  altogether  different  from  ours.  Inasmuch,  therefore. 
as  a  thing  is  called  good  or  evil  because  it  is  the  cause 
of  joy  or  sorrow  (Prop.  8,  pt.  4),  that  is  to  say  (Schol. 
Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  because  it  increases  or  diminishes,  lielps 
or  restrains,  our  power  of  action  ;  an  object,  whose  nature 
is  altogether  different  from  our  own,  cannot  be  either 
good  or  evil  to  us. — q.e.d. 


Prop.  XXX. — Nothing  can  he  evil  throiujh  thai  irhich  U 
possesses  in  common  with  our  nature,  hut  in  so  far  as 
a  thing  is  evil  to  us  is  it  contrary  to  us. 

Demonst. — We  call  that  thing  evil  which  is  tlie  cause  of 
sorrow  (Prop.  8,  pt.  4),  that  is  to  say  (by  tlie  definition  of 
sorrow  in  SchoL  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  which  lessens  or  restrains 
our  power  of  action.  If,  therefore,  any  object  were  evil 
to  us  through  that  which  it  possesses  in  common  with  us, 
it  could  lessen  or  restrain  what  it  possesses  in  common 
with  us,  which  (Prop.  4,  pt.  3)  is  absurd.  Xulhinj,', 
therefore,  through  that  whicli  it  possesses  in  common 
with  us  can  be  evil  to  us,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  evil,  that  is  to  say  (as  we  have  already  shown), 
in  so  far  as  it  can  lessen  or  restrain  our  power  of  action 
(Prop.  5,  pt.  3),  is  it  contrary  to  us. — Q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXXI. — In  so  far  as  an  object  agrcca  v'.th  .>ur 
nature  is  it  necessarily  good. 

Demonst. — In  so  far  as  any  object  agrees  witli  our 
nature  (Prop.  30,  pt.  4)  it  cannot  be  evil.  It  must, 
therefore,  necessarily  be  either  good  or  indiflerent.  If  it 
be  supposed  as  indifferent,  that  is  to  say,  as  neither  good 
nor  evil,  nothing  (Ax.  3,  pt.  i)  will  follow  from  its  nature 
which  conduces  to  the  preservation  of  our  nature,  that  is 


202  ETHIC. 

to  say  (by  hypothesis),  which  conduces  to  its  own  pre- 
servation. But  this  (Prop.  6,  pt.  3)  is  absurd,  and, 
therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  object  agrees  with  our  nature, 
it  will  necessarily  be  good. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  more  an  object 
agrees  with  our  own  nature,  the  more  profitable  it  is  to 
us,  that  is  to  say,  the  better  it  is  for  us,  and,  conversely, 
the  more  profitable  an  object  is  to  us,  the  more  does  it 
agree  with  our  own  nature.  For  in  so  far  as  it  does  not 
agree  with  our  nature  it  will  necessarily  be  either  diverse 
from  our  nature  or  contrary  to  it.  If  diverse,  it  can 
(Prop.  29,  pt.  4)  be  neither  good  nor  evil,  but  if  con- 
trary, it  will  therefore  be  contrary  also  to  that  which 
agrees  with  our  own  nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  3 1 , 
pt.  4),  contrary  to  the  good,  or,  in  other  words,  it  will  be 
evil.  IsTo thing,  therefore,  can  be  good  except  in  so  far 
as  it  agrees  with  our  nature,  and  therefore  the  more  an 
object  agrees  with  our  nature  the  more  profitable  it  will 
be,  and  vice  versa. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  XXXII. — In  so  far  as  men  are  suhject  to  passions, 
they  can7iot  he  said  to  agree  in  nature. 

Demonst. — Things  which  are  said  to  agree  in  nature 
are  understood  to  agree  in  power  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  and 
not  in  impotence  or  negation,  and  consequently  (Schol. 
Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  not  in  passion,  and  therefore  men,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  subject  to  passion,  cannot  be  said  to  agree 
in  nature. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  he  who 
says  that  black  and  white  agree  solely  in  the  fact  that 
neither  of  them  is  red,  absolutely  affirms  that  black  and 
white  agree  in  nothing.  So  also  if  we  say  that  a  stone 
and  a  man  agree  solely  in  this,  they  are  both  finite  or 
impotent,  or  do  not  exist  from  the  necessity  of  their 
nature,  or  are  both  to  an  indefinite  extent  dominated  by 
external   causes,    we  affirm    that    a    stone  and    a  man 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE.  303 

agree   in  nothing,  for  things  which  agree  in   nogatjon 
only,  or  in  that  which  they  have  not,  really  a^ree  in 

nothing. 

Peop.  XXXIII. — 3fcn  may  differ  in  nnfure  from  nu^ 
another  in  so  far  as  they  arc  agitated  by  affecta  vhirk 
are  passions,  and  in  so  far  also  as  one  and  the  sauir 
man  is  agitated  ly  passions  is  he  changeable  and  in- 

constant. 

Demonst. — The  natnre  or  essence  of  the  afTocts  cannot 
be  explained  through  our  essence  or  nature  alone  (Defs. 
I  and  2,  pt.  3),  but  must  be  determined  by  the  power. 
that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  the  nature  of  exlcrnal 
causes  compared  with  our  own  nature.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  there  are  as  many  kinds  of  each  affect  as  there 
are  kinds  of  objects  by  which  we  are  affected  (Prop.  $6, 
pt.  3)  ;  that  men  are  affected  in  different  ways  by  one  and 
the  same  object  (Prop.  51,  pt.  3),  and  so  far  differ  in 
nature;  and,  finally,  that  one  and  the  same  man  (I'rop. 
51,  pt.  3)  is  affected  in  different  ways  towards  the  same 
object,  and  so  far  is  changeable  and  inconstant. — Q.F..I). 

Prop.  XXXIV. — In  so  far  as  men  are  agitated  by  affcctn 

which  are  passions  can  they  he  contrary  to  one  anotlur. 

Demonst. — A  man,  Peter,  for  example,  may  be  a  cause 
of  sorrow  to  Paul,  because  he  possesses  something,'  re- 
sembling that  which  Paul  hates  (Prop.  16,  pt.  3),  or 
because  he  alone  possesses  something  wliich  Paul  him- 
self also  loves  (Prop.  32,  pt.  3,  witli  its  Schol.).  or  fur 
other  reasons  (the  chief  of  which  are  mentioned  in  Schol. 
Prop.  5  5,  pt.  3).  Hence  it  will  come  to  pass  (Def.  7  of 
the  affects)  that  Paul  hates  Peter,  and,  consequently,  it 
will  easily  happen  (Prop.  40,  pt.  3,  with  its  Schol.)  that 
Peter  in  turn  hates  Paul,  and  that  they  endeavour  (Prop. 
39,  pt.    3)   to  injure    one  another,   or,   in  other  wortU 


204  ETHIC. 

(Prop.  30,  pt.  4),  that  they  are  contrary  to  one  another. 
But  the  affect  of  sorrow  is  always  a  passion  (Prop.  59, 
pt.  3),  and  therefore  men,  in  so  far  as  they  are  agitated 
by  affects  wliicli  are  passions,  can  be  contrary  to  one 
another. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — I  have  said  that  Paul  hates  Peter  because  he 
imagines  that  Peter  possesses  something  which  he  him- 
self loves,  from  which  at  first  sight  it  appears  to  follow,  that 
because  they  both  love  the  same  thing,  and  consequently 
agree  in  nature  with  one  another,  they  are,  therefore,  injur- 
ious to  one  another ;  and  if  this  be  true.  Props.  30  and  31, 
pt.  4,  would  be  false.  But  if  we  will  examine  the  matter 
impartially,  we  shall  see  that  all  these  things  are  quite  in 
accord.  For  Peter  and  Paul  are  not  injurious  to  one  another 
in  so  far  as  they  agree  in  nature,  that  is  to  say,  in  so  far 
as  they  both  love  the  same  object,  but  in  so  far  as  they 
differ  from  one  another.  For  in  so  far  as  they  both  love 
the  same  object  is  the  love  of  each  strengthened  (Prop. 
3  I,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  6  of  the  Affects),  so  far  is 
the  joy  of  both  increased.  It  is  far  from  true,  therefore, 
that  in  so  far  as  they  love  the  same  object  and  agree  in 
nature  they  are  injurious  to  one  another.  They  are  in- 
jurious to  one  another,  on  the  contrary,  as  I  have  said, 
solely  because  they  are  supposed  to  differ  in  nature.  For 
we  suppose  Peter  to  have  an  idea  of  a  beloved  object 
which  he  now  possesses,  and  Paul,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
have  an  idea  of  a  beloved  object  which  he  has  lost.  The 
former,  therefore, . is  affected  with  joy,  and  the  latter,  on 
the  contrary,  with  sorrow,  and  so  far  they  are  contrary  to 
one  another.  In  this  manner  we  can  easily  show  that  the 
other  causes  of  hatred  depend  solely  on  the  fact  that  men 
differ  by  nature  and  not  on  anything  in  which  they  agree. 

Prop.   XXXV. — So  far  as  men  live  in  conformity  with  the 
guidance  of  reason,  in  so  far  only  do  they  always  neces- 
sarily agree  in  nature. 
Demonst. — In  so  far  as  men  are  agitated  by  affects 


OF  H  UMA  N  BOX  DA  GE.  305 

which  are  passions  can  they  differ  in  nature  (Proiv  33, 
pt.  4)  and  be  contrary  to  one  another  (rrop.  34,  pt  4).' 
But  men  are  said  to  act  only  in  so  far  as  they  livo 
according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  ami 
therefore,  whatever  follows  from  human  nature,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  determined  by  reason  (Def  2,  pt.  3),  must  bo 
understood  through  human  nature  alone  as  tliroui,'h  iu 
proximate  cause.  But  because  every  one,  according  to  tlio 
laws  of  his  own  nature,  desires  that  which  he  adjudges 
to  be  good,  and  endeavours  to  remove  that  which  he  ad- 
judges to  be  evil  (Prop.  1 9,  pt.  4),  and  because  that  which 
from  the  dictates  of  reason  we  judge  to  be  good  or  evil 
is  necessarily  good  or  evil  (Prop.  41,  pt.  2),  it  follows 
that  men,  only  in  so  far  as  they  live  according  to  the 
guidance  of  reason,  necessarily  do  those  things  wliich  are 
good  to  human  nature,  and  consequently  to  each  man, 
that  is  to  say  (Corol.  Prop.  31,  pt.  4),  whicii  agree  with 
the  nature  of  each  man,  and  therefore  also  men  neces- 
sarily always  agree  with  one  another  in  so  far  as  they 
live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason. — Q.E.D. 

Corol.  I. — There  is  no  single  thing  iu  nature  which  is 
more  profitable  to  man  than  a  man  who  lives  according 
to  the  guidance  of  reason.  For  that  is  most  profitable 
to  man  which  most  agrees  with  his  own  nature  (Corol. 
Prop.  31,  pt.  4),  that  is  to  say,  man  (as  is  self-evident). 
But  a  man  acts  absolutely  from  the  laws  of  his  own 
nature  when  he  lives  according  to  the  guidance  of  rea.s«>n 
(Def.  2,  pt.  3),  and  so  far  only  does  he  always  necessarily 
agree  with  the  nature  of  another  man  (Prop.  35,  pt.  4); 
therefore  there  is  no  single  tiling  more  proGtidde  t»  a 
man  than  man,  &c. — Q.E.D. 

Corol.  2.— When  each  man  seeks  most  that  which  i« 
profitable  to  himself,  then  are  men  most  profitable  to  ono 
another;  for  the  more  each  man  seeks  his  own  profit 
and  endeavours  to  preserve  himself,  the  more  virtue 
does  he  possess  (Prop.  20,  pt.  4),  or,  in  other  words  (Def. 
8,  pt.  4),  the  more  power  does  he  possess  to  act  accord- 


2o6  ETHIC. 

ing  to  the  laws  of  his  own  nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop. 
3,  pt.  3),  to  live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason. 
But  men  most  agree  in  nature  wdien  they  live  according 
to  the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop.  35,  pt.  4),  therefore  (by 
the  previous  Corol.)  men  will  be  most  profitable  to  one 
another  when  each  man  seeks  most  what  is  profitable  to 
himself. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — To  what  we  have  just  demonstrated  daily  ex- 
perience itself  testifies  by  so  many  and  such  striking 
proofs,  that  it  is  in  almost  everybody's  mouth  that  man 
is  a  God  to  man.  It  is  very  seldom  indeed  that  men 
live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  ;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  so  happens  that  they  are  generally  envious  and 
injurious  to  one  another.  But,  nevertheless,  they  are 
scarcely  ever  able  to  lead  a  solitary  life,  so  that  to  most 
men  the  definition  of  man  that  he  is  a  social  animal 
entirely  commends  itself,  and  indeed  it  is  the  case  that 
far  more  advantages  than  disadvantages  arise  from  the 
common  society  of  men.  Let  satirists  therefore  scoff  at 
human  affairs  as  much  as  they  please,  let  theologians  de- 
nounce them,  and  let  the  melancholy  praise  as  much  as 
they  can  a  life  rude  and  without  refinement,  despising 
men  and  admiring  the  brutes,  men  wdll  nevertheless  find 
out  that  by  mutual  help  they  can  much  more  easily  pro- 
cure the  things  they  need,  and  that  it  is  only  by  their 
united  strength  they  can  avoid  the  dangers  which  every- 
where threaten  them,  to  say  nothing  about  its  being  far 
nobler  and  worthier  of  our  knowledge  to  meditate  upon 
the  doings  of  men  than  upon  those  of  brutes.  But  more 
of  this  elsewhere. 

I  Peop.  XXXVI. — The  highest  good  of  those  who  follow  after 
virtue  is  common  to  all,  and  all  may  equally  enjoy  it. 

Dcinonst. — To  act  in  conformity  with  virtue  is  to  act 
according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop.  24,  pt.  4), 
and  every  effort  which  we  make  through  reason  is  an 


J 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DACE. 

effort  to  understand  (Prop.  26,  pt.  4),  aiul  ll»ert?foro 
(Prop.  28,  pt.  4)  the  highest  good  of  those  who  follow 
after  virtue  is  to  know  God,  that  is  to  say  (rrf>p.  47. 
pt.  2,  with  its  Schol.),  it  is  a  good  which  is  ci.imnon  to 
all  men,  and  can  be  equally  possessed  by  all  men  in  so 
far  as  they  are  of  the  same  nature. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — If  anybody  asks,  What  if  the  highest  goo<l  of 
those  who  follow  after  virtue  were  not  common  to  all  { 
would  it  not  thence  follow  (as  above,  see  Prop.  34,  pt.  4) 
that  men  who  live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason, 
that  is  to  say  (Prop.  35,  pt.  4),  men  in  so  far  as  they 
agree  in  nature,  would  be  contrary  to  one  another  ?  We 
reply  that  it  arises  from  no  accident,  but  from  the  nature 
itself  of  reason,  that  the  highest  good  of  man  is  com- 
mon to  all,  inasmuch  as  it  is  deduced  from  the  human 
essence  itself,  in  so  far  as  it  is  determined  by  reason,  and 
also  because  man  could  not  be  nor  be  conceived  if  he  had 
not  the  powder  of  rejoicing  in  this  highest  good.  For  it 
pertains  (Prop.  47,  pt.  2)  to  the  essence  of  the  human 
mind  to  have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and 
infinite  essence  of  God. 


Peop.  XXXYII. — The  good  which  evert/  one  who  foUmra 
after  virtue  seeks  for  himself  he  will  desire  for  other 
mm  ;  and  Ms  desire  on  their  hchalf  will  be  greater  in 
jjroportion  as  he  has  a  greater  knowledge  of  God. 

Demonst. — Men  are  most  profitable  to  man  in  so  far 
as  they  live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  (CoroL  I, 
Prop.  35,  pt.  4),  and  therefore  (Prop.  19,  pt-  4).  accord- 
ing to  the  guidance  of  reason,  we  neces.sarily  endeavour 
to  cause  men  to  live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason. 
But  the  good  which  each  person  seeks  who  lives  accord- 
ing to  the  dictates  of  reason,  that  is  to  say  (Proj*.  24. 
pt.  4),  who  follows  after  virtue,  is  to  understand  (Prop. 
26,  pt.  4),  and  therefore  the  good  which  each  iK;r«on 
seeks  'who   follows  after  virtue  he  will  also  desiro  for 


2o8  ETHIC. 

other  men.  Again,  desire,  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to 
the  mind,  is  the  essence  itself  of  the  mind  (Def.  i  of  the 
Affects).  But  the  essence  of  the  mind  consists  in  know- 
ledge (Prop.  II,  pt.  2),  which  involves  the  knowledge  of 
God  (Prop.  47,  pt.  2),  and  without  this  knowledge  the 
essence  of  the  mind  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived 
(Prop.  I  5 ,  pt.  I )  ;  and  therefore  the  greater  the  know- 
ledge of  God  which  the  essence  of  the  mind  involves, 
the  greater  will  be  the  desire  with  which  he  who  follows 
after  virtue  will  desire  for  another  the  good  which  he 
seeks  for  himself. — q.e.d. 

Another  Demonstration. — The  good  which  a  man  seeks 
for  himself  and  which  he  loves  he  will  love  more  un- 
changeably if  he  sees  that  others  love  it  (Prop.  3  i,  pt.  3), 
and  therefore  (Corol.  Prop.  31,  pt.  3)  he  will  endeavour 
to  make  others  love  it ;  and  because  this  good  (Prop.  3  6, 
pt.  4)  is  common  to  all  and  all  can  rejoice  in  it,  he  will 
endeavour  (by  the  same  reasoning)  to  cause  all  to  rejoice 
in  it,  and  (Prop,  37,  pt.  3)  he  will  do  so  the  more  the 
more  he  rejoices  in  this  good  himself. — q.e.d. 

Schol.  I. — He  who  strives  from  an  affect  alone  to  make 
others  love  what  he  himself  loves,  and  to  make  others 
live  according  to  his  way  of  thinking,  acts  from  mere 
impulse,  and  is  therefore  hateful,  especially  to  those  who 
have  other  tastes,  and  who  therefore  also  desire,  and  by 
the  same  impulse  strive  to  make  others  live  according  to 
their  way  of  thinking. 

Again,  since  the  highest  good  which  men  seek  from  an 
affect  is  often  such  that  only  one  person  can  possess  it, 
it  follows  that  persons  who  love  are  not  consistent  with 
themselves,  and,  whilst  they  delight  to  recount  the  praises 
of  the  beloved  object,  fear  lest  they  should  be  believed. 
But  he  who  endeavours  to  lead  others  by  reason  does 
not  act  from  impulse,  but  with  humanity  and  kindness, 
and  is  always  consistent  with  himself. 

Everything  which  we  desire  and  do,  of  which  we  are 
the  cause  in  so  far  as  we  possess  an  idea  of  God,  or  in 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  n.  ^^ 

so  far  as  we  know  God,  I  refer  to  RcWji.n.  Tho  desiro 
of  doing  well  which  is  horn  in  us,  because  wo  liv«  accord- 
ing to  the  guidance  of  reason,  I  call  Piety.  Tho  dcairo 
to  join  others  in  friendship  to  himself,  with  which  a  man 
living  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  is  possessed,  I 
call  Honour.  I  call  that  thing  Eonourahle  which  men 
who  live  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  praise ;  an»l 
that  thing,  on  the  contrary,  I  call  Base  which  sets  itself 
against  the  formation  of  friendship.  Moreover,  I  have 
also  shown  what  are  the  foundations  of  a  State. 

The  difference  also  between  true  virtue  and  impotence 
may,  from  wdiat  has  already  been  said,  be  easily  seen  to 
be  this — that  true  virtue  consists  in  living  according  to 
the  guidance  of  reason  alone ;  and  that  impotence  there- 
fore consists  in  this  alone — that  a  man  allows  hiiiisi'lf  to 
be  led  by  things  which  are  outside  himself,  and  by  tljctn 
to  be  determined  to  such  actions  as  the  connuon  consti- 
tution of  external  things  demands,  and  not  to  such  as  his 
own  nature  considered  in  itself  alone  demands.  These 
are  the  things  which  I  promised  in  Schol.  Prop.  1 8,  pt.  4, 
I  would  demonstrate.  From .  them  we  see  that  the  law 
against  killing  animals  is  based  upon  an  empty  supersti- 
tion and  womanish  tenderness,  rather  than  upon  sound 
reason.  The  law,  indeed,  of  seeking  one's  own  protit 
teaches  us  to  unite  in  friendship  with  men,  and  not  with 
brutes,  nor  with  things  whose  nature  is  diflerent  from 
human  nature.  It  teaches  us,  too,  that  the  same  right 
which  they  have  over  us  we  have  over  them.  Indeed, 
since  the  right  of  any  person  is  limited  by  his  virtue  or 
power,  men  possess  a  far  greater  riglit  over  brutes  than 
brutes  possess  over  men.  I  by  no  means  deny  tliat 
brutes  feel,  but  I  do  deny  that  on  tliis  account  it  is 
unlawful  for  us  to  consult  our  own  profit  by  usiiij;  them 
for  our  own  pleasure  and  treating  them  as  is  most  con- 
venient for  us,  inasmuch  as  they  do  not  agree  in  nature 
with  us,  and  their  affects  are  diilerent  frum  our  own 
(Schol.  Prop.  57,  pt.  3). 


210  ETHIC. 

It  now  remains  that  I  should  explain  what  are  Justice, 
Injustice,  Crime,  and,  finally,  Merit.  With  regard  to 
these,  see  the  following  scholium. 

ScJiol.  2. — In  the  Appendix  to  the  First  Part  I  promised 
I  would  explain  what  are  praise  and  hlame,  merit  and 
crime,  justice  and  injustice.  I  have  already  shown  what 
is  the  meaning  of  praise  and  blame  in  Schol.  Prop.  29, 
pt.  3,  and  this  will  be  a  fitting  place  for  the  explanation 
of  the  rest.  A  few  words  must,  however,  first  be  said 
about  the  natural  and  civil  state  of  man. 

It  is  by  the  highest  right  of  nature  that  each  person 
exists,  and  consequently  it  is  by  the  highest  right  of 
nature  that  each  person  does  those  things  which  follow 
from  the  necessity  of  his  nature ;  and  therefore  it  is  by 
the  highest  right  of  nature  that  each  person  judges  what 
is  good  and  what  is  evil,  consults  his  own  advantage  as 
he  thinks  best  (Props.  19  and  20,  pt.  4),  avenges  him- 
self (Corol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  3),  and  endeavours  to  pre- 
serve what  he  loves  and  to  destroy  what  he  hates  (Prop. 
28,  pt.  3).  If  men  lived  according  to  the  guidance  of 
reason,  every  one  would  enjoy  this  right  without  injuring 
any  one  else  (Corol.  i,  Prop.  35,  pt.  4).  But  because 
men  are  subject  to  affects  (Corol.  Prop.  4,  pt.  4),  which 
far  surpass  human  power  or  virtue  (Prop.  6,  pt.  4),  they 
are  often  drawn  in  different  directions  (Prop,  33,  pt.  4), 
and  are  contrary  to  one  another  (Prop.  34,  pt.  4), 
although  they  need  one  another's  help  (Schol.  Prop.  35, 
pt.  4). 

In  order,  then,  that  men  may  be  able  to  live  in  har- 
mony and  be  a  help  to  one  another,  it  is  necessary  for 
them  to  cede  their  natural  right,  and  beget  confidence 
one  in  the  other  that  they  will  do  nothing  by  which  one 
can  injure  the  other.  In  what  manner  this  can  be  done, 
so  that  men  who  are  necessarily  subject  to  affects  (Corol. 
Prop.  4,  pt.  4),  and  are  uncertain  and  changeable  (Prop. 
33,  pt.  4),  can  beget  confidence  one  in  the  other  and 
liave  faith  in  one  another,  is  evident  from  Prop.  7,  pt.  4, 


OF  HUMAN  DOXDAGE.  ,,, 

and  Prop.  39,  pt.  3.  It  is  there  shown  tlmt  no  nlFiTt 
can  be  restrained  unless  by  a  stronger  and  contrary 
affect,  and  that  every  one  abstains  from  doin.u'  ^n  injury 
through  fear  of  a  greater  injury.  T.y  this  hnv.  thon-fon'.. 
can  society  be  strengthened,  if  only  it  claims  for  itself 
the  right  which  every  individual  possesses  of  avpnj,»in" 
himself  and  deciding  what  is  good  and  wliat  is  evil,  and 
provided,  therefore,  that  it  possess  the  power  of  proscrih- 
ing  a  common  rule  of  life,  of  promulgating  laws  and 
supporting  them,  not  by  reason,  which  cannot  restrain 
the  affects  (Schol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  4),  but  by  penalties. 

This  society,  firmly  established  by  law  and  willi  a 
2)ower  of  self-preservation,  is  called  a  State,  and  those 
who  are  protected  by  its  right  are  called  Citizens.  We 
can  now  easily  see  that  in  the  natural  state  there  i.s 
nothing  which  by  universal  consent  is  good  or  evil,  since 
every  one  in  a  natural  state  consults  only  his  own  profit ; 
deciding  according  to  his  own  way  of  thinking  what  i.s 
good  and  what  is  evil  with  reference  only  to  liis  own 
profit,  and  is  not  bound  by  any  law  to  obey  any  one  but 
himself.  Hence  in  a  natural  state  sin  cannot  l»e  con- 
ceived, but  only  in  a  civil  state,  where  it  is  decided  by 
universal  consent  what  is  good  and  what  is  evil,  and 
where  every  one  is  bound  to  obey  the  State.  Sin,  there- 
fore, is  nothing  but  disobedience,  which  is  punished  by 
the  law  of  the  State  alone ;  obedience,  on  the  other  liantl. 

beino-  re^i-arded  as  a  7nerit  in  a  citizen,  because  on  aceount 

•   ■If 
of  it  he  is  considered  worthy  to  enjoy  the  pnvileu'os  of 

the  State.     Again,  in  a  natural  state  no  one  by  common 

consent  is  the  owner  of  anything,  nor  is  tiiere  anyihin;,' 

in  nature  which  can  be  said  to  be  the  rightful  projnirty 

of  this  and  not  of  that  man,  but  all  things  belong  to  all, 

so  that  in  a  natural  state  it  is  impossiljle  to  conceive  a 

desire  of  rendering  to  each  man  his  own  or  takinj;  from 

another  that  which  is  his ;  that  is  to  say,  in  a  natural 

state  there  is  nothing  which  can  be  called  juet  or  nnjii»t, 

but  only  in  a  civil  state,  in  which  it  is  decided  by  un»- 


212  ETHIC. 

versal  consent  what  is  one  person's  and  what  is  another's. 
Justice  and  injustice,  therefore,  sin  and  merit,  are  exter- 
nal notions,  and  not  attributes,  which  explain  the  nature 
of  the  mind.      But  enough  of  these  matters. 

Prop,  XXXVIII. — TJiat  ivJdcJi  so  disposes  the  human  lody 
that  it  can  he  affected  in  many  ways,  or  which  renders 
it  ccqjaUe  of  affecting  external  bodies  in  many  ivays,  is 
profitahh  to  man,  and  is  more  profitable  in  proportion 
as  by  its  means  the  body  becomes  better  fitted  to  be 
affected  in  many  ivays,  and  to  affect  other  bodies  ;  on 
the  other  hand,  that  thing  is  injurious  which  renders 
the  body  less  fitted  to  affect  or  be  affected. 

Demonst. — In  proportion  as  the  body  is  rendered  more 
fitted  for  this  is  the  mind  rendered  more  capable  of  per- 
ception (Prop.  14,  pt.  2),  and,  therefore,  whatever  dis- 
poses the  body  in  this  way,  and  renders  it  fitted  for  this, 
is  necessarily  good  or  profitable  (Props.  26  and  27,  pt.  4), 
and  is  more  profitable  in  proportion  to  its  power  of  ren- 
dering the  body  more  fitted  for  this,  while,  on  the  con- 
trary (by  Prop.  14,  pt.  2,  conversely,  and  Props.  26  and 
27,  pt.  4),  it  is  injurious  if  it  renders  the  body  less  fitted 
for  this. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXIX. —  Whatever  is  effective  to  preserve  the 
proportion  of  motion  and  rest  which  the  parts  of  the 
human  body  bear  to  each  other  is  good,  and,  on  the 
contrary,  that  is  evil  which  causes  the  parts  of  the 
human  body  to  have  a  different  proportion  of  ^notion 
and  rest  to  each  other. 

Demonst. — The  human  body  needs  for  its  preservation 
very  many  other  bodies  (Post.  4,  pt.  2).  But  what 
constitutes  thfe  form  of  the  human  body  is  this,  that  its 
parts  communicate  their  motions  to  one  another  in  a  certain 
fixed  proportion  (Def.  preceding  Lem.  4, following  Prop.  1 3, 


OF  HUMAN  BOS  DAG  n.  ,,. 

pt.  2).  Whatever,  therefore,  is  effective  to  preserve  ll.o 
proportion  of  motion  and  rest  whicli  tlie  parts  of  the  l.umftn 
body  bear  to  each  other,  preserves  the  form  of  tl»e  human 
body,  and,  consequently  (Posts.  3  and  6,  j^t.  2).  is  clToc- 
tive  to  enable  the  body  to  be  affected  in  many  ways,  and 
to  affect  external  bodies  in  many  ways,  and,  tllcTcforc 
(Prop.  38,  pt.  4),  is  good.  A'^am,  whatever  causes  the 
parts  of  the  human  body  to  get  a  different  propcrtion  of 
motion  and  rest  (by  the  definition  just  quoted),  causes 
the  human  body  to  assume  another  form,  that  is  to  say 
(as  is  self-evident,  and  as  we  observed  at  the  end  of  llj'e 
preface  to  this  part),  causes  the  human  body  to  W  de- 
stroyed, rendering  it  consequently  incapable  of  being 
affected  in  many  ways,  and  is,  therefore  (Prop.  38,  pt.  4>, 
bad. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — In  what  degree  these  things  may  injure  or 
profit  the  mind  will  be  explained  in  the  Fiftli  PurU 
Here  I  observe  merely  that  I  understand  tlie  body  to 
die  when  its  parts  are  so  disposed  as  to  acquire  a  differ- 
ent proportion  of  motion  and  rest  to  each  other.  For  I 
dare  not  deny  that  the  human  body,  though  the  circu- 
lation of  the  blood  and  the  other  tilings  l»y  moans  of 
which  it  is  thought  to.  live  be  preserved,  may,  nevertlie- 
less,  be  changed  into  another  nature  altogetiier  different 
from  its  own.  No  reason  compels  me  to  allirm  tiiut  ihu 
body  never  dies  unless  it  is  changed  into  a  coijt.se.  Ex- 
perience, indeed,  seems  to  teach  the  contrary.  It  liapiHjns 
sometimes  that  a  man  undergoes  such  changes  that  he 
cannot  very  well  be  said  to  be  the  same  man,  as  was  the 
case  with  a  certain  Spanish  poet  of  whom  I  liave  heani, 
who  was  seized  with  an  illness,  and  although  lie  recovured, 
remained,  nevertheless,  so  oblivious  of  his  i»a8t  lifo 
that  he  did  not  believe  the  tales  and  tragedies  he  had 
composed  were  his  own,  and  he  miglit,  indeed,  hnvc 
been  taken  for  a  grown-up  child  if  he  had  also  forgoiu-n 
bis  native  tongue.  I'.ut  if  this  seems  incredible,  whnt 
sliall  we  say  of  children  ?     The  man  of  mature  year* 


214  ETHIC. 

believes  the  nature  of  children  to  be  so  different  from 
his  own,  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  persuade  him 
he  had  ever  been  a  child,  if  he  did  not  conjecture 
regarding  himself  from  what  he  sees  of  others.  But  in 
order  to  avoid  giving  to  the  superstitious  matter  for  new 
questions,  I  prefer  to  go  no  farther  in  the  discussion  of 
these  matters. 

■  Prop.  XL. —  Whatever  conduces  to  the  universal  fellowship 
of  men,  that  is  to  say,  ivhatever  causes  men  to  live  in 
harmony  with  one  another,  is  profitable,  and,  on  the 
contrary,  vjhatever  hrinys  discord  into  the  State  is  evil. 

Demonst. — For  whatever  causes  men  to  live  in  har- 
mony with  one  another  causes  them  to  live  according  to 
the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop.  35,  pt.  4),  and,  therefore 
(Props.  26  and  27,  pt.  4),  is  good,  and  (by  the  same  reason- 
ing) those  things  are  evil  which  excite  discord. — q.e.d. 


r 


Prop.  XLI. — Joy  is  not  directly  evil,  hut  good  ;  sorrow, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  directly  evil. 

Demonst. — Joy  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3,  with  its  Schol.)  is  an 
affect  by  which  the  body's  power  of  action  is  increased 
or  assisted.  Sorrow,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  affect  by 
which  the  body's  power  of  action  is  lessened  or  re- 
strained, and,  therefore  (Prop.  38,  pt.  4),  joy  is  directly 
good. — Q.E.D. 


Prop.  XLI  I. — Cheerfulness  can  never  he  excessive,   hut  is 
always  good  ;  melancholy,  on  the  contrary,  is  always  evil. 

Demonst. — Cheerfulness  (see  its  definition  in  Schol. 
Prop.  II,  pt.  3)  is  joy,  which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to 
the  body,  consists  in  this,  that  all  the  parts  of  the  body 
are  equally  affected,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  11,  pt.  3),  the 
body's  power  of  action  is  increased  or  assisted,  so  that 


OF  HUMAN  BOiWDAGF 

nil  the  parts  acquire  the  same  proportion  of  .notion  an.l 
rest  to  each  other.  Cheerfulness,  therefore  (I'mp  ,o 
pt.  4),  IS  always  good,  and  can  never  l-e  excessive  *  H»i 
melancholy  (see  its  definition  in  Schol.  Prop,  i  i.pt  3)  j^ 
sorrow,  which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  the'lKKlv 
consists  in  this,  that  the  body's  power  of  action  is  abso^ 
lutely  lessened  or  restrained,  and  melancholy,  therefore 
(Prop.  38,  pt.  4),  is  always  evil.— q.e.d. 

Prop.  XLIII. — Pleasurable  excitement  may  U  excessirf 
and  an  evil,  and  pain  may  he  good  in  so  fur  a.i 
pleasurable  excitement  or  joy  is  evil. 

Demonst. — Pleasurable  excitement  is  joy,  wliich,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  related  to  the  body,  consists  in  tin's,  tiiat  one  or 
some  of  the  parts  of  the  body  are  affected  more  than 
others  (see  Def.  in  Schol.  Prop.  11,  pt.  3).  The  power 
of  this  affect  may,  therefore,  be  so  great  as  to  overcoino 
the  other  actions  of  the  body  (Prop.  6,  pt.  4) ;  it  ninv 
cling  obstinately  to  the  body ;  it  may  impede  the  body 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  it  less  capable  of  bein;; 
affected  in  many  ways,  and  therefore  (Prop.  38,  pt  4) 
may  be  evil.  Again,  pain,  which,  on  the  contrary,  is 
sorrow,  considered  in  itself  alone  cannot  be  good  (Prop. 
4 1,  pt.  4).  But  because  its  power  and  increase  is  limited 
by  the  power  of  an  external  cause  compared  with  our 
own  power  (Prop.  5,  pt.  4),  we  can  tliercfore  conceive 
infinite  degrees  of  strength  of  this  affect,  and  infmito 
kinds  of  it  (Prop.  3,  pt.  4),  and  we  can  therefore  con- 
ceive it  to  be  such  that  it  can  restrain  an  excess  of 
pleasurable  excitement,  and  so  far  (by  the  first  part  of 
this  proposition)  preventing  the  body  from  becoming  1cm 
capable.     So  far,  therefore,  will  pain  be  good. — g.JLU. 

Prop.  XLIV. — Love  and  desire  may  be  exctsnrr. 
Demonst.— Love  is  joy  (Def.  6  of  the  Affects)  with  iho 


2i6  ETHIC. 

accompanying  idea  of  an  external  cause.  Pleasurable 
excitement,  therefore  (Schol.  Prop.  1 1,  pt.  3),  with  the 
accompanying  idea  of  an  external  cause,  is  love,  and  there- 
fore love  (Prop.  43,  pt.  4)  may  be  excessive.  Again, 
desire  is  greater  as  the  affect  from  "which  it  springs  is 
greater  (Prop.  37,  pt.  3).  Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  an 
affect  (Prop.  6,  pt.  4)  may  overpower  the  other  actions  of 
a  man,  so  also  the  desire  which  springs  from  this  affect 
may  also  overpower  the  other  desires,  and  may  therefore 
exist  in  the  same  excess  which  we  have  shown  (in  the 
l^receding  proposition)  that  pleasurable  excitement  pos- 
sesses.— Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Cheerfulness,  which  I  have  affirmed  to  be 
good,  is  more  easily  imagined  than  observed ;  for  the 
affects  by  which  we  are  daily  agitated  are  generally  re- 
lated to  some  part  of  the  body  which  is  affected  more 
than  the  others,  and  therefore  it  is  that  the  affects  exist 
for  the  most  part  in  excess,  and  so  hold  the  mind  down 
to  the  contemplation  of  one  object  alone,  that  it  can 
think  about  nothing  else ;  and  although  men  are  subject 
to  a  number  of  affects,  and  therefore  few  are  found  who 
are  always  under  the  control  of  one  and  the  same  affect, 
there  are  not  wanting  those  to  whom  one  and  the  same 
affect  obstinately  clings.  We  see  men  sometimes  so 
affected  by  one  object,  that  although  it  is  not  present, 
they  believe  it  to  be  before  them ;  and  if  this  happens  to 
a  man  who  is  not  asleep,  we  say  that  he  is  delirious  or 
mad.  Nor  are  those  believed  to  be  less  mad  who  are  in- 
flamed by  love,  dreaming  about  nothing  but  a  mistress  or 
harlot  day  and  night,  for  they  excite  our  laughter.  But 
the  avaricious  man  who  thinks  of  nothing  else  but  gain 
or  money,  and  the  ambitious  man  who  thinks  of  nothing 
but  glory,  inasmuch  as  they  do  harm,  and  are,  therefore, 
thought  worthy  of  hatred,  are  not  believed  to  be  mad. 
In  truth,  however,  avarice,  ambition,  lust,  &c.,  are  a  kind 
of  madness,  although  they  are  not  reckoned  amongst  dis- 
eases. 


OF  HUMAX  BOXDAGE.  „y 

''  Trot.  XLY.— Hatred  can  nnrr  k'  goo<i 

Bemonst. — The  man  whom  we  liate  wc  endeavour  lo 
destroy  (Prop.  39,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  37,  pt  4). 
we  endeavour  to  do  something  whicli  is  evil.  Tlierefore 
liatred,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — It  is  to  be  observed  that  liere  and  in  tlio 
following  propositions  I  understand  by  hatred,  lulred 
towards  men  only. 

Corol.  I. — Envy,  mockery,  contempt,  anger,  revenue, 
and  the  other  affects  which  are  related  to  hatred  or  ariso 
from  it,  are  evil.  This  is  also  evident  from  Prop.  39, 
pt.  3,  and  Prop.  37,  pt.  4. 

Corol.  2. — Everything  which  we  desire  because  we  arc 
affected  by  hatred  is  base  and  unjust  in  the  State.  This 
is  also  evident  from  Prop.  39,  pt.  3,  and  from  the  defi- 
nition in  Schol.  Prop.  37,  pt.  4,  of  wluit  is  base  and 
unjust. 

Scliol. — I  make  a  great  distinction  between  mockery 
(which  I  have  said  in  Corol.  i  of  this  Prop,  is  bad)  and 
laughter;  for  laughter  and  merriment  are  nothing  bnt 
joy,  and  therefore,  provided  they  are  not  excessive,  ore 
in  themselves  good  (Prop.  41,  pt.  4).  Nothing  but  n 
gloomy  and  sad  superstition  forbids  enjoynient.  Ft>r 
why  is  it  more  seemly  to  extinguish  hunger  and  thirst 
than  to  drive  away  melancholy  ?  My  reasons  and  my  con- 
clusions are  these  : — No  God  and  no  human  being,  except 
an  envious  one,  is  delighted  by  my  impotence  or  my 
trouble,  or  esteems  as  any  virtue  in  us  tears,  sighs,  fears, 
and  other  things  of  this  kind,  which  are  signs  of  inentfll 
impotence ;  on  the  contrary,  the  greater  the  joy  with 
which  we  are  affected,  the  greater  tlie  perfection  to  which 
we  pass  thereby,  that  is  to  say,  the  more  do  we  neces- 
sarily partake  of  the  divine  nature.  To  njake  use  of 
things,  therefore,  and  to  deliglit  in  them  as  much  oa  pos- 
sible (provided  we  do  not  disgust  ourselvas  with  ihcin, 
which  is  not  delighting  in  them),  is  tlie  part  of  o  wiw 


2i8  ETHIC. 

man.  It  is  the  part  of  a  wise  man,  I  say,  to  refresh  and 
invigorate  himself  with  moderate  and  pleasant  eating  and 
drinking,  with  sweet  scents  and  the  beauty  of  green  plants, 
with  ornament,  with  music,  with  sports,  with  the  theatre, 
and  with  all  things  of  this  kind  which  one  man  can  enjoy 
without  hurting  another.  For  the  human  body  is  com- 
posed of  a  great  number  of  parts  of  diverse  nature, 
which  constantly  need  new  and  varied  nourishment,  in 
order  that  the  whole  of  the  body  may  be  equally  fit  for 
everything  which  can  follow  from  its  nature,  and  conse- 
quently that  the  mind  may  be  equally  fit  to  understand 
many  things  at  once.  This  mode  of  living  best  of  all 
agrees  both  with  our  principles  and  with  common  practice  ; 
therefore  this  mode  of  living  is  the  best  of  all,  and  is  to 
be  universally  commended.  There  is  no  need,  therefore, 
to  enter  more  at  length  into  the  subject. 

PPtOP.  XLVI. — He  ivho  lives  according  to  the  guidance  of 
reason  strives  as  much  as  possible  to  repay  the  hatred, 
anger,  or  contempt  of  others  towards  himself  with 
love  or  generosity. 

Demonst. — All  affects  of  hatred  are  evil  (Corol.  i.  Prop. 
45,  pt.  4),  and,  therefore,  the  man  who  lives  according 
to  the  guidance  of  reason  will  strive  as  much  as  possible 
to  keep  himself  from  being  agitated  by  the  affects  of 
hatred  (Prop.  19,  pt.  4),  and,  consequently  (Proj).  37,  pt. 
4),  will  strive  to  keep  others  from  being  subject  to  the 
same  affects.  But  hatred  is  increased  by  reciprocal 
hatred,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  extinguished  by 
love  (Prop.  43,  pt.  3),  so  that  hatred  passes  into  love 
(Prop.  44,  pt.  3).  Therefore  he  who  lives  according  to 
the  guidance  of  reason  will  strive  to  repay  the  hatred  of 
another,  &c.,  with  love,  that  is  to  say,  with  generosity  (see 
definition  of  generosity  in  Schol.  Prop.  59,  pt.  3). — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — He  who  wishes  to  avenge  injuries  by  hating 
in  return  does  indeed  live  miserablv.      But  he  who,  on 


OF  HUMAN  DOS'DAGE.  „, 

the  contrary,  strives  to  drive  out  Imtred  by  love  finhm 
joyfully  and  confidently,  .vitli  equal  ease  resisting  ono 
man  or  a  number  of  men,  and  needing  scarcely  any  assis- 
tance from  fortune.  Those  whom  he  conquers  yield 
gladly,  not  from  defect  of  strength,  but  from  an  incrca.se 
of  it.  These  truths,  however,  all  follow  so  plainly  {umx 
the  definitions  alone  of  love  and  the  intellect,  that  then- 
is  no  need  to  demonstrate  them  singly. 

Prop.  XLYIl.  —  The  affects  of  hope  awl  fear  eannot  U 

good  of  tlicm selves. 

Demonst. — The  affects  of  hope  and  fear  cannot  exist 
without  sorrow;  for  fear  (Def.  13  of  the  Allects)  is 
sorrow,  and  hope  (see  the  explanation  of  Defs.  1 2  and 
1 3  of  the  Affects)  cannot  exist  without  fear.  Therefore 
(Prop.  4 1 ,  pt.  4)  these  affects  cannot  be  good  of  them- 
selves, but  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  able  to  restrain  the 
excesses  of  joy  (Prop.  43,  pt.  4). — q.e.d. 

Schol. — We  may  here  add  that  these  affects  indicate 
want  of  knowledge  and  impotence  of  mind,  and,  for  the 
same  reason,  confidence,  despair,  gladness,  and  remorso 
are  signs  of  weakness  of  mind.  For  although  confidence 
and  gladness  are  affects  of  joy,  they  nevertheless  siip|)08« 
that  sorrow  has  preceded  them,  namely,  hope  or  fear.  In 
proportion,  tlierefore,  as  we  endeavour  to  live  according 
to  the  guidance  of  reason,  shall  we  strive  as  much  as 
possible  to  depend  less  on  hope,  to  liberate  ourselves  from 
fear,  to  rule  fortune,  and  to  direct  our  actions  by  the  sure 
counsels  of  reason. 

Prop.  XLYIII. — The  affects  of  over-estimation  ami  conlrmjtt 
are  alvxtys  evil. 

Demonst.— These  affects  (Defs.  21  and  22  ui  ll..- 
Affects)  are  opposed  to  reason,  and  therefore  (I'rops.  26 

and  27,  pt.  4)  are  evil. — Q.ED. 


220  ETHIC. 

Pkop.  XLIX. —  Over-estimation  easily  renders  the  man 
who  is  over-estimated  proud. 

Donortst. — If  we  see  that  a  person,  tlirougii  love,  thinks 
too  much  of  us,  we  shall  easily  glorify  ourselves  (Schol. 
41,  pt.  3),  or,  in  other  words,  be  affected  with  joy  (Def.  30 
of  the  Affects),  and  easily  believe  the  good  which  we  hear 
others  affirm  of  us  (Prop.  25,  pt.  3),  and  consequently, 
through  self-love,  we  shall  think  too  much  of  ourselves, 
that  is  to  say  (Def.  28  of  the  Affects),  we  shall  easily 
grow  proud. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  L. — Pity  in  a  man  who  lives  according  to  the  guidance 
of  reason  is  in  itself  evil  and  ii.nprofitcd)le. 

Demonst. — Pity  (Def.  i  8.  of  the  Affects)  is  sorrow,  and 
therefore  (Prop.  41,  pt.  4)  is  in  itself  evil.  The  good, 
however,  which  issues  from  pity,  namely,  that  we  endea- 
vour to  free  from  misery  the  man  we  pity  (Corol.  3, 
Prop.  27,  pt.  3),  we  desire  to  do  from  the  dictate  of 
reason  alone  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4);  nor  can  we  do  anything 
except  by  the  dictate  of  reason  alone,  which  we  are  sure 
is  good  (Prop.  27,  pt.  4).  Pity,  therefore,  in  a  man  who 
lives  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  is  in  itself  bad 
and  unprofitable, — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  a  man  who  lives  accord- 
ing to  the  dictates  of  reason  endeavours  as  much  as 
possible  to  prevent  himself  from  being  touched  by 
pity. 

Schol. — ^The  man  who  Las  properly  understood  that 
everything  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine 
nature,  and  comes  to  pass  according  to  the  eternal 
laws  and  rules  of  nature,  will  in  truth  discover  nothing 
which  is  worthy  of  hatred,  laughter,  or  contempt,  nor 
will  he  pity  any  one,  but,  so  far  as  human  virtue  is 
able,  he  will  endeavour  to  do  ivell,  as  we  say,  and  to 
rejoice.      AVe  must  add  also,  that  a   man  who  is  easily 


OF  II  UMAX  BOX  DAG  IL  „, 

touched  by  tlie  affect  of  pity,  and  is  moved  by  the  miaory 
or  tears  of  another,  often  does  something  of  which  ho 
afterward  repents,  both  because  from  an  nITect  wo  do 
nothing  which  we  certainly  know  to  be  good,  and  also 
because  we  are  so  easily  deceived  by  false  tears.  But 
this  I  say  expressly  of  the  man  who  lives  according  to 
the  guidance  of  reason.  For  he  who  is  moved  neither 
by  reason  nor  pity  to  be  of  any  service  to  othera  is  pro- 
perly called  inhuman  ;  for  (Prop.  27,  pt.  3)  he  secm.s  L. 
be  unlike  a  man. 

Pkop.  LI. — Favour  is  not  opposed  to  reason,  hut  ajrfc,^ 
ivltli  it,  and  may  arise  from  it. 

Demonst. — Favour  is  love  towards  him  who  does  good 
to  another  (Def.  19  of  the  Affects),  and  therefore  can  bo 
related  to  the  mind  in  so  far  as  it  is  said  to  act  (Prop. 
59,  pt.  3).  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  it 
understands,  and  therefore  favour  agrees  with  reason. — 

Q.E.D. 

Another  Demonstration. — If  we  live  according  to  tho 
guidance  of  reason,  we  shall  desire  for  otliers  the  goo«l 
which  we  seek  for  ourselves  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4).  Tliere- 
fore  if  we  see  one  person  do  good  to  another,  our  endea- 
vour to  do  good  is  assisted,  that  is  to  say  (Scliol.  Prop. 
II,  pt.  3),  we  shall  rejoice,  and  our  joy  (by  hypotliesi'*; 
will  be  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  the  person  wl»o 
does  good  to  the  other,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  19  of  tho 
Affects),  we  shall  favour  him. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Indignation,  as  it  is  defined  by  us  (Def.  20  of 
the  Affects),  is  necessarily  evil  (Prop.  45,  pt.  4);  but  it 
is  to  be  observed  that  when  the  supreme  authority,  con- 
strained by  the  desire  of  preserving  peace,  i)uni.shc«  a 
citizen  who  injures  another,  I  do  not  say  that  it  is  indig- 
nant with  the  citizen,  since  it  is  not  excited  by  hatrcti 
to  destroy  him,  but  punishes  him  from  motives  of 
piety. 


222  ETHIC. 

Pkop.  lit. — Self-satisfaction  may  arise  from  reason,  and 
the  self-satisfaction  alone  tuhich  arises  from  reason  is 
the  highest  which  can  exist. 

Demonst. — Self-satisfaction  is  the  joy  ■wliich  arises 
from  a  man's  contemplating  himself  and  his  power  of 
action  (Def.  25  of  the  Affects).  But  man's  true  power 
of  action  or  his  virtue  is  reason  itself  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3), 
which  he  contemplates  clearly  and  distinctly  (Props.  40 
and  43,  pt.  2).  Self-satisfaction  therefore  arises  from 
reason.  Again,  man,  when  he  contemplates  himself,  per- 
ceives nothing  clearly  and  distinctly  or  adequately,  ex- 
cepting those  things  which  follow  from  his  power  of 
action  (Def.  2,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3), 
those  things  which  follow  from  his  power  of  understand- 
ing ;  and  therefore  from  this  contemplation  alone  the 
highest  satisfaction  which  can  exist  arises. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — Self-satisfaction  is  indeed  the  highest  thing  for 
■which  we  can  hope,  for  (as  we  have  shown  in  Prop.  25, 
pt.  4)  no  one  endeavours  to  preserve  his  being  for  the 
sake  of  any  end.  Again,  because  this  self-satisfaction  is 
more  and  more  nourished  and  strengthened  by  praise 
(Corol.  Prop.  53,  pt.  3),  and,  on  the  contrary  (CoroL 
Prop.  55,  pt.  3),  more  and  more  disturbed  by  blame, 
therefore  we  are  principally  led  by  glory,  and  can  scarcely 
endure  life  with  disgrace. 

Prop.  LIII. — Rumility  is  not  a  virtue,  that  is  to  say,  it 
does  not  spring  from  reason. 

Demonst. — Humility  is  sorrow,  which  springs  from  this, 
that  a  man  contemplates  his  own  weakness  (Def.  26  of 
the  Affects).  But  in  so  far  as  a  man  knows  himself 
by  true  reason  is  he  supposed  to  understand  his  essence, 
that  is  to  say  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3),  his  power.  If,  therefore, 
while  contemplating  himself,  he  perceives  any  impotence 
of  his,  this  is  not  due  to  his  understanding  himself,  but, 
as  we  have  shown  (Prop.  55,  pt.  3),  to  the  fact  that  his 


OF  HUMAN  BOXDACn.  „, 

power  of  action  is  restrained.  ]lut  if  we  suppose  that 
he  forms  a  conception  of  his  own  impotence  becnuso  ho 
understands  something  to  be  more  powerful  than  him- 
self, by  the  knowledge  of  which  lie  limits  his  own  power 
of  action,  in  this  case  we  simply  conceive  that  ho  un- 
derstands himself  distinctly  (Prop.  26,  pt.  4),  and  \m 
power  of  action  is  increased.  Humility  or  sorrow,  there- 
fore, which  arises  because  a  man  contemplates  Iiis  own 
impotence,  does  not  spring  from  true  contemj)lation  or 
reason,  and  is  not  a  virtue,  but  a  passion. — q.k.d. 

Prop.  LIV. — Repentance  is  not  a  virtue,  that  is  to  my,  it 
does  not  spring  from  reason  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  vtan 
who  repents  of  what  he  has  done  is  dmihly  wretched  or 

impotent. 

Dcmonst. — The  first  part  of  this  proposition  is  demon- 
strated in  the  same  manner  as  the  preceding  projiosi- 
tion.  The  second  part  follows  from  the  definition  alono 
of  this  affect  (Def.  27  of  the  Affects).  For,  in  tiie  first 
place,  we  allow  ourselves  to  be  overcome  by  a  depraved 
desire,  and,  in  the  second  place,  by  sorrow. 

Schol. — Inasmuch  as  men  seldom  live  as  reason  dic- 
tates, therefore  these  two  affects,  humility  and  repent- 
ance, together  with  hope  and  fear,  are  productive  of  more 
profit  than  disadvantage,  and  therefore,  since  nu-n  must 
sin,  it  is  better  that  they  should  sin  in  this  way. 
For  if  men  impotent  in  mind  were  all  equally  proud, 
were  ashamed  of  nothing,  and  feared  nothing,  by  what 
bonds  could  they  be  united  or  constrained  ?  The  mul- 
titude becomes  a  thing  to  be  feared  if  it  has  nothing  to 
fear.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  the 
prophets,  thinking  rather  of  the  good  of  the  coniniuniiy 
than  of  a  few,  should  have  commended  so  greatly 
humility,  repentance,  and  reverence.  Indeed,  those  who 
are  subject  to  these  affects  can  be  led  much  more  easily 
than  others,  so  that,  at  last,  they  come  to  live  accord- 


224  ^  ETHIC. 

ing  to  tlie  guidance  of  reason,  that  is  to  say,  become 
free  men,  and  enjoy  the  life  of  the  blessed. 

Prop.  LV. — The  greatest  'pride  or  the  greatest  despondency 
is  the  greatest  ignorance  of  one's  self. 

Dcrnonst. — This  is  evident  from  Defs.  28  and  29  of 
the  Affects. 


Peop.  LVI. — The  greatest  pride  or  despondency  indicates 
the  greatest  impotence  of  mind. 

Demonst. — The  primary  foundation  of  virtue  is  the 
preservation  of  our  being  (Corel.  Prop.  22,  pt.  4)  accord- 
ing to  the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop.  24,  pt,  4).  The 
man,  therefore,  who  is  ignorant  of  himself  is  ignorant  of 
the  foundation  of  all  the  virtues,  and  consequently  is 
ignorant  of  all  the  virtues.  Again,  to  act  in  conformity 
with  virtue  is  nothing  but  acting  according  to  the  guid- 
ance of  reason  (Prop.  24,  pt.  4),  and  he  who  acts  ac- 
cording to  the  guidance  of  reason  must  necessarily  know 
that  he  acts  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason  (Prop. 
43,  pt.  2).  He,  therefore,  who  is  ignorant  of  himself, 
and  consequently  (as  we  have  just  shown)  altogether 
ignorant  of  all  the  virtues,  cannot  in  any  way  act  in 
conformity  with  virtue,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  8,  pt.  4), 
is  altogether  impotent  in  mind.  Therefore  (Prop.  55, 
pt.  4),  the  greatest  pride  or  despondency  indicates  the 
greatest  impotence  of  mind. — Q.e.d. 

Corol. — Hence  follows,  with  the  utmost  clearness,  that 
the  proud  and  the  desponding  are  above  all  others  sub- 
ject to  affects. 

Schol. — Despondency,  nevertheless,  can  be  corrected 
more  easily  than  pride,  since  the  former  is  an  affect  of 
sorrow,  while  the  latter  is  an  affect  of  joy,  and  is,  there- 
fore (Prop.   I  8,  pt.  4),  stronger  than  the  former. 


OF  HUM  AS  BOX  DAG  n.  ^j 

Vrov.  LVIL—Thc  proud  man  loves  the  presence  o/panuiUt 
or  flatterers,  and  hates  that  of  tlu  noUc-mindtd. 

Demonst. — rride  is  joy  firisiug  from  a  man's  having  too 
high  an  opinion  of  himself  (Defs.  28  and  6  of  the  Affecla). 
This  opinion  a  proud  man  will  endeavour,  as  much  as 
he  can,  to  cherish  (Schoh  Prop.  13,  pt.  3),  and,  there- 
fore, will  love  the  presence  of  parasites  or  Hatterers  (the 
definitions  of  these  people  are  omitted,  hecause  they  are 
too  well  known),  and  will  shun  that  of  the  noble-minded 
who  think  of  him  as  is  right. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — It  would  take  too  much  time  to  enumerate 
here  all  the  evils  of  pride,  for  the  proud  are  subject  to  all 
affects,  but  to  none  are  they  less  subject  tiiau  to  those  of 
love  and  pity.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  observe  hero 
that  a  man  is  also  called  proud  if  he  thiuks  too  little  of 
other  people,  and  so,  in  this  sense,  pride  is  to  be  defined 
as  joy  which  arises  from  the  false  opinion  that  wo  are 
superior  to  other  people,  while  despondency,  the  contrary 
to  this  pride,  would  be  defined  as  sorrow  arising  from  tho 
false  opinion  that  we  are  inferior  to  otlier  people.  This 
being  understood,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  proud  man  is 
necessarily  envious  (Schol.  Prop.  55,  pt.  3),  and  that  he 
hates  those  above  all  others  who  are  the  most  prai.scd  on 
account  of  their  virtues.  It  follows,  too,  that  his  hatred  of 
them  is  not  easily  overcome  by  love  or  kindness  (SchoL 
Prop.  41,  pt.  3),  and  that  he  is  delighted  by  the  presence 
of  those  only  who  humour  his  weakness,  and  from  a  fool 
make  him  a  madman.  Although  despondency  is  con- 
trary  to  pride,  the  despondent  man  is  closely  akin  to  the 
proud  man.  For  since  the  sorrow  of  the  de-sixjndeut 
man  arises  from  his  judging  liis  own  imjwtcnco  by  tlio 
power  or  virtue  of  others,  his  sorrow  will  be  mitigaUnl, 
that  is  to  say,  he  will  rejoice,  if  his  imagination  be  occu- 
pied in  contemplating  the  vices  of  others.  Hence  tho 
proverb— It  is  a  consolation  to  the  wretched  to  have  bad 

P 


2  26  ETHIC. 

compauions  in  their  misfortunes.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  more  the  despondent  man  believes  himself  to  be  below 
other  people,  the  more  will  he  sorrow ;  and  this  is  the 
reason  why  none  are  more  prone  to  envy  than  the  de- 
spondent ;  and  why  they,  above  all  others,  try  to  observe 
men's  actions  with  a  view  to  finding  fault  with  them 
rather  than  correcting  them,  so  that  at  last  they  praise 
nothing  but  despondency  and  glory  in  it ;  but  in  such  a 
manner,  however,  as  always  to  seem  despondent. 

These  things  follow  from  this  affect  as  necessarily  as 
it  follows  from  the  nature  of  a  triangle  that  its  three 
angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  It  is  true,  indeed, 
that  I  have  said  that  I  call  these  and  the  like  affects  evil, 
in  so  far  as  I  attend  to  human  profit  alone  ;  but  the  laws 
of  nature  have  regard  to  the  common  order  of  nature  of 
whichman  is  a  part — a  remark  I  desired  to  make  in  passing, 
lest  it  should  be  thought  that  I  talk  about  the  vices  and 
absurdities  of  men  rather  than  attempt  to  demonstrate 
the  nature  and  properties  of  things.  As  I  said  in  the 
Preface  to  the  Third  Part,  I  consider  human  affects  and 
their  properties  precisely  as  I  consider  other  natural 
objects ;  and,  indeed,  the  affects  of  man,  if  they  do  not 
show  his  power,  show,  at  least,  the  power  and  workman- 
ship of  nature,  no  less  than  many  other  things  which  we 
admire  and  delight  to  contemplate.  I  proceed,  however, 
to  notice  those  things  connected  with  the  affects  which 
are  productive  either  of  profit  or  loss  to  man. 

Prop.  LVIII. — Self- exaltation  is  not  opjoosccl  to  reason,  hut 
may  spring  from  it. 

Dcmonst. — This  is  plain  from  Def.  30  of  the  Affects, 
and  also  from  the  definition  of  honour  in  Schol.  i.  Prop. 

37,  Pt-  4- 

Schol. — What  is  called  vainglory  is  self-satisfaction, 
nourished  by  nothing  but  the  good  opinion  of  the  multi- 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE.  ,37 

tude,  so  that  wLeu  that  is  withilrawn,  tii.'  s.iusiaciion, 
that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  52,  j.t.  4),  the  cliii-f  gooti 
which  every  one  loves,  ceases.  For  this  reason  those 
who  glory  in  the  good  opinion  of  the  nniltitudc  anxiously 
and  with  daily  care  strive,  labour,  and  stni-^i;lo  to  pre- 
serve their  fame.  For  the  multitude  is  chani,'oable  and 
fickle,  so  that  fame,  if  it  be  not  preserved,  soon  \msacs 
away.  As  every  one,  moreover,  is  desirous  to  catch  the 
praises  of  the  people,  one  person  will  readily  destroy  the 
fame  of  another  ;  and,  consequently,  as  the  object  of  con- 
tention is  what  is  commonly  thought  to  be  the  highest 
good,  a  great  desire  arises  on  the  part  of  every  one  to 
keep  down  his  fellows  by  every  possible  means,  and  ho 
who  at  last  comes  off  conqueror  boasts  more  because  he 
has  injured  another  person  than  because  he  lias  profited 
himself.  This  glory  of  self-satisfaction,  therefore,  is  in- 
deed vain,  for  it  is  really  jio  glory.  WhaL  is  worthy  of 
notice  with  regard  to  shame  may  easily  be  gathered  from 
what  has  been  said  about  compassion  and  repentance. 
I  will  only  add  that  pity,  like  shame,  although  it  is  not 
a  virtue,  is  nevertheless  good,  in  so  far  as  it  shows  that  a 
desire  of  living  uprightly  is  present  in  the  man  who  is 
possessed  with  shame,  just  as  pain  is  called  good  in  so 
far  as  it  shows  that  the  injured  part  has  not  yet  putrefied. 
A  man,  therefore,  who  is  ashamed  of  what  he  has  done, 
although  he  is  sorrowful,  is  nevertheless  njore  perfect 
than  the  shameless  man  who  has  no  desire  of  living 
uprightly.  These  are  the  things  which  I  undertook  to 
establish  with  regard  to  the  affects  of  joy  and  sorrow. 
With  reference  to  the  desires,  these  are  good  or  evil  04 
they  spring  from  good  or  evil  affects.  All  «(  theru,  how- 
ever, in  so  far  as  they  are  begotten  in  us  of  atrect-s  which 
are  passions,  are  blind  (as  may  easily  be  inferred  fruni 
what  has  been  said  in  Schol.  Prop.  44.  I't-  4).  nor  would 
they  be  of  any  use  if  men  could  be  easily  prauaded  Uj 
live  according  to  the  dictates  of  reason  alone,  as  I  shall 
show  in  a  few  words. 


228  ETHIC. 

Peop.  LIX. — To  all  actions  to  which  we  are  determined  hy 
an  affect  which  is  a  passion  ice  may,  without  the 
affect,  he  determined  hy  reason. 

Demonst. — To  act  according  to  reason  is  nothing  (Prop. 
3,  and  Def.  2,  pt.  3)  but  to  do  those  things  which  follow 
froni  the  necessity  of  our  nature  considered  in  itself  alone. 
But  sorrow  is  evil  so  far  as  it  lessens  or  restrains  this 
power  of  action  (Prop.  41,  pt.  4) ;  therefore  we  can  be 
determined  by  this  affect  to  no  action  which  we  could 
not  perform  if  we  were  led  by  reason.  Again,  joy  is  evil 
so  far  only  as  it  hinders  our  fitness  for  action  (Props.  4 1 
and  43,  pt.  4);  and  therefore  also  we  can  so  far  be  de- 
termined to  no  action  which  we  could  not  do  if  we  were 
led  by  reason.  Finally,  in  so  far  as  joy  is  good,  so  far 
it  agrees  with  reason  (for  it  consists  in  this,  that  a  man's 
power  of  action  is  increased  or  assisted),  and  it  is  not 
a  passion  unless  in  so  far  as  man's  power  of  action  is 
not  increased  sufficiently  for  him  to  conceive  adequately 
himself  and  his  actions  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3,  wath  its  Schol.) 
If,  therefore,  a  man  affected  with  joy  were  led  to  such 
perfection  as  to  conceive  adequately  himself  and  his 
actions,  he  would  be  fitted — better  even  than  before — 
for  the  performance  of  those  actions  to  which  he  is  now 
determined  by  the  affects  which  are  passions.  But  alii 
the  affects  are  related  to  joy,  sorrow,  or  desire  *(see  the] 
explanation  of  Def.  4  of  the  Affects),  and  desire  (Def.  i  \ 
of  the  Affects)  is  nothing  but  the  endeavour  itself  to  act  ;j 
therefore  to  all  actions  to  which  we  are  determined  byj 
an  affect  which  is  a  passion  we  may  without  the  affect  bej 
determined  by  reason  alone. — q.e.d. 

Another  Demonstration. — Any  action  is  called  evil  inj 
so  far  as  it  arises  from  our  being  affected  with  hatred  01 
some  evil  affect  (Corol.  i.  Prop.  45,  pt.  4).  But  no! 
action  considered  in  itself  alone  is  either  good  or  evil  (asj 
we  have  already  shown  in  the  preface  to  this  part),  but! 
one  and  the  same  action  is  sometimes  good  and  some-l 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  n.  ^^ 

times  evil.  Therefore  we  may  be  led  by  reason  (Trop.  1 9, 
pt.  4)  to  that  same  action  wliich  is  sometimes  evil,  or 
which  arises  from  some  evil  affect. — q.e.d. 

Scliol. — This  can  be  explained  more  clearly  by  nn  ex- 
ample. The  action  of  striking,  for  insUxnce,  in  so  far  ns 
it  is  considered  physically,  and  we  attend  only  to  ll»e 
fact  that  a  man  raises  his  arm,  closes  his  hand,  and 
forcibly  moves  the  whole  arm  downwards,  is  a  virtue 
which  is  conceived  from  the  structure  of  the  human 
body.  If,  therefore,  a  man  agitated  by  anger  or  hatred 
is  led  to  close  the  fist  or  move  the  arm,  this  comes  to 
pass,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  Second  Tart,  because  one 
and  the  same  action  can  be  joined  to  different  images  of 
things,  and  therefore  we  may  be  led  to  one  and  the  same 
action  as  well  by  the  images  of  things  which  we  conceive 
confusedly  as  by  those  which  we  conceive  clearly  and 
distinctly.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  every  desire  which 
arises  from  an  affect  which  is  a  passion  would  be  of  no 
iise  if  men  could  be  led  by  reason.  We  shall  now  see 
why  a  desire  which  arises  from  an  affect  which  is  a  pas- 
sion is  called  blind. 


Pkop.  LX. — The  desire  u-kich  arises  fr<m  juy  or  sorraw, 
loliich  is  related  to  07ie  or  to  somf,  hut  not  to  all,  the 
parts  of  the  hodij,  has  no  regard  to  the  j^^'f^  "f  ''" 

whole  man. 

Dcrnonst. — Let  it  be  supposed  that  a  part  of  th-j  U"ly 
— A,  for  example — is  so  strengthened  by  the  force  of 
some  external  cause  that  it  prevails  over  the  others 
(Prop.  6,  pt.  4).  It  will  not  endeavour,  therefore,  to 
lose  its  strength  in  order  that  the  remaining  parts  of  the 
body  may  perform  their  functions,  for  in  that  case  it 
would  have  a  force  or  power  of  losing  its  strength,  wh:.-h 
(Prop.  6,  pt.  3)  is  absurd.  It  will  endeavour,  thm-fon-. 
and  consequently  (Props.  7  and  i  2,  pt.  3)  the  mind  al»» 
will  endeavour,  to  preserve  this  same  state ;  and  so  the 


230  ETHIC. 

desire  whicli  arises  from  such  an  affect  of  joy  has  no 
regard  to  the  whole  man.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  be 
supposed  that  the  part  A  is  restrained  so  that  the  other 
parts  prevail,  it  can  be  demonstrated  in  the  same  way 
that  the  desire  which  springs  from  sorrow  has  no  regard 
to  the  whole  man. 

Schol — Since,  therefore,  joy  is  most  frequently  related 
to  one  part  of  the  body  (Schol.  Prop.  44,  pt.  4),  we 
generally  desire  to  preserve  our  being  without  reference 
to  our  health  as  a  whole ;  and,  moreover,  the  desires  by 
which  we  are  chiefly  controlled  (Corol.  Prop.  9,  pt.  4) 
have  regard  to  the  j)resent  only,  and  not  to  the  future. 

Prop.  LXI. — A  desire  ivhich  s'prings  from  reason  can 
never  he  in  excess. 

Devwnst — Desire  (Def.  i  of  the  Affects),  absolutely 
considered,  is  the  very  essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
conceived  as  determined  in  any  way  whatever  to  any 
action,  and  therefore  the  desire  which  springs  from  reason, 
that  is  to  say  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  which  is  begotten  in  us  in 
so  far  as  we  act,  is  the  very  essence  or  nature  of  man  in 
so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as  determined  to  actions  which 
are  adequately  conceived  by  the  essence  of  man  alone 
(Def  2,  pt.  3).  If,  therefore,  this  desire  could  be  in 
excess,  it  would  be  possible  for  human  nature,  considered 
in  itself  alone,  to  exceed  itself,  or,  in  other  words,  more 
would  be  possible  to  it  than  is  possible,  which  is  a  mani- 
fest contradiction,  and  therefore  this  desire  can  never  be 
in  excess. — q.e.d. 

Pkop.  LXII. — III  so  far  as  the  co^icejotion  of  an  oljcct 
is  formed  hy  the  mind  according  to  the  dictate  of 
reason,  the  mind  is  equally  affected,  ivhether  the  idea 
he  that  of  something  future,  j'^ast,  or  2')rcsent. 

Demonst. — Everything  which  the  mind,  under  the 
guidance   of   reason,    conceives,   it   conceives   under  the 


OF  HUMAN  DOS'DAGF..  33, 

same  form  of  eternity  or  necessity  (Corol.  2,  I'rop.  44. 
pt.  2),  and  it  is  affected  with  tlie  same  certainty  (Prop.  43' 
pt.  2,  and  its  Schol.)  Therefore,  wliethcr  the'idoa  bo"  one' 
of  a  future,  past,  or  present  object,  the  mind  conci'ivcs 
the  object  with  the  same  necessity,  and  is  alTcGted  with 
the  same  certainty ;  and  whether  the  idea  be  that  of  a 
future,  past,  or  present  olyect,  it  will  nevertheless  bo 
equally  true  (Prop.  41,  pt.  2),  that  is  to  say  (Def.  4, 
pt.  2),  it  will  always  have  the  same  properties  of  nn 
adequate  idea.  Therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  conception  of 
an  object  is  formed  by  the  mind  according  to  the  dictates  of 
reason,  the  mind  will  be  affected  in  the  same  way  whelhor 
the  idea  be  that  of  something  future,  past,  or  itnsi-iit.^ — 

Q.E.D. 

ScJiol. — If  it  were  possible  for  us  to  possess  an  ade- 
quate knowledge  concerning  the  duration  of  things,  and 
to  determine  by  reason  the  periods  of  their  existence,  wo 
should  contemplate  with  the  same  affect  objects  futuni  ami 
present,  and  the  good  M'hich  the  mind  conceived  to  be 
future,  it  would  seek  just  as  it  would  seek  the  jirest-nt  j;ootl. 
Consequently  it  would  necessarily  neglect  the  present  ^'ood 
for  the  sake  of  a  greater  future  good,  and  would,  as  wo 
shall  presently  show,  be  very  little  disjiosed  to  seek  a 
good  which  was  present,  but  which  would  be  a  cause  of 
any  future  evil.  But  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  liave  any 
other  than  a  very  inadequate  knowledge  of  the  duration  of 
things  (Prop.  3  1,  pt.  2),  and  we  determine  (Schol.  Prop.  44, 
pt.  2)  the  periods  of  the  existence  of  objects  by  the  inia},'ina- 
tion  alone,  which  is  not  affected  by  the  image  of  a  present 
object  in  the  same  way  as  it  is  by  that  of  a  future  object. 
Hence  it  comes  to  pass  that  the  true  knowlcd;,'e  of  {•ood 
and  evil  which  we  possess  is  only  abstract  or  univer«al, 
and  the  judgment  we  pass  upon  the  order  of  thinj-s  nnd 
the  connection  of  causes,  so  that  we  may  detennino  what 
is  good  for  iis  in  the  present  and  what  is  evil,  is  rather 
imaginary  than  real.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondcrcl 
at  if  the  desire  which  arises  from  a  knowledge  of  good 


232  ETHIC. 

and  evil,  in  so  far  as  tLis  knowledge  has  regard  to  the 
future,  is  cajDable  of  being  easily  restrained  by  the  desire 
of  objects  which  are  sweet  to  us  at  the  present  moment. 
(See  Prop.  1 6,  pt.  4.) 

Peop.  LXIII. — He  loJio  is  led  hy  fear,  and  does  vjhat  is 
good  in  order  that  he  may  avoid  what  is  evil,  is 
not  led  hy  reason. 

Demonst. — All  the  affects  which  are  related  to  the 
mind,  in  so  far  as  it  acts,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3), 
which  are  related  to  reason,  are  no  other  than  affects  of 
joy  and  desire  (Prop.  59,  pt.  3) ;  and  therefore  (Def.  i  3  of 
the  Affects),  he  who  is  led  by  fear  and  does  good  through 
lear  of  evil  is  not  led  by  reason. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — The  superstitious,  who  know  better  how  to 
rail  at  vice  than  to  teach  virtue,  and  who  study  not  to 
lead  man  by  reason,  but  to  hold  him  in  through  fear,  in 
order  that  he  may  shun  evil  rather  than  love  virtue,  aim 
at  nothing  more  than  that  others  should  be  as  miserable  as 
themselves,  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if 
they  generally  become  annoying  and  hateful  to  men. 

Corol. — By  the  desire  which  springs  from  reason  we 
follow  good  directly  and  avoid  evil  indirectly. 

Demonst. — For  the  desire  which  springs  from  reason 
cannot  spring  from  sorrow,  but  only  from  an  afi'ect  of  joy, 
which  is  not  a  passion  (Prop.  59,  pt.  3),  that  is  to  say, 
from  joy  which  cannot  be  in  excess  (Prop.  6 1,  pt.  4).  This 
desire  springs,  therefore  (Prop.  8,  pt.  4),  from  the  know- 
ledge of  good,  and  not  from  the  knowledge  of  evil,  and 
therefore,  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason,  we  seek 
what  is  good  directly,  and  so  far  only  do  we  shun  what 
is  evil. — Q.E.D. 

&chol. — This  corollary  is  explained  by  the  example  of 
a  sick  man  and  a  healthy  man.  The  sick  man,  through 
fear  of  death,  eats  what  he  dislikes ;  the  healthy  man 
takes  a  pleasure  in  his  food,  and  so  enjoys  life  more  than 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  II. 

if  he  feared  death  and  directly  desired  to  avoid  it  S. 
also  the  judge  who  condemns  a  guilty  man  to  death  Dot 
Irom  hatred  or  anger,  but  solely  from  love  for  the  public 

welfare,  is  led  by  reason  alone. 

Pr.OP.  LXIV.~The  hwwledffc  of  evil  is  inadcqu.tU 

hwidcdje. 

Dcmonst. — The  knowledge  of  evil  (Prop.  8,  pt.  4)  is 
sorrow  itself,  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  of  it.  lint 
sorrow  is  the  passage  to  a  less  perfection  (Def.  3  of  the 
Affects),  and  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  understood  through 
the  essence  itself  of  man  (rrops.  6  and  7,  pt.  3).  It  i.s, 
therefore  (Def.  2,  pt.  3),  a  passion  which  (Prop.  3,  pt  3) 
depends  upon  inadequate  ideas,  and  consequently  (Prop. 
29,  pt.  2)  the  knowledge  of  sorrow,  tliat  is  to  say,  the 
knowledge  of  evil,  is  inadequate. — q.k.p. 

Cowl. — Hence  it  follows  that  if  the  human  mind  had 
but  adequate  ideas,  it  would  form  no  uotiou  of  evil. 


none 


Pkop.  LXY. — According  to  the  (jiiidancc  of  reason,  of  txco 
things  which  are  good,  wc  shall  follow  the  greater  gooti, 

and  of  two  evils,  we  shall  follow  the  less. 

Dcmonst. — The  good  which  hinders  us  from  enjoying  a 
greater  good  is  really  an  evil,  for  good  and  evil  (aa  we 
have  shown  in  the  preface  to  this  part)  arc  aflinuetl  of 
things  in  so  far  as  we  compare  them  with  one  another. 
By  the  same  reasoning  a  less  evil  is  really  a  good,  and 
therefore  (Corol.  Prop.  61,  pt.  4),  according  to  the  j.a>id- 
ance  of  reason,  we  shall  seek  or  follow  the  greater  gi>ud 
only  and  the  lesser  evil. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — According  to  the  guidance  of  reason,  we  shall 
follow  a  lesser  evil  for  the  sake  of  a  greater  good,  and  n 
lesser  good  which  is  the  cause  of  a  greater  evil  we  shall 
neglect.  For  the  evil  which  we  here  call  less  is  really 
a  good,  and  the  good,  on  the  other  hand,  is  evil;  and  ihea- 


234  ETHIC. 

fore  (Corol.  Prop.  6 2,  pt.  4)  we  shall  seek  tlie  former  and 
neglect  the  latter. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  LXVI. — According  to  the  guidance  of  reason,  vje  shall 
seek  the  greater  future  good  lefore  that  ivhich  is  less 
and  present,  and  we  shall  seek  also  the  less  and  'present 
evil  hcfore  that  which  is  greater  and  future . 

Demonst. — If  it  were  possible  for  the  mind  to  have  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  a  future  object,  it  would  be 
affected  by  the  same  affect  towards  the  future  object  as 
towards  a  present  object  (Prop.  62,  pt.  4).  Therefore,  in 
so  far  as  we  attend  to  reason  itself,  as  we  are  supposing 
in  this  proposition  that  we  do,  it  is  the  same  thing  whe- 
ther the  greater  good  or  evil  be  supposed  to  be  future  or 
present,  and  therefore  (Prop.  65,  pt.  4)  we  shall  seek  the 
greater  future  good  before  that  which  is  less  and  present, 
&c. Q.E.D. 

Corol. — According  to  the  guidance  of  reason,  we  shall 
seek  the  lesser  present  evil  which  is  the  cause  of  the 
greater  future  good,  and  the  lesser  present  good  which  is 
the  cause  of  a  greater  future  evil  we  shall  neglect.  This 
corollary  is  connected  with  the  foregoing  proposition  in 
the  same  way  as  Corol.  Prop.  65  is  connected  with 
Prop.  65. 

Schol. — If  what  has  been  said  here  be  compared  with 
what  has  been  demonstrated  about  the  strength  of  the 
passions  in  the  first  eighteen  Props,  pt.  4,  and  in  Schol. 
Prop.  18,  pt.  4,  it  will  easily  be  seen  in  what  consists 
the  difference  between  a  man  who  is  led  by  affect  or 
opinion  alone  and  one  who  is  led  by  reason.  The  former, 
whether  he  wills  it  or  not,  does  those  things  of  which  he 
is  entirely  ignorant,  but  the  latter  does  the  will  of  no  one 
but  himself,  and  does  those  things  only  which  he  knows 
are  of  greatest  importance  in  life,  and  which  he  therefore 
desires  above  all  things.  I  call  the  former,  therefore,  a 
slave,  and  the  latter  free. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE. 

*3> 

I  will  add  here  a  few  \\-ords  concerning  th,>  ,  l.:,r., ,.  r 
of  the  free  man  and  his  manner  of  life. 

PEOr.  LXVII.--^/;rc  man  thinks  of  nothing  less  than  of 
death,  and  his  wisdom  is  not  a  meditation  upon  dmth 
hut  iipon  life. 

Demonsf.—A  free  man,  that  is  to  say,  a  man  who  livoii 
according  to  the  dictates  of  reason  alone,  is  not  led  l.y 
the  fear  of  death  (Prop.  63,  pt.  4),  hut  directly  desired 
the  good  (Corol.  Prop.  63,  pt.  4);  that  is  to  say  (I'nip. 
24,  pt.  4),  desires  to  act,  to  live,  and  to  preserve  hit 
being  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  seeking  his 
own  profit.  He  thinks,  therefore,  of  nothing  less  "than 
of  death,  and  his  wisdom  is  a  meditation  uj.un  lif.-.— 

Q.E.D. 

,  Prop.  LXVIII. — If  men  were  horn  free,  they  would  f/rm 
no  conception  of  good  and  evil  so  long  as  they  were  free. 

Demonst. — I  have  said  that  that  man  is  free  who  m 
led  by  reason  alone.  He,  therefore,  who  is  Iwrn  free  nn«l 
remains  free  has  no  other  than  adequate  ideas,  and  tiien?- 
fore  has  no  conception  of  evil  (Corol.  Prop.  64,  pt  4). 
and  consequently  (as  good  and  evil  are  correlative)  no 
conception  of  good. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — It  is  clear  from  Prop.  4,  ])t.  4,  that  the  hypo- 
thesis of  this  proposition  is  false,  and  cannot  he  conct-ivetl 
unless  in  so  far  as  we  regard  human  nature  nlonc,  or 
rather  God,  not  in  so  far  as  He  is  infinite,  hut  in  so  far 
only  as  He  is  the  cause  of  man's  existence.  Thia  (to- 
gether with  the  other  things  we  have  before  ilenion- 
strated)  appears  to  have  been  what  was  meant  by  Mrtf*.** 
in  that  history  of  the  first  man.  In  that  histoiy  no  oilier 
power  of  God  is  conceived  excepting  that  by  which  Ho 
created  man ;  that  is  to  say,  the  power  with  which  Ho 
considered  nothing  but  the  advantage  of  man.     lhcrw« 


236  ETHIC. 

fore  we  are  told  that  God  forbad  free  man  to  eat  of  the 
tree  of  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and  warned  him  that 
as  soon  as  he  ate  of  it  he  would  immediately  dread  death 
rather  than  desire  to  live.  Afterwards  we  are  told  that 
when  man  found  a  wife  who  agreed  entirely  with  his 
nature,  he  saw  that  there  could  be  nothing  in  nature 
which  could  be  more  profitable  to  him  than  his  wife. 
But  when  he  came  to  believe  that  the  brutes  were  like 
himself,  he  immediately  began  to  imitate  their  affects 
(Prop.  27,  pt.  3),  and  to  lose  his  liberty,  which  the  Patri- 
archs afterwards  recovered,  being  led  by  the  spirit  of 
Christ,  that  is  to  say,  by  the  idea  of  God,  which  alone 
can  make  a  man  free,  and  cause  him  to  desire  for  other 
men  the  good  he  desires  for  himself,  as  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4) 
we  have  already  demonstrated. 

Prop.  LXIX. — The  virtue  of  a  free  man  ds  seen  to  he  as 
great  in  avoiding  danger  as  in  overcomirig  it. 

Demonst. — An  affect  cannot  be  restrained  or  removed 
unless  a  contrary  and  stronger  affect  restrains  it  (Prop. 
7,  pt.  4) ;  but  blind  audacity  and  fear  are  affects  which 
may  be  conceived  as  being  equally  great  (Props.  5  and 
3,  pt.  4).  The  virtue  or  strength  of  mind,  therefore 
(for  the  definition  of  this,  see  Schol.  Prop.  59,  pt.  3), 
which  is  required  to  restrain  audacity  must  be  equally 
great  with  that  which  is  required  to  restrain  fear ;  that 
is  to  say  (Defs.  40  and  41  of  the  Affects),  a  free  man 
avoids  danger  by  the  same  virtue  of  the  mind  as  that 
by  which  he  seeks  to  overcome  it. — q.e.d. 

Corol. — Plight  at  the  proper  time,  just  as  well  as 
fighting,  is  to  be  reckoned,  therefore,  as  showing  strength 
of  mind  in  a  man  who  is  free ;  that  is  to  say,  a  free  man 
chooses  flight  by  the  same  strength  or  presence  of  mind 
as  that  by  which  he  chooses  battle. 

Schol. — What  strength  of  mind  is,  or  what  I  under- 
stand by  it,  I  have  explained  in  Schol.  Prop.  59,  pt.  3. 


OF  HUMAN  BOS  DAG  E.  ,.37 

By  danger,   I   understand  anything  which  may  be  iho 
cause  of  sorrow,  hatred,  discord,  or  any  otljcr  evil  like 

them. 

LXX. — The  fire  man  who  lives  ammgst  those  who  are  i,j,uj- 
rant  strives  as  much  as  2J0Ssihlc  to  avoid  their /aruury. 

Dcmonst. — Every  one,  according  to  his  own  disposition, 
judges  what  is  good  (Schoh  Prop.  39,  pt.  3).  Tli-  ' 
rant  man,  therefore,  who  has  conferred  a  favour  on  ;.: 
person,  will  value  it  according  to  his  own  way  of  O.i.iX- 
ing,  and  he  will  be  sad  if  a  less  value  seems  to  bo  placed 
upon  it  by  the  person  who  has  received  it  (Prop.  42, 
pt.  3).  But  a  free  man  strives  to  unite  other  men 
with  himself  by  friendship  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4),  and  not  to 
return  to  them  favours  which  they,  according  to  their 
affects,  may  consider  to  be  equal  to  those  wliich  they 
have  bestowed.  He  desires  rather  to  govern  himself  and 
others  by  the  free  decisions  of  reason,  and  to  do  those 
things  only  which  he  has  discovered  to  be  of  the  first 
importance.  A  free  man,  therefore,  in  order  that  he  may 
not  be  hated  by  the  ignorant,  nor  yet  yield  to  their  apj*- 
tites,  but  only  to  reason,  will  endeavour  as  much  as  jws- 
sible  to  avoid  their  favours. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — I  say  as  much  as  jyossible.     For  although  men 
are  ignorant,  they  are  nevertheless  men,  who,  when  we  ar« 
in  straits,  are  able  to  afford  us  human  assistance — the  U-at 
assistance  which  man  can  receive.     It  is  often  n»<  • 
therefore,  to  receive  a  favour  from  the  ignorant,  . 
thank  them  for  it  according  to  their  ta.ste ;  an<l 
this,  care  must  be  used,  even  in  declining  favour., 
seem  either  to  despise  the  givers  or  tlirough  aviir;co  l^ 
dread  a  return,  so  that  we  may  not,  while  striving  to 
escape  their  hatred,  by  that  very  act  incur  their  ■: 
sure.      In  avoiding  favours,  therefore,  we  must  U-  : 
by  a  consideration  of  what  is  profitable  and  honourmWe. 


238  ETHIC. 

PiLOP.  LXXI. — Xone  hut  those  who  arc  free  arc  very  grate- 
ful to  one  another. 

Demonst — None  but  those  who  are  free  are  very  pro- 
fitable to  one  another,  or  are  united  by  the  closest  bond 
of  friendship  (Prop.  35,  pt.  4,  and  Corol.  i),  or  with 
an  equal  zeal  of  love  strive  to  do  good  to  one  another 
(Prop.  37,  pt.  4),  and  therefore  (Def.  34  of  the  Affects) 
none  but  those  who  are  free  are  very  grateful  to  one  an- 
other.  Q.E.D. 

Schol. — The  gratitude  to  one  another  of  men  who  are 
led  by  blind  desire  is  generally  a  matter  of  business  or  a 
snare  rather  than  gratitude.  Ingratitude,  it  is  to  be  ob- 
served, is  not  an  affect.  It  is  nevertheless  base,  because 
it  is  generally  a  sign  that  a  man  is  too  much  affected  by 
hatred,  anger,  pride,  or  avarice.  For  he  who  through 
stupidity  does  not  know  how  to  return  a  gift  is  not 
ungrateful ;  and  much  less  is  he  ungrateful  who  is  not 
moved  by  the  gifts  of  a  harlot  to  serve  her  lust,  nor  by 
those  of  a  thief  to  conceal  his  thefts,  nor  by  any  other 
gifts  of  a  similar  kind.  On  the  contrary,  a  man  shows 
that  he  possesses  a  steadfast  mind  if  he  does  not  suffer 
himself  to  be  enticed  by  any  gifts  to  his  own  or  the 
common  ruin. 

Prop.  LXXII. — A  free  man  never  acts  cleceiffidhj,  hut 
alicays  honouTably. 

Demonst. — If  a  free  man  did  anything  deceitfully,  in 
so  far  as  he  is  free,  he  would  do  it  at  the  bidding  of 
reason  (for  so  far  only  do  we  call  him  free) ;  and  there- 
fore to  act  deceitfully  would  be  a  virtue  (Prop.  24,  pt.  4), 
and  consequently  (by  the  same  projDosition)  it  would  be 
more  advantageous  to  every  one,  for  the  preservation  of 
his  being,  to  act  deceitfully;  that  is  to  say  (as  is  self- 
evident),  it  would  be  more  advantageous  to  men  to  agree 
only  in  words  and  to  be  opposed  in  reality,  which  (Corol. 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  E.  j^ 

Prop.  3  I,  pt.  4)  is  absurJ.     A  free  man,  therefore.  Sec  — 

Q.E.D, 

Schol. — If  it  be  asked  whether,  if  a  man  by  breach  of 
faith  could  escape  from  the  danger  of  instant  death. 
reason  does  not  counsel  him,  for  the  preservation  of  hi.i' 
being,  to  break  faith ;  I  reply  in  the  same  way.  iljat  if 
reason  gives  such  counsel,  she  gives  it  to  all  men.  and 
reason  therefore  generally  counsels  men  to  make  no 
agreements  for  uniting  their  strength  and  possessing  laws 
in  common  except  deceitfully,  that  is  to  say,  to  Lave  in 
reality  no  common  laws,  which  is  absurd. 

Prop.  LXXIII. — A  man  ivho  is  guided  hi/  nason  w  frttr 
in  a  State  where  he  lives  according  to  the  common  laws 
than  he  is  in  solitude,  where  he  obeys  himself  alune. 

Dcmonst. — A  man  who  is  guided  by  reason  is  not  led 
to  obey  by  fear  (Prop.  6^,  pt.  4),  but  in  so  far  as  ho 
endeavours  to  preserve  his  being  in  accordance  with  the 
bidding  of  reason,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  66,  pt.  4), 
in  so  far  as  he  endeavours  to  live  in  freedom,  does  ho 
desire  to  have  regard  for  the  common  life  and  the  common 
profit  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4),  and  consequently  (as  we  havo 
shown  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  37,  pt.  4)  he  desires  to  livo 
according  to  the  common  laws  of  the .  State.  A  man, 
therefore,  who  is  guided  by  reason  desires,  in  onlcr  that 
he  may  live  more  freely,  to  maintain  the  common  right« 
of  the  State. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — These,  and  the  like  things  whii-h  wc  liavo 
demonstrated  concerning  the  true  liberty  of  man,  are  re- 
lated to  fortitude,  that  is  to  say  (Schol.  Prop.  59.  \>t  3), 
to  strength  of  mind  and  generosity.  Nor  do  I  tliink  it 
worth  while  to  demonstrate  here,  one  by  one,  all  the  pn*- 
perties  of  fortitude,  and  still  less  to  show  how  iu  i^.*- 
sessor  can  hate  no  one,  be  angry  with  no  one,  can  neithiT 
envy,  be  indignant  with,  nor  despise  anybody,  and  cnii 
least  of  all  be  proud.     For  all  this,  together  with  trulli» 


240  ETHIC. 

of  a  like  kind  whicli  have  to  do  "with,  the  true  life  and 
religion,  are  easily  deduced  from  Props,  ^y  and  46,  pt.  4, 
which  show  that  hatred  is  to  be  overcome  by  love,  and 
that  every  one  who  is  guided  by  reason  desires  for 
others  the  good  which  he  seeks  for  himself.  In  addition, 
we  must  remember  what  we  have  already  observed  in 
Schol.  Prop.  5  o,  pt.  4,  and  in  other  places,  that  the  brave 
man  will  consider  above  everything  that  all  things  follow 
from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature;  and  that,  conse- 
quently, whatever  he  thinks  injurious  and  evil,  and,  more- 
over, whatever  seems  to  be  impious,  dreadful,  unjust, 
or  wicked,  arises  from  this,  that  he  conceives  things  in  a 
disturbed,  mutilated,  and  confused  fashion.  For  this  rea- 
son, his  chief  effort  is  to  conceive  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  and  to  remove  the  hindrances  to  true  know- 
ledge, such  as  hatred,  anger,  envy,  derision,  pride,  and 
others  of  this  kind  which  we  have  before  noticed  ;  and  so 
he  endeavours,  as  we  have  said,  as  much  as  possible  to 
do  well  and  rejoice.  How  far  human  virtue  reaches  in 
the  attainment  of  these  things,  and  what  it  can  do,  I  shall 
show  in  the  following  part. 


APPENDIX. 

My  observations  in  this  part  concerning  the  true 
method  of  life  have  not  been  arranged  so  that  they  could 
be  seen  at  a  glance,  but  have  been  demonstrated  here 
and  there  according  as  I  could  more  easily  deduce  one 
from  another.  I  have  determined,  therefore,  here  to  col- 
lect them,  and  reduce  them  under  principal  heads. 

I. 

All  our  efforts  or  desires  follow  from  the  necessity  of 
our  nature  in  such  a  manner  that  they  can  be  understood 
either  through  it  alone  as  their  proximate  cause,  or  in  so 
far  as  we  are  a  part  of  nature,  which  part  cannot  be  ade- 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  n.  ,  , 

qiiately  conceived  through  itself  and  without  the  other 

individuals. 

II. 
The  desires  which  follow  from  our  nature  in  such  a 
manner  that  they  can  he  understood  through  it  alone,  ore 
those  which  are  related  to  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
conceived  to  consist  of  adequate  ideas.     The  renminin- 
desires  are  not  related  to  the  mind,  unless  in  so  far  aa  it 
conceives  things  inadequately,  whose  power  and  in.  : 
cannot  he  determined  hy  human  power,  but  by  the  : 
of  objects  which  are  without  us.     The  first  kind  ..t  .ic- 
sires,  therefore,  are  properly  called  actions,  but  the  lattor 
passions;  for  the  first  always  indicate  our  power,  and  the 
latter,  on  the  contrary,  indicate  our  impotence  and  imper- 
fect knowledge. 

III. 
Our  actions,  that  is  to  say,  those  desires  which  are 
determined  by  man's  power  or  reason,  are  always  good ; 
the  others  may  be  good  as  well  as  evil. 

IV. 

It  is  therefore  most  profitable  to  us  in  life  to  make 
perfect  the  intellect  or  reason  as  far  as  possible,  and  in 
this  one  thing  consists  the  highest  hapjiiness  or  blessed- 
ness of  man  ;  for  blessedness  is  nothing  but  the  peace  of 
mind  which  springs  from  the  intuitive  knowledge  of  God. 
and  to  perfect  the  intellect  is  nothing  but  to  understand 
God,  together  with  the  attributes  and  actions  of  tloj, 
which  flow  from  the  necessity  of  His  nature,  llie  final 
aim,  therefore,  of  a  man  who  is  guided  by  reason,  that  is 
to  say,  the  chief  desire  by  which  he  strives  to  govern  all 
his  other  desires,  is  that  by  which  he  is  led  adequately  to 
conceive  himself  and  all  things  which  can  be  conceived 
by  his  intelligence. 

V. 

There  is  no  rational  life  therefore,  without  iutelligenw. 


242  ETHIC. 

and  things  are  good  only  in  so  far  as  they  assist  man  to 
enjoy  that  life  of  the  mind  which  is  determined  by  intel- 
ligence. Those  things  alone,  on  the  other  hand,  we  call 
evil  which  hinder  man  from  perfecting  his  reason  and 
enjoying  a  rational  life. 

VI. 

But  because  all  those  things  of  which  man  is  the  effi- 
cient cause  are  necessarily  good,  it  follows  that  no  evil 
can  happen  to  man  except  from  external  causes,  that  is 
to  say,  except  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  part  of  the  whole  of 
nature,  whose  laws  human  nature  is  compelled  to  obey — 
compelled  also  to  accommodate  himself  to  this  wdiole  of 
nature  in  almost  an  infinite  number  of  ways. 

VII. 

It  is  impossible  that  a  man  should  not  be  a  part  of 
nature  and  follow  her  common  order  ;  but  if  he  be  placed 
amongst  individuals  who  agree  with  his  nature,  his  power 
of  action  will  by  that  very  fact  be  assisted  and  supported. 
But  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  be  placed  amongst  individuals 
who  do  not  in  the  least  agree  with  his  nature,  he  will 
scarcely  be  able  without  great  change  on  his  part  to 
accommodate  himself  to  them. 

viir. 

Anything  that  exists  in  nature  which  we  judge  to  be 
evil  or  able  to  hinder  us  from  existing  and  enjoying  a 
rational  life,  we  are  allowed  to  remove  from  us  in  that 
way  which  seems  the  safest ;  and  whatever,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  judge  to  be  good  or  to  be  profitable  for  the  pre- 
servation of  our  being  or  the  enjoyment  of  a  rational  life, 
we  are  permitted  to  take  for  our  use  and  use  in  any  way 
we  may  think  proper ;  and  absolutely,  every  one  is  allowed 
by  the  highest  right  of  .nature  to  do  that  which  he  be- 
lieves contributes  to  his  own  profit. 


OF  HUMAN  BOX  DAG  i:.  ,^3 

IX. 

Nothing,  therefore,  can  agree  better  witli  the  nature  of 
any  object  than  other  individuals  of  the  same  kind,  and 
so  (see  §  7)  there  is  nothing  more  profitable  to  nmn  for 
the  preservation  of  his  being  and  the  enjoyment  of  a 
rational  life  than  a  man  who  is  guided  by  reason.  Ajinin. 
since  there  is  no  single  thing  we  know  which  is  m..r.. 
excellent  than  a  man  who  is  guided  by  reason,  it  follows 
that  there  is  nothing  by  which  a  person  can  better  show 
how  much  skill  and  talent  he  possesses  than  by  so  e<hj- 
cating  men  that  at  last  they  will  live  under  the  dirn  t 
authority  of  reason. 

X. 

In  so  far  as  men  are  carried  away  by  envy  or  any 
affect  of  hatred  towards  one  another,  so  far  are  they  con- 
trary to  one  another,  and  consequently  so  much  the 
more  are  they  to  be  feared,  as  they  have  more  power  than 
other  individuals  of  nature. 

xr. 
Minds,  nevertheless,  are  not  conquered  by  arms,  but  ly 
love  and  generosity. 

XII. 

Above  all  things  is  it  profitable  to  men  to  form  com- 
munities and  to  unite  themselves  to  one  another  by  bonds 
which  may  make  all  of  them  as  one  man ;  and  absolutely, 
it  is  profitable  for  them  to  do  whatever  may  lend  to 
strengthen  their  friendships. 

XIII. 
But  to  accomplish  this  skill  and  watchfulness  are  re- 
quired; for  men  are  changeable  (those  bem-  vi-ry  ffW 
who  live  according  to  the  laws  of  rea.«on).  and  nevt-rlhr- 
less  generally  envious  and  more  inclined  to  v.  i-v  niv - 
than  pity.  To  bear  with  "each,  therefore,  :.' 
his  disposition  and  to  refrain  from  imitaiin-  : 


244  E  THIC. 

requires  a  singular  power  of  mind.  But  those,  on  the 
contrary,  who  know  how  to  revile  men,  to  denounce  vices 
rather  than  teach  virtues,  and  not  to  strengthen  men's 
minds  but  to  weaken  them,  are  injurious  both  to  them- 
selves and  others,  so  that  many  of  them  through  an  excess 
of  impatience  and  a  false  zeal  for  religion  prefer  living 
with  brutes  rather  than  amongst  men ;  just  as  boys  or 
youths,  unable  to  endure  with  equanimity  the  rebukes  of 
their  parents,  fly  to  the  army,  choosing  the  discomforts 
of  war  and  the  rule  of  a  tyrant  rather  than  the  comforts 
of  home  and  the  admonitions  of  a  father,  suffering  all 
kinds  of  burdens  to  be  imposed  upon  them  in  order  that 
they  may  revenge  themselves  upon  their  parents. 


Although,  therefore,  men  generally  determine  every- 
thing by  their  pleasure,  many  more  advantages  than  dis- 
advantages arise  from  their  common  union.  It  is  better, 
therefore,  to  endure  with  equanimity  the  injuries  inflicted 
by  them,  and  to  apply  our  minds  to  those  things  which 
subserve  concord  and  the  establishment  of  friendship. 

XV. 

The  tilings  which  beget  concord  are  those  which  are 
related  to  justice,  integrity,  and  honour ;  for  besides  that, 
which  is  unjust  and  injurious,  men  take  ill  also  anything 
w^hich  is  esteemed  base,  or  that  any  one  should  despise 
the  received  customs  of  the  State.  But  in  order  to  win 
love,  those  things  are  chiefly  necessary  which  have  refer- 
ence to  religion  and  piety.  (See  Schols.  i  and  2,  Prop. 
37,  Schol.  Prop.  46,  and  Schol.  Prop.  73,  pt.  4.) 

XVI. 

Concord,  moreover,  is  often  produced  by  fear,  but  it 
is  without  good  faith.  It  is  to  be  observed,  too,  that 
fear  arises  from  impotence  of  mind,  and  therefore  is  of  no 


OF  HUMAN  DOS  DACE.  j^j 

service  to  reason ;  nor  is  pity,  althougli  it  seems  to  pw- 

sent  an  appearance  of  piety. 


Men  also  are  conqnered  by  liberality,  ospocinlly  t  ■ 
who  Lave  not  the  means  wherewith  to  procure  wl,,i:  :, 
necessary  for  the  support  of  life.  But  to  as.si.st  every  one 
who  is  needy  far  surpasses  the  strength  or  profit  of  a 
private  person,  for  the  wealth  of  a  private  person  is  alto- 
gether insufhcient  to  supply  such  wants.  IJesides,  the 
power  of  any  one  man  is  too  limited  for  liim  to  bo  oblo 
to  unite  every  one  with  himself  in  friendship.  Tl»e  care, 
therefore,  of  the  poor  is  incumbent  on  the  whole  of 
society  and  concerns  only  the  general  profit 

XVIII. 

In  the  receipt  of  benefits  and  in  returning  thanks,  can 
altogether  different  must  be  taken — concerning  which  seo 
Schol.  Prop.  70,  and  Schoh  Prop.  71,  pt.  4. 

XIX. 
The  love  of  a  harlot,  that  is  to  say,  the  lust  of  soxunl 
intercourse,  which  arises  from  mere  external  form,  nn.l 
absolutely  all  love  which  recognises  any  other  cause  than 
the  freedom  of  the  mind,  easily  passes  into  hatri'd,  unle.-w. 
which  is  worse,  it  becomes  a  species  of  delirium,  and 
thereby  discord  is  cherished  rather  than  concord  (Corel. 
Prop.  3i>  pt-  3)- 

XX. 

AVith  regard  to  marriage,  it  is  plain  that  it  is  in  ncconl- 
ance  with  r°eason,  if  the  desire  of  connection  is  en-c-nd-rx-.! 
not  merely  by  external  form,  but  by  a  love  of  U-'.-ttM.'.' 
children  and  wisely  educating  tliem  ;  and  if  in  nddil.on. 
the  love  both  of  the  husband  and  wife  has  for  U«  cauw 
not  external  form  merely,  but  chiefly  liberty  of  mmd. 


246  ETHIC. 


Flattery,  too,  produces  concord,  but  only  by  means  of 
the  disgraceful  crime  of  slavery  or  perfidy ;  for  there  are 
none  who  are  more  taken  by  flattery  than  the  proud,  who 
wish  to  be  first  and  are  not  so. 


There  is  a  false  appearance  of  piety  and  religion  in 
dejection  ;  and  although  dejection  is  the  opposite  of  pride, 
the  humble  dejected  man  is  very  near  akin  to  the  proud 
(Schol.  Prop.  57,  pt.  4). 

XXIII. 

Shame  also  contributes  to  concord,  but  only  with  re- 
gard to  those  matters  which  cannot  be  concealed.  Shame, 
too,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  kind  of  sorrow,  does  not  belong 
to  the  service  of  reason. 

XXIV. 

The  remaining  affects  of  sorrow  which  have  man  for 
their  object  are  directly  opposed  to  justice,  integrity, 
honour,  piety,  and  religion  ;  and  although  indignation  may 
seem  to  present  an  appearance  of  equity,  yet  there  is  no 
law  where  it  is  allowed  to  every  one  to  judge  the  deeds  of 
another,  and  to  vindicate  his  own  or  another's  right. 


Affability,  that  is  to  say,  the  desire  of  pleasing  men, 
which  is  determined  by  reason,  is  related  to  piety  (Schol. 
Prop.  37,  pt.  4).  But  if  affability  arise  from  an  affect, 
it  is  ambition  or  desire,  by  which  men,  generally  under 
a  false  pretence  of  piety,  excite  discords  and  seditions. 
For  he  who  desires  to  assist  other  people,  either  by  advice 
or  by  deed,  in  order  that  they  may  together  enjoy  the 
highest  good,  will  strive,  above  all  things,  to  win  their 
love,  and  not  to  draw  them  into  admiration,  so  that  a 
doctrine  may  be  named  after  him,  nor  absolutely  to  give 


OF  HUMAN  BON  DAG  I 

any  occasion  for  envy.  Li  common  convcrsntr.n  i-...  h.. 
\vill  avoid  referring  to  the  vices  of  men,  nnd  will  ukl 
care  only  sparingly  to  speak  of  human  impotence  while 
he  will  talk  largely  of  human  virtue  or  power,  aiuluf 
the  way  by  which  it  may  be  made  perfect,  so  that  men 
being  moved  not  by  fear  or  aversion,  but  solely  by  the 
aifect  of  joy,  may  endeavour  as  much  as  they  can  to  Uvc 
under  the  rule  of  reason. 

XXVI. 

Excepting  man,  we  know  no  individual  thin?  in 
nature  in  whose  mind  we  can  take  pleasure,  nor  "any- 
thing which  we  can  unite  with  ourselves  by  friend.ship  or 
any  kind  of  intercourse,  and  therefore  the  law  of  our  own 
profit  does  not  demand  that  we  should  preserve  anythini: 
which  exists  in  nature  excepting  men,  but  teaches  us  to 
preserve  it  or  destroy  it  in  accordance  with  its  varied  use*, 
or  to  adapt  it  to  our  own  service  in  any  way  whatever. 

xxvii. 

The  profit  which  we  derive  from  objects  without  us, 
over  and  above  the  experience  and  knowledge  which  wo 
obtain  because  we  observe  them  and  change  them  from 
their  existing  forms  into  others,  is  chiefly  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  body,  and  for  this  reason  those  objects  aro 
the  most  profitable  to  us  which  can  feed  and  nourish  the 
body,  so  that  all  its  parts  are  able  properly  to  iK;rf«)riu 
their  functions.  For  the  more  capal)le  the  body  is  of 
being  affected  in  many  ways,  and  affecting  exlcnial 
bodies  in  many  ways,  the  more  capable  of  tliinkinjj  is 
the  mind  (Props.  38  and  39,  pt.  4).  But  there  st-cm 
to  be  very  few  things  in  nature  of  this  kind,  and  il  »« 
consequently  necessary  for  the  requisite  nouri.shmont 
of  the  body  to  use  many  different  kinds  of  fo(jd  ;  for  the 
human  body  is  composed  of  a  great  number  of  parts  of 
different  nature,  which  need  constant  and  varied  fowl  in 
order  that  the  whole  of  the  body  may  be  cqunlly 
adapted  for  all  those  things  which  can  follow  fruoi  iU 


248  ETHIC. 

nature,    and   consequently   that   the   mind   also  may  be 
equally  adapted  to  conceive  many  things. 

XXVIII. 

The  strength  of  one  man  would  scarcely  suffice  to 
obtain  these  things  if  men  did  not  mutually  assist  one 
another.  As  money  has  presented  us  with  an  abstract 
of  everything,  it  has  come  to  pass  that  its  image  above 
every  other  usually  occupies  the  mind  of  the  multitude, 
because  they  can  imagine  hardly  any  kind  of  joy  without 
the  accompanying  idea  of  money  as  its  cause. 

XXIX. 

This,  however,  is  a  vice  only  in  those  who  seek  money 
not  from  poverty  or  necessity,  but  because  they  have 
learnt  the  arts  of  gain,  by  which  they  keep  up  a  grand 
appearance.  As  for  the  body  itself,  they  feed  it  in  ac- 
cordance with  custom,  but  sparingly,  because  they  believe 
that  they  lose  so  much  of  their  goods  as  they  spend  upon 
the  preservation  of  their  body.  Those,  however,  who 
know  the  true  use  of  money,  and  regulate  the  measure  of 
wealth  according  to  their  needs,  live  contented  with  few 
things. 

XXX. 

Since,  therefore,  those  things  are  good  which  help  the 
parts  of  the  body  to  perform  their  functions,  and  since 
joy  consists  in  this,  that  the  power  of  man,  in  so  far  as 
he  is  made  up  of  mind  and  body,  is  helped  or  increased, 
it  follows  that  all  those  things  which  bring  joy  are  good. 
But  inasmuch  as  things  do  not  work  to  this  end — that 
they  may  affect  us  with  joy — nor  is  their  power  of  action 
guided  in  accordance  with  our  profit,  and  finally,  since 
joy  is  generally  related  chiefly  to  some  one  part  of  the 
body,  it  follows  that  generally  the  affects  of  joy  (unless 
reason  and  watchfulness  be  present),  and  consequently 
the  desires  which  are  begotten  from  them,  are  excessive. 
It  is  to  be  added,  that  an  affect  causes  us  to   put  that 


OF  IIUMA.\  BOX D AGE.  ^^ 

thing  first  wliicli  is  sweet  to  us  in  the  present,  nn.l  ihnt 
we  are  not  able  to  judge  the  future  with  nn  cqiuU  nffcct 
of  the  mind  (Schol.  Prop.  44,  and  Sehol.  Prop.  Co.  pt.  4). 

XXXI.  t 
Superstition,  on  the  contrary,  seems  to  animi  thnt  what 
brings  sorrow  is  good,  and,  on  the  contrary,  that  what 
brings  joy  is  evil.  But,  as  we  have  ah-eady  said  (SclpL 
Prop.  45,  pt.  4),  no  one  excepting  an  envious  man  is 
delighted  at  my  impotence  or  disadvantage,  for  the  jjrealcr 
the  joy  with  which  we  are  affected,  the  greater  the  jwr- 
fection  to  which  we  pass,  and  consequently  tlie  more  do 
we  participate  in  the  divine  nature ;  nor  can  joy  ever  be 
evil  w^hich  is  controlled  by  a  true  consideration  for  our 
own  profit.  On  the  other  hand,  the  man  who  is  led  by 
fear,  and  does  what  is  good  that  he  may  avoid  wliat  is 
evil,  is  not  guided  by  reason. 

XXXII. 

But  human  power  is  very  limited,  and  is  infinitely  snr- 
passed  by  the  power  of  external  causes,  so  tliat  we  do 
not  possess  an  absolute  power  to  adapt  to  our  service  the 
things  which  are  without  us.  Kevertheless  we  shall  bear 
with  equanimity  those  things  which  hajtpen  to  u.s  con- 
trary to  what  a  consideration  of  our  own  profit  demand.<». 
if  we  are  conscious  that  we  have  performed  our  duty,  that 
the  power  we  have  could  not  reach  so  far  as  to  enable  \in 
to  avoid  those  things,  and  that  we  are  a  part  of  the  whole 
of  nature,  whose  order  we  follow.  If  we  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly understand  this,  the  part  of  us  which  is  deter- 
mined by  intelligence,  that  is  to  say,  the  better  part  of 
us,  will  be  entirely  satisfied  therewith,  and  in  that  satis- 
faction will  endeavour  to  persevere ;  for,  in  so  far  as  wc 
understand,  we  cannot  desire  anything  excepting,'  what  is 
necessary,  nor  absolutely,  can  we  be  satisfied  with  any- 
thing but  the  truth.  Therefore  in  so  far  as  wo  under- 
stand these  things  properly  will  the  efforts  of  the  Wllcr 
part  of  us  agree  with  the  order  of  the  whole  of  nature. 


(      250      ) 


ETHIC. 


Jift}}  ^art. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  INTELLECT,  OR  OF 
HUMAN  LIBERTY. 

PREFACE. 

I  PASS  at  length  to  the  other  part  of  Ethic  which  con- 
cerns the  method  or  way  which  leads  to  liberty.  In  this 
part,  therefore,  I  shall  treat  of  the  power  of  reason,  show- 
ing how  much  reason  itself  can  control  the  affects,  and 
then  what  is  freedom  of  mind  or  blessedness.  Thence 
we  shall  see  how  much  stronger  the  wise  man  is  than  the 
ignorant.  In  what  manner  and  in  what  way  the  intel- 
lect should  be  rendered  perfect,  and  with  what  art  the 
body  is  to  be  cared  for  in  order  that  it  may  properly  per- 
form its  functions,  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  here ;  for 
the  former  belongs  to  logic,  the  latter  to  medicine.  I 
shall  occupy  myself  here,  as  I  have  said,  solely  with  the 
power  of  the  mind  or  of  reason,  first  of  all  showing  the 
extent  and  nature  of  the  authority  which  it  has  over  the 
affects  in  restraining  them  and  governing  them ;  for  that 
we  have  not  absolute  authority  over  them  we  have  already 
demonstrated.  The  Stoics  indeed  thought  that  the  affects 
depend  absolutely  on  our  will,  and  that  we  are  absolutely 
masters  over  them  ;  but  they  were  driven,  by  the  contra- 
diction of  experience,  though  not  by  their  own  principles, 
to  confess  that  not  a  little  practice  and  study  are  required 
in  order  to  restrain  and  govern  the  affects.     This  one  of 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  IMl  I.ILCT.  35, 

them  attempted  to  illustrate,  if  I  rcmomber  rightly,  by 
the  example  of  two  dogs,  one  of  a  domestic  and  Uie  olhrr 
of  a  hunting  breed  ;  for  he  was  able  by  liabit  to  make  ilu' 
house-dog  hunt,  and  the  hunting  dog,  on  the  contmn-.  U) 
desist  from  running  after  hares.  To  the  Stoical  oi,in'i.,n 
Descartes  much  inclines.  He  affirms  that  the  soul  or  mind 
is  united  specially  to  a  certain  part  of  the  brain  call.-.l 
the  pineal  gland,  which  the  mind  by  the  mere  i-xi-rt-iM' 
of  the  will  is  able  to  move  in  different  ways,  and  by 
whose  help  the  mind  perceives  all  the  movements  wliich 
are  excited  in  the  body  and  external  objects.  Tliis  gland 
he  affirms  is  suspended  in  the  middle  of  the  brnin  in 
such  a  manner  that  it  can  be  moved  by  the  least  motion 
of  the  animal  spirits.  Again,  he  affirms  tliat  any  varia- 
tion in  the  manner  in  which  the  animal  spirits  inipinj:!* 
upon  this  gland  is  followed  by  a  variation  in  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  suspended  in  the  middle  of  the  brain,  and 
moreover  that  the  number  of  different  impressions  on  the 
gland  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  different  external  object« 
which  propel  the  animal  spirits  towards  it.  Hence  it 
comes  to  pass  that  if  the  gland,  by  the  will  of  the  soul 
moving  it  in  different  directions,  be  afterwards  susiiended 
in  this  or  that  way  in  which  it  had  once  been  susjHjndftl 
by  the  spirits  agitated  in  this  or  that  way,  then  the  j:land 
itself  will  propel  and  determine  the  animal  spirits  them- 
selves in  the  same  way  as  that  in  which  they  had  before 
been  repelled  by  a  similar  suspension  of  tlie  gland. 
Moreover,  he  affirmed  that  each  volition  of  tlje  mind  in 
united  in  nature  to  a  certain  motion  of  the  gland.  For 
example,  if  a  person  wishes  to  behold  a  remote  object, 
this  volition  will  cause  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  ddaU-.  but 
if  he  thinks  merely  of  the  dilation  of  the  ptjpil,  to  have 
that  volition  will  profit  him  nothing,  l>ecau.«5e  natur«  h«« 
not  connected  a  motion  of  the  gland  which  8er\-es  to  im- 
pel the  animal  spirits  towards  the  optic  nen'e  iu  a  way 
suitable  for  dilation  or  contraction  of  the  pupil  with  iho 
volition  of  dilation   or  contraction,  but  only  w»ih  U.o 


252  ETHIC. 

volition  of  beholding  objects  afar  off  or  close  at  band. 
Finally,  be  maintained  tbat  altbougb  eacb  motion  of  this 
gland  appears  to  be  connected  by  nature  from  the  com- 
mencement of  our  life  with  an  individual  thought,  these 
motions  can  nevertheless  be  connected  by  habit  with  other 
thoughts,  a  proposition  which  he  attempts  to  demonstrate 
in  his  "  Passions  of  the  Soul,"  art.  50,  pt.  i. 

From  this  he  concludes  that  there  is  no  mind  so  feeble 
that  it  cannot,  when  properly  directed,  acquire  absolute 
power  over  its  passions  ;  for  passions,  as  defined  by  him, 
are  "  perceptions,  or  sensations,  or  emotions  of  the  soul 
which  are  related  to  it  specially,  and  which  are  produced, 
preserved,  and  strengthened  by  some  motion  of  the 
spijits."  (See  the  "  Passions  of  the  Soul,"  art.  27,  pt. 
I.)  But  since  it  is  possible  to  join  to  a  certain  volition 
any  motion  of  the  gland,  and  consequently  of  the  spirits, 
and  since  the  determination  of  the  will  depends  solely 
on  our  power,  we  shall  be  able  to'  acquire  absolute 
mastery  over  our  passions  provided  only  we  determine 
our  will  by  fixed  and  firm  decisions  by  which  we  desire 
to  direct  our  actions  and  bind  with  these  decisions  the 
movements  of  the  passions  we  wish  to  have.  So  far  as 
I  can  gather  from  his  own  words,  this  is  the  opinion  of 
that  distinguished  man,  and  I  could  scarcely  have 
believed  it  possible  for  one  so  great  to  have  put  it  for- 
w^ard  if  it  had  been  less  subtle.  I  can  hardly  wonder 
enough  that  a  philosopher  who  firmly  resolved  to  make 
no  deduction  except  from  self-evident  principles,  and  to 
affirm  nothing  but  what  he  clearly  and  distinctly  per- 
ceived, and  who  blamed  all  the  schoolmen  because  they 
desired  to  explain  obscure  matters  by  occult  qualities, 
should  accept  a  hypothesis  more  occult  than  any  occult 
quality.  What  does  he  understand,  I  ask,  by  the  union 
of  the  mind  and  body  ?  What  clear  and  distinct  con- 
ception has  he  of  thought  intimately  connected  with  a 
certain  small  portion  of  matter  ?  I  wish  that  he  had 
explained  this  union  by  its   proximate  cause.     But  he 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLE 


(fr     -'53 


conceived  the  inind  to  be  so  distinct  fro,„  theSlody  thit 
he  was  able  to  assign  no  single  cause  of  thj,  union  nor 
of  the  mind  itself,  but  was  obliged  to  have  recourse  to 
the  canse  of  the  whole  universe,  that  is  to  say  to  (jcl 
Again,  I  should  like  to  know  how  many  dejrriM^  o*f 
motion  the  mind  can  give  to  that  pineal  gland,  and  with 
how  great  a  power  the  mind  can  hold  it  suspemictl.  For 
I  do  not  understand  whether  this  gland  is  acted  on  by 
the  mind  more  slowly  or  more  quickly  tlian  by  the 
animal  spirits,  and  whether  the  movements  of  the  i^. 
sions,  which  we  have  so  closely  bound  witli  firm  deci- 
sions, might  not  be  separated  from  them  again  by  Ixxlily 
causes,  from  which  it  would  follow  tliat  although  the 
mind  had  firmly  determined  to  meet  danger,  and  had 
joined  to  this  decision  tlie  motion  of  boldness,  th.-  ■  • 
of  the  danger  might  cause  the  gland  to  be  susj.  :.  ; 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  mind  could  think  of  u<-u-::^ 
but  flight.  Indeed,  since  there  is  no  relation  bttw.-i, 
the  will  and  motion,  so  there  is  no  comparison  between 
the  power  or  strength  of  the  body  and  that  of  tjje  mind, 
and  consequently  the  strength  of  the  body  can  never 
be  determined  by  the  strength  of  the  mind.  It  is  to  bo 
remembered  also  that  this  gland  is  not  found  to  be  «o 
situated  in  the  middle  of  the  brain  that  it  can  be  driven 
about  so  easily  and  in  so  many  ways,  and  that  all  the 
nerves  are  not  extended  to  the  cavities  of  the  brain. 
Lastly,  I  omit  all  that  Descartes  asserts  concerning  the 
will  and  the  freedom  of  the  will,  since  I  have  sliown 
over  and  over  again  that  it  is  false.  Therefore,  inasmuch 
as  the  power  of  the  mind,  as  I  have  shown  above,  ii 
determined  by  intelligence  alone,  we  shall  detennine  bjr 
the  knowledge  of  the  mind  alone  the  remedit-s  a'.;aiu»t 
the  affects — remedies  which  every  one,  I  believe,  haji  ex- 
perienced, although  there  may  not  have  been  any  accurals 
observation  or  distinct  perception  of  them,  and  fn'ta 
this  knowledge  of  the  mind  alone  shall  we  deduce  every- 
thinfi  which  relates  to  its  blessedness. 


254  \^       ETHIC. 

"p-  Axioms. 

1.  If  two  contrary  actions  be  excited  in  the  same 
subject,  a  change  must  necessarily  take  place  in  both,  or 
in  one  alone,  until  they  cease  to  be  contrary. 

2.  The  power  of  an  affect  is  limited  by  the  power  of 
its  cause,  in  so  far  as  the  essence  of  the  affect  is  ex- 
plained or  limited  by  the  essence  of  the  cause  itself. 

This  axiom  is  evident  from  Prop.  7,  pt.  3. 

Prop.  I. — As  tlwughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are  arranged 
and  conneeted  in  the  mind,  exactly  so  are  the  affec- 
tions of  the  body  or  the  images  of  things  arranged  and 
connected  in  the  tody. 

Demonst. — The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the 
same  (Prop,  7,  pt.  2)  as  the  order  and  connection  of 
things,  and  vice  versa,  the  order  and  connection  of  things 
is  the  same  (Corol.  Props.  6  and  7,  pt.  2)  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  ideas.  Therefore,  as  the  order  and  connec- 
tion of  ideas  in  the  mind  is  according  to  the  order  and 
connection  of  the  affections  of  the  body  (Prop.  1 8,  pt.  2), 
it  follows,  vice  versa  (Prop.  2,  pt.  3),  that  the  order  and 
connection  of  the  affections  of  the  body  is  according  to 
the  order  and  connection  in  the  mind  of  the  thoughts  and 
ideas  of  things. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  II. — If  we  detach  an  emotion  of  the  mind  or  affect 
from  the  thought  of  an  external  cause  and  connect  it 
uiith  other  thoughts,  then  the  love  or  hatred  towards  the 
external  cause  and  the  fluctuations  of  the  mind  which 
arise  from  these  affects  will  he  destroyed. 

Demonst. — That  which  constitutes  the  form  of  love  or 
hatred  is  joy  or  sorrow,  accompanied  with  the  idea  of  an 
external  cause  (Defs.  6  and  7  of  the  Affects).  If  this  idea 
therefore  be  taken  away,  the  form  of  love  or  hatred  is  also 
removed,  and  therefore  these  affects  and  any  others  which 
arise  from  them  are  destroyed. — Q.e.d. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLLU.  ^jj 

rnop.  lll.~An  affect  which  i.  a  passion  ceases  to  U  a 

passion  as  soo>i  as  tec  form  a  clear  ami  ,listi,ut  idnt 

of  it. 

Dernonst.~An  afTect  which  is  a  passion  is  a  confiwod 
idea  (by  the  general  defiuition  of  the  Aflects).  If,  there- 
fore, we  form  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  this'  afTccl. 
the  idea  will  not  be  distinguished— except  by  reaaon— 
from  this  affect,  in  so  far  as  the  affect  is  related  to  iho 
mind  alone  (Prop.  21,  pt.  2,  with  its  Schol.),  and  there- 
fore  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3)  the  affect  will  cease  to  be  a  passion. 

Q.E.D. 

Coral. — In  proportion,  then,  as  we  know  an  afTect 
better  is  it  more  within  our  control,  and  the  less  docs 

the  mind  suffer  from  it. 


Pkop.  IV. — Tliere  is  no  affection  of  the  lochj  of  ichich  tc€ 
cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception. 

Demonst. — Those  things  which  are  common  to  all  can- 
not be  otherwise  than  ade(iuately  conceived  (Prop.  38, 
pt.  2),  and  therefore  (Prop.  12,  and  L-ni.  2,  following' 
Schol.  Prop.  13,  pt.  2)  there  is  no  affection  of  the  hotly 
of  which  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
tion.  Q.E.D. 

Corol. — Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  no  affect  of  which 
we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception.  For 
an  affect  is  an  idea  of  an  affection  of  the  body  (by  tho 
general  definition  of  the  Affects),  and  this  idea  therefore 
(Prop.  4,  pt.'  5)  must  involve  some  clear  and  distinct  con- 
ception. 

Schol. — Since  nothing  exists  from  which  some  cfTt-ct 
does  not  follow  (Prop.  36,  pt.  l),  and  since  we  under- 
stand clearly  and  distinctly  everything  which  follows  from 
an  idea  which  is  adequate  in  us  (Prop.  40,  pL  2).  it  U 
a  necessary  consequence  that  every  one  luw  ihf  i»uwcr. 
partly  at  least,  if  not  absolutely,  of  uudersUmdmi'  clearly 


256  ETHIC. 

and  distinctly  himself  and  his  affects,  and  consec[uently 
of  bringing  it  to  pass  that  he  suffers  less  from  them.  We 
have  therefore  mainly  to  strive  to  acquire  a  clear  and 
distinct  knowledge  as  far  as  possible  of  each  affect,  so 
that  the  mind  may  be  led  to  pass  from  the  affect  to  think 
those  things  which  it  perceives  clearly  and  distinctly,  and 
with  which  it  is  entirely  satisfied,  and  to  strive  also  that 
the  affect  may  be  separated  from  the  thought-  of  an 
external  cause  and  connected  with  true  thoughts.  Thus 
not  only  love,  hatred,  &c.,  will  be  destroyed  (Prop.  2, 
pt.  5),  but  also  the  appetites  or  desires  to  which  the  affect 
gives  rise  cannot  be  excessive  (Prop.  61,  pt.  4).  For  it 
is  above  everything  to  be  observed  that  the  appetite  by 
which  a  man  is  said  to  act  is  one  and  the  same  appetite 
as  that  by  which  he  is  said  to  suffer.  For  example,  we 
have  shown  that  human  nature  is  so  constituted  that  every 
one  desires  that  other  people  should  live  according  to  his 
way  of  thinking  (Schol.  Prop.  31,  pt.  3),  a  desire  which 
in  a  man  who  is  not  guided  by  reason  is  a  passion  which 
is  called  ambition,  and  is  not  very  different  from  pride ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  in  a  man  who  lives  according 
to  the  dictates  of  reason  it  is  an  action  or  virtue  which 
is  called  piety  (SchoL  i,  Prop.  37,  pt.  4,  and  Demonst.  2 
of  the  same  Prop.)  In  the  same  manner,  all  the  appe- 
tites or  desires  are  passions  only  in  so  far  as  they  arise 
from  inadequate  ideas,  and  are  classed  among  the  virtues 
whenever  they  are  excited  or  begotten  by  adequate  ideas; 
for  all  the  desires  by  which  we  are  determined  to  any 
action  may  arise  either  from  adequate  or  inadequate  ideas 
(Prop.  59,  pt.  4).  To  return,  therefore,  to  the  point  from 
which  we  set  out :  there  is  no  remedy  within  our  power 
which  can  be  conceived  more  excellent  for  the  affects 
than  that  which  consists  in  a  true  knowledge  of  them, 
since  the  mind  possesses  no  other  power  than  that  of 
thinking  and  forming  adequate  ideas,  as  we  have  shown 
above  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3). 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLFXT. 

Trot.  Y.~A,i  affect  towards  an  object  ivhich  tr< 
imagine  as  ncccssari/, possible,  or  amtinqnit,  hu 
we  simphj  imagim,  is,  other  thbujs  bruv,  .-,. 
greatest  of  all.  '      ' 


Demoiist.— The  affect  towards  an  object  which  we 
imagine  to  be  free  is  greater  than  towards  one  which  is 
necessary  (Prop.  49,  pt.  3),  and  consequently  still  -rcalcr 
than  towards  one  which  we  imagine  as  possible  or  con- 
tingent  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  4).  But  to  imagine  an  object  as 
free  can  be  nothing  else  than  to  imagine  it  simply,  while 
we  know  not  the  causes  by  which  it  was  determined  to 
action.  (See  Schol.  Prop.  35,  pt.  2.)  An  affect,  then- 
fore,  towards  an  object  which  we  simj.ly  imagine  is,  other 
things  being  equal,  greater  than  towards  one  which  we 
imagine  as  necessary,  possible,  or  contingent,  and  conse- 
quently greatest  of  all. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  VI. — In  so  far  as  the  miiul  nndcrstamU  all  (huujt 
as   necessary,  so  far  has  it  greater  poirrr  ocrr  the 

affects,  or  suffers  less  from  them. 

Demonst. — The  mind  understands  all  things  to  b- 
necessary  (Prop.  29,  pt.  i),  and  determined  by  un  intinii" 
chain  of  causes  to  existence  and  action  (Proj).  28,  pL  i). 
and  therefore  (Prop.  5,  pt.  5)  so  far  enables  iUielf  to 
suffer  less  from  the  affects  which  arise  from  these  ihiti^'t. 
and  (Prop.  48,  pt.  3)  to  be  less  affected  towards  lii- in. 
— Q.E.D. 

Sc/(ol. — The  more  this  knowledge  tliat  lhiii;.'H  art- 
necessary  is  applied  to  individual  things  whicli  we 
imagine  more  distinctly  and  more  vividly,  the  gn-atcr  w 
this  power  of  the  mind  over  the  affects,— a  fact  to  which 
experience  also  testifies.  For  we  see  that  sorrow  for  the 
loss  of  anything  good  is  diminished  if  the  i^rsou  who 
has  lost  it  considers  that  it  could  not  by  any  |x>-»ibjlity 
have  been  preserved.     So  also  we  see  that  nobody  pilie* 


an  infant  because  it  does  not  know  how  to  speak,  walk, 
or  reason,  and  lives  so  many  years  not  conscious,  as  it 
were,  of  itself ;  but  if  a  number  of  human  beings  were 
born  adult,  and  only  a  few  here  and  there  were  born 
infants,  every  one  would  pity  the  infants,  because  we 
should  then  consider  infancy  not  as  a  thing  natural  and 
necessary,  but  as  a  defect  or  fault  of  nature.  Many 
other  facts  of  a  similar  kind  we  might  observe. 

Prop.  VII. — Tlie  affects  ivhich  spring  from  reason  or  icliich 
are  excited  hy  it  are,  if  time  be  taken  into  account,  more 
powerful  than  those  which  are  related  to  individual 
objects  which  we  contemplate  as  absent. 

Demonst. — We  do  not  contemplate  an  object  as  absent 
by  reason  of  the  affect  by  which  we  imagine  it,  but  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  the  body  is  affected  with  another 
affect,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  that  object  (Prop. 
17,  pt.  2).  The  affect,  therefore,  which  is  related  to  an 
object  which  we  contemplate  as  absent,  is  not  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  overcome  the  other  actions  and  power  of 
man  (concerning  these  things  see  Prop.  6,  pt.  4),  but, 
on  the  contrary,  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can  in  some 
way  be  restrained  by  those  affections  which  exclude  the 
existence  of  its  external  cause  (Prop.  9,  pt.  4).  But  the 
affect  which  arises  from  reason  is  necessarily  related  to 
the  common  properties  of  things  (see  the  definition  of 
reason  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  which  we  always  con- 
template as  present  (for  nothing  can  exist  which  excludes 
their  present  existence),  and  which  we  always  imagine 
in  the  same  way  (Prop.  38,  pt.  2).  This  affect,  there- 
fore, always  remains  the  same,  and  consequently  (Ax.  i, 
pt.  5),  the  affects  which  are  contrary  to  it,  and  which  are 
not  maintained  by  their  external  cause,  must  more  and 
more  accommodate  themselves  to  it  imtil  they  are  no 
longer  contrary  to  it.  So  far,  therefore,  the  affect  which 
springs  from  reason  is  the  stronger. — q.e.d. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLU  i. 

Vnor.VlU.-Tkc  r,natrr  the  nu.a.r  of  the  causes  ^kick 
simulancousl>/  concur  to  excite  any  nfot,  (J,,  grtattr 

it  will  he.  '' 

Demonst.—X  number  of  simultineous  causes  can  do 
more  than  if  they  M'ere  fewer  (Prop.  7.  pt,  3).a,ul  iherv- 
fore  (Prop.  5,  pt.  4)  the  greater  tlie  number  of  the  simul- 
taneous causes  by  wliich  an  allect  is  excited,  tlu-  greater 
it  is. Q.E.D. 

ScM.—Thh  proposition   is  also   evident  fmm   Ax    - 

pt.  5- 

Prop.  IX.— //  wc  are  affected  hj  an  affect  ichich  is  rtlattd 
to  many  and  different  causes,  which  the  mind  eontem- 
plates  at  the  same  time  with  the  aff,ct  itself,  we  are  less 

injured,  suffer  less  from  it,  and  are  less  affected  (i.     ■ 
towards  each  ccmse  than  if  we  were  affected  In,  ■■ 
affect  ecjiLolUj  great  which  is  related  to  one  coum  wwi'y 
or  to  fewer  causes. 

Dcmonst. — An  affect  is  bad  or  injuriou.s  only  in  «o  fur 
as  it  hinders  the  mind  from  tliinkinu'  (Props.   26  and 
27,  pt.  4),  and   therefore  that  affect  by  which  the  mind 
is   determined  to    the    contempUition    of  a    nuinl»cr   of 
objects  at  the  same  time  is  less  injurious  tlian  n?i<>t)i<'r 
affect   equally  great  which  holds  the  mind  in  t!;- 
templation  of  one  object  alone  or  of  a   few  ol'j  . 
that  it  cannot  think  of  others.     This  is  the  first  li*ui>^ 
we  had  to  prove.     Again,  since  the  essence  of  tlic  jnind. 
that  is   to   say  (Prop.    7,  pt.    3),  its  power,  con 
thought  alone  (Prop,    i  i,  pt.  2),  the  mind  .sul!« : 
through  an   aifect  by  which  it  is  determined  to  i:. 
templation  of  a  number  of  oiyects  at  the  same  tin.' 
through  an  affect  equally  great  whicli  liolds  it  oc<m:: 
the  contemplation  of  one  object  alone  or  of  a  few  - 
This    is    the  second  thing  we  had  to  j»rove.       1 
this  affect  (Prop.  48,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  it  is  reltt:-  .  1 
a  number  of   external  causes,  is  therefore  less  lowaxiU 
eauh. — ^.E.D. 


26o  ETHIC. 

Prop.  X. — So  long  as  vje  are  not  agitated  hy  affaU  wliicli 
are  contrary  to  onr  nature  do  we  possess  the  poiuer 
of  arranging  and  connecting  the  affections  of  the  tody 
according  to  the  order  of  the  intellect. 

Dcmonst. — The  affects  wbicli  are  contrary  to  our 
nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  30,  pt.  4),  which  are  evil, 
are  evil  so  far  as  they  hinder  the  mind  from  understand- 
ing (Prop.  27,  pt.  4).  So  long,  therefore,  as  we  are  not 
agitated  by  affects  which  are  contrary  to  our  nature,  so 
long  the  power  of  the  mind  by  which  it  endeavours  to 
understand  things  (Prop.  26,  pt.  4)  is  not  hindered,  and 
therefore  so  long  does  it  possess  the  power  of  forming 
clear  and  distinct  ideas,  and  of  deducing  them  the  one 
from  the  other  (see  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  and  Schol.  Prop. 
47,  pt.  2).  So  long,  consequently  (Prop,  i,  pt.  5),  do  we 
possess  the  power  of  arranging  and  connecting  the  affec- 
tions of  the  body  according  to  the  order  of  the  intellect. 

Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Through  this  power  of  properly  arranging  and 
connecting  the  affections  of  the  body  we  can  prevent 
ourselves  from  being  easily  affected  by  evil  affects.  For 
(Prop.  7,  pt.  5)  a  greater  power  is  required  to  restrain 
affects  which  are  arranged  and  connected  according  to 
the  order  of  the  intellect  than  is  required  to  restrain 
those  M-hich  are  uncertain  and  unsettled.  The  best 
thing,  therefore,  we  can  do,  so  long  as  we  lack  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  our  affects,  is  to  conceive  a  right  rule  of  life, 
or  sure  maxims  {dogmata)  of  life, — to  commit  these  latter 
to  memory,  and  constantly  to  apply  them  to  the  particu- 
lar cases  which  frequently  meet  us  in  life,  so  that  our 
imagination  may  be  widely  affected  by  them,  and  they 
may  always  be  ready  to  hand.  For  example,  amongst  the 
maxims  of  life  we  have  placed  this  (see  Prop.  46,  pt.  4, 
with  its  Schol.),  that  hatred  is  to  be  conquered  by  love 
or  generosity,  and  is  not  to  be  met  with  hatred  in  return. 
Put  in  order  that  we  may  always  have  this  prescript 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLFXT. 

of  reason  in  readiness  whenever  it  will  l)o  of  son-jco.  w« 
must  think  over  and  often  meditate  upon  iho  comiiH.n 
injuries  inflicted  by  men,  ami  consider  how  and  in  what 
wny  they  may  best  be  repelled  by  generosity ;  f..r  \hv.^ 
we  shall  connect  the  image  of  injury  witli  the  iniaum  i; •.••:» 
of  this  maxim,  and  (rrop.  1 8,  pt  2)  it  will  W  at  hand 
whenever  an  injury  is  offered  to  us.     If  we  also  have  nt 
liand  the  law  of  our  own  true  profit  anil  yofKJ  whirh 
follows  from  mutual  friendsliip  and  common  fell- .w si, i]., 
and   remember   that  the   higliest  peace  of   niin«l 
from  a  right  rule  of  life  (Prop.  52,  pt.  4),  and  al 
man,  like  other  things,  acts  according  to  the  ni 
of  nature,  then  the  injury  or  the  hatred  which  1: 
arises  from  that  necessity  will  occupy  hut  the  Ica^^t  |  :irt  .f 
the  imagination,  and  will  be  easily  overcome:  or  .xiipi"*-  n„' 
that  the  anger  which  generally  arises  from  the  ■: 
injuries  is  not  so  easily  overcome,  it  will  ni'V«rtli«  ; 
overcome,  although  not  without  fluctuation  of  mma.  m 
a  far  shorter  space  of  time  than  would  have  been  nr.-. .- 
sary  if  we  had  not  pcssessed  those  maxims  on  which  wo 
had  thus   meditated  beforehand.     This  is  evident  fri»in 
Props.  6,  7,  and  8,  pt.  5. 

Concerning  strength  of  mind,  we  must  roflect  in  the 
same  way  for  the  purpose  of  getting  rid  of  fear,  thai  w 
to  say,  we  must  often  enumerate  and  imagine  the  rom- 
mon  dangers  of  life,  and  think  upon  the  manner  in  which 
they  can  best  be  avoided  and  overcome  by  prcsi-nco  of 
mind  and  courage.  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  lliat 
in  the  ordering  of  our  thoughts  and  iinu'^es  wo  niiwl 
always  look  (Corol.  Prop.  63,  pt.  4.  «'>'l  ^'^?-  59.  I»«-  3) 
to  those  qualities  which  in  each  thing  are  gocl.  5..  tliat  wo 
may  be  determined  to  action  always  by  an  affect  of  joy. 

For  example,  if  a  man  sees  that  he  pursueH  j;  ..ry  t-. 
eacrerly,  let  him  think  on  its  proper  use.  f..r  wh.v.  .  vi 
it  is  to  be  followed,  and  by  what  means  it  can  hr 
obtained;   but  let  him  not  think  upon  iU  abu*,  .M 


lity,  and  on  tlie  inconstancy 


of  men  and  ibinj,'*  of  lhi» 


263  ETHIC. 

sort,  about  wliicli  no  one  thinks  unless  through  disease 
of  mind ;  for  with  such  thoughts  do  those  who  are 
ambitious  greatly  torment  themselves  when  they  despair 
of  obtaining  the  honours  for  which  they  are  striving ; 
and  while  they  vomit  forth  rage,  wish  to  be  thought 
wise.  Indeed  it  is  certain  that  those  covet  glory  the 
most  who  are  loudest  in  declaiming  against  its  abuse 
and  the  vanity  of  the  world.  Nor  is  this  a  peculiarity 
of  the  ambitious,  but  is  common  to  all  to  whom  fortune 
is  adverse  and  who  are  impotent  in  mind ;  for  we  see 
that  a  poor  and  avaricious  man  is  never  weary  of  speak- 
ing about  the  abuse  of  money  and  the  vices  of  the  rich, 
thereby  achieving  nothing  save  to  torment  himself  and 
show  to  others  that  he  is  unable  to  bear  with  equani- 
mity not  only  his  own  poverty  but  also  the  wealth  of 
others.  So  also  a  man  who  has  not  been  well  received 
by  his  mistress  thinks  of  nothing  but  the  fickleness  of 
women,  their  faithlessness,  and  their  other  oft-proclaimed 
failings, — all  of  which  he  forgets  as  soon  as  he  is  taken 
into  favour  by  his  mistress  again.  He,  therefore,  who 
desires  to  govern  his  affects  and  appetites  from  a  love 
of  liberty  alone  will  strive  as  much  as  he  can  to  know 
virtues  and  their  causes,  and  to  fill  his  mind  with  that 
joy  which  springs  from  a  true  knowledge  of  them.  Least 
of  all  will  he  desire  to  contemplate  the  vices  of  men  and 
disparage  men,  or  to  delight  in  a  false  show  of  liberty. 
He  who  will  diligently  observe  these  things  (and  they 
are  not  difficult),  and  will  continue  to  practise  them,  will 
assuredly  in  a  short  space  of  time  be  able  for  the  most 
part  to  direct  his  actions  in  accordance  with  the  com- 
mand of  reason. 

Peop.  XI. — The  greater  the  numher  of  objects  to  which  an 
image  is  'related,  the  more  constant  is  it,  or  the  7nore 
frequently  does  it  jprescnt  itself  and  the  more  does  it 
occupy  the  mind. 

Dcmonst. — The  greater  the  number  of  objects  to  which 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLFXT.  >Sj 

an  image  or  affect  is  related,  the  greater  is  the  number 
of  causes  by  Avhich  it  can  be  excited  and  cherished.  All 
these  canses  the  mind  contemplates  simultancoiHlv  by 
means  of  the  affect  (by  hypothesis),  and  llH-roforv  the 
more  constant  is  the  affect,  or  the  more  frequently  docs 
it  present  itself,  and  the  more  does  it  occupv  ih.'  mind 
(Prop.  8,  pt.  5)._Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XII. — The  images  of  things  arc  inorf  tasUy  eon- 
meted  with  those  images  which  are  related  to  th\ny$ 
which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  understand  than  iri/A 

any  others. 

Demonst.  —  Things  which  we  clearly  and  (ii>tiimy 
understand  are  either  the  common  properties  of  things 
or  what  are  deduced  from  them  (see  the  definition  of  reason 
in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2).  and  consequently  (Prop.  1 1. 
pt.  5)  are  more  frequently  excited  in  us  ;  and  thercforu 
it  is  easier  for  us  to  contemplate  other  things  together 
with  these  which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  underKtand 
than  with  any  others,  and  consequently  (Prop.  18,  pt.  2), 
it  is  easier  to  connect  things  with  these  which  we  clearly 
and  distinctly  understand  than  with  any  others. 

Prop.  XIII. — The  greater  the  numher  of  other  things  tritk 
which  any  image  is  connected,  tlic  viore  frequently  dot* 

it  'present  itself. 

Demonst. — For  the  greater  the  number  of  other  thin^ 
with  which  an  image  is  connected,  the  greater  is  iho 

number  of  causes  (Prop.   18.  pt.  2)  by  whi-h  .t  m-y  l-- 
excited. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XIY.—The  mind  can  cause  all  the  affeetioM  of  tki 
body  or  the  images  of  things  to  he  rrlated  to  the  ulot 

of  God  {ideam  Dei).  ^ 

I  See  note,  p.  24.— Te. 


264  ETHIC. 

Dnnonst. — There  is  no  affection  of  the  body  of  which 
the  mind  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception 
(Prop.  4,  pt.  5),  and  therefore  (Prop.  15,  pt.  i)  it  can 
cause  all  the  affections  of  the  body  to  be  related  to  the 
idea  of  God. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XV.  —  He  ivlio  clearly  and  distinctly  understands 
himself  and  his  affects  loves  God,  and  loves  Him  tetter 
the  tetter  he  understands  himself  and  his  affects. 

Demonst. — He  who  clearly  and  distinctly  understands 
himself  and  his  affects  rejoices  (Prop.  53,  pt.  3),  and  his 
joy  is  attended  with  the  idea  of  God  (Prop.  14,  pt.  5)- 
therefore  (Def.  6  of  the  Affects)  he  loves  God,  and  (by 
the  same  reasoning)  loves  Him  better  the  better  he  un- 
derstands himself  and  his  affects. — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XVI. — This  love  to  God  above  every thiny  else  ouyJit 
to  occupy  the  mind. 

Demonst. — For  this  love  is  connected  with  all  the  affec- 
tions of  the  body  (Prop.  14,  pt.  5),  by  all  of  which  it  is 
cherished  (Prop,  i  5,  pt.  5),  and  therefore  (Prop.  1 1,  pt.  5) 
above   everything   else    ought  to   occupy   the   mind.  — 

Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XVII. — God  is  free  from,  passions,  nor  is  He  affected 
ivith  any  affect  of  joy  or  sorrow. 

Demonst. — All  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to 
God,  are  true  (Prop.  32,  pt.  2);  that  is  to  say  (Def.  4, 
pt.  2),  are  adequate,  and  therefore  (by  the  general  defini- 
tion of  the  Affects)  God  is  free  from  passions.  Again,  God 
can  neither  pass  to  a  greater  nor  to  a  less  perfection 
(Corol.  2,  Prop.  20,  pt.  i),  and  therefore  (Defs.  2  and  3 
of  the  Affects)  He  cannot  be  affected  with  any  affect  of 
joy  or  sorrow. — q.e.d. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLECT.  ^^ 

Coro/.— Properly  speakin.Lr,  God  loves  no  on 
no  one;  for  God   (Prop.  17,  pt.  5)  is  not  a:; 
any  affect  of  joy  or  sorrow,  and  consequfiuly  (be*,  0  ana 
7  of  the  Affects)  lie  neither  loves  nor  hates  any  c.no. 

Trop.  XVI II.— To  o)ic  can  hate  ^^>7. 

Dcmonst. — The  idea  of  Crod  which  is  in  us  is  adequaln 
and  perfect  (Props.  46  and  47,  pt.  2),  and  therefore  in 
so  far  as  we  contemplate  God  do  we  act  (Prop.  3,  pt  3). 
and  consequently  (Prop.  59,  pt.  3)  no  sorrow  can  exist 
with  tlie  accompanying  idea  of  God  ;  that  is  to  say  (Duf. 
7  of  the  Affects),  no  one  can  hate  God. — q.e.p. 
Corol. — Love  to  God  cannot  be  turned  into  liatreiL 
Schol. — But  some  may  object,  that  if  we  undersUml 
God  to  be  the  cause  of  all  things,  we  do  for  that  very 
reason  consider  Him  to  be  the  cause  of  sorrow.  But 
I  reply,  that  in  so  far  as  we  umlerstaud  tlie  c-ati<»<'.<  "f 
sorrow,  it  ceases  to  be  a  passion  (Prop.  3,  pt.  5),  that 
is  to  say  (Prop.  59,  pt.  3),  it  ceases  to  ho.  .sorrow;  ami 
therefore  in  so  far  as  we  understand  God  to  be  the  cauM 
of  sorrow  do  we  rejoice. 

Prop.  XIX. — He  who  loves  God  cannot  stnir  tnut '/."-/  snoiuU 
love  him  in  return. 

Dcmonst. — If  a  man  were  to  strive  after  this,  he  wooM 
desire  (Corol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  5)  that  God,  whom  he  lovw. 
should  not  be  God,  and  consequently  (I'rop.  19.  pt.  3)  ho 
would  desire  to  be  sad,  which  (Prop.  28,  pt.  3)  is  absurd 
Therefore  he  who  loves  God,  &c. — Q.K.i>. 

Prop.  XX.— This  love  to  God  cannot  he  defiled  either  bji  tMi 

affect  of  envy  or  jealous)/,  hU  u  tlu  more  .<' 
the  more  people  we  imar/ine  to  he  connedtd  , 
the  same  bond  of  love. 
Dcmonst— Thi^  love  to  God  is  the  highest  good  which 


266  ETHIC. 

we  can  seek  according  to  the  dictate  of  reason  (Prop.  28, 
pt.  4) ;  is  common  to  all  men  (Prop.  36,  pt.  4)  ;  and  we 
desire  that  all  may  enjoy  it  (Prop.  37,  pt.  4).  It  cannot, 
therefore  (Def.  2  3  of  the  Affects),  be  snllied  by  the  affect 
of  envy,  nor  (Prop.  18,  pt.  5,  and  Def.  of  Jealousy  in 
Schol.  Prop.  35,  pt.  3)  by  that  of  jealousy,  but,  on  the 
contrary  (Prop.  31,  pt.  3),  it  must  be  the  more  strength- 
ened the  more   people  we   imagine   to  rejoice   in  it. — 

Q.E.D. 

Schol. — It  is  possible  to  show  in  the  same  manner  that 
there  is  no  affect  directly  contrary  to  this  love  and  able 
to  destroy  it,  and  so  we  may  conclude  that  this  love  to 
God  is  the  most  constant  of  all  the  affects,  and  that,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  related  to  the  body,  it  cannot  be  destroyed 
unless  with  the  body  itself.  What  its  nature  is,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  related  to  the  mind  alone,  we  shall  see  hereafter. 

I  have,  in  what  has  preceded,  included  all  the  remedies 
for  the  affects,  that  is  to  say,  everything  which  the  mind, 
considered  in  itself  alone,  can  do  against  them.  It 
appears  therefrom  that  the  power  of  the  mind  over  the 
affects  consists — 

1.  In  the  knowledge  itself  of  the  affects.  (See  Schol. 
Prop.  4,  pt.  5.) 

2.  In  the  separation  by  the  mind  of  the  affects  from 
the  thought  of  an  external  cause,  which  we  imagine  con- 
fusedly.    (See  Prop.  2,  pt.  5,  and  Schol.  Prop.  4,  pt.  5.) 

3.  In  duration,  in  which  the  affections  which  are  re- 
lated to  objects  we  understand  surpass  those  related  to 
objects  conceived  in  a  mutilated  or  confused  manner. 
(Prop.  7,  pt.  5.) 

4.  In  the  multitude  of  causes  by  which  the  affections 
which  are  related  to  the  common  properties  of  things  or 
to  God  are  nourished.      (Props.  9  and  1 1,  pt.  5.) 

5.  In  the  order  in  which  the  mind  can  arrange  its 
affects  and  connect  them  one  with  the  other.  (Schol.  Prop. 
10,  pt.  5,  and  see  also  Props.  12,  13,  and  14,  pt.  5.) 

But  that  this  power  of  the  mind  over  the  affects  may 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLECT.  ^7 

be  better  understood,  it  is  to  be  carefully  obsorvnl  ihat 
we  call  tbe  affects  great  when  we  conipure  iho  ulWt  of 
one  man  with  that  of  another,  and  see  that  one  man  w 
agitated  more  than  another  by  the  same  airuct.  or  when 
we  compare  the  affects  of  one  and  tlie  s:ime  mnn  with 
one  another,  and  discover  that  he  is  affected  or  movtil 
more  by  one  affect  than  by  another. 

For  (Prop.  5,  pt.  4)  the  power  of  any  affect  is  limited 
by  the  power  of  the  external  cause  as  compared  with  our 
own  power.  But  the  power  of  the  mind  is  limited  solely 
by  knowledge,  whilst  impotence  or  passion  is  estimated 
solely  by  privation  of  knowledge,  or,  in  other  words,  by 
that  through  which  ideas  are  called  inadequate ;  and  it 
therefore  follows  that  that  mind  suffers  the  mo.st  whoso 
largest  part  consists  of  inadequate  ideas,  so  that  it  is 
distinguished  rather  by  what  it  suffers  than  by  what  it 
does,  while,  on  the  contrary,  that  mind  acts  the  most 
whose  largest  part  consists  of  adequate  ideas,  so  that 
although  it  may  possess  as  many  inadequate  ideas  as  the 
first,  it  is  nevertheless  distinguished  rather  by  those  which 
belong  to  human  virtue  than  by  those  which  are  a  sijjn 
of  human  impotence.  Again,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
our  sorrows  and  misfortunes  mainly  proceed  fn»m  to«i 
much  love  towards  an  object  which  is  subject  to  many 
changes,  and  which  we  can  never  possess.  For  no  one 
is  troubled  or  anxious  about  any  object  he  does  not  love. 
neither  do  wrongs,  suspicions,  hatreds,  &c.,  arise  except 
from  love  towards  objects  of  which  no  one  can  be  truly 
the  possessor. 

From  all  tliis  we  easily  conceive  what  is  the  power 
which  clear  and  distinct  knowledge,  and  especially  that 
third  kind  of  knowledge  (see  Schol.  Prop.  47.  pt  2) 
whose  foundation  is  the  knowledge  itself  of  God.  poMcMM 
over  the  affects ;  the  power,  namely,  by  which  it  i»  able. 
in  so  far  as  they  are  passions,  if  not  actually  to  dcrtroy 
them  (see  Prop.  3,  pt.  5.  with  the  Schol.  to  Prop.  4.  pt- 
5),  at  least  to  make  them  constitute  the  smallest  part  of 


268  ETHIC. 

the  mind  (see  Prop.  14,  pt.  5).  Moreover,  it  begets  a 
love  towards  an  immutable  and  eternal  object  (see  Prop. 
15,  pt.  5)  of  which  we  are  really  partakers  (see  Prop.  45, 
pt.  2) ;  a  love  which  therefore  cannot  be  vitiated  by  the 
defects  which  are  in  common  love,  but  which  can  always 
become  greater  and  greater  (Prop.  15,  pt.  5),  occupy  the 
largest  part  of  the  mind  (Prop.  16,  pt.  5),  and  thoroughly 
affect  it. 

I  have  now  concluded  all  that  I  had  to  say  relating  to 
this  present  life.  For  any  one  who  will  attend  to  what 
has  been  urged  in  this  scholium,  and  to  the  definition  of 
the  mind  and  its  affects,  and  to  Props,  i  and  3,  pt.  3, 
will  easily  be  able  to  see  the  truth  of-  what  I  said  in  the 
beginning  of  the  scholium,  that  in  these  few  words  all 
the  remedies  for  the  affects  are  comprehended.  It  is 
time,  therefore,  that  I  should  now  pass  to  the  considera- 
tion of  those  matters  which  appertain  to  the  duration  of 
the  mind  without  relation  to  the  body. 

Prop.  XXI, — The  mind  can  imagine  nothing,  nor  can  it 
recollect  anything  that  is  past,  except  while  the  hochj 
exists. 

Demonst. — The  mind  does  not  express  the  actual  exist- 
ence of  its  body,  nor  does  it  conceive  as  actual  the  affec- 
tions of  the  body,  except  while  the  body  exists  (Corol. 
Prop.  8,  pt.  2),  and  consequently  (Prop.  26,  pt.  2)  it 
conceives  no  body  as  actually  existing  except  while  its 
own  body  exists.  It  can  therefore  imagine  nothing  (see 
the  definition  of.  Imagination  in  Schol.  Prop.  1 7,  pt.  2), 
nor  can  it  recollect  anything  that  is  past,  except  while  the 
body  exists  (see  the  definition  of  Memory  in  Schol.  Prop. 
1  8,  pt.  2). — Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXII. — In  God,  nevertheless,  there  necessarily  exists 
an  idea  which  expresses  the  essence  of  this  or  that  Minian 
body  under  the  form  of  eternity. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLECT.  .^^ 

Demonsf.— God  is  not  only  tlio  cause  of  the  cxist«nco 
of  this  or  that  human  body,  but  also  of  its  essence  (l»rop. 
2  5,  pt.  I),  which  therefore  must  necessarily  l*  conceivca 
through  the  essence  of  God  itself  (Ax.  4.' pt  i)  and  by 
a  certain  eternal  necessity  (Prop.  1 6,  pt  i ).  Thia  con- 
ception, moreover,  must  necessarily  exist  in  Cod  (IW 

3,  pt.  2). Q.E.D. 

PliOP.    XXIII. — The  hnman   mind  cannot   U   „■■.,.< „i,., 
destroyed  ivith  the  hodi/,  hut  something  of  it  remains 

tvhich  is  eternal 

Demonst. — In  God  there  necessarily  exists  a  conccjv 
tion  or  idea  which  expresses  the  essence  of  tlie  human 
body  (Prop.  22,  pt.  5).  This  conception  or  idea  is  tliere- 
fore  necessarily  something  which  pertains  to  the  essence 
of  the  human  mind  (Prop,  i  3,  pt.  2).  But  we  ascribe  to 
the  human  mind  no  duration  which  can  be  limited  by 
time,  unless  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  the  actual  existenco 
of  the  body,  which  is  explained  through  duration,  and 
which  can  be  limited  by  time,  that  is  to  say  (Corol. 
Prop.  8,  pt.  2),  we  cannot  ascribe  duration  to  the  mind 
except  while  the  body  exists. 

But  nevertheless,  since  this  something  is  tliat  which 
is  conceived  by  a  certain  eternal  necessity  throu;,'h  the 
essence  itself  of  God  (Prop.  22,  pt  5),  this  sunifihin;? 
which  pertains  to  the  essence  of  the  mind  will  neccsarily 
be  eternal. — Q.E.D. 

Schol. — This  idea  wliich  expresses  the  essence  of  tho 
body  under  the  form  of  eternity  is,  as  we  have  said.  • 
certain  mode  of  thought  which  pertains  to  the  ess.-ncc  of 
the  mind,  and  is  necessarily  eternal.  It  is  impoMible, 
nevertheless,  that  we  should  recollect  that  we  fxi»l«d 
before  the  body,  because  there  are  no  traces  of  any  »uch 
existence  in  the  body,  and  also  because  eternity  ainnot 
be  defined  by  time,  or  have  any  rd  itionship  to  it  Never- 
theless  we  feel  and  know  by  experience  that  we  are 


270  ETHIC. 

eternal.  For  the  mind  is  no  less  sensible  of  those  things 
which  it  conceives  through  intelligence  than  of  those 
which  it  remembers,  for  demonstrations  are  the  eyes  of 
the  mind  by  which  it  sees  and  observes  things. 

Although,  therefore,  we  do  not  recollect  that  we  existed 
before  the  body,  we  feel  that  our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it 
involves  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of  eternity, 
is  eternal,  and  that  this  existence  of  the  mind  cannot 
be  limited  by  time  nor  explained  by  duration.  Only  in 
so  far,  therefore,  as  it  involves  the  actual  existence  of 
the  body  can  the  mind  be  said  to  possess  duration,  and 
its  existence  be  limited  by  a  fixed  time,  and  so  far  only 
has  it  the  power  of  determining  the  existence  of  things 
in  time,  and  of  conceiving  them  under  the  form  of  dura- 
tion. 

Pkop.  XXIV, — The  more  we  understand  individual  ohjeets, 
the  more  ive  understand  God. 

Dcmonst. — This  is  evident  from  Corol.  Prop.  25,  pt.  i. 

Prop.  XXV. — The  highest  effort  of  the  mind  and  its  highest 
■  virtue  is  to   understand  things  hy  the  third  kind  of 
hnovjledge. 

Demonst. — The  third  kind  of  knowledge  proceeds  from 
an  adequate  idea  of  certain  attributes  of  God  to  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  things  (see  its 
definition  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2) ;  and  the  more  we 
understand  things  in  this  manner  (Prop.  24,  pt.  5),  the 
more  we  understand  God;  and  therefore  (Prop.  28,  pt.  4) 
the  highest  virtue  of  the  mind,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  8,  pt. 
4),  the  power  or  nature  of  the  mind,  or  (Prop.  7,  pt.  3) 
its  highest  effort,  is  to  understand  things  by  the  third 
kind  of  knowledge. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXVI. — The  letter  the  mind  is  adapted  to  uoidcr- 


OUJ. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELUa  . 

stand  things  ly  tlic  third  khid  of  knoxcltdfff  Jht  « 
it  desires  to  understand  them  hj  this  kind  of  Ln 

ledge. 

Dciiio/ist. — Tliis  is  evident;  for  in  so  far  as  wi 
ceive  the  mind  to  be  adapted  to  understand  tlniij,-*  by 
this  kind  of  knowledge,  do  we  conceive  it  to  be  deter- 
mined to  understand  things  by  tliis  kind  of  knowledp-. 
and  consequently  (Def.  i  of  the  Affects)  the  Wllfr  llio 
mind  is  adapted  to  this  way  of  understaudiug  thin"9,  Uie 
more  it  desires  it. — q.e.d. 

Prop.  XXYU.—From  this  third  kind  of  knoidtdge  ariM* 
the  highest  possible  peace  of  mind. 

Dcmonst. — The  highest  virtue  of  the  mind  is  to  know 
God  (Prop.  28,  pt.  4),  or  to  understand  thinjis  by  the 
third  kind  of  knowledge  (Prop.  25,  pt.  5).  This  virtue 
is  greater  the  more  the  mind  knows  things  by  this  kind 
of  knowledge  (Prop.  24,  pt.  5),  and  tlierefore  he  who 
knows  things  by  this  kind  of  knowledge  passes  to  the 
highest  human  perfection,  and  consequently  (I)of.  2  of 
the  Affects)  is  affected  with  the  liighest  joy,  wliit-h  w 
accompanied  with  the  idea  of  himself  and  his  own  virtue 
(Prop.  43,  pt.  2);  and  therefore  (Def.  25  of  the  AfTecl*) 
from  this  kind  of  knowledge  arises  the  liighest  |K>MiUf 
peace  of  mind. — q.e.d. 

Peop.  XXYIU.—The  effort  or  the  desire  to  kn 
the  third  kind  of  knowledge  eannot  arise  Jr. 
kind,  but  may  arise  from  the  seeond  kind  of  kncndtdgt. 

Bemonst. — This  proposition  is  self-evident ;  f«'r  overr- 
thing   that    we   clearly  and   distinctly  und.-r-' i:;  ?.    ^f^ 
understand  either  through   itself  or  throu-h 
which  is  conceived  through  itself;  or,  in   d 
ideas  which  are  clear  and  distinct  in  us,  or  which  aw 


272  ETHIC. 

related  to  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  (Schol.  2,  Prop.  40, 
pt.  2),  cannot  follow  from  mutilated  and  confused  ideas, 
which  (by  the  same  scholium)  are  related  to  the  first 
kind  of  knowledge,  but  from  adequate  ideas,  that  is  to 
say  (by  the  same  scholium),  from  the  second  and  third 
kinds  of  knowledge.  Therefore  (Def.  i  of  the  Affects) 
the  desire  of  knowing  things  by  the  third  kind  of  know- 
ledge cannot  arise  from  the  first  kind,  but  may  arise 
from  the  second. — q.e.d. 

Pnop.  XXIX. — Every  tiling  which  the  mind  understands 
binder  the  form  of  eternity,  it  understands  not  tecause 
it  conceives  the  present  actual  existence  of  the  body,  hut 
hecause  it  conceives  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form 
of  eternity. 

Dononst. — In  so  far  as  the  mind  conceives  the  present 
existence  of  its  body  does  it  conceive  duration  which 
can  be  determined  in  time,  and  so  far  only  has  it  the 
power  of  conceiving  things  in  relation  to  time  (Prop.  2  i , 
pt.  5,  and  Prop.  26,  pt.  2).  But  eternity  cannot  be 
explained  by  duration  (Def.  8,  pt.  i,  and  its  explanation)  ; 
therefore  the  mind  so  far  has  not  the  power  of  conceiv- 
ing things  under  the  form  of  eternity :  but  because  it  is 
the  nature  of  reason  to  conceive  things  under  the  form 
of  eternity  (Corol.  2,  Prop.  44,  pt.  2),  and  because  it  also 
pertains  to  the  nature  of  the  mind  to  conceive  the  essence 
of  the  body  under  the  form  of  eternity  (Prop.  23,  pt.  5), 
and  excepting  these  two  things  nothing  else  pertains  to 
the  nature  of  the  mind  (Prop,  i  3,  pt.  2),  therefore  this 
power  of  conceiving  things  under  the  form  of  eternity 
does  not  pertain  to  the  mind  except  in  so  far  as  it  con- 
ceives the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of  eternity. 

Q.E.D. 

Schol. — Things  are  conceived  by  us  as  actual  in  two 
ways ;  either  in  so  far  as  we  conceive  them  to  exist  with 
relation  to  a  fixed  time  and  place,  or  in  so  far  as  we 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTELLECT.  573 

conceive  them  to  be  contained  in  God,  and  to  follow  from 
the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature.  IJut  lh«i9c  l\iui^% 
which  are  conceived  in  this  second  way  as  true  or  rt»«l 
we  conceive  under  the  form  of  eternity,  and  thrir  ideoii 
involve  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  CIoil.  as  wo 
have  shown  in  Prop.  45,  pt.  2,  to  the  scholium  of  which 
proposition  the  reader  is  also  referred. 

PitOP.  XXX. — Okt  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  kno\rs  iLvl/and 
the  hodij  under  the  form  of  eternity,  ntctsaarUit  hat  a 
knowledge  of  God,  and  knoics  that  it  is  in  God  and  it 

conceived  through  Him. 

Dcmonsf. — Eternity  is  the  very  essence  of  t..M,  ...  ... 

far  as  that  essence  involves  necessary  existence  (Def.  8, 
pt.  i).  To  conceive  things  therefore  under  the  fonn  of 
eternity,  is  to  conceive  them  in  so  far  as  they  are  con- 
ceived through  the  essence  of  God  as  actually  .-x 
things,  or  in  so  far  as  through  the  essence  of  G.' ; 
involve  existence.  Therefore  our  mind,  in  so  far  :us  jt 
conceives  itself  and  its  body  under  tiie  form  of  elcnuir. 
necessarily  has  a  knowledge   of  God,   and  knows.  &c 

Q.E.D. 

Prop    XXXI.— The  third  Jdnd  ofknou-u"'f  "-y f  - 

the  mind  as  its  formal  cavse,  in  so  far  as  the  tmnd  itMif 

is  eternal. 

Damna.-The  mind   conceives   notiM.,^   u...r   i^ 
form  of  eternity,  unless  in  so  far  «»  U  co,.c...vc..  U-. 
essence  of  its  body  under  tl>e  form  of  -■•'"»">■<'' 
pt.  5),  that  is  to  say  (Props.  21  and  23,  I'M).  <■- 
so  fi   as  it  is  eternal.     Therefore  (1^  30.  -^  5    ■  -  ' 
far  as  the  mind  is  eternal  it  has  a  kno»  Ws.  o(  t.od. 

^vhich  is  necessarily  aJeciuate  (Prop  46. 1't-  -)•••'•' 
foreinsotarasitisete™al.t.shttcdloUo.a^. 


274 


ETHIC. 


things  which  can  follow  from  this  knowledge  of  God 
(Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  that  is  to  say,  it  is  fitted  to  know  things 
by  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  (see  the  definition  of  this 
kind  of  knowledge  in  Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pt.  2),  of  which 
(Def.  I,  pt.  3),  in  so  far  as  the  mind  is  eternal,  it  is  the 
adequate  or  formal  cause. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — As  each  person  therefore  becomes  stronger  in 
this  kind  of  knowledge,  the  more  is  he  conscious  of  him- 
self and  of  God ;  that  is  to  say,  tbe  more  perfect  and  the 
happier  he  is,  a  truth  which  will  still  more  clearly  appear 
from  what  follows.  Here,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed, 
that  although  we  are  now  certain  that  the  mind  is  eternal 
in  so  far  as  it  conceives  things  under  the  form  of  eternity, 
yet,  in  order  that  what  we  wish  to  prove  may  be  more 
easily  explained  and  better  understood,  we  shall  consider 
the  mind,  as  we  have  hitherto  done,  as  if  it  had  just 
begun  to  be,  and  had  just  begun  to  understand  things 
under  the  form  of  eternity.  This  we  can  do  without 
any  risk  of  error,  provided  only  we  are  careful  to  conclude 
nothing  except  from  clear  premisses. 

PPvOP.  XXXII. — In  whatever  lue  understand  hy  the  third 
kind  of  knowledge  we  delight,  and  our  delight  is  accom- 
panied  with  the  idea  of  God  as  its  cause. 

Dcmonst. — From  this  kind  of  knowledge  arises  the 
highest  possible  peace  of  mind,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  25  of 
the  Affects),  the  highest  joy,  attended  moreover  with  the 
idea  of  one's  self  (Prop.  27,  pt.  5),  and  consequently 
(Prop.  30,  pt.  5)  attended  with  the  idea  of  God  as  its 
cause. — Q.E.D. 

Carol. — From  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  necessarily 
springs  the  intellectual  love  of  God.  For  from  this  kind 
of  knowledge  arises  (Prop.  32,  pt.  5)  joy  attended  with 
the  idea  of  God  as  its  cause,  that  is  to  say  (Def.  6  of  the 
Affects),  the  love  of  God,  not  in  so  far  as  we  imagine  Him 
as  present  (Prop.   29,  pt.  5),  but  in  so  far  as  we  under- 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  IS 


T,:,.i^^ 


stand  that  He  is  eternal;  and  that  is  \\W    ■  '7 

intellectual  love  of  God. 

Peop.  XXXIIL— yV;^'  intclhrfual  loir  i<j<:..: ^rurj 

from  the  third  kind  of  knowUdye  is  ettmal. 

Demonst. — The  tliird  kind  of  knowled;,'o  (rrop.  31, 
pt.  5,  and  Ax.  3,  pt.  i)  is  eternal,  and  tht-reforu  (by  iho 
same  axiom)  the  love  which  springs  from  it  is  necessarily 
eternal. — q.e.d. 

Scliol. — Although  this  love  to  God  lias  no  beglDtiiDg 
(Prop.  33,  pt.  5),  it  nevertheless  has  all  tiie  porlections 
of  love,  just  as  if  it  had  originated  ; — as  we  suppostnl  in 
the  corollary  of  Prop.  32,  pt.  5.  Nor  is  there  here  any 
difference,  excepting  that  the  mind  has  eternally  iiosseftSinl 
these  same  perfections  which  we  imagined  as  now  accruin^j 
to  it,  and  has  possessed  them  with  the  accunijwnyin;j 
idea  of  God  as  the  eternal  cause.  And  if  joy  consi.st  \\\ 
the  passage  to  a  greater  perfection,  blessedness  must 
indeed  consist  in  this,  that  the  mind  is  endowed  with 
perfection  itself. 

Prop.  XXXIV.  — TAe  mind  is  suhfd  to  afftds  whirh  art 
related  to  j^assions  only  so  long  as  the  body  exisis. 

JDemonst.— An  imagination  is  an  idea  by  which  tlio  mind 
contemplates  any  object  as  present  (see  its  dilltut: -u  ui 
Schol.  Prop.  17,  pt.  2).  This  idea  nevertheb 
the  present  constitution  of  the  human  boily  i .: 
the  nature  of  the' external  object  (Corol.  2,  Trup.  16,  f»L 
2).  An  affect,  therefore  (by  the  genend  definition  of  (ho 
Affects),  is  an  imagination  in  so  far  as  it  indi.  nt«-»  tb« 
present  constitution  of  the  body,  and  tlierefuru  (Tnit  31, 
pt.  5)  the  mind,  only  so  long  as  the  body  exisU.  it  »ub- 
ject  to  affects  which  are  related  to  jjassions.— <J.E.l>. 

Coro/.— Hence  it  follows  that  no  love  excel*  intel- 
lectual love  is  eternal. 


276  ETHIC. 

Sdiol. — If  we  look  at  the  common  opinion  of  men,  we 
shall  see  that  they  are  indeed  conscious  of  the  eternity 
of  their  minds,  but  they  confound  it  with  duration,  and 
attribute  it  to  imagination  or  memory,  which  they  believe 
remain  after  death. 


Prop.  XXXV. —  God  loves  Himself  with  an  infinite  intellec- 
tual love. 

God  is  absolutely  infinite  (Def.  6,  pt.  i),  that  is  to  say 
(Def.  6,  pt.  2),  the  nature  of  God  delights  in  infinite 
perfection  accompanied  (Prop.  3,  pt.  2)  with,  the  idea  of 
Himself,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  1 1,  and  Def.  i,  pt.  i),  with 
the  idea  of  Himself  as  cause,  and  this  is  what,  in  Corol. 
Prop.  32,  pt.  5,  we  have  called  intellectual  love.  ' 

Pkop.  XXXVI. — The  intellectual  love  of  the  mind  towards 
God  is  the  very  love  with  which  He  loves  Himself,  not 
in  so  far  as  He  is  infinite,  hut  in  so  far  as  He  can  he 
explained  through  the  essence  of  the  hiiman  mind  con- 
sidered under  the  form  of  eternity ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
■intellectual  love  of  the  mind  towards  God  is  part  of  the 
infinite  love  with  which  God  loves  Himself 

Devionst. — This  love  of  the  mind  must  be  related  to 
the  actions  of  the  mind  (Corol.  Prop.  32,  pt.  5,  and 
Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  and  it  is  therefore  an  action  by  which  the 
mind  contemplates  itself;  and  which  is  accompanied 
with  the  idea  of  God  as  cause  (Prop.  32,  pt.  5,  with  the 
Corol.);  that  is  to  say  (Corol.  Prop.  25,  pt.  i,and  Corol. 
Prop.  II,  pt.  2),  it  is  an  action,  by  which  God,  in  so 
far  as  He  can  be  explained  by  the  human  mind,  con- 
templates Himself,  the  action  being  accompanied  with 
the  idea  of  Himself;  and  therefore  (Prop.  35,  pt.  5),  this 
love  of  the  mind  is  part  of  the  infinite  love  with  which 
God  loves  Himself. — q.e.d. 

Co7vl.  —  Hence  it  follows  that  God,  in  so  far  as  He 


OF  THE  rOU-ER  OF  THE  ISTl.U  t.CT. 
loves  Himself,  loves  men,  and  consequcntlv  ilml  t^ 
of  God  towards  men  and  tl.e   intellectual   lovo  . 
mmd  towards  God  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 

>S'c7w/.— Hence  we  clearly  understand  that  onr  Mira- 
tion, or  blessedness,  or  liberty  consists  in  a  r-   •     - 
eternal   love  towards    God,   or  in  the  love 
wards  men.     This  love  or  blessedness  is  cali-i  i, 
the  sacred  writings,  and  not  without  reason.     For  u . 
it  be  related  to  God  or  to  the  mind,  it  mav  proj. 
called  repose  of  mind,  which  (Defs.  25  and  30  .  . 
Affects)  is,  in  truth,  not  distinguished  from  glory.      Fur 
in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  God,  it  is  (Trop.  35.  pt   5) 
joy   (granting    that  it   is  allowable  to  use  this'v    ■ 
accompanied  with  the  idea  of  Himself,  and  it  is  th-' 
thing  when  it  is  related  to  the  mind  (Trop.  27.  • 
Again,  since  tlie  essence  of  our  mind  consists  in  i. 
ledge   alone,   whose   beginning  and   foundation   is  (iod 
(Prop.   15,  pt.   I,  and  Schol.  Prop.  47,  pt  2).  it  ii  rlcir 
to  us  in  what  manner  and  by  what  method  our  n.  :i  i, 
with  regard  both  to  essence  and  existence,  follows  ::uta 
the  divine  nature,  and  continually  depends  upon  (5od 
I  thought  it  worth  while  for  me  to  notice  this  here,  in 
order  that  I  might  show,  by  this  e.xnnij»lc,  what  that 
knowledge    of  individual   objects   which  I  have  callol 
intuitive  or  of  the  third  kind  (Schol.  2,  Prop.  40,  pL  2) 
is  able  to  do,  and  how  much  more  potent  it  i«  than  the 
universal  knowledge,  which  I  have  called  knowlcd^.'c  of 
the  second  kind.     For  although  I  have  show;: 
in  the  First  Part  that  all  things,  and  cons*- 
the  human  mind,  depend  upon  God  l»oth  wv 
existence  and  essence,  yet  that  demonstral:' 
legitimate,  and  placed  beyond  the  possibility  cf  a  '.;  ui'.. 
does  not,  nevertheless,  so  afl'ect  our  mind  as  a  proof  from 
the  essence  itself  of  any  individual  object  which  wc  wy 
depends  upon  God. 


278  ETHIC. 

Peop.  XXXVII. —  lliere  is  notliing  in  nature  which  is 
contrary  to  this  intellectual  love,  or  ivhich  can  negate  it. 

This  intellectual  love  necessarily  follows  from  the 
nature  of  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered,  through 
the  nature  of  God,  as  an  eternal  truth  (Proj)s.  33  and 
29,  pt-  5)-  If  there  were  anything,  therefore,  contrary 
to  this  love,  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  truth,  and  con- 
sequently whatever  might  be  able  to  negate  thjs  love 
would  be  able  to  make  the  true  false,  which  (as  is  self- 
evident)  is  absurd.  There  exists,  therefore,  nothing  in 
nature,  &c. — q.e.d. 

Schol. — The  axiom  of  the  Fourth  Part  refers  only  to 
individual  objects,  in  so  far  as  they  are  considered  in 
relation  to  a  fixed  time  and  place.  This,  I  believe,  no 
one  can  doubt. 

Prop.  XXXVIII. — The  more  objects  the  mind  understands 
hy  the  second  and  third  hinds  of  knoivledge,  the  less  it 
suffers  from  those  affects  which  are  evil,  and  the  less 
it  fears  death. 

Dcmonst. — The  essence  of  the  mind  consists  in  know- 
ledge (Prop.  II,  pt.  2).  The  more  things,  therefore,  the 
mind  knows  by  the  second  and  third  kinds  of  knowledge, 
the  greater  is  that  part  which  abides  (Props.  29  and  23, 
pt.  5),  and  consequently  (Prop.  37,  pt.  5)  the  greater 
is  that  part  wliich  is  not  touched  by  affects  which  are 
contrary  to  our  nature,  that  is  to  say  (Prop.  30,  pt.  4), 
which  are  evil.  The  more  things,  therefore,  the  mind 
understands  by  the  second  and  third  kinds  of  knowledge, 
the  greater  is  that  part  which  remains  unharmed,  and 
the  less  consequently  does  it  suffer  from  the  affects. 

Schol. — We  are  thus  enabled  to  understand  that  which 
I  touched  upon  in  Schol.  Prop.  39,  pt.  4,  and  which  I 
promised  to  explain  in  this  part,  namely,  that  death  is 
by  so   much   the  less  injurious  to  us  as  the  clear  and 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  ISTUiu  I.  ^^ 

distinct  knowledge  of  the  mind  is  greater,  and  conwnuenUr 
as  the  mind  loves  God  more.  Atjain.  since  (I'ropc  -7 
pt.  5)  from  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  theP-  .-.-^  '  ' 
highest  possible  peace,  it  follows  that  it  is 
the  human  mind  to  be  of  such  a  nature  thai  um.  ,  .:-. 
of  it  which  we  have  shown  i)erishes  with  iia  iInIv 
(Prop.  21,  pt.  5),  in  comparison  with  the  part  of  it 
which  remains,  is  of  no  consequence.  But  inort?  fully 
upon  this  subject  presently. 

Prop.  XXXIX.— ^c  who  possesses  a  hod  j/ Jit  for  manylhinyt 
possesses  a  mind  of  which  the  greater  jxirt  w  tttrnal. 

Dcmo7isf. — He  who  possesses  a  body  fitted  for  iWwi 
many  things  is  least  of  all  agitated  by  those  all.-.;, 
which  are  evil  (Prop.  38,  pt.  4),  that  is  to  say  (IV.i-.  30. 
pt.  4),  by  affects  which  are  contrary  to  our  naturr.  oud 
therefore  (Prop.  10,  j^t.  5)  he  posses.ses  the  jNiwer  of 
arranging  and  connecting  the  aflections  of  ihe  UhIv 
according  to  the  order  of  the  intellect,  and  constNjuonily 
(Prop.  14,  pt.  5)  of  causing  all  the  aflections  of  the  botly 
to  be  related  to  the  idea  of  (lod  (Prop.  15,  pL  5);  m 
consequence  of  which  he  is  affected  with  a  love  to  God, 
which  (Prop.  16,  pt.  5)  must  occupy  or  form  the 
greatest  part  of  his  mind,  and  therefore  (Prop.  33.  pL  5) 
he  possesses  a  mind  of  which  the  greatest  part  i.s  clcmal. 

ScJiol. — Inasmuch  as  human  bodies  are  til  f-T  many 
things,  we  cannot  doubt  the  possibility  of  their  |>oj«k'!»iii;{ 
such  a  nature  that  they  may  be  related  to  minds  which 
have  a  large  knowledge  of  themselves  and  of  (lod,  wiJ 
whose  greatest  or  principal  part  is  etenial,  so  that  ihcy 
scarcely  fear  death.  To  understand  this  more  clemrly. 
it  is  to  be  here  considered  that  we  live  in  consUnt 
change,  and  that  according  as  we  chang«>  f.>r  th.-  U-ti.-r 
or  the  worse  we  are  called  happy  or  unhappy.  K-r  h.- 
who  passes  from  infancy  or  childho-nl  to  .i-aih  i*  «--vl.d 
unhappy,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  cuuiidcr  ouml^.* 


28o  ETHIC. 

happy  if  we  can  pass  through  the  whole  period  of  life 
with  a  sound  mind  in  a  sound  body.  Moreover,  he  who, 
like  an  infant  or  child,  possesses  a  body  fit  for  very  few 
things,  and  almost  altogether  dependent  on  external  causes, 
has  a  mind  which,  considered  in  itself  alone,  is  almost 
entirely  unconscious  of  itself,  of  God,  and  of  objects.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  who  possesses  a  body  fit  for  many 
things  possesses  a  mind  which,  considered  in  itself  alone, 
is  largely  conscious  of  itself,  of  God,  and  of  objects.  In 
this  life,  therefore,  it  is  our  chief  endeavour  to  change 
the  body  of  infancy,  so  far  as  its  nature  permits  and  is 
conducive  thereto,  into  another  body  which  is  fitted  for 
many  things,  and  which  is  related  to  a  mind  conscious 
as  much  as  possible  of  itself,  of  God,  and  of  objects ;  so 
that  everything  which  is  related  to  its  memory  or  imagina- 
tion, in  comparison  with  the  intellect  is  scarcely  of  any 
moment,  as  I  have  already  said  in  the  scholium  of  the 
preceding  proposition. 

Peop.  XL. — The  innre  'perfection  a  thing  j^ossesses,  the  more 
it  acts  and  the  less  it  suffers,  and  conversely  the  more  it 
acts  the  more  perfect  it  is. 

Dcmonst. — The  more  perfect  a  thing  is,  the  more  reality 
it  possesses  (Def.  6,  pt.  2),  and  consequently  (Prop.  3, 
pt.  3,  with  the  Schol.)  the  more  it  acts  and  the  less  it 
suffers.  Inversely  also  it  may  be  demonstrated  in  the 
same  way  that  the  more  a  thing  acts  the  more  perfect 
it  is. — Q.E.D. 

Coral. — Hence  it  follows  that   that  part  of  the  mind 
which  abides,  whether  great  or  small,  is  more  perfect  than 
the  other  part.     For  the  part  of  the  mind  which  is  eterna 
(Props.  23  and  29,  pt.  5)  is  the  intellect,  through  whic 
alone  we  are  said  to  act  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3),  but  that  p? 
which,  as  we  have  shown,  perishes,  is  the  imaginat 
itself  (Prop.  21,  pt.  5),  through  which  alone  we  are 
to  suffer  (Prop.  3,  pt.  3,  and  the  general  definition  0 


OF  THE  POU'ER  OF  THE  IS 


ii.i.i.iA  I.  ;f, 


affects).  Therefore  (Prop.  40.  pt.  5)  that  part  irhich 
abides,  M-liether  great  or  small,  is  more  pcrfm  ilmn  iho 
latter. — q.e.d. 

SM.—These  are  the  things  1  proposed  to  prove  con- 
cerning the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  is  consi.lorcd  without 
rehation  to  the  existence  of  tlie  bodv,  and  fnun  tho*o 
taken  together  with  Prop.  21,  pt.  i.  and  other  prnj^*,." 
tions,  It  is  evident  that  our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  under- 
stands, is  an  eternal  mode  of  tliought,  wliich  i-  '  1 
by  another  eternal  mode  of  thouglit,  and  i . 
another,  and  so  on  ad  infinUum,  so  that  all  takm  lu^-ahcr 
form  the  eternal  and  infinite  intellect  of  God. 

Prop.  XLI. — Even  if  wc  did  not  Jniow  thai  our  vii'ut  T. 
eternal,  we  shmdd  stUl  comider  as  of  priman/ 
ance   Piety   and  Ecligion,  and  ahsdutdy  tr>  ^ 
which  in  the  Fourth  Fart  we  hare  shoun  to  U  niattti 

to  strength  of  mind  and  (jcnerosity. 

Dcriionst. — The  primary  and  sole  foundation  of  •. 
or  of  the  proi^er  conduct  of  life  (by  Corol.  Pri'p.  22,  ntui 
Prop.  24,  pt.  4)  is  to  seek  our  own  profit.     Uut  in  onU-r 
to   determine   "what  reason  prescribes  a.s  profitahje.  w« 
had  no  regard  to  the  eternity  of  the  mind,  which  Wi-  did 
not  recognise  till  we  came  to  the  Fifth  Part     Ti.' ; 
although  we  were  at  that  time  ignorant  that  tli< 
is  eternal,  we  considered  as  of  primary  imiKirtanc- 
things  which  we  have  shown  are  related  to  sini. 
mind  and  generosity  ;  and  therefore,  even  if  wo  wx    ■ 
ignorant  of  the  eternity  of  the  mind,  wc  .sh<  "'  ' 
those  commands  of  reason  as  of  primary  iniiMn: 

Schol — The    creed    of  the    multitude   wtm-    ' 
different  from  this;    for  most  persons  »ecni  lo  i- 
that  they  are  free  in  so  far  as  it  is  allowe<l  i: 
their   lusts,  and  that  they  give  up  a  \^>r\ 
rights,  in  so  far  as  they  are  bound  to  live 
the    commands    of   divine   law.     Piety,    ll-  • 


282  ETHIC. 

religion,  and  absolutely  all  those  tilings  that  are  related 
to  greatness  of  soul,  they  believe  to  be  burdens  which 
they  hope  to  be  able  to  lay  aside  after  death  ;  hoping  also 
to  receive  some  reward  for  their  bondage,  that  is  to  say, 
for  their  piety  and  religion.  It  is  not  merely  this  hope, 
however,  but  also  and  chiefly  fear  of  dreadful  punish- 
ments after  death,  by  which  they  are  induced  to  live 
according  to  the  commands  of  divine  law,  that  is  to  say, 
as  far  as  their  feebleness  and  impotent  mind  will  permit ; 
and  if  this  hope  and  fear  were  not  present  to  them,  but 
if  they,  on  the  contrary,  believed  that  minds  perish  with 
the  body,  and  that  there  is  no  prolongation  of  life  for 
miserable  creatures  exhausted  with  the  burden  of  their 
piety,  they  would  return  to  ways  of  their  own  liking  ; 
they  would  prefer  to  let  everything  be  controlled  by  their 
own  passions,  and  to  obey  fortune  rather  than  themselves. 
This  seems  to  me  as  absurd  as  if  a  man,  because  he 
does  not  believe  that  he  will  be  able  to  feed  his  body 
with  good  food  to  all  eternity,  should  desire  to  satiate 
himself  with  poisonous  and  deadly  drugs ;  or  as  if,  be- 
cause he  sees  that  the  mind  is  not  eternal  or  immortal, 
he  should  therefore  prefer  to  be  mad  and  to  live  without 
reason, — absurdities  so  great  that  they  scarcely  deserve  to 
be  repeated. 

Peop.  XLII. — Blessedness  is  not  the  reward  of  virtue,  hut  is 
virtue  itself;  nor  do  we  delight  in  blessedness  because 
we  restrain  our  lusts  ;  hut,  on  the  contrary,  because  we 
delight  in  it,  therefore  are  we  ahle  to  resti'ain  them. 

Demonst. — Blessedness  consists  in  love  towards  God 
(Prop.  36,  pt.  5,  and  its  Schol.),  which  arises  from  the 
third  kind  of  knowledge  (Corol.  Prop.  32,  pt.  5),  and  this 
love,  therefore  (Props.  59  and  3,  pt.  3),  must  be  related 
to  the  mind  in  so  far  as  it  acts.  Blessedness^  therefore 
'Def.  8,  pt.  4),  is  virtue  itself,  which  was  the  first  thing 

be  proved.     Again,  the  more  the  mind  delights  in  this 


OF  THE  POU-ER  OF  THE  ISTELLECT.  ,fy 

divine  love  or  blessedness,  the  UK.ro  it  undcretund.  (I'r,,,. 
32,  pt.   5),  that  is  to  say  (Carol.   I'rop.   3.  pt.   5)    H,. 
greater  is  the  power  it  has  over  its  nnoctsan.l  (I'n,,*,  ;S 
pt.    5)  the  less   it  suffers  from  affec-ts  which  nr.'  ■  . 
Therefore,  it  is  because  the  mind  deli-his  in  thus  , 
love  or  blessedness  that  it  possesses  the  \w\n'r  of  r.  ,-•:    : 
ing  the  lusts ;  and  because  the  power  of  man  to  r.    - 
the   affects  is  in  the  intellect  alone,  no  one.  th.-r.  •  ■ 
delights  in  blessedness  because  he  has  restrained  his  all".-,  i.,, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  the  power  of  restraining  his  lu«l« 
springs  from  blessedness  itself. — q.e.p. 

Schol. — I  have  finished  everything  I  wishetl  to  explain 
concerning  the  power  of  the  mind  over  the  alTctt 
concerning  its  liberty.  From  what  has  been  said  ••■ 
what  is  the  strength  of  the  wise  man,  and  how  niucli  hv 
surpasses  the  ignorant  who  is  driven  forwanl  by  lu»i 
alone.  For  the  ignorant  man  is  not  only  aJ^tatt^l  l>y 
external  causes  in  many  ways,  and  never  enjoy.-*  tni«' 
peace  of  soul,  but  lives  also  ignorant,  as  it  were,  l->t!i  ■  i 
God  and  of  things,  and  as  soon  as  lie  ceases  to  suflV-r  <  ••.i^-  - 
also  to  be.  On  the  other  hand,  the  wise  man,  in  «<•  tar 
as  he  is  considered  as  sucli,  is  scarcely  ever  moved  ui  li:< 
mind,  but,  being  conscious  by  a  certain  eternal  ni"-e*j»iiy 
of  himself,  of  God,  and  of  things,  never  cca-scs  to  be.  and 
always  enjoys  true  peace  of  soul.  If  the  way  which,  m  I 
have  shown,  leads  hither  seem  very  diflicult,  it  can  never- 
theless be  found.  It  must  indeed  be  diflicult  since  it  u 
so  seldom  discovered;  for  if  salvation  lay  ready  to  liand 
and  could  be  discovered  without  *,'reat  labour,  how  ct»ul.l 
it  be  possible  that  it  should  be  neglected  ainiosl  by  every- 
body ?     But  all  noble  things  are  as  diflicult  as  they  an 


rare. 


0^ 


INDEX. 


Absent,  afiFects  related  to  absent 
objects,  258. 

Action,  power  of,  cause  of  iov,  i  c  r 
152,  158.    .  ' 

connection  with  adequate  ideas, 

106,  107,  112,  241,  256,  267. 

definition,  106,  241. 

determined  by  reason  always 

good,  241. 

increase  or  diminution  of,  106. 

is  perfection,  280. 

not  determined  by  reason  may 

be  good  or  evil,  241. 

Actions,  contrary,  in  same  subject, 
254- 

or  passions,  order  in  mind  and 

body  the  same,  108. 

Adeijuate  cause,  definition,  lo6. 

idea,  definition,  48. 

Affability,  its  nature,  246. 

Affect  able  to  surpass  action,  1 85. 

active,  relation  to  joy  or  de- 
sire, 158. 

animal,  157. 

arrangement  and  connection  of 

affects,  266. 

clear  idea  and  knowledge  of  it, 

255,  256,  26J,  266. 

contrary,  definition,  1 80. 

correspondence     with    object, 

154- 

definition,  106,  1 74. 

detachment   from   thought  of 

external  cause,  254,  266. 

differs  according  to  essence  of 

person,  156. 

• duration  of,  258,  266. 

■ excited  by  numbers  of  simul- 
taneous causes,  259. 

• guidance  by,  as  compared  with 

that  by  reason,  234. 

imagination  of  cause  of,  as  pre- 
sent, 1^7. 


Affect,  mind'*  nowrroTfr.  it'  3(a 

262,  266,  267. 

n.c.  ..ity  ..f  r.v;..-.    |,  C.  236. 

ol..-tili.it.c:ili.:;:.-    ;,   |S^3|<i. 

powirof  it  liuuUil  b*  lUOMHT, 

254. 

related  to  niaoy  cau*t«,  15^ 

266. 

remedica  for  kflixi#,  3(A 

rejitraint  or   rvmotai  of,  lt5, 

186,  190,  260. 
Btrength   of,   oa  «b«l  ilfm 

dent,  187. 
towanlit  pMt,  pTMeat,  or  fatal* 

object,  iSl. 
.tVff('Ction!>,  bodily,  arrmrevtDMit  mc- 

cordinir  to  urJ«:r  o(  iotoUacf,  3te\ 

266. 
bodily,  cli-ar  itlc* 

ledge  of  thim,  s^v 
IxhIIIv,  oim-*]- 

with  thoughu,  354. 
bo<lily,  rt- Utiun  to  UmcI  Ood, 

263. 
Af!irniatii)n  in  the  mind  iiirt>l««d  la 

the  id.a,  95. 
Agrcimcnt  cauMd  by  oooforwitjr  l» 

reaiMin,  204. 

prevtnUd  by  {iMii(«^  XXL 

with  our  DJklun  ia  good,  Ml, 

202,  204. 
Ambition,  dcfinllkio.  tjl.  Il>  IJ*. 

172. 
Anger,  .i.  f'liiiti.  n,  m.  i*i. 

Antij    • 
App.li- 

that  ■■>■'.  -, 


Uk 


.-ia. 


Anton; 

Attrib; 


IJA  Ite- 


I 


286 


INDEX. 


Attributes  of  substance,  each  must 
be  conceived  through  itself,  8. 

distinct  do  not  constitute  dif- 
ferent substances,  8. 

Audacity,  definition,  149,  172. 

Avarice,  definition,  156,  173. 

Aversion,  definition,  164. 

Baseness,  definition,  209. 
Beauty,  explanation,  43,  44. 

prejudice  concerning,  39. 

Being,  infinite  thinking,  49. 

of   things,   mode  in  which  it 

follows  from  God,  52. 

origin  of  the  term,  85. 

Belief,    connection   with   hope    and 

fear,  147. 
Benevolence,  definition,  130,  1 7 1. 
Blame,  origin  of  notion,  43,  131. 

prejudice  concerning,  39. 

Blessedness,    definition,    241,    275, 

277. 
not  reward  of  virtue,   but  vir- 
tue itself,  282. 
Bodies,  agi-eement,  61. 

determination,  61,  62. 

hard    and    soft,    meaning    of 

terms,  63. 

how  distinguished,  61. 

in  moti(jn  or  at  rest,  61. 

mode  of  motion,  61. 

— • —  union,  63. 

Body,   affected  in  many  ways,   48 

212. 
composite,  retention  of  nature, 

64,  65. 

definition,  47. 

constitution,  67. 

idea   of,    involves    essence    of 

God,  92. 

imagination  of  it,  76. 

knowledge  of  it,  75,  76,  78. 

modes  of  its  affection,  62. 

perception  of  it,  48,  67,  76. 

reflection  of  motion,  63. 

human,  affections  by  external 

bodies,  67,  68,  70,  75,  76,  77,  212, 

247,  279. 
human,    capable    of    affection 

and  suffering  change,  106. 
human,    capacity  of   affecting 

bodies,  212,  247,  279. 

human,  changes  of,  213. 

human,  community  with  other 

bodies,  84. 
. human,  death  of  it  terminates 

passion,  275. 


Body,    human,    determination     by 

external  body,  66. 
human,  determination  by  mind 

of  body,    and  of  body  by   mind, 

108,  109,  no,  III,  112. 
human,  existence  of,  cannot  be 

excluded  by  the  mind,  116,  1 17. 
human,  fitness  for  many  things, 

human,    idea   of   it   exists   in 

God,  268. 
human,  inadequate  idea  of  its 

duration,  79. 
human,    increase  in  its  power 

of  action,  106,  1 16,  118. 
human,  individuals  composing 

it,  66. 

human  is  composite,  65,  66. 

human,  knowledge  of  it,  76. 

human,  knowledge  of  its  parts, 

74- 

human,  knowledge  of  its  exis- 
tence, 71. 

human,  knowledge  or  concep- 
tion of  it  under  form  of  eternity, 
268,  269,  270,  272,  273,  276. 

human,    mind   not   absolutely 

destroyed  with  it,  269. 

human,  moves  external  bodies, 

66. 

human,  object  of  the  human 

mind,  59. 

human,  order  of  actions,  &c. 

same  as  in  mind,  108. 

human,  perception  of  it  by  the 

mind,  58,  59,  67,  73,  74,  78. 

human,  preservation,   66,  247. 

human,  simultaneous  affec- 
tions, 70. 

human,  union  with  mind,  60, 

72,  73,  251,  252,  253,  268,  269. 

human,  ways  in  which  it  can 

be  disposed,  66. 

Bondage,  definition,  176. 

Bravery,  definition,  149. 

Brutes,  man's  rights  over,  209. 

Cause,  adequate,  definition,  106. 

determinate,  effect  follows,  2. 

determination  by  other  causes, 

28. 

external  alone  can  destroy  a 

thing,  113. 

inadequate,  definition,  106. 

knowledge  of,  2. 

Cause  of  itself,  definition,  i. 
Causes,  connection  of,  54,  55. 


ISDEX. 


Causes,  external  limit  perseverance 
in  being,  183. 

Certitude  something  positive,  97. 

Change  necessary  to  man,  183,  2S0. 

Changeableness  caused  by  passions, 
203. 

Chastity  not  an  affect,  156. 

Cheerfulness  always  good,  214. 

definition,  1 17. 

raritj'  of,  216. 

Cicero  quoted,  172. 

Citizens,  definition,  211. 

Class,  love  of  a  class  or  nation,  145. 

Cold,  explanation  of  action,  43. 

Commiseration,  definition,  125, 129, 
165. 

Common,  things  having  nothing  in 
common,  2-3. 

what  is  common  is  not  essence, 

82. 

what  is  common,  adequate  con- 
ception of  it,  82,  83. 

what  is  common,  dependence 

of  perception  on  it,  84. 

Community  of  nature  as  it  affects 
our  good  or  evil,  200,  201. 

profitable  to  man,  243,  244, 

Compassion,  definition,  166. 

Conception,  activity  of  it,  47. 

Concord,  things  which  beget  it,  244, 
246. 

Confidence,  definition,  123,  165. 

sign  of  weakness,  219. 

Confusion,  explanation  of  it,  43,  44. 

Consternation,  definition,  140,  1 50, 
172. 

Contempt  always  evil,  219. 

definition,  15 1,  163,  166. 

nothing  worthy  of  it,  220. 

repayment  of  it  by  love,  218. 

Contentment  with  one's  self,  defini- 
tion, 132. 

Contingency  dependent  on  imagina- 
tion, 90. 

does  not  exist,  29. 

imagination    of    it   influences 

affects,  188,  1 89,  190,  192,  257. 

meaning  of  it,  33,  180. 

reason  does  not  recognise  it, 

90. 
Contrary,  actions  contrary  in  same 

subject,  254. 
evil  is  contrarj-  to  us,  201. 

men  contrary  to  one  another 

through  passion,  203. 

things  contrary  alone  can  de- 
stroy each  other,  1 13. 


Court<»«y,  dofinition.  173, 
Cruelty,  dcfinilioo,  143.  i;i. 

Haxokr.  fnn.  ni»n  »!..,! 

Dtuth.d.-lit.- 

f.aro!    • 

lf«inj .....    . 

grv»UT.  278,  279. 
not  thought  of  by  •  I. 

in  frw,  235. 
not  to  b«  avoided  by  t»iaili  ^ 

faith,  239. 
Deceit,  never  pr»cttw<J   bj  »  mm 

who  ii«  fro*,  25S. 
Deformity.  cxplanAtino  o^  it,  4  v  44. 

pr\'judic«?  cimcrrnini;,  39. 

Dejection,  f«Iw  piety  in  it,  2461 
Derision,  definition.  151,  164. 
Descartes,  his  doctrine  m  to  kflacU, 

105. 
his  doctrine  m  to  unioa  at  atM 

and  body.  251.  252,  253. 
Desire,  accidental  cauar  (•/,  1 1<). 

connection    with     tifin    td 

others,  132. 

definition,  1 16.  i6<x  i6t. 

extinguiubment  or  mtralal  <4 

^-it,  191,  192. 

follows  fmm  a(lei{Q«t0  aaJ  la 

adequate  id'-a«,  ?4  • 

may  1» 

relation  •  •.^l<ll 

gprin;.'i:  :'f< 

Bprin^;i' 

4c.,  137.  I 

undtT-'  i 

or  as  a  p;i  ' 
Despair,  d^  t  : 

sign  nl  : 

Despondency,   j. !  ti.-.i  n.  I'«>,  M^ 
ij,'norancc  ut  ooc's  tull  aad  »»• 

potencc,  224. 

more    caailj    cncrwUd    ik** 

jiri«l»',  224. 

Determination  I  a  <aj«<«,  J< 
Devotion,  .i.  •  ■ 
Difference  ■  • 

men  and  t! 
of  nature  x>  it  Allc-tt  -«»  f  •J 

or  evil,  200,  201,  204. 

of  natuni  causwl  by 

205. 

Discord  eWI  to  man.  3*4- 
Dis-.rder,  prejodioo 

39. 
Distinct  things  bo« 


INDEX. 


Doubt,  same  as  vacillation  of  mind, 

122. 

Drunkenness,  definition,  156,  173. 
Duration,  definition,  48. 

ECCLESIASTES  quoted,  192. 

Education,  effect  of  it,  167,  168. 

Effect  follows  a  cause,  2. 

follows  from  something  which 

exists,  37. 

knowledge  of  it,  2. 

Emotion,  detachment  from  thought 
of  external  cause,  254. 

Emulation,  definition,  129,  1 71. 

End,  definition,  181. 

Envy,  cause  of  it,  135. 

definition,  166. 

natural  to  man,  134,  153. 

not  excited  by  those  who  are 

not  our  equals,  154. 

Error,  cause  of  it,  93,  96,  182. 

definition,  69,  81. 

Essence,  definition,  47,  56,  57, 
82. 

of  God,  human  mind  has  know- 
ledge of  it,  93. 

of  God,  knowledge  of  it  in- 
volved in  idea  of  body,  92. 

of  God,  knowledge  of  it  ade- 
quate and  perfect,  92. 

of  man,  what  it  involves,  48. 

of  things  not  existing,  2. 

of  things  produced  by  God,  26, 

Eternity,  definition,  2. 

riot  duration,  276. 

things  considered  under  form 

of  it,  91,  272,  273. 
Evil  avoided  by  all,  195. 
conception  of  it  as  cornected 

with  freedom,  235. 

contrary  to  us,  201. 

due  to  external  causes,  242. 

explanation  of  it,  43,  139,  179, 

180. 
fear  of  it  as  a  motive,  232. 

knowledge   of,  desire    arising 

from  it,  191,  192. 

knowledge  of  it  an  effect  of 

sorrow,  186. 

knowledge    of   it   inadequate, 

233- 

knowledge  of  :  restraint  of  af- 
fects, 190. 

necessity  of  it,  240. 

nothing  certainly  evil  but  ab- 
sence of  imderstanding,  199. 

prejudice  concerning  it,  39. 


Evil  produced  by  hatred,   139,  141, 

142. 
reason  follows  the  lesser  evil, 

233.  234. 

removal  of  it,  242. 

Existence,  desire  of,  196. 
Experience,  vague,  definition,  86. 

vague,  cause  of  falsity,  87. 

Extension,  attribute  or  affection  of 

attribute  of  God,  13,  49. 
relation  to  thought,  52,  53. 

Faculties  absolute,  their  nature,  94, 

95- 

Faith,  never  to  be  broken,  239. 

False  idea,  removal  of  what  is  posi- 
tive in  it,  181. 

Falsity,  cause  of  it,  87,  96. 

definition,  80. 

Favour,  agreement  with  reason,  221. 

definition,  126,  166. 

Fear  as  a  motive,  232. 

cause  of  it,  147,  244. 

causes  disbelief,  147. 

definition,  123,  140,  164,  171. 

hope  accompanies  it,  164. 

how  to  get  rid  of  it,  261. 

not  good  of  itself,  219. 

Fellowship  profitable  to  man,  214. 

Ferocity,  definition,  17 1. 

Final  causes,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  178. 

Finite  in  its  own  kind,  definition,  I. 

Finiteness  is  negation,  5. 

Flattery  as  a  means  of  promoting 
concord,  246. 

Flight  from  danger  sometimes  neces- 
sary, 236. 

Food,  varied  kinds  necessary,  247. 

Fortitude,  definition,  159. 

properties  of  it,  239. 

Free,  man  born  free  could  not  form 
conception  of  good  and  evil,  235. 

man  who  is  free  avoids  danger, 

236. 

man  who  is  free  avoids  favours 

of  the  ignorant,  237. 

man  who  is  free  does  not  think 

of  death,  235. 

man  who  is  free  is  the  only 

grateful  man,  238. 

man  who  is  free  never  deceives, 

238. 

Freedom,  connection  with  love  and 
hatred,  146,  147. 

definition,  2. 

■ not  an  attribute  of  will,  32,  94, 

99,  100,  loi,  102,  103. 


Freedom,  reasons  why  men  attribute 

it  to  themselves,  39,  Si. 
Friendship  of  beloved  object  with 

another  is  a  cause  of  hatred,  135. 

profitable  to  man,  243. 

Future  objects,  affect  towards  them, 

122,  123,  1S7,  iSS,  191,  230,  231, 

234- 

Generosity,  definition,  159. 
importance  of  it,  281. 

repayment  of  anger,  &c.,  by 

generosity,  218,  243. 

Gladness,  definition,  123,  165. 

sign  of  weakness,  219. 

Gland  pineal,  opinion  of  Descartes 

with  regard  to  it,  251,  252,  253. 
Glory,  definition,  277. 

how  we  are  to  think  of  it,  261. 

God  acts  from  no  freedom  of  will,  32. 

adequacy    and    perfection   of 

knowledge  of  His  essence,  92. 

amplitude  of  His  laws,  46. 

can  be  hated  by  nobody,  265. 

cause  of  existence  and  essence 

of  things,  27. 
cause  of  formal  being  of  ideas, 

51- 

cause  of  modes  of  attributes, 

51- 

cause  through  Himself,  19. 

compelled  by  no  one,  19. 

comprehension  of  non-existent 

thingis  in  His  idea,  53. 
connection  of  causes  in  Hiin, 

54,  55- 
definition,  I. 

determination    of    things    by 

Him,  27,  28. 

does  not  act  for  the  sake  of  the 

good,  37. 

efficient  cause,  19. 

essence  of  things  produced  by 

Him,  26. 
essence  of,  involved  by  idea  of 

body,  92. 

eternal,  23. 

everything  in  Him,  14. 

existence  and  essence  the  same, 

23. 

existence  and  essence  eternal 

truths,  24. 

exists  for  no  end,  1 78. 

extension  attribute  of  Hira,  49. 

first  cause,  19. 

formal  being  of  things,  how  it 

follows  from  Him,  52. 


INDEX. 

Godfrw, 


:«o 


0.  JO. 

tnv  (mm  pMtkioi  nr  aActu. 

264. 

human  mind  riiiu  ia  Hta^ 

and  is  coccivrj  U»nj«ch  lltek 
273.  2S1.  ^        ^ 

human  mind  baa  kDo«UdM  «4 

Him,  49. 
idea  of  human  t 

of  tUniity  «xii>t«  -.■ 
idea  of  humajj  i...;,..  .  .„_  ,_ 

Him,  72. 
idia  of,  iu  unity,  5a 

idea  of,  rwlaUoii  U 

]      to  it,  263. 

I  identity     with     mbaUaea. 

!      '3-. 

immanent  cauar,  aj. 

immutable  cau<«,  24. 

individual  thinjj»  afTccti<i«M  <4 

His  attributea,  27. 

infinite  thingi  follow  frma  IIm 

nature,  18. 

inU'llect  doM  not  perlaia  Us 

21,  32- 

lovo  of   cannot  ba  dvfiUd  by 

envy,  At,  265. 

love  of,  cunncdion  ot  it  vttJt 

undenttandin);,  264. 

love  of,  cunntancy  a(  il,  tiA 

love  of   dcnuuiila  out  ion  ia 

return,  265.  , 

love  of,  intollcctoal,  174,  tJi, 

276,  277,  27.S.  270. 

love  of,  DO  affect  coaU*ry  to 

it,  266. 

lore  of  ought  to  oocupv  tit* 

mind,  264. 

love  of  utrrngthrwd  bj  lot* 

to  Him  of  othrr  |>«<f>pJ*,  J6C 

knowK-.lK''-  <-'  cM»m»  d^in  !•• 

good  of  oth.n.  ^'7 
knowlfdj,'c  ft    i»  bliaiiilBM^ 

knowledge  ct  b  Ii%Im«  g-rf 

and  virtu.-,  .'oo. 

'"><'  ''    '■  ..        -^ 

„„.  :,.  IIU^   «6l 

. til  t'--k'^   ■  '      ''"X*  ^,  •fc'**  *• 

nfctA.li)  ••(  .r.lcr  ia  wbkk  Il« 

has  produced  tbisfi.  XV  34.  iV 
36,  37. 


290 


INDEX. 


God,  nothing  can  be  conceived  with- 
out Him,  14. 

omnipotence  actual  from  eter- 
nity, 21. 

perfection  of  His  nature  excites 

His  action,  19. 

perfection  of  things  produced 

by  Him,  34,  35,  36,  37. 

power  of  is  His  essence,  37. 

power  of,  meaning  of  term,  49, 

power  of  acting  equal  to  His 

power  of  thinking,  52. 

proximate  cause,  29. 

relationship  to  essence  of  man, 

56. 

remote  cause,  meaning  of  the 

term,  29. 

substance  with  infinite  attri- 
butes, 9. 

things  which  follow  from  abso- 
lute nature  of  His  attributes,  24. 

things  which  follow  from  modi- 
fied attributes,  25. 

thought  an  attribute  of  Him, 

48. 

understanding  of  Him,  270. 

unity  of,  13. 

why  knowledge  of  Him  is  not 

distinct,  93. 

will  does  not  pertain  to  Him, 

21,  32,  34.  35,  36,  37- 

works  for  no  end,  38,  39,  40, 

41,  42,  43,  44,  45>.46. 

Good,  agreement  with  our  nature, 
201,  202. 

conception    of,    as    connected 

with  freedom,  235. 

desired  by  all,  195. 

desired  for  others,  207. 

explanation  of,    43,    1 16,   1 39, 

179,  180. 

highest,  common  to  all,  206. 

highest  is  knowledge  of  God, 

200. 

knowledge  of,  an  affect  of  joy, 

186. 

knowledge   of,    desire    arising 

from  it,  191,   192. 

knowledge  of,  restraint  of  af- 
fects by  it,  190. 

nothing  known  to  be  good  but 

understanding,  199,  242. 

prejudice  concerning  it,  39. 

produced  by  love,  139. 

reason    follows    greater   good, 

233,  234. 


Good,  reason  why  joy  follows  it,  167. 
Gratitude,  definition,  142,  1 7 1. 
dependence  on  freedom,  238. 

Happiness,  in  what  it  consists,  194, 
Hardness,  definition,  63. 
Hatred  by  beloved  object,  141. 

can  never  be  good,  217. 

co-existence    with    love,    141, 

142. 

connection  with  desire,  137. 

connection  with  freedom   and 

necessity,  146,  147. 
connection     with     hatred     of 

others,  132,  133,  140,  141,  143. 
connection  with  joy,  124,  126, 

127,  128. 
connection  with   sorrow,    120, 

121,  125,  126,  12S,  129,  145,  146. 

definition,  119,  163. 

dependence    on    difference    of 

nature,  204. 

desire  to  remove  it,  144. 

destruction  of  it,  143,  254. 

— - —  destruction  of  object  of  it,  145. 

natural  to  man,  153. 

nothing  worthy  of  it,  220. 

of   beloved  object,    135,    13S, 

144. 
of    object     dependent    on   its 

causation  of  sorrow,  146. 

overcome  by  love,  143,  260. 

productive   of   evil  to   others, 

139,  141,  142,  243. 

repayment  with  love,  218. 

Health  of  whole  man,  230. 
Heat,  explanation  of  notion,  43.   i 
Honour,  definition,  209. 
Hope,  cause  of,  147. 

causes  belief,  147. 

definition,  123,  164. 

fear  accompanies  it,  164.  , 

not  good  of  itself,  219. 

Horror,  definition,  150. 
Humanity,  definition,  13 1. 
Humility,  definition,  153,  167. 
not  a  virtue,  222. 

Idea  adequate,  definition,  48. 

clear  idea  of  a  passion,  255. 

definition,  47. 

distinguished  from  images  and 

words,  97. 
in   the   mind   alone   involves 

volition,  &c.,  95. 
true,  agreement  cum  suo  ideato, 

2. 


INDEX. 


191 


Idea,  true,  he  who  has  it  knows  ho 

has  it,  88. 
Ideas,  adequate,  wliich  follow  from 

adequate  ideas,  84. 
adequate,  connection  with  ac- 
tion, 106,  107,  112,  241,  256,267. 

common,  83. 

falsity  in  them,  nothing  posi- 
tive, 80. 

formal  being  of,  51. 

inadequate  and  confused,  82. 

inadequate,     connection    with 

suffering    or   passion,    loo,    107, 

112,  241,  255,  256,  267. 
inadequate,    connection    with 

virtue,  197. 

mutilated,  81. 

order   and  connection  of,   52. 

254. 

relation  to  God,  80. 

true,  80. 

universal,  86. 

Ignorant,  avoidance  of  favours   of 

ignorant  men,  237. 

man,  his  weakness,  283. 

Images    of    things,    connection    of 

them,  254,  263. 
of  things,  constancy  of  them, 

262. 

of  things,  definition,  69. 

of  things,   distinguished  from 

ideas,  97. 
of  things,  frequency  of  them, 

263. 
of    things,    past,    present,   or 

future,  122,  123,  187,  188. 
of  things,  relation  to  a  number 

of  objects,  262,  263. 
of  things,  relation  to  idea  of 

God  ,263. 
. of  things,  relation  to  tilings  we 

understand,  263. 
Imagination,  cause  of  contingency, 

90. 

cause  of  falsity,  87,  182. 

entities  of,  45. 

knowledge  of   the  first   kmd, 

86. 
Imperfection,   definition,    176,    I7"> 

178,  179,  180. 

. prevents  existence,  12. 

Impossibility,  meaning  of,  33. 
Impotence,  cause  of,  193. 
difference  between  it  and  vir- 
tue, 209. 
neglect  to  preserve  our  being, 

195. 


Impijl»4-,  .v-tiiii:  fr-.iti  >-^ 

In«.i.  ^^ 

Inclii. 

Incn  „^„^^ 

20j. 

IndignKtinn,  drfinitiao,  136^  |64 
evil  of.  ;ji,  :.ii. 


Individual  tt 

4& 

thin^^. 

Infinit*-  in  ii- 

Intinitudo  i"  . 

nt»tc<>ii., 

»rU.I<k 

Ingratitude  i. 

Rodni**- 

Injiisticv  in  u  , 

:|. 

InU-llect  act'  >  . 

Atnm 

iwttntial,  3i 

actual,  rcfcrrvU  to  tmlmrm  attm- 

rata.  31. 

actual,  what  it 

3'- 

amuip>-ni.  lit  nf 

oa«p.«lMMl.. 

ftfT.<Hui«M   MP- 

cording  l"  • 

diH-.H  n. '  . 

Ji. ;? 

p«.rfc'c:i.  1. ..., .. 

. pnAU 

241-242. 

same  a.  wUl,  96*  97.  98.  W^ 

100,  101,  102,  103. 

Int<llectt«iU  lo»c  of  Cod,  rfA.  >7J. 

276,  277,  27SL 

Intuitive  »ci'-T—    '-• 

..;•.  ..    vA 

Kicno' 

BO  far  a»  i'. 

sciencf  iiiii.iii^ui«...  t.uUiii'-^> 

falsity.  S7- 

-     p^fcrtk. 

and  !    :                -: 

ari- 

BCf  III'     1-    1- 

uci.iic.-.    lU    «• 

irrl..|«,      M>! 

pow.r,  :'>:.  2:<\  2 

1 

jBAU)f»r,  ilcfinllioo.  I1& 
Joy,  accidenlal  e»tt«»  «.  ••♦ 

__     c..M..i-ti.«witbli«»^ia4»«'^ 


,i,ii.<-tiaO  •rJth>oy  «4 


131. 


.  c.rtlD«<tJ.«  will.  »»~.  »».  »»'■ 

123.  134,  115.  »»7'  '"^ 
dcfinilioo.  116,  161. 

193- 


292 


INDEX. 


Joy,  desire  to  produce  what  con- 
duces to  it,  1 30. 

directly  good,  214. 

may  be  accompanied  with  sor- 
row, 145. 

may  be  excessive,  248. 

mind's  power  of  action  is  the 

cause  of  it,  151. 

praise  is  the  cause  of  it,  152. 

reasons  why  it  follows   good 

actions,  167. 

relation  to  action  as  well  as 

passion,  158. 

relation  to  active  affects,  158. 

relation  to  parts  of  the  body, 

229. 
resemblance  is  the  cause  of  it, 

121. 
sameness  of  it  whether  object 

be  imagined  as  past,  present,  or 

future,  122,  123,  187. 
Judgment,  suspension  of  it,  100. 
Justice,  in  natural  State,  21 1. 

Knowledge,  different  kinds  of  it, 
86,82, 

of  good  and  evil,  186,  190,  191, 

192. 

of  second  and  third  kind  dimi- 
nishes fear  of  death  and  subjec- 
tion to  passion,  278. 

third  kind  of  it  depends  on  the 

mind,  so  far  as  it  is  eternal,  273. 

• third  kind  of  it  increases  per- 
fection and  happiness,  274. 

third   kind  of  it,   intellectual 

love  of  God  arises  from  it,  274, 275. 

third  kind  of  it,  its  excellence 

and  pow^r,  267,  270,  271. 

third  kind  of  it  may  arise  from 

second  kind,  271. 

third  kind  of  it,  our  delight  in 

it,  274. 

Laughter  distinguished  from  mock- 
ery, 217. 

nothing  worthy  of  it,  220. 

Law,  impossible  with  absolute  exer- 
cise of  rights,  246. 

reason  counsels  life  under  it, 

239. 

Liberality,   men   conquered    by   it, 

245- 
Liberty,  in  what  it  consists,  277. 
Life,  subject  of  thoughts   of   man 

who  is  free,  235. 
Likeness  of  an  object  to  ourselves, 


affects  produced   in  us  thereby, 

128,  134,  144. 
Longing,  definition,  137. 
Love  by  hated  object,  142. 

coexistence  with  hatred,  141, 

142. 

connection  with  freedom  and 

necessity,  146,  147. 

connection  with  joy,  120,  121, 

123,  124,  125,  127,  129,  146. 
connection  with  love  of  others, 

132,  133,  142. 

connection  with  sorrow,  1 23, 

124,  125,  127. 

definition,  1 19,  163. 

desire  springing  from  it,  137, 

destroys  hatred,  143,  260. 

destruction  of  it,  254. 

fruition  of,  causes  new  disposi- 

fr  tion  of  body,  160. 

lustful,  passes  into  hatred,  245. 

may  be  excessive,  2 1 5. 

of  class  or  nation,  145. 

of  God  cannot  be  defiled  by 

envy,  &c.,  265. 

of  God  cannot  be  turned  into 

hatred,  265. 
of  God,  constancy  of  it,  266. 

of  God  demands  not  love  in 

return,  265. 

of  God,  dependence  of  it  on 

understanding,  264. 

of  God,  intellectual,  274,  275, 

276,  277,  278. 
of  God,  no  affect  contrary  to  it, 

266. 

of  God  ought  to  occupy  the 

mind,  264. 

of  God  strengthened  by  love  to 

Him  of  other  people,  265. 

of  objectdependenton  its  causa- 
tion of  joy,  146. 

preservation   of  object   of   it 

causes  joy,  123. 

production   of   good   thereby, 

139- 

repayment  of  hatred,  &c.,  by  it, 

218,  243,  260. 
Lust,  definition,  156,  1 73. 

restraint  of  it,  282. 

Luxuriousness,  definition,  173. 

Madness,  in  what  it  really  consists 

216. 
Man,  consequences  of  agreememt  or 

disagreement  of  man  with  man, 

242. 


INDEX. 


^\ 


Man,  his  essence,  what  it  involves, 
48. 

his  final  aim,  241. 

in  what  he  consists,  56,  60. 

Mosaic  account  of  first  man 

235- 

necessary  to  man,  194,  243. 

substance  is  not  his  form,  55. 

thought  affirmed  of  him,  4S. 

]\Iarriage  in  accordance  with  reason, 

245- 
IVIaxims  of  life,  260. 
Melancholy  always  evil,  2 1 4. 

definition,  117. 

Memory,  definition,  70. 

influence  on  affects,  iSS. 

Mercy  is  generosity,  159. 

not  a  passion  but  a  power,  171. 

Merit,  definition,  211. 

origin  of,  43. 

prejudice  concerning,  39. 

Mind,    huuian,    actions   arise   from 

adequate  ideas,  112. 

■ human,  acts  and  sufiFers,  106. 

human,  adequate  ideas  exist  in 

it,  83. 

human,  aptitude  for  percep- 
tion, 66. 

human,  body  its  object,  59. 

human,  cannot  be  absolutely 

destroyed  with  the  body,  269. 

human,  confused  ideas  of  affec- 
tions, 77. 

human,  contemplation  of  things 

absent,  6S,  69. 

human,     determination     by 

causes,  94. 

human,  determination  of  body 

and  of  mind  by  body,  108,    109, 

no.  III,  112. 
human,  endeavours  to  imagine 

increase  in  action  of  body,  1 1 8. 
human,  endeavours  to  imagine 

its  own  action,  152. 

human,  endeavours  to  perse- 
vere in  its  being,  1 15. 

human,  eternity  of  it,  269,  272, 

276,  278,  279,  280,  281. 
human,  excludes  things  which 

lessen  body's  action,  llS,  119. 

human,    follows    from    God, 

277- 

human,   formal   being   of   iU 

idea,  66. 

human,  has  no  absolute  free 

will,  32,  94,  95.  96,  97.  9S.  99. 
100,  loi,  102. 


Mind,  human,  tuu  no  1 

culty,  94. 
human,  idra  nUu  ia  (mJ.  7a. 

human,  i.i.  a  1,  t  rU*/.  rj, 

human,  ►  ^  «iMa 

'>^v,  71,  :;  .;. 

Duman,  <    nmU 

74.  77.  273- 

huinnn.  knowlMlf^  n(  tb*  UiiH 

kind  di'|K'n<lii  cm  th«  mind  m>  laf 
as  it  in  tU-niAl.  373. 

human,  ..r>lcr  .4  acCioM^  Aa, 

same  M  in  Uwly.  108,  JJ4. 

human,  i>art  o(  Uod  •  iaUUMt. 

58,  281. 

human,  pvrcoptiooa  of  H,  (S. 

59.  67.  73.  74.  7".  JM- 

huntan,    |«><uH>ur«    aicqaato 

knowle<J){e  of  <;.«!  .  ..-..^   ..■ 

human,  |««««-«^ 

excludeii  exi*t<nco 

116,  117. 
human,  power  of  actioo,  vs<l«a- 

vours  to  ima^nnc,  152. 

human,  power  of  actius,  ffj 

over,  151. 

human,  powt-r  of  tkoucht.  In- 
crease of  it,  116. 

human,  power  orer  the  afl«t«, 

257,  260,  202,  266,  207. 

human,  |»>wir  <i»er  Um  body, 

loii,  109,  I  10,  I  II,   II]. 

human,  niinuilancou*  afl«cti<«i 

by  two  affect*.  IIQ. 

human,  »orTt)Wi  at  lU  1 

'52- 
human,  »ubjcctiun  lo 

107.  275,  27X. 
human,iinl-r«*art!'n;'^  !»»•*{> 

under  fonii    ' 

human. 

72.  73.^?' 

I,,:  .lu;u,U.«l 

by  t! 


M.K.-kcry  .i 
U-r,  217. 
Mo<lc,  d.fli 
M.Mj.r.V 


tl.  n,  I 


Mode  ; 

of  allnl'Ut^ 

God.  5 

idia- 
M<h1.-' 


U'W  caatwd  »t 


hi,    .1 


294 


INDEX. 


Money,  uses  of  it,  248. 
Moses  quoted,  235. 
Motion    and    rest,   preservation    of 
proportions,  212. 

Nation,  love  of  a,  145. 

Natura  iiaturans  and  naturata,  30. 

Nature,  man  as  part  of,  183,  240, 

241,  242. 

order  of,  man  follows,  184. 

Necessity,  all  things  determined  by 

it,  29,  240. 

definition,  2. 

connection    with    love    and 

hatred,  146. 

imagination  of   it  influences, 

affects,  188,  257. 

meaning  of,  33. 

recognition  of  it  by  reason,  90. 

Negation  in  the  mind  involved  in 

the  idea,  95. 
Non-existent  things,  comprehension 

in  God's  idea,  53. 

things,  their  objective  being, 

53,  54- 
Notions,  common,  their  origin,  84. 

second,  their  origin,  84. 

universal,  their  origin,  85. 

Omens,  definition,  147. 
Opinion,  cause  of  falsity,  87. 

definition,  86. 

Order,  explanation  of  it,  43. 

prejudice  concerning  it,  39. 

Over-estimation  always  evil,  219. 

definition,  166. 

makes  men  proud,  220. 

Ovid  quoted,  133,  192. 

Pain,  definition,  117. 

may  be  good,  215. 

Passion    able    to    surpass     action, 
185. 

connection    with    inadequate 

ideas,  106,  107,  112,  255. 

definition,  106,  241. 

definition  according   to    Des- 
cartes, 252. 

limitation  by  external  cause, 

185. 

man  necessarily  subject  to  it, 

184. 
reason  can  determine  to  actions 

to  which  passion  determines  us, 

228. 
terminated  by  death  of  body, 

275. 


Passions  and  actions,  order  in  mind 
and  body  the  same,  108. 

cause  of  contrariety,  203. 

cause  of  difference  and  change, 

203. 

involve  negation,  1 1 3. 

prevent  agreement,  202. 

Past  objects,  affect  towards  them, 
122,  123,  187,  188,  190,  230,  231. 

Peace  of  mind,  how  it  arises,  271. 

Peculiarity  of  an  object  induces  con- 
templation, 159. 

Perception,  passivity  of  it,  47. 

Perfection,  definition,  176,  177,  1 78, 
179,  180. 

establishes  existence,  12. 

identical  with  reality,  48. 

is  increase  of  action,  280. 

Perseverance  in  being,  actual  essence 
of  the  thing,  114. 

in  being,    each  thing   strives 

after  it,  114. 

in  being,  force  causing  it 

limited,  183. 

in   being    involves   indefinite 

time,  115. 

in  being,  mind  strives  after  it, 

"5- 

in  being  not  a  limit  to  passion, 

185. 
Piety,  definition,  209. 

importance  of  it,  281. 

what  it  is  commonly  thought 

to  be,  282. 
Pity,  evil  and  unprofitable  in  itself, 

220,  245. 
may  be  good,  227. 

misery   of    the   object   of   it, 

129. 

natural  to  man,  134. 

nothing  worthy  of  it,  220. 

Pleasurable  excitement,  definition, 
117. 

may  be  evil,  215. 

Poor,  care  of  them,  245. 

Positive,  removal  of  what  is  positive 
in  a  false  idea,  181. 

Possession  of  an  object  by  one  per- 
son, 133. 

Possibility,  definition,  180. 

imagination  of  it  influences  the 

affects,  1 88,  1S9,  257. 

Power,  degrees  of,  in  nature,  1 81. 

same  as  virtue,  181. 

Praise,  cause  of  joy,  152. 

origin  of,  43,  1 31. 

prejudice  concerning  it,  39. 


INDEX. 


*9\ 


Presenceof  mind  is  strength  of  mind,  |  RoajM.n  coon^U  Ul«  ' 


159 
Present  objects,  affect  towards  them, 

122,   123,  1S7,  1S8,  189,  190,  191, 

192,  230,  231,  234. 
Preservation  of  being  foundation  of 

virtue,  194,  195,  196,  197,  198. 
of  being,  no  object  superior  to 

it,  198. 

of  being,  no  one  neglects  it,  196. 

of  being,  same  as  happiness,  194. 

of  being  with  reference  to  health 

as  a  whole,  230. 
Pride,  definition,  16S,  225. 

encourages  flattery,  225,  246. 

ignorance  of  one's  self  and  im- 
potence, 224. 
Profit,  agreement  with  our  nature, 

202. 
capacity  of  body  for  affecting 

and  being  affected  is  true  pro  fit, 

212,  247. 
everybody  has  the  right  to  seek 

his  own,  242. 
man  under  guidance  of  reason 

is  chief  profit  to  man,  205,  243, 
no  one  neglects  to  seek  his  own, 

196. 
of  the  whole  man,  partial  joy 

or    sorrow   has    no   regard   to  it, 

229. 
seeking  our  own  profit  is  the 

foundation  of  virtue,  195,   198. 

what  is  the  profit  of  one's  self 

is  that  of  others,  205. 

what  the  law  of  our  own  profit 

demands,  247. 
Property,  rights  of  it,  21 1. 
Punishment  by  supreme  authority, 

221. 
Pusillanimity,  definition,  149,  172. 

Quantity,  existence  in  imaginati>m 
distinguished  from  existence  in 
intellect,  17. 

Reality,  connection  between  it  and 
attributes,  8. 

identical  with  perfection,  48, 

179,  180. 

Reason,  affects  which  spring  from  it, 

258,  266. 
conception  of  objects  by  it,  230. 

conformity    of   men   to   it  i» 

agreement  of  nature,  204. 

considers  things  as  necewar)', 

90. 


law*,  2;.) 
<|.  liniii 


S6. 

nt  .4   UtMj. 


87.  ' 
fallow*  gntktoT  goad  umA  immt 

e»il.  .' ; ;. 

wi!  ■.,:x4 

■  .         lu  U  b  atoM. 

urily  Uuc,  67. 

ninn  under  t^'^iUUnco  at  tl  fm- 

fitahlt!  t<i  man,  lof,. 

may  dit<nninp  to  artto—  le 

which  p.ift'iiin  <1.  trntuRM  •>,  JiA. 

pcrciivi-*  thing*  oadar  lavmof 

eternity,  91. 
ptrft-ction  of  it  b  oar  (ot*  ff- 

fit,  241. 

Hoek*  (jn«tfr  (uturr  C"«J.  JU 

t«acheK  dir>xt  |iir»'i.l  ■  f  g>"i 

and   indirect   AVoiviMtca   U   •«ii, 

232. 
Rocolli-ction,  cau«r  of  drairr,  1 37 
Kopret,  dct^ri'     ■•     •■ 
Religion,  <i' 

import 

what  ii  ■»  ^.  .........  ..--^i^l* 

be,  282. 
Remontc,  difiniti.«.  Hi  165. 

Kij.Ti  of  wrAkiMM,  119. 

Repentanc«^    drfiniUoO,    Ija,    t4^ 

167. 
not  a  \;  *        "*' 

RcpOM!  of  II 

RfgimMan. 

:ind  Kalr.  .1.  I -m 
K..t.  j.r.  -r«»tliiO  o* 

ni.ti.ii  and  rrrt,  3i; 
Right,  natural,  Jia 


SAi.VATlo?f.  in  what  it 
Sci'  nc<,   iiituili*o.     JJi 


.S<-li 

Self 

t: 

Self 


m 


296 


INDEX. 


Self-satisfaction  our  highest  hope, 
222. 

Shame,  definition,  132,  170. 

difference  between  it  and  mo- 
desty, 170. 

how  caused,  141. 

may  be  good,  227. 

— —  may  produce  concord,  246. 

Sin,  definition,  211. 

origin  of  it,  43. 

prejudice  concerning  it,  39. 

Sobriety  is  strength  of  mind,  159. 

not  an  affect,  156. 

Social,  man  necessarily  social,  206. 

Society,  its  rights,  211. 

Softness,  definition,  63. 

Solitude,  reason  does  not  counsel  it, 
239,  244. 

Something,  origin  of  the  term,  85. 

Sorrow,  accidental  cause  of  it,  1 19. 

connection  with  hate,  120,  1 2 1, 

125,  126,  128,  129. 

connection  with  love,  123,  124, 

127. 

definition,  1 17,  t6i. 

desire  springing  from  it,  137, 

193- 

desire  to  destroy  what  con- 
duces to  it,  130. 

desire  to  remove  it,  I44. 

directly  evil,  214. 

may  be  accompanied  with  joy, 

145. 

reason  why  it  follows  wicked- 
ness, 167. 

related   to    action  as   well    as 

passion,  158. 

related  to  parts  of  the  body, 

229. 

sameness  of  it,  whether  object 

be  past,  present,  or  future,  122, 
123,  187. 

Stability,  want  of  it,  193. 

State,  definition,  21 1. 

reason  counsels  life  in  one,  239. 

Stoics'  opinion  quoted,  250. 

Strength,  degrees  of  it  in  nature, 
181. 

of  mind,  definition,  159. 

of  mind,  importance  of  it,  281. 

Substance,  attributes  of  it,  con- 
ceived through  themselves,  8. 

cannot  be  produced  by  another 

substance,  4,  1 4. 

cannot  be  produced  by  any- 
thing, 4. 

definition,  i. 


Substance,  division  impossible,  12, 

13- 

existence  pertains  to  it,  5. 

extended,  not  unworthy  of  God, 

18. 

is  infinite,  5. 

no  other  than  God,  13. 

not  the  form  of  man,  55. 

prior  to  affections,  3. 

thinking  and  extended,  are  the 

same,  52. 
Substances  of  the  same  nature,  4-8. 

with  different  attributes,  3. 

Suffering,    connection    with    inade- 
quate ideas,   106,   107,    1 12,   241, 

256,  267. 
consequent  on  our  being  part 

of  nature,  183. 

definition,  106. 

increase   or    diminution    of   it. 

106. 
Suicide,  194. 
Superstition  aflBrms    sorrow   to  be 

good,  249. 

aim  of  it,  232. 

cause  of  it,  147. 

Sympathy,  definition,  120. 

Temperance  is  strength  of  mind, 

159- 

not  an  affect,  156. 

Thankfulness,  definition,  142,  171.'! 
Thing,  origin  of  the  term,  85. 
Thought,   attribute   or  affection  of 

attribute  of  God,  13,  48. 
correspondence  with  affections 

of  the  body,  254. 

perception  of  it,  48. 

relation  to  extension,  52,  53. 

Timidity,  definition,  149. 
Tolerance  of  men,  243. 
Transcendental  terms,  their  origin, 

85- 
Truth,  standard  of  it,  89. 

Understanding,  connection  of   it 

with  love  of  God,  264. 
evil  is  the  prevention  of  it, 

199. 

necessary  to  virtue,  197. 

nothing  else    certainly  good, 

199. 
sole  effort  of  reason,  and  sole 

profit  of  the  mind,  198. 
Universal  ideas,  ideas  of  perfection 

and  imperfection  depend  on  them, 

177. 


isnr.x. 


Vacillation  of  mind,  cause  of  it, 

definition,  121. 

same  as  doubt,  12  ■» 

Vainglory,  definition,  226. 

Veneration,  definition,  150. 

- — origin  of  it,  153.  15, 

Vengeance,  definition,  141,  171 

—— misery  of  it,  218. 

V  ice,     treatment     by     geometrical 
method,  105. 

Virtue,  connection  with  inadequate 
ideas,  197. 

desirable  for  its  own  Pake,  194. 
difference  between  it  and  im- 
potence, 209. 

foundation  of  it,  194,  195,  197, 

■ of  the  mind  is  knowledge  of 

God,  200. 


>97 

Virtue  Mmr  M  pnw,».   |g,, 

undcmtAnJiBi,  ■>~~-,^  „  j^ 

Volition  inrolvcj  by  tbo  kW  te  iw 

•iiiii'i,  >»5. 


«s» 


VUuKSB«,c»u.eo».»„ 

"  ick«lnt«i,  rrMi«  wb»  •urro«  14. 

Iow«  it,  1 07. 
Will,  dttinition,  nj. 

do*-*  not  {•PrtAin  toUod.  ai.  ji 

not  frw  but  aiuffmmij,  yt,  <^ 

95.  96,  97.  9!^  99>  100^  loi,  108. 

'03. 
lamp  %»  intz-llcet,  96,  ol^  obl 

100,  101,  10;,  105. 
Wise  m&n.  in  whM  hia  itra^tk  9a^ 

cista,  283. 
Words  di<tingui«b«d  frooi  UiM,  fj. 


THE   i:.\D. 


PRINTliO  BV     BAM-AMIVXIt.  I 

kUiNbUKCM  AMU  tOKOOM 


[ 


RETURN     CIRCULATION  DEPARTMENT 
T0»^      202  Main  Library 


LOAN  PERIOD  1 
HOME  USE 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

1  -month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling  642-3405 

6-month  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing  books  to  Circulation  Desk 

Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  mode  4  days  prior  to  due  dote 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


m^    OCT  1  5  1981 


uB^!^^i!^\ AUTO  n<R(- 


c 


^/^R  12  1984 


AUG  2  2  19(6 


aBCULAiSTL^S 


.IBRARY  USHONLY 


AUG  2  9  198i; 


iSCqgiWP^g'* 


CIRCULATION  DIPT 


OCT  2f  4 


RECEIV 


RECEIVED  rr 


AUG  2  0 


m&- 


ClRCULATIO^f^EPT: 


my  14  198" 


CIRCULATION  DEPT. 


m- 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
FORM  NO.  DD6,  60m,  12/80        BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


.:-;{fsr:\;';^ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORMIA  UBRAKY 


